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A STUDY OF THE CHANGING VISsTS IN SELECTED 
FOREIGN POLICY SPEECHES OF SENATOR 
ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, 1937-1949
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background and S u b j e c t  o f  t h e  Study 
Th is  s tu d y  i s  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  a  s e l e c t e d  
group  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  s p e e c h e s  by S e n a t o r  Arthur  H. Vandenberg 
d e l i v e r e d  b e tw e e n -1937 and 1949 .  The b a s i c  h y p o th e s i s  on which 
t h e  s t u d y  r e s t s  i s  t h a t  t h i s  tw e lv e  y e a r  p e r i o d  i n c l u d e s  t h r e e  
m ajo r  p h ases  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y :  t h e  p e r i o d  of w or ld -w ide
a g g r e s s i o n  and o f  American i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  war  
and o f  American p l a n s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y ,  and th e  p e r i o d  
o f  the  c o l d  war and of  the  American p o l i c y  o f  S o v ie t  c o n ta in m e n t .  
The im p o r ta n c e  o f  V andenberg ’ s s p e e c h e s ,  i n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  t h i s  
s t u d y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  l i e s  in  t h e  way th e y  r e p r e s e n t  American i d e a s  
on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d u r i n g  t h e s e  t h r e e  p h a s e s .  This  b a s i s  f o r  
t h e  s tu d y  can be e x p l i c a t e d  by a b r i e f  r ev ie w  of  t h e  m a jo r  
e v e n t s  o f  t h e s e  y e a r s  and th e  p a r t  vdiich. Vandenberg p la y e d  
i n  them.
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As America s t r u g g l e d  d u r i n g  t h e  1930’ s t o  p u t  h e r  
d o m es t ic  house  i n  o r d e r ,  t h e  hope f o r  a w or ld  ’’s a f e  f o r  
democracy” f a d e d .  J a p a n  marched on Manchuria  i n  1931.
H i t l e r  w i thd rew  Germany from t h e  League of  N a t i o n s ,  s c o rn e d  
t h e  T r e a t y  o f  V e r s a i l l e s ,  and e n t e r e d  t h e  d e m i l i t a r i z e d  
R h i n e l a n d .  M u s s o l in i  i n v a d e d  E t h i o p i a ,  c i v i l  war  b rok e  ou t  
i n  S p a in ,  and J a p a n  a t t a c k e d  t h e  China m a in la n d .  The climax' 
came when R u s s i a  s i g n e d  a n o n - a g g r e s s i o n  p a c t  w i t h  Germany, 
and t h e n  H i t l e r  i n v a d e d  Po lan d  i n  September  o f  1939.
America r e a c t e d  t o  the  w o r ld  c r i s i s  w i t h  .a s e r i e s  
o f  n e u t r a l i t y  a c t s .  I t  was hoped t h a t  l e g i s l a t i o n  would . 
make American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  s t r u g g l e  i m p o s s i b l e  by 
o u t l a w in g  th e  k i n d s  o f  a c t i o n s  w h ich  many b e l i e v e d  p r e c i p i ­
t a t e d  A m er ica ’ s e n t r y  i n t o  World War I .  H i s t o r i c a l  
r e v i s i o n i s t s  c o n c lu d ed  t h a t  America had been t r i c k e d  i n t o  
t h a t  c o n f l i c t  by s e l f i s h  m u n i t i o n  m akers ,  s i n i s t e r  economic 
f o r c e s ,  and B r i t i s h  p ro p ag a n d a .  The same o p in io n  was 
expounded i n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  of  a S en a te  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
c o m m it tee .  T h is  a g i t a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  in  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  
to. t a k e  p r o f i t s  ou t  o f  w a r ,  p r e v e n t  t h e  s a l e  o f  war  m a t e r i a l s  
t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s ,  and t o  f o r b i d  Americans from e n t e r i n g  war 
zones .
From 1933 to  1937 ,  the  R o o se v e l t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
seemed t o  f a v o r  t h e  p rogram  of  s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y ,  i n s i s t i n g  
t h a t  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  shun a l l  involvem ent  i n  f o r e i g n  
s q u a b b l e s .  R o o s e v e l t  may have r e s e n t e d  the  i n t e r f e r e n c e  by
.3
Congress  i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  th r o u g h  th e  p a s sa g e  o f  t h e  
n e u t r a l i t y  l a w s ,  b u t  he made no i n t e n s e  e f f o r t  t o  s t o p  i t . ^
The P r e s i d e n t  warned in  h i s  a d d re s s  a t  Chautauqua d u r i n g  th e  
1936 campaign t h a t  "no m a t t e r  how w e l l  we a r e  s u p p o r t e d  by 
n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  we must  remember t h a t  no laws can 
be p r o v id e d  t o  c o v e r  ev e ry  c o n t i n g e n c y . "2 S t i l l  he c o n t in u e d  
t o  s t r a d d l e  t h e  i s s u e  because  he cou ld  n o t  " w i t h s t a n d  t h e  
i s o l a t i o n i s t  c y c l o n e . "3 B eg inn ing  w i th  h i s  famous " Q u a r a n t in e "  
sp e ec h  in  1937, however ,  R o o s e v e l t  i n a u g u r a t e d  a s e r i e s  o f  
a t t e m p t s  t o  t u r n  back  the " i s o l a t i o n i s t "  t r e n d ,  i n s i s t i n g  
t h a t  Am erica ’ s ch an c es  f o r  peace l a y  i n  p r e p a r e d n e s s  a t  home 
and " c o n c e r t e d  e f f o r t s "  w i t h  f o r e i g n  n a t i o n s  ab ro a d .
During t h i s  l a t e r  " i s o l a t i o n i s t ” p e r i o d .  S e n a t o r  
A r th u r  K. Vandenberg was r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  the  man "who most 
n e a r l y  sy m b o l izes  o p p o s i t i o n " ^  to  t h e  R o o s e v e l t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s 
a t t e m p t s  t o  move i n  the  d i r e c t i o n  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  He 
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  " t h e r e  i s  b u t  one r a t i o n a l  o o l i c v  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  .
^ F o s t e r  Rhea D u l l e s ,  America’ s R i s e  t o  World Power 
(New York: H a rp e r  & B r o s . ,  19 5 4 ) ,  p .  17$ .  The a u t h o r  r e p o r t s  •
t h a t  R o o se v e l t  "was c o n te n t  t o  rem ain  on th e  s i d e l i n e s  w h i le  
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  was l a r g e l y  shaped by t h e  im pact  o f  e v e n t s  
a b ro a d  on a s t r o n g l y  i s o l a t i o n i s t - m i n d e d  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  m a j o r i t y . "
g
Samuel I .  Rosenman ( e d . ) .  The P u b l i c  P a p e rs  and 
A d d re s s e s  o f  F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t , Vol .  V: The P eop le
Approve (New York: Random House, 193H), 2o$.
^ C o r d e l l  H u l l ,  The Memoirs o f  C o r d e l l  H u l l , I  
(New York: The Macm illan  Company, 1 9 4 8 ) ,  400.
^The New York Times, O c tober  1, 1939, p. 7- ■
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S t a t e s ,  namely, a p o l i c y  o f  s c r u p u l o u s  n e u t r a l i t y . ”  ̂ Vandenberg 
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  "av o id  a l l  e n t a n g l i n g  a l l i ­
an ces  t h a t  vjould m o r a l ly  o r  o t h e r w i s e  b in d  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s " ^  
t o  f o r e i g n  powers. He spoke c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  b o th  i n  and o u t  
o f  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S e n a t e ,  f o r  l e g i s l a t i o n  d e s ig n e d  to  
i n s u r e  n e u t r a l i t y ,  and he s t r o n g l y  sup p o r ted  the  n e u t r a l i t y  
a c t s  of 1935 and 1937.
Vandenberg fo u g h t  th e  t r e n d  o f  " c o o p e r a t i v e  r e s i s t a n c e "  
up t o  P e a r l  H arbor .  He spoke a g a i n s t  t h e '  removal o f  t h e  
embargo on arms,  ammunition ,  and implements  o f  w ar ,  a g a i n s t  
t h e  l i f t i n g  of  t h e  " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  p r o v i s i o n  of  the  
N e u t r a l i t y  Act;  he Opposed t h e  S e l e c t i v e  S e rv ic e  Act ;  he 
fo u g h t  the Lend-Lease B i l l ;  he spoke a g a i n s t  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  
t o  p e rm i t  American s h i p s  t o  s a i l  i n t o  b e l l i g e r e n t  w a t e r s ,  
r e f e r r i n g  to  the a c t  as " th e  pend ing  S en a te  d e c i s i o n  sub­
s t a n t i a l l y  s e t t l i n g  th e  q u e s t i o n - w h e t h e r  America d e l i b e r a t e l y  
and c o n s c i o u s l y  s h a l l  go a l l  t h e  way i n t o  a s h o o t i n g  w a r . " ^
But when war came, t h e  M ichigan  S e n a to r  s a i d :  " I
s t a n d  w i t h  my Commander i n  C h i e f  f o r  the  s w i f t e s t  and most 
i n v i n c i b l e  r e p l y  o f  which our t o t a l  s t r e n g t h  may be c a p a b l e . " ^
^I b i d . , September  7 ,  1939, p. 12.
^I b i d . . August 31 ,  1937 , p. 1 . .
n
'U .  s. C o n g re s s io n a l  R e c o rd , 77th Cong.,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1941, 
LXXXVII, P a r t  8 ,  8251. H e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as  R eco rd .
^R e c o rd , 77 th  Cong. ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1941, LXÏXVII, P a r t  9 ,
9 5 0 5 .
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R o o s e v e l t  w ro te  Vandenberg:  " I n  t h e  S e n a te  you have an
o p p o r t u n i t y  g r a n t e d  few men t o  be o f  r e a l  s e r v i c e  t o  
p ro m o t in g  u n i t y  i n  t h e  Congress  and t h e  c o u n t r y .
S e n a t o r  Vandenberg a c c e p t e d  th e  c h a l l e n g e .  By 
e a r l y  1943» he was d e s c r i b e d  as  a " m i d d l e - o f - t h e - r o a d  
R e p u b l i c a n  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  q u e s t i o n s , a n d  a t  t h a t  
t i m e ,  he s t a t e d :  "The U n i ted  S t a t e s  must o b v i o u s l y  be a
f a r  g r e a t e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t o r  a f t e r  t h i s  war th a n  
e v e r  b e f o r e . ' H e  cou p led  t h e s e  words w i th  a c t i o n  a s  a 
member of t h e  "Committee o f  E i g h t , "  a group o f  R e p u b l ic a n  
and D em ocrat ic  S e n a to r s  who iriet p e r i o d i c a l l y  w i th  S e c r e t a r y -  
o f - S t a t e  H u l l  t o  a d v is e  him. on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  When th e  
Committee came o u t  in  s u p p o r t  of  a p o s tw a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
i n v o l v i n g  G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  and R u s s i a ,  
Vandenberg t u r n e d  h i s  e n e r g i e s  to  s e l l i n g  the i d e a  t o  
h i s  coun trym en .  By 1944, he was g i v i n g  f u l l  s u p p o r t  t o  
t h e  Dumbarton Oaks ag re em e n t ,  a f f i r m i n g  t h a t  l a s t i n g  peace 
was on ly  p o s s i b l e  th ro u g h  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n , "  a 
f a c t ,  he s a i d ,  t h a t  i s  " to o  obvious  f o r  a r g u m e n t .
The f i n a l  t u r n i n g  p o i n t  came i n  1945 when he a d d re s s e d  
t h e  S e n a te  " t o  make my own personal,- v i e w p o in t  c l e a r  . . .  I
9A r th u r  H. Vandenberg, J r .  ( e d . ) .  The P r i v a t e  P a p e rs  
o f  S e n a t o r  Vandenberg (Boston :  Houghton M i f f l i n  C o . ,  1952) ,
p .  2$. H e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  P a p e r s .
^^The New York T im es , June  14 ,  1943» p .  17.
^^P a p e r s , p. 41.
Re c o r d , 78 th  Cong.., 2d S e s s . ,  1944» XC, P a r t  5, 7177.
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do n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  any n a t i o n  h e r e a f t e r ' c a n  immunize i t s e l f  
by i t s  own e x c l u s i v e  a c t i o n . A f t e r  t h i s ,  h i s  s t o r y  was 
one of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n f e r e n c e s  and e f f o r t s  f o r  l e g i s l a t i o n  
d e s ig n e d  t o  e n a b le  h i s  country-  to  a s s e r t  a p o s i t i v e  r o l e  i n  
w o r ld  a f f a i r s .  He was an American d e l e g a t e  t o  t h e  U n i ted  
N a t io n s  C o nfe ren ce  a t  San F r a n c i s c o ,  the  f i r s t  two s e s s i o n s  
o f  th e  G e n e ra l  Assembly,  and the P a r i s  Peace  C o n fe re n ce .
When R u s s i a n  and American pos tw ar  r e l a t i o n s  e r u p t e d  i n t o  a 
" c o l d  w a r V a n d e n b e r g  l e d  the  Sena te  i n  s u p p o r t i n g  p o l i c i e s  
o f  c o n ta in m e n t  i n c l u d i n g  " g e t  tough"  p o l i t i c a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  
t h e  G r e e k - T u r k i s h  Aid Program, the  European Recovery  Program, 
and the  N o r th  A t l a n t i c  P a c t .  He t o l d  a W ashington  a u d ie n c e  
on th e  eve o f  h i s  d e a th  t h a t  America had j o i n e d  w i t h  f r e e  
n a t i o n s  i n  a " c r u s a d e  f o r  h o n o rab le  p e ac e .  We g r i p  f r i e n d l y  
hands a c r o s s  the  s e a . " ^ ^
But Vandenberg was not  a lone  in  r e - o r i e n t i n g  h i s  
t h i n k i n g  on A m e r i c a ' s  r o l e  i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  be tween  1937 
and 1949'. A s i m i l a r  s h i f t , ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  had t a k e n  p l a c e  1:. 
t h e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  the  American peo p le .  I t  may be s a i d  t h a t  
a v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  American peop le  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  
n e u t r a l i t y  p o l i c y . o f  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s .  Even to  P e a r l  
H a rb o r ,  i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  the  American p u b l i c  o p in io n  
rem ained  t o r n  between a s t r o n g  d e s i r e  t o  keep  out  o f  t h e
l ^ P a o e r s , p. 135.
^^ R e c o rd , S l s t  Cong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1949,  ÏCV, P a r t  16,
A5755.
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war and an e q u a l l y  s t r o n g  hope t h a t  the  Axis co u ld  be made 
t o  l o s e  t h e  s t r u g g l e . ^5
The impact  o f  P e a r l  H a rb o r ,  however, seemed t o  c a r r y  
w i th  i t  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  c o u ld  no 
l o n g e r  a v o id  f o r e i g n  wars  b e ca u se  o f  g e o g r a p h i c a l  l o c a t i o n  
and t h e  f u r t h e r  t r u t h  t h a t  America was now a p a r t  o f  a world  
community i n  which no s t a t e  c o u ld  s i n g l e h a n d e d l y  a ch iev e  and 
m a in t a in  i t s  own s e c u r i t y .  This  s h a f t  of a t t i t u d e  r e s u l t e d  
i n  American a p p ro v a l  o f  t h e  U n i ted  N a t io ns  C h a r t e r  w i t h  
v i r t u a l l y  no o r g a n iz e d  o p p o s i t i o n . B u t  even a f t e r  Ameri­
cans r e a l i z e d  t h a t  the  Grand A l l i a n c e  o f  World War I I  had 
been r e p l a c e d  by a " c o l d  war"  between nhe two m ajor  powers,  
t h e r e  was no w id e sp re a d  a t t e m p t  t o  w ithdraw  from th e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  s c e n e .  The American p e o p l e ,  i n s t e a d ,  were p r e p a r e d  
f o r  o r g a n i z e d  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  S o v i e t  ex p ans io n  by means of 
mutual  a s s i s t a n c e .
Along w i th  a m a j o r i t y  o f  the  American p e o p le ,  t h e n ,  
Vandenberg sw i tch ed  from a b e l i e f  i n  i s o l a t i o n i s m  i n  th e  
t h i r t i e s  t o  t h a t  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  i n  the f o r t i e s ,  and 
th e n  e x tended  t h a t  view t o  " c o n t a in m e n t . "  T h is  i s  n o t  t o  
imply t h a t  he l e d  the  change  i n  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  the  American 
p e o p le ,  b u t  i t  i s  t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  he h e lp e d  i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n
^ ^ P h i l i p  E. J a c o b ,  " I n f l u e n c e s  o f  World E ven ts  on 
U. S.  ' N e u t r a l i t y '  O p i n i o n , "  P u b l i c  Opinion  Q u a r t e r ly . , IV 
(March, 1 9 4 0 ) ,  64.
^ ^ D u l l e s ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 219.
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of  a  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  each  of  the  p o i n t s  o f  view a lo ng  t h i s  
t r a n s i t i o n ,  t h i s  sequence  o f  p o s i t i o n s .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  
w he ther  V andenberg ’s p e r s u a s i o n  fo l lo w ed  p u b l i c  o p in io n  o r  
was i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n  molding i t  i s  open to  f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i ­
g a t i o n .  But i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  deny t h e  view t h a t  h i s  was 
a t y p i c a l  v o ic e  i n  the  s h i f t  o f  American a t t i t u d e s  on f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  between 1937 and 1949* o r  t h a t  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l  
a id e d  t h e  development  o f  w orkab le  p o l i c y  d u r in g  t h e s e  y e a r s .  
There  seems l i t t l e  doab t  t h a t  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  a s e l e c t i o n  
o f  sp e ec h es  ad eq u a te  to  r e p r e s e n t  Vandenberg’ s views th r o u g h  
t h i s  time o f  chang ing  p o l i c y  ought  to  p r o v i d e  i n t e r e s t i n g  
and u s e f u l  c o n c l u s i o n s .
The P urpose  and Method of the  Study 
The Purpose
The p u rpo se  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  i s  t o  d e s c r i b e  the  p a t t e r n  
o f  th o u g h t  i n  the  sp eech es  t h ro u g h  which A r th u r  Vandenberg 
e x p re s s e d  h i s  ch ang ing  c o n c e p t  o f  America’ s r o l e  in  w or ld  
a f f a i r s  between 1937 and 1949, and to  d e s c r i b e  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  
r o l e  in  th e  development  o f  a c c e p t a b l e  and w orkab le  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  t o  implement t h e s e  c o n c e p t s .  This  t h e s i s  draws t h e s e  
i n s i g h t s  from an e x a m in a t io n  of  s e l e c t e d  Vandenberg speech es  
i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  t h e  r e l a t e d  p e r s o n s ,  i d e a s ,  and s o c i a l  
f o r c e s  o p e r a t i n g  d u r in g  t h i s  p e r i o d .
The changes  which o c c u r r e d  in  V andenberg ’ s t h i n k i n g  
as  he made th e  t r a n s i t i o n  th ro u g h  the  p h a ses  of  i s o l a t i o n i s m .
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,  and c o n ta in m e n t  may be t a k e n  to  c o n s t i t u t e
a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n d e x  o f  t h e  p o p u l a r  t h o u g h t  o f  the  whole
n a t i o n ,  and  a r e  p a r t i a l l y  r e c o r d e d  i n  h i s  p u b l i c  s p e e c h e s .
His sp e ec h es  can  be viewed a s  an a t t e m p t  t o  v e r b a l i z e  a
r a t i o n a l e  f o r  h i s  c h a n g in g  a t t i t u d e s ,  and to  p l a c e  t h i s
r a t i o n a l e  in  a c o n t e x t  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  Americans.
According t o  Wrage, s p e e c h e s  " s e r v e  a s  u s e f u l  i n d i c e s  t o  th e  
17p o p u la r  m in d ."  An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  V a n d e n b e rg 's  s p e e c h e s ,  
assuming t h e y  were p i t c h e d  t o  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  o f  
h i s  a u d i e n c e ,  and assum ing  t h a t  t h e y  to o k  i n t o  a cc o u n t  t h e  
b e l i e f s  and v a l u e s  o f  t h i s  n a t i o n a l  a u d ie n c e ,  sh o u ld  add t o  
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  i n  t h e  
" p o p u l a r  m i n d . " This  t a s k  i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  one f o r  t h e  
r h e t o r i c a l  c r i t i c  b e c a u se  " t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  a speech  
c a l l s  f o r  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  what goes i n t o  a s p e e c h . "
The s t u d e n t  "who i s  s c h o o le d  i n  p r i n c i p l e s  and t e c h n i q u e s "
o f  p u b l ic  a d d r e s s  b r i n g s  t o  t h i s  t a s k  an " e s s e n t i a l  s k i l l
1 ^
. . . f o r  s c h o l a r s h i p . "
But beyond th e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  V an den b e rg ’ s sp e ec h es  
a s  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  r e c o r d  of  changes  i n  the  p o p u l a r  mind 
l i e s  a second  and r e l a t e d  p u rp o se .  C l e a r l y ,  Vandenberg 
pe rfo rm ed  s i g n i f i c a n t  and un ique  p o l i t i c a l  f u n c t i o n s  d u r in g
J .  Wrage,' " P u b l i c  A ddress :  A S tudy  i n  S o c i a l
and I n t e l l e c t u a l  H i s t o r y , "  Q u a r t e r l y  J o u r n a l  o f  S p e e c h , 
r a m  (December,  1 9 4 7 ) ,  453.
l ^ I b i d . ,  p . 454.
-L u
t h e s e  y e a r s .  J u s t  a s  h i s  p e r s o n a l  v iews accompanied t h e  
s h i f t s  i n  p o p u l a r  a t t i t u d e ,  so he became t h e  m e d i a t o r  o f  
l e g i s l a t i v e  c o n f l i c t  and t h e  " e x p e d i t e r ” o f  w orkab le  
b i p a r t i s a n  p o l i c y .  I t  seems f a i r  t o  a rg u e  t h a t  Vandenberg 
i s  o f  l e s s  i n t e r e s t  as a c r e a t i v e  t h i n k e r  and of  much 
g r e a t e r  i n t e r e s t  a s  an " e x p e d i t e r . "  His p o s i t i o n  as 
m i n o r i t y  p a r t y  l e a d e r  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  as a m a j o r i t y  
p a r t y  l e a d e r  d u r in g  a h o s t i l e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  and as 
" e l d e r  s t a t e s m a n , "  p l a c e d  him i n  a v i t a l  p o s i t i o n  f o r  t h e  
deve lopm ent  of  s p e c i f i c  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s .  Of g r e a t e s t  
im p o r t a n c e ,  h i s  e a r l y  p o s i t i o n  as i s o l a t i o n i s t  l e a d e r  made 
him a c c e p t a b l e  to  n e a r l y  a l l  o f  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  f a c t i o n s  
a f t e r  he changed to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  p o s i t i o n .
Both d u r i n g  t h e  war and th e  c r i t i c a l  y e a r s  a f t e r  i t ,  
he d i s t i n g u i s h e d  h i m s e l f  by s t i m u l a t i n g  c o o p e r a t i v e  e f f o r t  
where  i t s  a b sence  m ight  have s e r i o u s l y  i n j u r e d  th e  n a t i o n .
One of  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  to  i d e n t i f y
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  " e x p e d i t i n g "  o r  compromising i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  h i s  s p e e c h e s  on t h e s e  c r i t i c a l  and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  
i s s u e s — t h u s  to  i n q u i r e  i n t o  the  " p o l i t i c a l  r o l e "  o f
Vandenberg d u r in g  t h e s e  y e a r s  of  change .
The Method
The ach iev em en t  o f  th e  pu rp o se s  of  t h i s  s tu d y  i s  
d e p en d e n t  upon t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h r e e  m ajo r  p r o c e s s e s :  
the- s e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  r e p o r t i n g ,  and t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f
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V a n d e n b e rg ' s  sp e e c h e s .  The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n s  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
ways by which t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  were  p u rsu e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y .
Method of s e l e c t i o n . — The p r o c e s s  of s e l e c t i n g  th e  
s p e e c h e s  t o  be s t u d i e d  a l s o  i n v o l v e d  th e  problem of l i m i t i n g  
t h e  scope  o f  tne  s t u d y .  No a t t e m p t  was made t o  t r e a t  t h e  
e n t i r e t y  o f  Vandenberg’ s sp e a k in g  c a r e e r .  Most or  a l l  o f  
h i s  sp e e c h e s  d e a l in g  w i th  American f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s ,  however,  
were examined.  An e f f o r t  was made to  s e l e c t  t h o s e  speeches  
which b e s t  e x em pl i fy  Vandenberg’ s i d e a  sys tem  w i t h i n  each o f  
t h e  p e r i o d s  d e f i n e d  above.  I n  a l l  e l e v e n  o f  t h e  speech es  
c h o se n ,  V andenberg’ s a t t e n t i o n  i s  f o c u s e d  on a major  i s s u e  
o r  on th e  most  c r i t i c a l  problem of  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  then  
c o n f r o n t i n g  h i s  c o u n t r y .  O b v io u s ly ,  the  f i n a l  c h o ic e ,  based  
on t h i s  c r i t e r i o n ,  was p e r fo rm ed  s u b j e c t i v e l y .  The t im e  
p e r i o d s  and th e  sp e ec h es  s e l e c t e d  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
The p e r i o d  o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  1937-1941:
(1) Speech i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  N e u t r a l i t y  Act o f  1937.
The speech was p r e s e n t e d  i n  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
S e n a te  on March 1 ,  1937.
(2) Speech i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  the  p r o p o s a l  t o  remove 
t h e  Embargo on a rm s .  The speech  was p r e s e n t e d  
i n  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  S e n a te  on O c tob er  4 ,  1939.
(3) Speech i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  the  S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e
Act of 1940 .■ The sp e ec h  was p r e s e n t e d  i n  th e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s  S e n a te  on August  12 ,  1940.
(4) Speech i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  Lend-Lease  p r o p o s a l
on F eb ruary  I S ,  1941. The speech  was p r e s e n t e d  
i n  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  S e n a te  on Febr^aary 18 ,  1941.
The p e r i o d  of  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y ,  1943-1946:
(1) Speech i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  C o n n a l ly  R e s o l u t i o n ,  
which o l a c e d  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S e n a te  on r e c o r d
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as f a v o r i n g  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by th e  U n i ted  
S t a t e s  i n  a p o s t - w a r  c o l l e c t i v e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
t o  keep  th e  p e ace .  The speech  was d e l i v e r e d  
i n  t h e  S e n a te  on O ctober  25, 1943.
•: (2) Speech i n  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  c o l l e c t i v e
s e c u r i t y  i n  194$.  The s p e e c h  was p r e s e n t e d  i n  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S e n a te  on J a n u a r y  10,  1945.
(3) Speech i n  s u p p o r t  of  th e  U n i t e d  N a t io n s  C h a r t e r .
The soeech  was a S en a te  a d d r e s s ,  g iv e n  on Ju n e  29,  
1945.'
The p e r i o d  o f  c o n ta in m e n t ,  1946-1949:
(1) Speech c a l l i n g  f o r  a  " g e t - t o u g h ” p o l i c y  w i th  
R u s s i a .  The a d d re s s  was d e l i v e r e d  to  t h e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s  Sena te  on F eb rua ry  27 ,  1946.
(2) Speech i n  s u p p o r t  o f  a  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y .  The speech was d e l i v e r e d  b e f o r e  t h e  
C o u n c i l  on World A f f a i r s  i n  C l e v e la n d ,  Ohio 
on Janu ary  11 ,  1947.
(3) Speech i n  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  European Recovery 
Program. The speech  was p r e s e n t e d  b e f o r e  th e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s  Sena te  on March 1 ,  194Ô.
(4) Speech i n  s u p p o r t  of the  N or th  A t l a n t i c  P a c t .
The speech  was p r e s e n t e d  to  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
S e n a te  on J u l y  6 ,  1949.
Method o f  r e p o r t i n g . —The r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  b e g in s  
w i th  a s tudy  of  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be tween  Vandenberg as a
s p e a k e r ,  h i s . s p e e c h ,  h i s  a u d ie n c e s ,  and th e  o c c a s io n  o f  t h e
a d d r e s s .  A ccord ing  t o  B e r io ,  "pu rpose  and a u d ie n c e  a r e  n o t  
s e p a r a b l e ;  a l l  communication b e h a v io r  has as  i t s  pu rpose  t h e  
e l i c i t i n g  o f  a s p e c i f i c  r e sp o n se  from a  s p e c i f i c  pe rso n  ( o r  
g roups  o f  p e r s o n s ) . " ^ /  Thus,  t h e  t a s k  o f  " g e t t i n g  a t "  meaning 
i n  each speech  c e n t e r s  on t h e  concep t  of  th e  s p e a k e r ’ s p u r p o s e .
^^David K. B e r i o ,  The P ro c e s s  of  Communication 
(New York; H o l t ,  R h i n e h a r t  & Co. ,  I 9 6 0 ) ,  p.  16.
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b u t  i n c l u d e s  an e x a m in a t io n  o f  th e  s p e a k e r ,  the  a u d i e n c e ,  and 
t h e  m i l i e u  i n  which he f u n c t i o n e d .
I n  each i n s t a n c e ,  b e f o r e  any a t t e m p t  i s  made t o  
r e p o r t  t h e  i d e a s  of  t h e  s p e e c h ,  an a n a l y s i s  i s  made o f  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  of  which  the speech  was a p a r t .  The f o r c e  
o f  e v e n t s  i s  b r o u g h t  i n t o  r e l a t i o n  w i th  Y an d en be rg ’s purpose  
i n  t h e  s p e e c h .  A l though  most o f  h i s  s p e e c h e s  were d e l i v e r e d  
on th e  f l o o r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S e n a t e ,  i t  can s a f e l y  be 
assumed t h a t  he u s u a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  a. l a r g e r  a u d i e n c e — th e  
p e o p le  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  M ic h ig a n ,  the  American p e o p le  a t  
l a r g e ,  and i n  many c a s e s ,  t h e  p e o p le s  t h r o u g h o u t  the  w or ld .  .. 
H is  p e r s u a s i o n s  r e p r e s e n t  h i s  a t t e m p t  t o  accommodate h i s  
i d e a s  t o  t h e  changes-  g o in g  on a b ou t  h i m . ■ An e x a m in a t io n  o f  
t h e s e  e v e n t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p r e c e d e s  an e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e  i d e a s .
Fol lowing  an a n a l y s i s  o f  the  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  s p e e c h ,  
an  a t t e m p t  i s  made to  r e p o r t  th e  i d e a s  o f  t h e  s p e e c h .  This  
t a s k  b e g in s  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  what a r e  V and en be rg ’ s m ajor  
p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  s t a t e d  o r  i m p l i e d ,  th ro ug h  which  he i n t e n d e d  
t o  a f f e c t  the  b e h a v i o r  o f  h i s  a u d ie n c e ?  The answer t o  t h i s  
q u e s t i o n  i n v o l v e s  more t h a n  a l i s t i n g  o f  the  m a jo r  p rem ise s  
o f  t h e  sp e e c h ;  h i s  e x p l i c i t  a s s e r t i o n s  t e l l  o n ly  a p o r t i o n  o f  
t h e  s t o r y .  One must lo o k  f o r  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  h i s  message.  
These  more b a s i c  c o n c e p t s ,  u s u a l l y  no t  o v e r t  i n  t h e  s p e e c h ,  
a r e  found  i n  t h e  c h o i c e s  he makes,  the  q u e s t i o n s  he r a i s e s ,  
t h e  g o a l s  he r e a c h e s  o u t  f o r ,  t h e  m o t iv es  t o  which he  a p p e a l s ,  
t h e  v a l u e s  upon which he b a s e s  h i s  p r o p o s a l s  and i n  many o t h e r
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i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h i n  t h e  s p e e c h .  Hochmuth n o t e s  t h a t  
t h e  c r i t i c  must a sk :  "Does t h e  o r a t o r  a rgue  from an a b i d i n g
c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  ' n a t u r e  o f  t h i n g s ' ?  from a  c o n c e p t io n  o f  
e x p ed iency?  from t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  h i s t o r y ?  from s i m i l i t u d e ?  
from t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  g ro u n d s? " ^ ^  I n  s h o r t ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  
t o  b l e n d  a v a r i e t y  of e l e m e n t s  t o  form an adequa te  r e p o r t  o f  
t h e  s p e e c h .
Once i n  p o s s e s s i o n  of  th e  s p e a k e r ' s  more obv ious
p r e m i s e s ,  however, the  a n a l y s i s  moves on t o  the  "manner in
which t h e  s p e a k e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  connec t  v a l u e s  w i th  p r o p o s a l s
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i n  t h e  minds o f  h i s  a u d i e n c e . "  T h is  i n q u i r y  i n v o l v e s  t h e  
manner i n  which Vandenberg a t t e m p t e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p  be tween h i s  message and th e  n e e d s ,  d e s i r e s ,  and 
w an ts  of h i s  a u d ie n c e .
I n  summary, t h e  method u se d  i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  
V a n d e n b e rg ' s  sp e ec h es  may be viewed a s  a p r o c e s s .  The 
w r i t e r  t a k e s  i n t o  a c c o u n t  e x t e n s i v e  d a t a  on th e  l i f e  and 
t im e s  of t h e  s p e a k e r ,  th e  c o n t e x t  i n  wrdch he spoke ,  t h e  
a u d ie n c e  f o r  whom h i s  comm unica t ions  were  i n t e n d e d ,  and t h e  
p e r s u a s i o n s  which he employed to a t t a i n  h i s  ends .  Once in  
p o s s e s s i o n  of the  i d e n t i f i a b l e  p r o p o s a l s  i n  the  sp e ec h ,  
however , i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  e x te n d  th e  l e v e l s  of meaning in
Marie  Ka th ryn  Hochmuth ( e d . ) ,  A H i s t o r y  and 
■ C r i t i c i s m  of  American P u b l i c  A ddress  (New York: ■ Longmans, 
Green and C o . ,  1 9 55) ,  p. l b .
^^A. J .  C r o f t ,  "The F u n c t io n s  o f  R h e t o r i c a l ' C r i t i c i s m , " 
Q u a r t e r l y  J o u r n a l  o f  S p e e c h , XLII ( O c to b e r ,  1950) ,  289.
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t h e  a d d r e s s  by n o t i n g  how t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  e n t a i l  o t h e r  
c o n c e p t s ,  t h o s e  i m p l i e d  by th e  s p e e c h .  The p r o c e s s  o f  
" r e p o r t i n - " a  speech  r e a l l y  a s k s ,  "What does  t h e  speech  
mean?" I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  d e r i v e  i t s  m eaning  and r e p o r t  
i t  by some o f  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  above d e s c r i b e d .
Method o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . —C l e a r l y ,  " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  
a s  a  p r o c e s s  i s  n o t  w h o l ly  s e p a r a b l e  from " r e p o r t i n g . "  The 
second  s t e p  i n  g a i n i n g  an u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  V andenberg’ s 
i d e a s ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  n e c e s s i t a t e s  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  
l i n e s  o f  a c t i o n ,  t h e  ou tcom es,  which h i s  p e r s u a s i o n  e n t a i l s .  
The t a s k  i n v o l v e s  a d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  among v a l u e s .  , T h is  s tu dy  
makes c e r t a i n  v a lu e  judgments  abou t  V andenberg’ s cho ic e  o f  
p e r s u a s i o n s ,  and t h e s e  seem to... go beyond th e  l e s s e r  r e q u i r e ­
ments of " r e p o r t i n g . "  Through h is  p e r s u a s i o n ,  a sp e a k e r  
a t t e m p t s  t o  move men t o  u n d e r s t a n d ,  to  b e l i e v e ,  t o  a c t .
T h is  p r o c e s s  i n v o lv e s  the  s p e a k e r  i n  c h o ic e s  of  means of  
a c h i e v i n g  g o a l s ,  o f  choos ing  am.ong a c t i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and 
i t  i s  sometimes p o s s i b l e  t o  i n d i c a t e  the n a t u r e  and conse ­
quences o f  the  c h o ic e s  a s p e a k e r  makes. B a s k e r v i l l e  n o te s  
t h a t  t lie  c r i t i c  may escape  t h i s  t a s k  by i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  
" t r u t h  i s  r e l a t i v e ,  t i i a t  everyone  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  h i s  own 
o p i n io n ,  and t h a t  t h e  r h e t o r i c a l  c r i t i c ’ s t a s k  i s  t o
22d e s c r i b e  and e v a l u a t e  t h e  o r a t o r ’ s s k i l l  i n  h i s  c r a f t . "
S t i l l  Hochmuth’ s o b s e r v a t i o n  i s  w e l l  t a k e n :  "However much
^ ^ B a rn e t  B a s k e r v i l l e , " E m e r s o n  as a C r i t i c  of  O r a to r y , "  
The S o u th e rn  Speech J o u r n a l . XVIII (March, 1 9 5 3 ) ,  161.
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t h e  c r i t i c  may w ish  t o  e sca p e  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  ^ . o n g v a l u e s ,  
a s  an  e f f e c t i v e  r h e t o r i c a l  c r i t i c  he  canno t  do so .  
A c c o rd in g ly ,  C r o f t  o b s e r v e s  t h a t  ’’t e c h n i q u e  canno t  be 
e v a l u a t e d  a p a r t  from i t s  c o n t e n t , ” adding t h a t  a r h e t o r i c a l  
t e c h n i q u e ,  f o r  the  c r i t i c ,  i s  only an a i d  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  
t h e  s u c c e s s  w i t h  which a s p e a k e r  s e l e c t e d  and e s t a b l i s h e d  
t h e  most a p p r o p r i a t e  i d e a  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  th e  s p e e c h ,”24 
and t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s  i n  a speech  i s  p a r t  o f  
what i s  meant by ’’i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . ” The l a r g e r  o b j e c t i v e  o f  
t h i s  ’’i n t e r p r e t a t i v e ” p r o c e s s  i s  t h e  ach ievem en t  of  t h e  
two purposes  s t a t e d  e a r l i e r :  t o  r e v e a l  the  i d e a  sys tem s
which accompanied th e  c h a n g e s  i n  p o l i c y ,  and t o  i n t e r p r e t  
V andenberg’s p o l i t i c a l  r o l l  i n  t h e s e  chan ges .
. The S o u rc e s  o f  the  S tudy  
P r e v io u s  r e s e a r c h . — Two p r e v io u s  s t u d i e s  have c o n ce n ­
t r a t e d  on l i m i t e d  a s p e c t s  o f  Vandenberg’s sp e a k in g  c a r e e r .
I n  1953,  Theodore  R o b e r t  Kennedy made a s t u d y  o f  V andenberg ’ s 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  s p e e c h e s . ^5 Kennedy b r i e f l y  examines i n  te rm s  
o f  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  canons  o f  r h e t o r i c  many o f  Vandenberg’ s 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  sp e e c h e s  be tw een  1930 and 19-50. While t h e  
’’change” i n  V an d en be rg ’ s t h i n k i n g  on American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y
^^Hochmuth, op. c i t . ,  p. 16.
^ ^ C r o f t ,  l o c . .  c i t . ,  p .  2Ô9.
^■^Theodore R o b e r t  Kennedy, ”A S tudy  o f  the F o re ig n  
P o l i c y  Speeches  o f  S e n a t o r  A r th u r  H. Vandenberg ' ( u n p u b l i s h e d  
Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  Deot .  o f  Speech,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  W isco n s in ,  
1952) .  .
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i s  m e n t io n e d ,  o n ly  s c a n t  e f f o r t  i s  made t o  compare and 
c o n t r a s t  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o s i t i o n s  Vandenberg t o o k .  He a t t e m p t s  
to  d e a l  w i t h  so many spe ec h es  t h a t  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  can  be 
g iv en  t o  any s i n g l e  sp e e c h .  The K ennedy . s t u d y  i s  c l e a r l y  
n o t  " i d e a - c e n t e r e d , "  b u t  i s ,  i n s t e a d ,  c o n ce rn e d  p r i m a r i l y  
w i t h  a b s t r a c t  r h e t o r i c a l  f a c t o r s ,  p o i n t i n g  ou t  th o s e  which 
a r e  t h o u g h t  t o  be the  most e f f e c t i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  i n  V a n denb e rg ’ s 
methods o f  p e r s u a s i o n .  Kennedy a p p e a r s  t o  be more i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  t h e  Vandenberg r h e t o r i c ,  f o r  the  sake  o f  r h e t o r i c ,  t h a n  
i n  t h e  e x a m in a t io n  o f  h i s  r h e t o r i c  a s  a means o f  e x p l o r i n g  
h i s  i d e a s  and the  many s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l -  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
h i s  sp e e c h e s  and h i s  sp eak in g  c a r e e r .  .
A l e s s  a m b i t io u s  p r o j e c t  i s  F re d  Smith R o b ie ’ s s tu d y  
o f  S e n a t o r  V andenberg’ s '1945 i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  a d d r e s s . 2 b  
The sp e ec h  a n a ly z e d  i n  t h i s  s tu d y  i s  o f t e n  s a i d  t o  r e f l e c t  
a  t u r n i n g  p o i n t  i n  V andenberg ’ s c a r e e r — i . e . ,  from i s o l a ­
t i o n i s m  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m .  Because o f  i t s  l i m i t e d  s c o p e ,  
however,  t h e  t h e s i s  adds  l i t t l e  t o  a  f u l l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  V a n d enb e rg ’s change o f  a t t i t u d e  i n  r e g a r d  
t o  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
The d e f i n i t i v e  Vandenberg b io g r a p h y  has  y e t  t o  a p p e a r .  
Much o f  t h e  d a t a  on h i s  l i f e  i s  a v a i l a b l e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i n  
numerous p e r i o d i c a l s  and newspapers  which t r a c e  h i s  c a r e e r ,
2&Fred Smith  R o b ie ,  "An A n a l y t i c a l  S tu d y  o f  S e n a t o r  
V andenberg ’ s 1945 I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  A d d re s s ’’ ( u n p u b l i s h e d  
M a s t e r ’ s t h e s i s .  D ep t ,  o f  S p eech ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M ic h ig a n ,  1949).
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b o t h  as  a  newspaperman and S e n a t o r ,  The b i b l i o g r a p h y  
c o n t a i n s  a  f u l l  l i s t i n g  of  th o s e  c o n s u l t e d  f o r  t h i s  s t u d y .
I n  summary, no o t h e r  s tu d y  h as  as  y e t  been  di_s.co.vered 
w hich  u n d e r t a k e s  t h e  pu rp o se  of t h i s  t h e s i s .
M ajor  s o u r c e s . — A m a jo r  s o u r c e  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  was 
t h e  p r o c e s s e d  Vandenberg P a p e r s . ^7 This  c o l l e c t i o n  i n c l u d e s  
t h e  S e n a t o r ’ s d i a r y ,  and a number o f  l e t t e r s ,  r e p o r t s  and 
s p e e c h e s  d i s c l o s i n g  many ’’b e h i n d - t h e - s c e n e s ” a c t i v i t i e s .
For  p u rp o se s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y ,  t h e  c h i e f  l i m i t a t i o n  of- 
t h e  P a p e r s  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  book c o n t a i n s  on ly  s c a n t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  S e n a t o r ’ s a c t i v i t i e s  p r i o r  to  
P e a r l  H a rb o r .  I t  p r o v i d e s  l i t t l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e rn in g  
h i s  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  h i s  speech -m ak ing ,  h i s  p r i v a t e  t h i n k i n g ,  or  
h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r in g  the  p e r io d  i n  which he a d v o ca te d  
i s o l a t i o n i s m  f o r  America.
The P a p e r s ,  however,  a f f o r d  numerous i n s i g h t s  i n t o  
a l l  pbiases of the  S e n a t o r ’ s l i f e  and work a f t e r  the  m iddle  
o f  1943.  There  i s  much, n o t  o t h e r w i s e  a v a i l a b l e ,  f o r  example , 
on a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  Committee o f  E i g h t ,  b r i e f i n g s  on th e  
Y a l t a  C o n f e r e n c e ,  ’’b e h i n d - t h e - s c e n e s ” a c t i v i t i e s  a t  t h e  
San F r a n c i s c o  C o n fe re n ce ,  t n e  P a r i s  Peace  C o n fe re n ce ,  t h e  
f i r s t  m ee t in g  o f  th e  U n i ted  N a t io n s ,  and the  S e n a t o r ’ s work 
a s  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  S e n a te  from 1947 t o  1949.
7The o r i g i n a l  p a p e r s  a re  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p u b l i c  
e x a m in a t io n  a t  t h i s  t im e ,  and t h i s  e d i t e d  v e r s i o n  i s  t h e  
o n ly  way t o  draw upon them.
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The C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Record  was u se d  a s  the  m a jo r  sou rc e  
f o r  t h e  Vandenberg s p e e c n e s .  The Record was a l s o  u s e f u l  as 
a d a i l y  a c c o u n t  of  a c t i v i t i e s .  Vandenberg spoke o f t e n  in  
C on g re ss ,  and i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  compare the  l a n g u a g e  used 
on the  f l o o r  o f  t h e  S e n a te  w i th  t h a t  u se d  i n  t h e  p r i v a c y  o f  
h i s  d i a r y  and c o r r e s p o n d e n c e .
The l i m i t a t i o n s  of th e  Record a s  a s o u r c e  o f  speeches  
i s  r e c o g n i z e d .  I t  i s  a lways p o s s i b l e  t h a t  a  r e c o r d e r  w i l l  
make m i s t a k e s  and what  i s  p r i n t e d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w i l l  d i f f e r  
from what was sp o ken .  I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a member o f  
Congress  to have h i s  rem arks  changed b e f o r e  the  f i n a l  
p r i n t i n g .  For  t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  t h e  sp e ec n es  as found i n  th e  
Record w e re ,  when p o s s i b l e ,  compared w i th  the  p a r t i a l  t e x t s  
i n  t h e  Vandenberg P a p e r s , The New York Times and V i t a l  
S p e e c h e s .
O th e r  g o v e rn m e n ta l  documents were u t i l i z e d  in  t h i s  
s t u d y .  I n c l u d e d  were  such C o n g r e s s io n a l  documents  as 
h e a r i n g s  and r e p o r t s  o f  t h e  S e n a te  F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s  
co m m it tee s .  The l i m i t a t i o n  h e r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  t h e  f a c t  
t n a t  t h e  r e c o r d s  o f  the  e x e c u t i v e  s e s s i o n s  a r e  n e v e r  made 
p u b l i c .  V andenberg ’ s d i a r y  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  v a l u a b l e  i n  
f i l l i n g  i n  some s i g n i f i c a n t  gaps in  t n i s  r e s p e c t .
The C o r d e l l  H u l l  Memoirs was an i n v a l u a b l e  sou rce  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  inasmuch a s  t h e  a u th o r  had a c c e s s  t o  many 
o f f i c i a l  s t a t e  d e p a r tm e n t  r e c o r d s .
2S
H u l l ,  op.  c i t .
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29James F. B y r n e s ’ Speaking  F r a n k l y , and Tom C o n n a l l y ’ s 
■My Name i s  Tom C o n n a l l y ,^^  b o t h  i n c l u d e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e f e r e n c e s  
t o  Vandenberg’s  r o l e  i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
Among th e  g e n e r a l  a c c o u n t s  of t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  American 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d u r in g  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  f o u r  were e s p e c i a l l y  u s e f u l  
i n  t h i s  s t u d y .  These were F o s t e r  Rhea D u l l e s ’ A m erica ’ s 
R ise  t o  World Power, 1B9#-1954;^ ^  W il l iam  L. Danger and S. 
E v e r e t t  G l e a s o n ’ s two volumes.  The C h a l len g e  to  I s o l a t i o n , 
1937-1940» ' and The U ndec la red  War, 19 40 -1 9 41 ;^^ and J u l i u s  
P r a t t ’ s A H i s t o r y  o f  U ni ted  S t a t e s  F o r e ig n  P o l i c y . & 
c l a s s i f i e d  l i s t i n g  o f  o t h e r  u s e f u l  s o u r c e s  i s  p ro v id ed  i n  
t h e  b i b l i o g r a p h y .
The P lan  o f  t h e  S tu dy
F o l lo w in g  t h i s  i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  Yandenberg,  t h e  man, i s  
examined i n  C h ap te r  I I .  The p u rp o se  o f  t h e  c h a p t e r ,  however,  
i s  no t  to  p r e s e n t  a d e t a i l e d  b i o g r a p h y ,  bu t  s im ply  t o  
p ro v id e  a s k e t c h  of  Vandenberg’s p e r s o n a l  h i s t o r y  as  a
^'^James F. B yrnes ,  S peak ing  F r a n k ly  (New York :
Harper  & B r o s . ,  1947) .
^^Tom C o n n a l ly ,  My Name i s  Tom Gonnal ly  (New York; 
Thomas Y. C ro w e l l ,  1954T. ^
^ ^ D u l l e s ,  op. c i t .
32W il l ia m  L. Danger, and S .  E v e r e t t  G leason ,  The 
C h a l len ge  to  I s o l a t i o n .  1937-1940 (New York: H arper  & B r o s . ,  
1 95 2 ) ,  a.nd The U n d ec la red  War, 1940-1941 ( New York: H a rp e r  
& B r o s . ,  1 953) .
J u l i u s  P r a t t ,  A H i s t o r y  o f  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  F o r e ig n  
P o l i c y  (New York: , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc . - ,  1955) .
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background t o  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  the  t w e l v e - y e a r  p e r i o d  
w i t h  which t h i s  s tu d y  i s  c o n c e rn e d .  While i t  p r o v id e s  a 
b r i e f  view o f  h i s  e n t i r e  l i f e ,  t h e  main p o i n t  of the  c h a p t e r  
i s  to  p r o v id e  a summary view of  V andenberg’ s a c t i v i t i e s  in  
t h e  f i e l d  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .
Three c h a p t e r s  a r e  t h e n  d e v o te d  t o  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
o f  th e  e l e v e n  s e l e c t e d  Vandenberg s p e e c h e s .  C h ap te r  I I I  
d e a l s  w i th  V andenberg ’ s s p e e c h e s  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  American 
n e u t r a l i t y  b e f o r e  P e a r l  H a rb o r .  C h a p te r  IV i s  c o n ce rn e d  
w i t h  h i s  sp e a k in g  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  p o s tw a r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  
C h a p te r  V d i s c u s s e s  h i s  i d e a s  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  S o v i e t  c o n t a i n ­
ment p o l i c i e s  a f t e r  194$.
Each o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  c h a p t e r s  d e a l i n g  w i th  the  spe ec h es  
i s  w r i t t e n  i n  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .  These a r e :  (1)  an i n t r o d u c t i o n
t o  th e  c h a p t e r  i n  which an o ve rv iew  o f  i t s  c o n t e n t  i s  p r o v i d e d ,
(2) a c r i t i c a l  e x a m in a t io n  - o f ' the  s p e e c h e s ,  and (3) a summary 
o f  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  i d e a s  which dom inated  .h i s  t h i n k i n g  i n  t h e  
s p e e c h e s .  The t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  s p e e c h e s  i n  each o f  the chap­
t e r s  i s  made i n  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .  These a r e :  (1) a rev iew  o f
t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n t e x t  i n  which  t h e  sp e ec h  was p r e s e n t e d ,  (2) 
a r e p o r t  of t h e  speech  c o n t e n t ,  and (3) an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
t h e  sp eech .
A f i n a l  c h a p t e r  r e p o r t s  m ajor  c o n c l u s i o n s  abo u t  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  Vandenberg’ s i d e a s  as  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  the  changes  
i n  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  from 1937 t o  1949, and o f  h i s  
p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  i n  t h e s e  c h an g e s .
CHAPTER II
ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG: BACKGROUND TO TRANSITION
I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h i s  s t u d y  i s  i n t e n d e d  as  an i n q u i r y  i n  r h e t o r i c a l  
c r i t i c i s m ,  and n o t  as  a f u l l  b iog raphy  o f  t h e  man. I t  
t r e a t s  t h e  sy s te m  o f  i d e a s  as  r e v e a l e d  i n  s e l e c t e d  sp eech es  
o f  A r th u r  H. V andenberg .  What t h e  form er  S e n a t o r  d i d  • 
t h r o u g h o u t  h i s  e n t i r e  l i f e ,  what he t h o u g h t ,  and what he 
s a i d ,  how ever ,  a r e  a l l  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  h i s  f a m i ly  o f  
i d e a s .  For  t h a t  r e a s o n ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  r e c a l l  c e r t a i n  
p o r t i o n s  o f  V a n d enb e rg ’ s l i f e  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o v i d e  a c o n te x t  
f o r  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  which he t o o k  on v i t a l  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  
from 1937 t o  1949.  T h is  c h a p t e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  summarize t h o s e  
m a t t e r s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h e  s tu d y  of t h e  i d e a s  
i n  h i s  s p e e c h e s .
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  d i v i d e  V andenberg’ s l i f e  i n t o  t h r e e  
p h a s e s .  The f i r s t  phase  c o v e r s  t h e  f i r s t  tw e n ty - tw o  y e a r s  
o f  h i s  l i f e  (1 8 8 3 -1 9 0 6 ) ;  he c r e d i t e d  c e r t a i n  e v e n t s  o f  t h i s  
p e r i o d  a s  f a c t o r s  which molded h i s  m ature  s o c i a l  p h i lo s o p h y .
The second  p e r i o d  (1905-1928)  covers  t h e  second  tw en ty - tw o  
y e a r s  o f  h i s  l i f e .  I t  was du r in g  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h a t  he p u b l i s h e d  
a n e w spaper ,  w ro te  books ,  and began h is .  p o l i t i c a l  c a r e e r .
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The t h i r d  p e r i o d  (1920-1951)  c o v e rs  h i s  c a r e e r  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  S e n a te .  The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  a r e  
d e v o te d  t o  t h o s e  t h r e e  p e r i o d s  o f  h i s  l i f e ,  and t h e  f o u r t h  
s e c t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t e s  on t h e  t w e l v e - y e a r  p e r i o d  d u r i n g  which 
h i s  v iews on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  underw ent  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n ,  which 
i s  -the fo cu s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y .
The E a r l y  L i f e .  1883-1906
The C hi ldhood  Years
A rthur  H. V a n d e n b e rg 's  a n c e s t o r s  were in ,many ways
t y p i c a l  Americans .  His f a t h e r ' s  Dutch a n c e s t o r s  had s e t t l e d
i n  New York S t a t e  i n  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  His m o t h e r ' s
p e o p l e — E n g l i s h — a l s o  s e t t l e d  i n  New York. Like many A m ericans ,
h i s  p a r e n t s —Aaron and Alpha H endr ick  Vandenberg— t u r n e d
t h e i r  t h o u g h t s  t o  th e  West and tow ard  b u i l d i n g  a new l i f e .
They l e f t  t h e  Mohawk V a l l e y  of  New York i n  1S7Ô to  s e t t l e
i n  Grand R ap ids ,  M ich ig an ,  where the  f u t u r e  S e n a to r  was 
b o rn  on March 22,  I 0S4 .
Aaron Vandenberg's harness b u s in e s s  provided a
com fortab le  home fo r  h is  fa m i ly  on Grand Rapid's Washington
S t r e e t .  His b u s i n e s s  t u r n e d  i n t o  such a s u c c e s s ,  i n  f a c t ,
t h a t  i n  t im e  he employed o v e r  a dozen o t h e r  a r t i s a n s .  The
p a n ic  o f  1893» however, wiped out  the  Vandenberg l i v e l i h o o d ,
f o r c e d  t h e  m other  t o  t a k e  i n  b o a r d e r s ,  and s e n t  young A r t h u r ,
a t  the  age o f  n i n e ,  ou t  i n t o  t h e  b u s i n e s s  w o r ld .  The e l d e r
Vandenberg blamed P r e s i d e n t  C lev e la n d  and the  Democrats  f o r
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h i s  m i s f o r t u n e .  The i n c i d e n t  made such  an im p r e s s io n  on 
th e  f a t h e r  t h a t  one o f  h i s  f i n a l  a d m o n i t io n s  a s  he l a y  on 
h i s  d e a th  bed was " s o n ,  a lways be a R e p u b l i c a n . " !
N i n e - y e a r - o l d  A r th u r  met t h e  c h a l l e n g e  o f  f a m i ly  
p o v e r t y .  With a p u s h c a r t  he put  h i m s e l f  i n t o  b u s i n e s s  
c a r r y i n g  sh o e s  from a warehouse  t o  a  f r e i g h t  y a rd .  Two 
y e a r s  l a t e r  he had two boys a s s i s t i n g  him and was e a r n i n g  
tw en ty  d o l l a r s  a week. As h i s  e n t e r p r i s e  p r o s p e r e d ,  he 
b ran c h ed  o u t  i n t o  t h e  s e l l i n g  of lem onade ,  f l o w e r s ,  p a p e r s  
and v e g e t a b l e s .  " I  had no y o u t h , ” rem arked  Vandenberg.
" I  went t o  work when I  was n i n e ,  and I  never  g o t  a chance,  
t o  e n jo y  m y s e l f  u n t i l  I  came t o  th e  S e n a t e . "  But t h e  
i n c i d e n t  had a b r i g h t e r  s i d e  f o r ,h i m ;
My e x p e r i e n c e s  a s  a  c h i l d  b e n t  me two ways, 
i f  I  a s s i g n  m y s e l f  to  any p o l i t i c a l  c a t e g o r y .
I  know from b i t t e r  e x p e r i e n c e  what i t  f e e l s  l i k e  
t o  have n o t h in g  i n  your  p o c k e t ,  b u t  a l s o  I  know 
t h e  v a lu e  o f  e n t e r p r i s e ,  and how e n t e r p r i s e  can 
p r o t e c t  o ld  a g e .  I ’m ' h a l f  a c o n s e r v a t i v e ,  h a l f  
a  l i b e r a l .  The c o n s e r v a t i s m  d e r i v e s  from hav ing  
g o t t e n  m o d e r a te ly  r i c h ,  the  l i b e r a l i s m  from my 
h a v in g  been p o o r . 3
The A do lescen t  Years
E a r l y  e d u c a t i o n . — Vandenberg’ s jo b s  a s  a y o u t h ,  
however ,  d id  not i n t e r f e r e  w i th  h i s  s c h o l a s t i c  a c t i v i t i e s .
1
B e v er ly  Sm i th ,  " R u s s i a ’s P e t  Whipping Boy,"
S a t u r d a y  Evening  P o s t . CCXIX (A p r i l  5, 1947) ,  10$.
^ B i l l  D avidson ,  "The Two Mr. V an den b e rgs ,"  C o l l i e r ’s  
CXXI ( Ju n e  19 ,  1 94 6 ) ,  60.
3Jo h n  G u n th e r ,  I n s i d e  U. S .  A. (New York: H a r p e r  &
B r o s . ,  1946 ) ,  p. 3 9 3 .
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He viewed e d u c a t i o n  as  a  means to  f i n a n c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  " I
so lem nly  promised  God A lm ig h ty ,^  s a i d  Vandenberg ,  " t h a t  i f
i t  l a y  w i t h i n  my power,  I -w o u ld  n e v e r  pe rm i t  what happened
t o  my f a t h e r  to  happen t o  m e .”^ H is  " H o r a t i o  A lg e r  f a i t h ”
may have pu t  him a t  th e  head o f  h i s  g r a d u a t i n g  c l a s s .  His
a c t i v e  f o r e n s i c  mind ea rn ed  him th e  nickname o f  " S e n a t o r , " ^
and b r o u g h t  him honors  in  speech  c o n t e s t s .  When o n ly  f i f t e e n
. he won f i r s t  p l a c e  with  an o r a t i o n  on the  peace  c o n fe re n c e
a t  t h e  Hague. He was fond  o f  t h i s  a c t i v i t y .  "The d e b a t in g
and l i t e r a r y  s o c i e t i e s ,  t h e  f r a t e r n i t y  b a n q u e t s , "  he s a i d ,
6
"were the  forums f o r  ray c o n s t a n t  e f f e r v e s c e n c e . "
E a r l v  j o b s .-—Young A r t h u r ' s  f i r s t  job  a f t e r  h ig h  
s c h o o l  was as  a f a c t o r y  c l e r k .  But he q u i t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
when t h e  company f a i l e d  t o  meet i t s  p a y r o l l .  He v/as f i r e d  
from h i s  n e x t  j o b .  One of h i s  h e r o e s  came t o  Grand Rapids 
one day, and Vandenberg p la y e d  "hookey" i n  o r d e r  to h e a r  
him s p e a k .  About t h i s  i n c i d e n t ,  Vandenberg l a t e r  s a i d :
I n  I 9OÜ, Theodore R o o s e v e l t  was r u n n in g  f o r  
P r e s i d e n t ,  and I  was a  t rem endous  TR f a n .  I  was 
ou t  -of h igh  sc h o o l  by t h i s  t i m e ,  working as  a 
b i l l i n g  c l e r k  in  a c r a c k e r  f a c t o r y .  There  was a 
TR p a ra d e  i n  town, and I  a sked  the  boss  f o r  t h e  
t im e  ou t  to s e e  i t .  He r e f u s e d .  I  went anyway.
I  came b a c k ,  and he f i r e d ^ m e .  I  had t o  have a n o th e r  
jo b  r i g h t  away, and I g o t  one a s  an o f f i c e  boy on 
the  Grand Rapids  H e r a l d . '
4 l b i d . . pp.  392- 93 .
c
Sm i th ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  p. 106.
^ I b i d .
7 ^
'G u n th e r ,  0 0 . c i t . ,  p .  393.
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H igh e r  e d u c a t i o n . — But f o r  a youth  w i th  V andenberg ’ s 
h a b i t s ,  c i t y  h a l l  r e p o r t i n g  was n o t  as  p ro m is in g  as a c o l l e g e  
e d u c a t i o n .  A f t e r  a y e a r  on t h e  H e ra ld  he e n t e r e d  t h e  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Michigan  w i th  p l a n s  t o  s tu d y  law . The m a t r i c u ­
l a t i o n  f e e s  to o k  f o r t y - e i g h t  o f  t h e  f i f t y  d o l l a r s  which he 
had saved  from h i s  e a r n i n g s ,  and he was f o r c e d  t o  t a c k l e  a 
number o f  odd jo b s  t o  s u p p o r t  h i m s e l f .  The sch ed u le  proved  
t o o  much f o r  h i s  h e a l t h , and Vandenberg,  on th e  v e rg e  o f  
p h y s i c a l  c o l l a p s e ,  r e t u r n e d  t o  the  H e ra ld  a f t e r  on ly  one 
y e a r  o f  c o l l e g e .  He rem ained  i n  t h i s  work u n t i l  he e n t e r e d  
t h e  S e n a te  tw e n ty - tw o  y e a r s  l a t e r .
M a r r i a g e . — I n  1967, Vandenberg m a r r i e d  E l i z a b e t h  
Watson, a l s o  o f  Grand R a p id s .  The young coup le  iiad t i i r e e  
c h i l d r e n ,  A r t h u r ,  J r . ,  B a r b a r a ,  and E l i z a b e t h .  The f i r s t  
Mrs. Vandenberg d i e d  i n  1916. Two y e a r s  l a t e r ,  Vandenberg 
m a r r i e d  Haze l  W h i ta k e r ,  a s c h o o l t e a c h e r  and newspaper  woman, 
whom he had met w h i l e  s t u d y i n g  a t  the  U n i v e r s i t y  of  
M ic h ig a n .  T h e i r  m a r r i a g e  was ended by ^er  d e a th  j u s t  a  
y e a r  b e f o r e  Vandenberg d ied  i n  19)1 .
The Newspaper Y e a r s ,  1906-1928
D uring  t h e  y e a r s  i n  which Vandenberg s e r v e d  as 
p u b l i s h e r  o f  t h e  Grand Rapids  H e ra ld  he found economic 
s e c u r i t y ,  began  a v a r i e t y  of  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and 
p u b l i s h e d  a num.ber  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  books .  This  s e c t i o n  
examines t h e s e  e v e n t s  i n  te rm s  of  t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  
h i s  l a t e r  c a r e e r .
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/  The Young P u b l i s h e r
Vandenberg p lu n ged  i n t o  p o l i t i c s  a lm ost  a t  t h e  
b e g in n in g  of h i s  newspaper  c a r e e r .  He p r o g r e s s e d  from 
c i t y  h a l l  t o  s t a t e  p o l i t i c a l  r e p o r t e r .  He was e s p e c i a l l y  
fond of the l a t t e r  j o b ,  b e cau se  i t  e n a b le d  him to  t r a v e l  
a round  t h e  s t a t e  on campaign t r i p s .  His  f a v o r i t e  p o l i t i c i a n  
was W il l iam  Alden Sm ith ,  a Congressman, who was to  become 
a Vandenberg h e r o .  "He modeled h i m s e l f  a f t e r  the  o l d e r  man 
and i m i t a t e d  some o f  h i s  g rand  w a y s , "  sa y s  one o b s e r v e r .  
"When you h e a r  S e n a t o r  Vandenberg l a u n c h  upon a sonorous  
p e r o r a t i o n ,  v p u . a r e  l i s t e n i n g  not  m e re ly  to  him bu t  to  an 
echo from old  S e n a to r  Smith ."®
Congressman Smith r e c i p r o c a t e d  Vandenberg’ s 
d e v o t i o n .  Upon h i s  e l e c t i o n  to  the  S e n a te  i n  19C7,
Smith p u rchased  the  H e ra ld  and made t w e n t y - t w o - y e a r - o l d  
Vandenberg e d i t o r  and p u b l i s h e r .  "A b r e a k  l i k e  t h a t  c a n ’t  
happen t o  more th a n  one p e r s o n  i n  a  m i l l i o n , "  observed  
Vandenberg y e a r s  l a t e r .  " I ’ve been  a  c r e a t u r e  of  good
Q
f o r t u n e . "
Under V andenberg ’ s l e a d e r s h i p ,  t h e  Herald  p r o s p e r e d ,  
and so  d id  i t s  e d i t o r .  H is  p e r s o n a l  f o r t u n e  became s e c u re  
as  c i r c u l a t i o n  and a d v e r t i s i n g  i n c r e a s e d .  Vandenberg was 
t h e n  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  occupy h i s  t im e  w i th  c i v i c  a f f a i r s
®Smith, l o c .  c i t . , p .  10?. 
^G un ther ,  op. c i t . , p. 394 .
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and s t a t e  p o l i t i c s .  "He became a p u b l i c  o p in io n  inc lder ;  
he l e d  c i v i c  movements. I f  t h e r e  was a committee,  he was 
on i t .  I f  t h e r e  was a m e e t in g ,  he a d d re s s e d  i t .  While 
s t i l l  i n  h i s  t w e n t i e s ,  he was a power i n  s t a t e  p o l i t i c s .
The Young P o l i t i c i a n
At t h i r t y - t w o ,  Vandenberg s e r v e d  as  chairman o f
t h e  R e p u b l ic a n  s t a t e  c o n v e n t io n .  There  was t a l k  o f
Vandenberg f o r  C o n g re ss ;  some m ent ioned  h i s  name f o r
Governor .  But t h e  e d i t o r  was not  i n t e r e s t e d .  He wanted
f i n a n c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e f o r e  g e t t i n g  i n t o  p u b l i c  l i f e .
As he pu t  i t ,  " I  d e c id e d  not t o  go i n t o  p u b l ic  l i f e  u n t i l
12
I  was in d e p e n d e n t  of  p u b l i c  l i f e . ”
As an e d i t o r ,  Vandenberg’ s i n f l u e n c e  was a l s o  f e l t  
o u t s i d e  o f  M ich ig an .  He co r re sp o n d e d  w i t h  S e n a to r  Henry 
Cabot Lodge on American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e 'L e a g u e  o f  
N a t io n s ,  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t h e  p h r a s e :  " u n sh a re d  i d e a l i s m  i s
a menace ."  I t  i s  a l s o  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  Vandenberg i n f l u e n c e d  
Warren G. H a r d in g ’ s p lank  on th e  League i n  th e  e l e c t i o n  of  
1920 inasmuch as he  s e rv e d  as  one of  t h a t  " i l l - f a t e d "  
s t a t e s m a n ’ s speech w r i t e r s .  W>:en asked  w h e tn e r  he was 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  H a r d in g ’ s "back t o  norm alcy"  p h r a s e ,  he
■ ^^Sm ith ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  p . 10?.
^^ I b i d .
12G u n th e r ,  op.  c i t . ,  p .  394.
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r e sp o n d ed :  ” I  d o n ' t  c la im  i t ,  and I  d o n ’ t  deny i t .
Normalcy c e r t a i n l y  sounds l i k e  one o f  my w o rd s .
The Young Author 
The H am il ton  e p i s o d e . — V a n d en b e rg 's  i n t e r e s t s  were 
n o t  l i m i t e d  t o  p o l i t i c s  and e d i t o r i a l  w r i t i n g .  During  t h e  
t w e n t i e s ,  he " s e t  out  t o  r i g h t  a h i s t o r i c a l  w ro n g ."  He 
f e l t  t h a t  h i s t o r i a n s  had n o t  r e c o g n i z e d  the  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
o f  A lexander  H am il ton  to  America .  " I  f e l t  t h a t  America 
owed a l o n g - o v e r d u e  d e b t  t o  t h e  memory of A lex an de r  H a m i l to n ,"  
s a i d  Vandenberg.  " I  d e te rm in e d  to  make a s m a l l  payment t o  
a c c o u n t . T h e  n e t  r e s u l t  was t h r e e  p u b l i s h e d  Hamil ton  
e u l o g i e s .
In h i s  f i r s t  e f f o r t ,  he a t t e m p t e d  t o  p rove  t h a t  
Ham il ton  was the  g r e a t e s t  A m e r i c a n . T h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  
was fo l lo w e d  w i t h  a book e n t i t l e d  I f  H am il ton  Were Here
T odav . in  which he c h a r a c t e r i z e d  h i s  h e r o  a s  th e  " i n s p i r e d  
o r a c l e  of  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n . " ^ ^  His f i n a l ' "paym ent" was 
made i n  a book c a l l e d .  The T r a i l  o f  T r a d i t i o n , ^ ^  i n  widch
^^Smith ,  l o c .  c i u . . p .  107 .
^ ^ A r th u r  H. V andenberg ,  "A lexander  H a m i l t o n , "  L i f e , 
X Ï I I I  ( J u l y  7 ,  1 9 4 7 ) ,  65.
A r t h u r  H. V andenberg ,  The G r e a t e s t  A m erican : 
A lexander  H am il ton  (New York : G. P. P u tn a m 's  Sons ,  1 9 2 1 ) .
A r th u r  H. V andenberg ,  I f  Ham il ton  Were Here 
Todav (New York: G. P. P u tn a m 's  Sons,  1 9 2 3 ) ,  p .  v.
A r th u r  H. V andenberg ,  The T r a i l  o f  T r a d i t i o n  
(New York: G. P .  P u tn a m 's  S o n s ,  1 9 2 6 ) .  ~
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Ham il ton  r e c e i v e d  c r e d i t  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  " n a t i o n a l i s m ” 
t r a d i t i o n  i n  America.  This l a s t  book i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e  
h i s t o r i c a l  background f o r  American i s o l a t i o n i s m  o f  t h e  
t w e n t i e s ,  a  p o l i c y  d e s c r i b e d  by  Vandenberg as the  " e s s e n c e  • 
. . .  o f  p e a c e , "  and f a l l s  i n  t h e  long  l i n e  of  i s o l a t i o n i s t  
s t a t e m e n t s  which c h a r a c t e r i z e  Vandenberg up t o  P e a r l  H a rb o r .
H am il ton  was f i r s t  i n  t h e  l i n e  of  V andenberg ’ s h e r o e s .  
He s a i d  t h a t  "Hamil ton  s to o d  a t  my s h o u l d e r  l i k e  a b ig  
b r o t h e r  i n  my y o u t h . H i s  i n t e r e s t  i n  H am il ton ,  however,  
was n o t  b a se d  on a deep a p p r e c i a t i o n  of t h a t  f o r e f a t h e r ’ s 
t h o u g h t  o r  i n f l u e n c e  on th e -A m e r ic a n  s o c i e t y .  Vandenberg 
was c o n c e rn e d ,  i n s t e a d ,  w i th  H a m i l t o n ’ s c a r e e r  and h i s  r i s e  
from a low o r i g i n  i n  l i f e  to  the  t o p  of th e  American s c e n e .  
His l a c k  o f  p e r c e p t i o n ,  h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  come t o  g r i p s  w i th  
H a m i l to n ’ s mind,  may e x p l a i n  h i s  l a t e r  a t tem .p ts t o  pass  
h i s  d e v o t i o n  f o r  H am il ton  o f f  t o  i m p r e s s io n a b le  y o u th .  I t  
c an n o t  be o v e r lo o k e d ,  however ,  t h a t  Vandenberg was t h i r t y -  
seven  when he nom ina ted  H am il ton  f o r  the  honor  o f  t h e  
" g r e a t e s t  A m erican ."  He was l a t e r  t o  q u a l i f y  t h i s  con­
c l u s i o n .  "The g r e a t e s t  A m er ican ,"  s a i d  Vandenberg i n  194b,
20" i s  a t y p e ,  n o t  a p e r s o n . "
^ ^ I b i d . , p. v i i i .
- ^ R ic h a r d  H. R overe ,  "The U n a s s a i l a b l e  Vandenberg ,"  
H a r p e r s . CXCVI (May, 1 9 4 8 ) ,  398.
^^D av idson ,  l o c .  c i t . .  p. 80.
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The P o l i t i c a l  C a r e e r ,  1928-1951
V a n d enb e rg 's  tw e n ty - tw o  y e a r s  on t h e  Hera ld  were
an a p p r e n t i c e s h i p  which he s e r v e d  p r i o r  t o  e n t e r i n g  i n t o
p o l i t i c s .  Through t h e  media o f  e d i t o r i a l s ,  s p e e c h e s ,  b o oks ,
and p a m p h le t s ,  he had e x p r e s s e d  h i m s e l f  on most of the m a jo r
i s s u e s  of  h i s  t i m e .  When the  t im e  came i n  1928,  f o r  him
t o  announce h i s  l o n g - s t a n d i n g  d e s i r e  t o  s e r v e  i n  t h e  U n i ted
S t a t e s  S e n a t e ,  he was t o  many c i t i z e n s  o f  Michigan a symbol
o f  s t a t e s m a n s h i p .  His rew ard  was th e  appo in tm en t  t o  f i l l
ou t  t h e  u n e x p i r e d  terra o f  the  Dem ocrat ic  incum ben t ,  Woodbridge
N. F e r r i s .  He was s w o r n . i n t o  th e  o f f i c e  on A p r i l  5, 1928.
The f o l lo w in g  November he was e l e c t e d  to  a  f u l l  s i x - y e a r
term  -with a 600,000 v o t e  m a j o r i t y ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  " e v e r  g iven
21
t o  any M ich igan  c a n d i d a t e  i n  a s t a t e  e l e c t i o n . "  He 
s e r v e d  i n  t h a t  c a p a c i t y  u n t i l  h i s  d e a t h  on A p r i l  18, 1951*
This  s e c t i o n  w i l l  t r e a t  t h e  h i g h l i g h t s  o f  t h a t  c a r e e r .
B r i e f  ment ion  w i l l  be made o f  t h e  s e n a t o r i a l  image which he 
c r e a t e d ,  h i s  c a r e e r  a s  a c a n d i d a t e  f o r  o f f i c e ,  and h i s  
C o n g r e s s io n a l  r e c o r d  on d o m e s t i c  a f f a i r s .  Because o f  i t s  
s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  to  t h i s  s t u d y ,  h i s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  be t r e a t e d  i n  a s e p a r a t e  s e c t i o n .
The Image o f  a S e n a to r  
The man as  S e n a t o r . — S e n a t o r  Vandenberg was once 
d e s c r i b e d  as  a man t h a t  a Hollywood movie d i r e c t o r  would
91 " P e rso n s  and P e r s o n a l i t i e s , "  L i t e r a r y  D i g e s t , 
G Ï Ï  (September 28,  1 9 3 5 ) ,  39.
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2 2c a s t  ’’f o r  a U n i ted  S t a t e s  S e n a to r  on s i g h t . "  John 
Gunther  s a y s  t h a t  i f  he "had t o  d e s c r i b e  him i n  a s e n t e n c e ,
I  would be t em p ted  t o  say t h a t  he lo o k s  e x a c t l y  l i k e  what 
he i s — a S e n a t o r . "^3 He was a  b i g  man, over  s i x  f e e t  t a l l  
and a round  200 pounds i n  w e ig h t  w i t h  b r o a d ,  sq u a re  s h o u l d e r s .  
An o u t s t a n d i n g  f e a t u r e  was h i s  f a t ,  round f a c e ,  p a r t i a l l y  
covered  w i t h  horn-r immed s p e c t a c l e s .  He combed h i s  w h i te  
h a i r  l a t e r a l l y  a c r o s s  a l a r g e  head .  His g o ld  watch  c h a in  
■and e v e r  p r e s e n t  c i g a r  were f a m i l i a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  His 
c l o t h e s  were  i n  th e  c l a s s i c a l  American p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t i o n — 
w i th  t h e  e x c e p t i o n ,  p e rh a p s ,  o f  the  Homburg h a t ,  w i th o u t  
which he was r a r e l y  se en .  He had humor and warmth, bu t  h i s  
ego sometimes c o v e r e d  h i s  l i k e a b l e  q u a l i t i e s .  ■ James B. 
R es ton  sa y s  many r e g a r d e d  Vandenberg as a "somewhat cocky 
lo n e  w o l f . " ^ 4  But Dean .Acheson, who knew him w e l l ,  i n s i s t s  
t h i s  was no t  the  c a s e ;  t h a t  t h e  S e n a t o r  " to o k  a b i t  o f
k now ing ."^5
Although  V andenberg’ s mind could  p e n e t r a t e  th e  
main a s p e c t s  of an i s s u e ,  he was e s s e n t i a l l y  a s t u d e n t  o f  
men r a t h e r  t h a n  i d e a s .  He p o s s e s s e d ,  however, some r a r e
^^Maxine B lock  ( e d . ) ,  " A r th u r  H. V andenberg ,"  Curren t  
B iography  (New York: The H. W. Wilson  C o . ,  1 9 40 ) ,  p. 821.
Z^Gunther ,  op. c i t . ,  p . 392.
^^James B. R e s to n ,  "Case f o r  V andenberg ,"  L i f e ,  
m v .  (May 2 4 ,  1 9 4 8 ) ,  117.
^^Dean Acheson,  " Jo u rn e y  I n t o  Our T im es ,"  American 
H e r i t a g e , I I  ( F e b r u a r y ,  I 9 6 0 ) ,  79.
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g i f t s  i n  h i s  " c a p a c i t y  t o  l e a r n  and  c a p a c i t y  f o r  a c t i o n .
He l e a r n e d  from h i s  n ew spaper  work t h e  im p o r tan c e  o f  
p r e c i s i o n  when d e a l i n g  w i th  d e t a i l s .  H is  h a r d  work e a r n e d  
him the  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  b e in g  " t h e  most s t u d i o u s  man i n  
C o n g r e s s . "^7 He lo o k e d  upon th e  t im e  s p e n t  i n  h i s  Wardman 
Park Hote l  and t h e  S e n a te  o f f i c e  b u i l d i n g  doing h i s  home­
work as a p r e c o n d i t i o n  f o r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  the  a r t  o f
s t a t e s m a n s h i p .  One W ashing ton  o b s e r v e r  n o te d :
The r e a s o n  Vandenberg  seems t o  be a c u t  o r  
two above th e  a v e ra g e  s t a t e s m a n  i s  t h a t  he t r i e s  
so  h a r d  t o  b e .  He works s l a v i s h l y  a s  a. S e n a t o r ,  
a t t e n d s  S e n a te  s e s s i o n s  and com m it tee  m e e t in g s  
c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  and comes up w i th  s o l i d ,  s p e c i f i c  
p r o p o s a l s  b ased  on e x te n d e d  r e s e a r c h . * ®
The S e n a to r  a s  c o m p rom ise r . — Vandenberg e a r n e d  a
r e p u t a t i o n  in  th e  S e n a te  a s  a com prom iser .  He t r u l y  
viewed p o l i t i c s  a s  t h e  a r t  o f  th e  p o s s i b l e .  "My l i f e l o n g  
r o l e  has  been  in  the m idd le  o f  t h e  ro a d  t r y i n g  to  r e s o l v e  
oppos ing  e x t r e m e s  i n t o  w o rk a b le  g o v e r n m e n t , "^9 he s a i d .
I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  he was o f t e n  a b l e  to  accommodate h i s  own 
views t o  t h e  o p i n io n s  o f  o t h e r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  needed  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  Acheson f u r t h e r  n o t e s :  " A r th u r  V a n d e n b e rg 's
mind was n o t  o r i g i n a l ;  bu t  i t  was open. He was no t  a
2&I b i d .
27M il to n  S. Mayer,  "Men Who Would Be P r e s i d e n t , ” 
N a t io n ,  CL (May 11,  1 9 4 0 ) ,  588. . .
ZGlbid.
^^Sm ith ,  l o c .  c i t .  , pp.  107 - 0 8 .
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c r e a t o r  o f  th e  i d e a s  which  he was e m in e n t ly  capab le  o f  
r e c e i v i n g  and u s i n g . "3^ He was,  p e r h a p s ,  a t  t im e s  i n c o n ­
s i s t e n t  i n  h i s  v o t in g  r e c o r d .  But he was a t  a l l  t im e s  
t h e  " c l a s s i c  Man o f  A c t io n .
The C a n d id a te  f o r  O f f i c e
Vandenberg won e l e c t i o n  t o  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  S e n a te  
f o u r  t i m e s .  He won e a s i l y  i n  1928 ,  b u t  f a c e d  c lo s e  r a c e s  
i n  1934 and 1940 d u r i n g ' t h e  y e a r s  o f . F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t ' s  
p o p u l a r i t y . .  I n  1946, he  won a l a n d s l i d e  v i c t o r y  w i t h o u t  
even cam p a ig n in g ,  c a r r y i n g  every  c o u n ty  i n  M ichigan .
The 1936 e l e c t i o n . —Vandenberg was t h r e e  t im e s  
c o n s i d e r e d  a  s t r o n g  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  ..the R ep u b l ica n  nomi­
n a t i o n  f o r  P r e s i d e n t .  H is  s u c c e s s  as  one o f  f i v e  R e p u b l ic a n  
S e n a t o r s  t o  win r e - e l e c t i o n  i n  1934 pushed  him t o  t h e  f r o n t  
a s  n o m ina l  l e a d e r  o f  h i s  p a r t y .  "From 1934 to  1938 t h e  
S e n a t o r  f rom M ichigan  was th e  R e p u b l i c a n  P a r t y , "  n o ted  
Mayer.  "He r o s e  t o  the  t o p  o f  t h e  p a r t y  • by tiie  s im ple  
e x p e d i e n t  o f  b e in g  t h e  o n ly  man i n  i t . "32 He r e f u s e d ,  
however ,  t o  be c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  t h e  1936 n o m in a t io n .  A f t e r  
L a n d o n 's  n o m in a t io n ,  many p a r t y  l e a d e r s  h i n t e d  a t  a v i c e -  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  n o m in a t io n  f o r  Vandenberg .  He a s s e r t e d :
^^Acheson ,  l o c . c i t .., p. 47 .
^^Reston, loc. cit., p. IO4.
32Mayer,  l o c .  c i t .
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" I  am s u r e  I  can be o f  g r e a t e r  s e r v i c e  i n  a c t i v e  l a b o r s  
on the  S e n a te  f l o o r  t h a n  on i t s  s i l e n t  r o s t r u m . "33
The 1940 e l e c t i o n . —I n  1940, he emerged w i th  Thomas 
E. Dewey and Rober t  E. T a f t  as p o p u l a r  c h o ic e s  f o r  t h e  
n o m in a t io n .  While he d id  no t  a c t i v e l y  campaign f o r  th e  
n o m in a t io n ,  he l e t  i t  be known t h a t  he would a c c e p t  i f  
o f f e r e d .  "When Dewey and T a f t  have b u rn ed  th e m se lv e s  o u t ,  
Vandenberg w i l l  come l o p i n g  down the  s t r e t c h , "34 p r e d i c t e d  
one o b s e r v e r . But e f f o r t s  i n  hi s b e h a l f  were c ru s h e d  in  
p r e - c o n v e n t i o n  p r i m a r i e s  by Governor Dewey, and a t  t h e  
c o n v e n t io n  by the  W i l l k i e  l a n d s l i d e .
The 1944 e l e c t i o n . — The M ichigan  S e n a to r  r e f u s e d  even 
t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  P r e s i d e n c y  i n  1944.  He d i d  h o p e ,  however , 
t h a t  R o o s e v e l t  would b e  out of t h e  White  House b e f o r e  th e  
peace  c o n f e r e n c e . 35 He c a s t  about f o r  t h e  man whom he 
th o u g h t  could  d e f e a t  R o o s e v e l t  f o r  a f o u r t h  t e r m .  He 
concluded  t h a t  G e n e ra l  Douglas MacArthur was th e  man f o r  
t h e  j o b .  I n  an a r t i c l e  f o r  C o l l i e r ' s  magazine e n t i t l e d  
"Wny I  Am For  M a cA r th u r ,"  Vandenberg a l l e g e d  t h a t  t h e
33 The New York T im es , June 7 ,  1936 ,  p. 32.
^^Mayer, l o c .  c i t . , p .  5^9.
33A r th u r  H. V andenberg ,  J r .  ( e d . ) .  The P r i v a t e  
P a p e rs  o f  S e n a to r  Vandenberg (Boston:  Houghton M i f f l i n
Company, 1 9 5 2 ) ,  75. H e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to a s  P a p e r s . 
The e d i t o r  n o t e s  t h a t  Vandenberg co n c lu d ed  " t h a t  t h e  
most i m p o r t a n t  s t e p  t h a t  could  be t a k e n  t o  a s s u r e  a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  peace  s e t t l e m e n t  a f t e r  th e  war was to  
d e f e a t  Mr. R o o s e v e l t  i n  1 9 4 4 ."
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G e n e r a l  "'would make th e  s t r o n g e s t  P r e s i d e n t  i n  t h e  to u g h  
days t h a t  l i e  a h e a d , "  b ecause  he embodied " l o y a l t y  t o  our 
American d e s t i n y .  . . , "3b  The boom f o r  MacArthur  ended ,  
however ,  when th e  G e n e ra l  announced t h a t  he would n o t  
a c c e p t  th e  n o m in a t ion  i f  i t  were o f f e r e d  t o  him b e c a u s e  o f  
" w id esp read  p u b l i c  o p in io n  t h a t  i t  i s  d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  our  
war e f f o r t  t o  have an o f f i c e r  in  a h ig h  p o s i t i o n  o f  a c t i v e  
s e r v i c e  a t  t n e  f r o n t  c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  P r e s i d e n t . " 3 7  A f t e r  
t h i s  announcement,  Vandenberg s u p p o r t e d  Dewey.
The 1946- e l e c t i o n . —I n  1948, Vandenberg was a w o r ld  
f i ' g u r e .  The S e n a t o r  " s t a n d s  on t h e  s a f e s t  and l e a s t  
a s s a i l a b l e  g round  i n  AjT'serican p o l i t i c s , "  w ro te  H a r t e r s  
magazine e d i t o r s .  " Indeed  i t  i s  h a r d  to see  liow any 
p u b l i c  man co u ld  e v e r  be any b e t t e r  o f f  t 'nan he i s  a t  t h i s  
m o m e n t . M a n y  of  h i s  f r i e n d s  begged him t o  l e t  them 
e n t e r  h i s  name i n  a  " d r a f t "  movement f o r  tiie P r e s i d e n c y .  
Vandenberg r e f u s e d .  He found ,  however ,  t h a t  " i t  i s  h a r d e r  
n o t  t o  run  f o r  P r e s i d e n t  t: ian i t  i s  t o  r u n . "39 I n  March 
o f  1948, t h e  e d i t o r s  of U n i ted  S t a t e s  News p o i n t e d  t o  
Vandenberg a s  " tn e  man most l i k e l y  t o  t a k e  th e  p r e s i d e n t i a l
3oArthur Vandenberg, "Why I  Am For MacArthur," 
C o l l i e r ' s , GXIII (Februaim’- 12,  1 9 44 ) ;  14.
37P a p e r s , p . 64.
38Rovere, l o c .  c i t . ,  p. 394,
39&rthur H. Vandenberg, "I Am Not Running fo r  
P r e s id e n t ,"  L i f e . XXII (March 17, 1 9 4 7 ) ,  43.
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o a t h  o f  o f f i c e  n e x t  J a n u a r y  2 0 . " ^ ^  The S e n a to r  spoke o u t .  
" I  am n o t  a c a n d i d a t e , ” he s a i d .  " I  do no t  e x p e c t  t o  be 
a c a n d i d a t e .  I  s h a l l  se ek  no c o n v e n t io n '  d e l e g a t e s  n o r  
approve  the  e f f o r t s  of o t n e r s  i n  my b e h a l f . ■ He l a t e r  
e x p l a i n e d :
I  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  I  c o u ld  b e s t  s e r v e  my c o u n t r y  , 
by f i n i s h i n g  out  my S e n a te  t o u r  o f  d u ty .  That  was 
my c o n t r o l l i n g  m o t iv e .  I n d e e d ,  i t  was more t h a n  a 
m o t iv e .  I t  was a p a s s i o n . 4-2
. The R ep u b l ican  C onven t ion  p e r m i t t e d  Vandenberg t o . . 
r em a in  i n  the  S e n a t e ,  and  t u r n e d ,  i n s t e a d ,  t o  Dewey as  . 
i t s  nominee.  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o te  t h a t  in  s p i t e  of 
h i s  d isavowed i n t e r e s t  in  the  o f f i c e ,  h i s  d i a r y  c o n t a i n s  
an u n d e l i v e r e d  a c c e p ta n c e  speech which Vandenberg had 
w r i t t e n  b e f o r e  g o ing  t o  P h i l a d e l p h i a .  " I  iiave a lways 
b e l i e v e d  i n  p r e p a r e d n e s s , ” s a i d  V andenberg .  ”I  had t o  
be r ea d y  fo r  th e  u n e x p e c te d  and th e  u n s o u g ' n t .  ”43
The Domestic  Record  
The new S e n a t o r . —When Vandenberg  f i r s t  r e a c n e d  
Washington  in  1926 to  b e g in  h i s  S e n a t o r i a l  c a r e e r ,  he 
i s s u e d  the  f o l lo w in g  s t a t e m e n t  as  a summary o f  t i le  p o l i c i e s  
he would p u r su e :
4*3»»People of t h e  Week,” U n i t e d  S t a t e s  News, XXIV 
(March 26 ,  1 9 4 2 ) ,  39.
^^P a p e r s . p. 4 2 2 .
42l b i d . ,  p .  435. 
43i b i d . ,  p .  442,
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A l l  I can say  a t  th e  moment i s  t h a t  I am a 
' R e p u b l i c a n  by f a i t h  and i n h e r i t a n c e .  The i n h e r i ­
t a n c e  comes from a g r a n d f a t h e r  who h e lp e d  nominate  
L i n c o l n .  The f a i t h  comes from a b e l i e f  t h a t  h i s t o r y  
and e x p e r i e n c e  u n i t e d  t o  recommend b a s i c  R e p ub l ican  
p r i n c i p l e s  as  s a f e s t  f o r  t h e  R e p u b l i c .
T h is  demands always an unimpeached C o n s t i t u t i o n  
which may be changed b u t  n e v e r  c h e a t e d .  It demands 
u n e n t a n g l e d  Americanism which makes every p o s s i b l e  
e f f o r t  t o  l e a d  i n  the  p u r s u i t s  of  b l e s s e d  p e ace ,  
b u t  k eep s  i t s  powder d ry .  I t  demands economic 
in d ep en d ence  on a high s c a l e  f o r  o u r  mass c i t i z e n ­
s h i p ,  a t i l i n g  p o s s i b l e  on ly  under  s t a l w a r t  
R e p u b l i c a n  tariffs.44
I n  a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e ,  Vandenberg was n e i t h e r  a  " l i b e r a l ” , 
n o r  a " c o n s e r v a t i v e . ” One o b s e r v a t i o n  t n a t  Vandenberg "on 
most i s s u e s  s t a n d s  somewhat no th e  r i g h t  o f  center,”45 i s  
p r o b a b ly  a p p r o p r i a t e .  During h i s  f i r s t  te rm ,  fo r  example ,  
he g a in e d  th e  good w i l l  of P r e s i d e n t  Hoover by su p p o r t in g ,  
him on m a jo r  domestic,  l e g i s l a t i o n .  He was ne Id  in  such 
es teem  by th e  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ,  whom Vandenberg had s u p p o r t e d  
e d i t o r i a l l y  i:.  the  H e r a l d , t h a t  Dawes b ro k e  p r e c e d e n t  and 
t u r n e d  t h e  p r e s i d i n g  g ave l  over  t o  the  fresnman S e n a t o r .
But he d i d n ’ t  f a r e  as  w e l l  wit:,  tne  R e p u b l i c a n  l e a d e r s h i p  
in. Con r e s s .  He o r g a n iz e d  a g roup  of l i b e r a l s  in  r e b e l l i o n  
who became known as t:.e "Young T u r k s . ” The o b j e c t i v e  o f  
t h i s  young g roup  "was to  n e ed le  tiie Hoover a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
and t ; ie  ’Old G uard’ P a r t y  l e a d e r s h i p  i n t o  more l i b e r a l  l i n e s  
o f  a c t i o n . ”4^
44The New York T im es, A p r i l  2 , 1928,  p .  3-
45"Peop:
4& Ib id .
^^ le of the Week,” loc. cit., p. 39.
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The t a r i f f  q u e s t i o n . — B efo re  th e  end of World War 
I I ,  Vandenberg was a s t r i c t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t .  He r e f l e c t e d  
t h e  commercial  i n t e r e s t  of  Michigan  i n  f i g h t i n g  f o r  h igh  
t a r i f f s  on a n t i q u e s ,  s u g a r  a.nd c o p p e r .  He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  
th e  R o o se v e l t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s R e c i p r o c a l  Trade Agreement 
Acts  were d e s ig n e d  to  " c l o t h e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w i th  unchecked 
and u n c o n t r o l l e d  t a r i f f - b a r g a i n i n g  p ow ers ,"  r e s u l t i n g  in
i n
" d i c t a t o r i a l  a u t h o r i t y . "
A f t e r  America e n t e r e d  h e r  po s tw a r  p e r i o d  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l i s m ,  Vandenberg changed h i s  mind on the t a r i f f  
q u e s t i o n .  He d i d  not  become an adv o ca te  o f  f r e e  t r a d e  by 
any .means ,  b u t  ne d id  i n s i s t  t n a t  " t h e  r e c i p r o c a l  fo rm ula  
i s  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  t o  o ; r  economy in  th . is  pos tw ar  w o r l d . "
His on ly  announced r e a s o n  f o r  th e  change of  a t t i t u d e s  was 
s im p ly ,  " I  happen t o  be one o f  t h o s e  who has come to ,  
b e l i e v e . J a m e s  R e s to n ,  however,  s a i d  Vandenberg cnanged 
b eca u se  th e  S e n a to r  b e l i e v e d  " t h e  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n '
p o l i c y  would be m e a n in g le s s  i f  i t  were no t  ex tended  i n t o
/ o
t . ie  economic f ' e l d . " ^ "
The New D e a l . - - T h e  coming of th e  New Deal i n  1932 
found Vandenberg a g r e e i n g  w i th  i t s  "n o b le  o b j e c t i v e s , "  but
S.  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  R e c o rd , 73rd  C o ng . , 2d S e s s . ,  
1934, LXÏVIII ,  P a r t  S, 9081.  H e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as  
R e co rd .
^^R e c o rd , 80th  C o n - . ,  2d S e s s . ,  1948, ÏCIV, P a r t  o,
S031.
^^The New.York Times, February $, 1947, p. 1.
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f e e l i n g  "co m p e l le d ,  r e g r e t f u l l y ,  a lm os t  t e a r f u l l y ,  t o  
k n i f e  n ine  o u t  o f  t e n  New Deal  m e a s u r e s . H e  b e l i e v e d  
t h a t  " t h e  New Deal  must  be . . . m e l ted  o v e r ,  r e c a s t  i n t o  
a  new e n g in e ,  go ing  s low ly  and r a t h e r  on the  b i a s  i n  
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n s . T h i s . ,  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  
e a r n e d  him the  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  be ing  a " s t r a d d l e r . "
Vandenberg wore out  M s  lu n g s  b a t t l i n g  a g a i n s t  
t h e  Wagner Act ,  t h e  N. R. A . ,  t h e  A. A. A. ,  and 
t h e  T. V. A . ,  Passamaquoddy, t h e  F l o r i d a  Ship 
C ana l ,  and  n e a r l y  e v e ry  o t h e r  New Deal p r o p o s a l .
He was n o t  a l l  b l a c k  o r  w h i t e ,  however .  In  
December o f  1933> he waged a  monumental bu t  
h o p e l e s s  s t r u g g l e , t o  keep  t h e  l o c a l  banks from 
c l o s i n g .  T h is  l o s i n g  f i g h t  so im p re ssed  him 
w i th  t h e  p l i g h t  o f  the b a n k s ’ d e p o s i t o r s  t h a t  
he w ro te  an amendment t o  th e  1933 Banking  Act 
s e t t i n g  up t h e  F e d e ra l  D e p o s i t  I n s u r a n c e  Cor- 
.D e r a t i o n .  Crowley, l a t e r  head  o f  th e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  
c r e d i t e d  Vandenberg w i th  b e in g  the  " f a t h e r  o f  
t h e  FDIG."
Vandenberg a l s o  v o ted  f o r  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y ,  
t h e  SEC, and  t h e  C h i l d 'L a b o r  amendments. A l l  
t h i s  seemed m ere ly  t o  c o n fu s e  h i s  f r i e n d s  and 
enem ies .  . . .52
Because  he f e a r e d  th e  R o o se v e l t  v e r s i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  
d e b t s  and u n b a la n c e d  b u d g e t s ,  Vandenberg laun ch ed  some o f  
h i s  h e a v i e s t  a t t a c k s  a g a i n s t  New Deal  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  b i l l s .  
He r e f e r r e d  t o  many o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  p r o p o s a l s  as  " d r iv in g  
w e a l t h  o u t "53 d e v i c e s .  On th e  o th e r  hand,  he conceded 
t h a t  t h e  New Deal  " lau n c h ed  c e r t a i n  s o c i a l  c o n c e p t s ,  wh ich ,
^^Mayer, l o c .  c i t . , p .  $c9 .
^^Rovere^ l o c .  c i t . , p. 402 .
^^Davidson ,  l o c .  c i t . , p .  b l .
5^ R ec o rd , 74 th  Cong. ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1935, LXXIX, P a r t  
12,  1304S.
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i n  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s ,  can n o t  and s n o u la  not be r e v e r s e d . "^4 
Vandenberg ,  however , u s u a l l y  c o u n te r e d  w i t h  a watered-down 
v e r s i o n  o f  each f i s c a l  s u - y e s t io n ,  f u r t h e r  c o n fu s in g  h i s  
o p p o s i t i o n .  In  1935,  f o r  example ,  wnen he spoke 15 ,000  
words a g a i n s t  a work r e l i e f  b i l l ,  S e n a t o r  Hugh Black a r o s e  
and s a i d ,  " I  am f r a n k  to  c o n f e s s  t h a t  I  am unab le  t o  
a s c e r t a i n  w h e th e r  t h e  S e n a to r  i s  f o r  t h e  b i l l  or  a g a i : . s t  
the  b l l l . ” 5t  M i l to n  S.  Mayer p a i n t e d  an even r:iore b a f f l i n g  
p i c t u r e  o f  V andenberg ’ s v o t in g  r e c o r d  on New Deal p r o p o s a l s .  
O b s e r v ln :  t i i a t  t h e  M ich igan  S e n a t o r  ’’d o e s n ’ t  add up to  
a n y t h i n g .  He c a n c e l s  o u t .  . . . ” Mayer added:-
On dom es t ic  problems you c a n ’ t  l o c a t e  him a t  
a l l .  He has  s t o o d  s q u a r e l y  on bo th  s i d e s  o f  every  
i s s u e  f o r  tne  p a s t  t e n  y e a r s .  He has been  a g a i n s t  
s u b s i d i e s  t o  tlie f a r m e r  and f o r  the  payment of  
e q u a l i z a t i o n  f e e s ;  f o r  th e  RFC and a g a i n s t  pump 
p r im in g ;  f o r  economy and a g a i n s t  r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n ;  
f o r  d e v a l u a t i o n  and a g a i n s t  ’’r e p u d i a t i o n ” ; f o r  
h o us in g  and a g a i n s t  s p e n d - l e n d  t h e o r y  (and f o r  
and a g a i n s t  h o u s i n g ) ;  f o r  the  SEC and a g a i n s t  
t r a d i n g  and h o l d i n g  company r e g u l a t i o n ;  f o r  
t a r i f f  and lo a n  b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  poor 
(and f o r  and a g a i n s t  r e l i e f ) ;  f o r  and a g a i n s t  
f e d e r a l  c o n t r o l  o f  r e l i e f .  . . . 5'-
V andenberg’ s r e p u t a t i o n  as  a comprom iser  on New 
Deal  m easures  drew comment from t h e  Was:;in,"to.’: G r i d i r o n  
Club one s e a s o n .  The newspapermen p a i n t e d  a scene  ir. 
which  two b a s e b a l l  t e a m s ,  one d r e s s e d  in  w h i t e  and th e
54Mayer, l o c . c i t . , p. 589-
2>Davidson,  l o c . c i t . ,  p .  I p .
^^Mayer, loc. cit., pp. $87-86.
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o t h e r  i n  b l u e ,  bounced on t h e  f i e l d .  Each team had  o n ly  
e i g h t  p l a y e r s .  Sudden ly  a n o th e r  p l a y e r  marched on t h e  
f i e l d  d r e s s e d  i n  a v h i t e  and r e d  u n i fo rm .  "My name i s  
V a n d en b e rg ,"  t h e  m y s t e r i o u s  p l a y e r  announced,  "1^11 b a t  
f o r  bo th  s i d e s .
I n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  however ,  i t  i s  no t  ha rd  to  u n d e r s t a n d  
how Vandenberg e a r n e d  h i s  r e p u t a t i o n  as  a "Yes" and "No" 
man. He had a p a s s i o n a t e  i n t e r e s t  i n  bo th  the  humane g o a ls  
o f  R o o s e v e l t ’ s r e fo rm  and h i s  R e p u b l i c a n  background o f  
" t r i c k l e  down from the t o p "  t h e o r y  o f  p r o s p e r i t y .  He 
f e a r e d  t h e  conseq u en ces  o f  a b u r e a u c r a t i c  n a t i o n a l  g o v e rn ­
m ent ,  b u t  he b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  body p o l i t i c ’s , m ajo r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was t o  human r i g h t s  o v e r  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s .
He came to  t h i n k  o f  h i m s e l f  as  symbolic  o f  the  g o ld e n  mean. 
On most i s s u e s  he s t o o d  somewhere between w h i te  and b l a c k .  
"He i s  h a r d l y  a l i b e r a l  i n  the  u s u a l  a c c e p te d  meaning o f  
t h e  word .  And he s t o p s  s h o r t  o f  the extreme c o n s e r v a t i s m  
o f  some o f  h i s  p a r t y  c o l l e a g u e s .
Domestic  a c t i v i t i e s  a f t e r  P e a r l  H a rb o r . —A f t e r  t h e  
J a p a n e s e  a t t a c k  on P e a r l  H a rb o r ,  Vandenberg j o i n e d  t h e  
r e s t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n  i n  t h e  m o b i l i z a t i o n  o f  A m erica ’ s f o r c e s  
f o r  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  He s u p p o r t e d  most of R o o s e v e l t ’ s war  
p o l i c i e s ,  b o th  i n  th e  rea lm  of  f o r e i g n  and dom es t ic  a f f a i r s .
^ ^ B e v e r ly  S m i th ,  "Grand R ap ids  Boy Makes Good,"  
American M agaz ine , CXXV ( J a n u a r y ,  1 9 3 c ) ,  120.
5'Cnpeople of the Week," loc. cit., p. 39-
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A f t e r  1945,  Vandenberg to o k  an a c t i v e  p a r t  in  o n ly
two l e g i s l a t i v e  i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  d o m es t ic  a f f a i r s .  He
assumed t'.ie p a r t y ' s  l e a d e r s h i p  o i  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  but
o f f e r e d  no c n a l l e n g e  to t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  of  S e n a to r  Rober t
A. T a f t  o f  Ohio i n  d o m es t ic  m a t t e r s .  In  tn e  c a s e  of  t h e
T a f t - H a r t l e y  l a b o r  a c t ,  Vandenberg ,  i n  r e g a r d  t o  c e r t a i n
d e t a i l s ,  held s e r i o u s  r e s e r v a t i o n s ,  bu t  "gave Mr. T af t
h i s  .way in  t h e  hope o f  o b t a i n i n g  t. :e  Ohio S e n a t o r ’ s
so
im p o r t a n t  back ing  in  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s . H e  sensed  tn e  
need  f o r  p a r t y  s o l i d a r i t y  in  d e a l i n g  w i th  the "co ld  w a r . "
The Michigan S e n a t o r j  however ,  was a c t i v e  in  
r e s o l v i n g  the  c o n f l i c t s  ove r  c i v i l i a n  v e r s u s  m i l i t a r y  
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  Atomic Energy  Commission. He i n s i s t e d  
t n a t  the .  m i l i t a r y  have some c o r i t a c t  w i th  a l l  m a t t e r s  
i n v o l v i n g  th e  u se  of  a tomic  e n e rg y  f o r  d e fe n se  p u r p o s e s . '
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  he h e lp e d  t o  s e c u r e  the  c o n f i r m a t i o n  of David 
S. L i l i e n t h a l  as  Chairman o f  t h e  Atomic Energy Gomjnission. 
He alig. ' ied n i m s e l f  f o r  L i l i e n t n a l  a g a i n s t  s : c h  s t r o n g  
R ep u b l ica n  S e n a to r s  a s  T a f t ,  White and Br idges  to  :'ielp 
s t o p  wiiat he c a l l e d  a  " p o l i t i c a l  l y n c h i n g . H e  a rg u ed  
t h a t  " l o g i c , e q u i t y ,  f a i r  p l a y ,  and a j u s t  r e g a r d  t o  u rg em
/.I
o u b l i e  w e l f a r e  combine to  recommend c o n f i r m a t i o n . " ^
>9i b i d .
^ ^ " H in t :  How To Swing a  V o t e , "  Time, XLIX ( A o r i l  14,
1947), 24 .
^^R e c o rd , 8 0 th  Cong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1947, X CIII ,  P a r t  
2 , 3108.
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Vandenberg a l s o  became i n v o lv e d  i n  a c o n t r o v e r s y  
o v e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  l i m i t  the  use o f  th e  f i l i b u s t e r .  The 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  R e o r g a n i z a t i o n  Act o f  1946 p r o v id e d  f o r  a 
l i m i t  on d e b a te  when a s p e c i f i e d  number o f  S e n a t o r s  ag re ed  
t o  sucn a c t i o n .  As P r e s i d e n t  Pro Tempore of  t h e  S e n a te ,  
Vandenberg was c a l l e d  upon fo r  a r u l i n g  as  t o  w h e th e r  t h i s  
l i m i t a t i o n  a p p l i e d  t o  m o t io i s  to c o n s i d e r  a b i l l  as w e l l  as  
d e b a t e s  a l r e a d y  in  p r o g r e s s .  He r u l e d  t h a t  i t  d id  -not 
a p p ly  t o  m o t ion s  t o  c o n s i d e r .  Tiie Se.nate s u s t a i n e d  h i s  
r u l i n ^  o v e r  s t r o n g  o b j e c t i o n s  o f  S e n a t o r  B a r k le y .  The 
l a t t e r  a s  p r e s i d i n g  o f f i c e r  in  1949 r e v e r s e d  V andenberg’ s 
r u l i n g .  A f t e r  a v ig o r o u s  speech I , '  Vandenberg i n  d e fe  ,se 
o f  h i s  o r i g i n a l  r u l i n g ,  B a r k le y ’ s r u l i n g  was o v e r r i d d e n  by 
a  vo te  o f  4 6 -4 1 .
As Vandenberg’s concern fo r  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  in c re a se d ,  
and as the d i v i s i o n  o f  labor between Taft  and Vandenberg 
became more f ir - s ,  he became l e s s  ”Mr. Republican” and more 
the  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  arm of  the party ,  and in r.a:gr ways tne  
P r e s i d e n t ’s a d v i s e r .  The ’' t r a n s i t i o n ” in  h i s  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  
views can now be p laced  in the conte:-:", of  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  career .
The Foreivr . P o l i c y  C a r e e r
A major c o n c lu s io n  reac^ied in  t h i s  study i s  that  
Vandenberg’ s a l t i t u d e s  on America’s r o l e  in world a f f a i r s ,  
r e f l e c t  th ree  major p o l i c y  phases tnrougi; which he moved 
between 1937 a;:a 1949. Until  Pearl Harbor, he was an avowed 
i s o l a t i o n i s t .  A f te r  P ear l  Harbor u n t i l  1946, at l e a s t ,  i.e
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supported the  concept of c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y ,  and f o l lo w in g  
the breakup o f  big-pov/er . n i t y a f t e r  World War I I ,  he 
focu sed  h i s  i n t e r n a t io n a l i s m  on the idea  o f  containment  
o f  the S o v i e t  Union.
The Period of  I s o l a t i o n i s t  
Climate of i s o l a t i o n i s m . — During' the 1920’ s 
Vandenberg g e n e r a l ly  took e d i t o r i a l  p o s i t i o n s  in  the  Grand 
Rapids Herald c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  the ’’r e t r e a t  to t r a d i t i o n a l  
i s o l a t i o n i s m  . . . not in  th e  sense  of  complete withdrawal  
from world a f f a i r s  but oi' c o n s i s t e n t  r e f u s a l  to  make any 
p o l i t i c a l  commitments i n f r i n g i n g  upon the n a t i o n ’ s freedom 
o f  a c t i o n . ”'̂  He wanted America to  assume a r o l e  in  world  
a f f a i r s ,  but in  the t r a d i t i o n  th a t  avoided any bindinj
commitments. Vandenberg i n s i s t e d  th a t  America preserve her
o3'’’a b s o lu te  and untrammeled r ig i . t  o f  s e l f - d e c  Ls Lon."' D u l l e s
d e s c r ib e s  t h i s  brand of i s o l a t i o n i s m  as f o l lo w s :
I t s  u n d er ly in g  s p i r i t  o f t e n  served t o  cre a te  
a d i s t r u s t  of  any d e a l in g s  whatsoever  with fore ign  
n a t i o n s .  I t  a f f e c t e d  t a r i f f  p o l i c i e s ,  immigrâtiou 
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  the  i n s i s t e n c e  upon war debt payments.'
I t  encouraged other  s t r o n g l y  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  a c t i v i t i e s . .  
Within tiie broad reaches  of foreign; p o l i c y  i t s e l f ,  
however, i s o l a t i o n i & i  meant no more and no l e s s  ti.an 
the a b i l i t y  o f  t'ne American people  t o  r e a l i z e  t:.at
Ô2F o s te r  Rhea D u l l e s ,  America’s R ise  to  World 
Power (New fork: Harper &, B r o s . ,  1954)',' p. 144.
o3 Vande fcerg,  The T r a i l  o f  T r a d i t io n ,  p. 314.
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m o ra l  p l a t i t u d e s  about  peace  were no s u b s t i t u t e  
f o r  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  c o l l e c t i v e
s e c u r i t y .
Vandenberg c a r r i e d  t  l i s  emphatic  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
A m e r ic a ’ s p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  w i t ; ,  him 
t o  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S e n a te  i n  1928. As a member o f  th e  
S e n a te  Committee on F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s ,  he c o n s i s t e n t l y  
opposed a l l  m easures  wnich mended t o  i ;n ;o lve  the U n i ted  
S t a t e s  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  The one e x c e p t i o n  no t h i s  
p o s i t i o n  might be his, s t a n d  on the American e n t r y  i n t o  the  
World C o u r t .  Wnile he v o t e d  f o r  e n t r y ,  r.e i n s i s t e d  t n a t  
American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  s h o u ld  n o t  be i n t e r p r e t e d  zo  mean 
t n a t  t n e - U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o u ld  be s u b j e c t e d  zo  the  c o u r t ’ s 
d e c i s i o n s  w i t h o u t  p r e v io u s  c o n s e n t .
The n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n . - -V and en b e rn  v iewed wit'n 
a la rm  J a p a n ’ s march on M anchur ia  i n  1931 and ner  l a c e r  a t t a c k  
on t h e  China  m ain land  in  J u l y ,  1937; M u s s o l i n i ’ s i n v a s io n  
o f  E t h i o p i a ;  H i t l e r ’ s e n t r a n c e  i n t o  t-he d e m i l i t a r i z e d  
R h in e l a n d ;  and the  C i v i l  War i n  S p a in .  But he s h a r e d  tn e  
u h in k in g  of a m a j o r i t y  o f  n i s  countrymen wno ’’r e f u s e d  t o
° 4 D u l l e s ,  op. c i t . , p .  14$.  He a l s o  comments on 
V andenberg ’ s c o n s i s t e n t  i s o l a t i o n i s t  s t a n d .  He w r i t e s :
”As a  lead ing^  spokesman f o r  t h i s  approach  t o  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  
[ i s o l a t i o n i s m ] , S e n a to r  Borah i n v a r i a b l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  was a lways r e a d y  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s  
t o  mankind.  But t h e  p o i n t  he c o n s t a n t l y  s t r e s s e d  was t h a t  
t n e  n a t i o n  should  a lways a c t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y —n e i t h e r  a t  tne  
b i d d i n g  no r  t h ro u g h  th e  p e r m i s s i o n  of o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .
A r t h u r  . H. Vandenberg ,  a t  t h i s  t im e  e d i t o r  of  the H era ld  
and  d e s t i n e d  t o  t a k e  o v e r  B o r a h ’ s p o s i t i o n  as  i s o l a t i o n i s t  
l e a d e r  i n  t h e  S e n a te ,  had v e r y  much the  same i d e a s . ”
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e n t e r t a i n  any p r o p o s a l  f o r  a c t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  t o  
check th e  r a p i d  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
s i t u a t i o n . The S e n a t o r ,  i n  f a c t ,  was a c h i e f  a r c h i ­
t e c t  i n  h e l p i n g  t o  b u i l d  a w a l l  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  around h i s  
c o u n t r y .  He s u p p o r t e d  n e u t r a l i t y  a c t s  in  1935-1937 
d e s ig n e d  t o  a v o id  the  m i s t a k e s  of  the  Wilson e r a .  The 
l e g i s l a t i o n  was d e s ig n e d  to  make i t  im p o s s ib le  fo r  Arnericans 
t o  s e l l  arms t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s ,  ex te n d  l o a n s ,  o r  t r a v e l  in  
b e l l i g e r e n t  w a t e r s .
Defense  o f  n e u t r a l i t y . - - A f t e r  tne 1937 N e u t r a l i t y  
Act became the  law of  th e  l a n d ,  e v e n t s  in  Europe c o n t in u e d  
t o  o f f e r  a c h a l l e n g e  t o  Arrerican n e u t r a l i t y .  Germany- 
o ccu p ied  A u s t r i a  i n  t h e  s p r i n g  o f  1933, follcrwed by the  
C z e c h o s lo v a k ia  s i t u a t i o n  and t h e  Munich c r i s i s ,  and c l im axed  
by t h e  i n v a s i o n  o f  P o la n d .  The P r e s i d e n t  su g g e s te d  niiat 
t h e  embargo s e c t i o n  o f  the  N e u t r a l i t y  Act be r e p e a l e d .  
Vandenberg f o u g h t  a l o s i n g  b a t t l e  i n  opposing the  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  r e q u e s t .
As war came c l o s e r  i n  194 0 -4 1 ,  Va.ide.nberg c o n t in u e d  
t o  r e s i s t  a l l  moves wnich he t h o u g h t  m.ignt mean American 
i n t e r v e n t i o n .  He opposed s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e ,  Lend-Lease ,  
and t h e  arming o f  American m erc h an t  s h i p s .  Although he 
s h a r e d  th e  st rong^ d e s i r e  o f  h i s  p e o p le  t o  see the d e f e a t  
o f  t h e  A x is ,  he t h o u g h t  i t  more im p o r t a n t  f o r  the  U n i ted
^ % i l l i a m  L. L an ge r  and S. E v e r e t t  Gleason ,  The 
C h a l len g e  t o  I s o l a t i o n  (New York; Harper  & B r o s . ,  1 942) ,
p.  1 1 .
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S t a t e s  t o  keep out  o f  t n e  c o n f l i c t .  He f e a r e d  t n a t  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  n i j n t  r e s u l t  in  a .^oss o f  th e  Ainerican way o f  l i f e .  
He was f u r t n e r  conv inced  t h a t  t  l i s  was a s t e p  which Aner lca  
-leed n e v e r  t a k e .  His r a t i o n a l e  was c h a r a c t e r i z e d  'ey th e  
comment: "Two g r e a t  o c e a n s ,  th o u g n m u c h  f o r e s h o r t e n e d ,
s t i l l  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s u l a t e  our s h o r e s  a g a i n s t  t h i s  c u r s e  of  
w a r . " ° °
The o n se t  o f  w ar . —Ja p an  ended t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  b a t t l e  
i n  America w i th  h e r  a t t a c k ,  on P e a r l  H arbor  on December .?, 
1941 . A f t e r  P r e s id e n t  R o o s e v e l t  asked. Congress  f o r  a 
d e c l a r a t i o n  of war a g a i n s t  J ap an  on December Ô, 1941,  the '  
l e a d e r  o f  the  S e n a te ,  Tom C o n n a l ly ,  hoped t o  move t h e  
m easure  th ro u g h  Congress  w i t h o u t  any s p e e c h e s .  But 
Vandenberg i n s i s t e d  on b e in g  h e a r d .  . He a s su re d ,  t h e  w o r ld  
t h a t  t h e r e  was "no shadow of  a  doubt abou t  Am erica ’ s u n i te d -  
and i n d o m i t a b l e  answer t o  th e  c r u e l  and r u t h l e s s  c h a l l e n g e  
o f  t h i s  t r a g i c  h o u r . " ^ ?  He n o t e d  i n  h i s  d i a r y ,  however,  
t h a t  " a  w i s e r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  c o u ld  have been  f o l l o w e d - -  
a l t h o u g h  now no one w i l l  e v e r  be  a b le  t o  p ro v e  i t . "  But 
h e  a d m i t t e d :  "We were no l o n g e r  ’ f r e e  a g e n t s ’ a f t e r  t h e
in fam ous  J a p a n e s e  a t t a c k .  . . . There was n o t h i n g  t o  do bu t  
t o  answer  i n  k i n d . " ^ °
c^R e c o rd , ?6 th  C on g . ,  2d S e s s . ,  1939 ,  LXXXV, P a r t  1, 104.
°'^R e c o rd , 7 ? th  C ong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1941,  LXXXVII, P a r t  
9 ,  9505 .
c^P a p e r s , p.  1?.
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The C o l l e c t i v e  S e c u r i t y  P e r i o d
In  p l e d g i n g  h i s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  A l l i e d  c ause  on 
December S, 1941,  S e n a t o r  Vandenberg made i t  p l a i n  ’’t h a t  we 
were n o t  d e s e r t i n g  our b e l i e f s ,  b u t  t h a t  we were  p o s tp o n in g  
a l l  f u r t h e r  argument  o v e r  p o l i c y  u n t i l  the  b a t t l e  f o r c e d  upon 
us by J a p a n  i s  w on ."°9  But h i s  c o n c e p t  o f  A m e r ic a ’ s r o l e  i n  
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  was n e v e r  t o  r e t u r n  to  the  p rew ar  p o s i t i o n .
His t h i n k i n g  underw ent  a g r a d u a l  change .
A m i d d l e - o f - t h e - r o a d  p o s i t i o n . — By e a r l y  1943 ,  i t  was 
t h e  v o i c e  of  a m i d d l e - o f - t h e - r o a d  man, p e r h a p s ,  which d e c l a r e d  
t h a t  th e  a v e ra g e  American i s  ’’n e i t h e r  an i s o l a t i o n i s t  n o r .  
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t . ” The S e n a t o r  went  on t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  
him as  one ’’who i s  w i l l i n g  t o  t a k e  h i s  f u l l  s h a r e  o f  r e s p o n -  
s i b i l i t i e s ” 7 0  i n  t h e  p o s t w a r  w o r ld .  He was c o n v in c e d  t h a t  , 
America shou ld  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  some t y p e  o f  p o s tw a r  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  But t h e  S e n a t o r  was u n s u r e  o f  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  s h o u ld  t a k e .  Acheson n o t e s  h i s  
f r u s t r a t i o n :
He was ve ry  much on th e  o u t s i d e  t r y i n g  t o  lo ok  
i n ;  and he c o u ld  see  n o t h i n g .  S u s p i c i o n  consumed 
him—s u s p i c i o n ,  i n  h i s  own w o rd s ,  o f  ’’E x e c u t i v e  
d i c t a t o r s h i p ,  b y - p a s s i n g  the  S e n a te ,  f l o u t i n g  o f  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ” ; n o th in g  i s  more f r u s t r a t i n g  than  
not  to  knowvhat i s  g) ing  on; and th e  R e p u b l i c a n  
m i n o r i t y  i n  t h e  S e n a te  had n o t  found a c h a n n e l  t o  
t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t .71
c^P a p e r s , p. 35 . 70j B i d .
' 7lAcheson, loc. cit. , p. 45.
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The " c h a n n e l ” was opened t o  him in  March o f  1944
when S e c r e t a r y  H u l l  r e q u e s t e d  t h e  S e n a te  F o r e ig n  R e l a t i o n s
Committee to  s e t  up a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  g roup t o  c o n f e r  r e g u l a r l y
w i t h  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  on p o s tw a r  p rob lem s .  Vandenberg was
s e l e c t e d  a s  a  member of  t h e  "Committee of E i g h t , "  which
c o n s i s t e d  of four  Democrats and f o u r  R e p u b l i c a n s .  The
Committee was g iv e n  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o n f e r  weekly w i t h
t h o s e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the  s h a p i n g  o f  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
T h is  e x p e r i e n c e  was a v a l u a b l e  one f o r  the  Michigan S e n a t o r .
"This  gave  Vandenberg an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  t r y  out  s t a t e m e n t s
o f  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l  and. p o s s i b l e  answers to
■ a rgu m en ts ’ a g a i n s t  i t , "  sa y s  Acheson. "He th o u g h t  ou t  loud
and h i s  t a l k  would p ro ceed  w i t h  m ounting  e n th u s ia sm  as
72c o n v i c t i o n  and c o n f id e n c e  g re w ."
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t . - - B y  J a n u a r y ,  1945,  t h e  change 
i n  V an d enb e rg ’s mind from i s o l a t i o n i s m  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  
was c o m p le t e .  In  th e  most famous speech o f  h i s  c a r e e r ,  he 
a r o s e  on J a n u a ry  1 0 ,  i n  th e  S e n a te  and announced h i s  complete  
c o n v e r s i o n  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  "No n a t i o n  h e r e a f t e r  can 
immunize i t s e l f  by i t s  own e x c l u s i v e  a c t i o n .  . . . Our oceans 
have  c e a s e d  t o  be moats which a u t o m a t i c a l l y  p r o t e c t  our  
r a m p a r t s . "73 V andenberg ’ s h i s t o r i c  announcement ended a l l  
s p e c u l a t i o n  t h a t  he would r e v e r t  t o  h i s  p rew ar  i s o l a t i o n i s m .
/ ^ I b i d . , p. 4c .
73Record, 9 1 s t  Cong. ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945,  LXXEX, P a r t
1 , 166.
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The man who h e lp e d  Lodge d e f e a t  th e  League of N a t ions  and 
who on many o c c a s i o n s  had f o l lo w e d  th e  l e a d  of S e n a to r  
Borah i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  t h u s  gave a  c l e a r  s i g n a l  t h a t  
t h e r e  would be  no S e n a te  f i g h t  a g a i n s t  t h e  U n i ted  N a t io n s .
"What Vandenberg d i d  by s w i t c h i n g  from i s o l a t i o n i s m  t o  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , "  ob se rv ed  R overe ,  "was t o  make i t  p o s s i b l e  
. . . f o r  l o t s  of o t h e r  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  . . .  t o  make an 
h o n o r a b le  p eace  w i t h  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and t h e r e b y  to  g iv e  
t h e  c o u n t r y  som eth ing  l i k e  a w o rkab le  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y . "7^
P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t ’ s r e s p o n s e  t o  Vandenberg’s avowed 
s t a n d  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  was t o  a p p o in t  t h e  S e n a to r  
a s  an American d e l e g a t e  t o  t h e  San F r a n c i s c o  C onfe rence .  
Vandenberg r e s p o n s e d  t o  R o o s e v e l t :  " I  a p p r e c i a t e  the h o n o r ,
Mr. P r e s i d e n t ,  b u t  you d o n ’t  have  t o  a p p o in t  me. I ’l l  t a k e  
you o f f  t h e  hook by going  out  and b r e a k i n g  a l e g  o r  som eth ing .  
Then you can a p p o in t  someone you r e a l l y  want to have t h e r e . "  
S a id  t h e  P r e s i d e n t :  " S e n a t o r ,  I  d o n ’ t  c a r e  about any o f  t h e
o t h e r s  g o in g .  You’ r e  t h e  one man who must be t h e r e .
The d ip lo m a t  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y . —At San F r a n c i s c o ,  
Vandenberg p lay e d  a key r o l e  i n  s e c u r i n g  the  a d o p t io n  o f  
A r t i c l e  51 and o t h e r  p r o v i s i o n s  of  the  C h a r te r  which p ro v id ed  
f o r  r e g i o n a l  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  He was a l s o  i n s t r u m e n t a l  
i n  s e c u r i n g  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  which e n a b l e d  the  Genera l  Assembly
7^Rovere ,  l o c .  c i t . .  p .  396.
75Davidson, loc. cit., p. 15.
52
t o  examine any s i t u a t i o n  which might be a  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  
peace  of  the w o r ld ,  i n c l u d i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  
t r e a t i e s .
P r e s i d e n t  Truman a l s o  c a l l e d  on Vandenberg t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  the  f i r s t  s e s s i o n s  o f  t h e  G e n e ra l  Assembly 
o f  t h e  U n i ted  N a t io n s  and l a t e r  t.he C o u nc i l  o f  F o r e ig n  
M i n i s t e r s '  m eet ing  and t h e  P a r i s  Peace C o n fe re n c e .  A f t e r  
h i s  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i th  the  R uss ian s  a t  t h e s e  c o n f e r e n c e s ,  
Vandenberg e x e r t e d  i n f l u e n c e  o n ' t h e '  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  
fo r m a t io n  of  i t s  " f i r m n e s s  w i th  p a t i e n c e "  p o l i c y  tow ard  
R u s s i a .  • •
When th e  R e p u b l i c a n s  t o o k  o v e r  Congress  i n  1947, 
Vandenberg was e l e v a t e d  t o  new p o s i t i o n s  of  im p o r t a n c e .
He was e l e c t e d  both P r e s i d e n t  Pro Tempore of  th e  S e n a te  
and Chairman o f  the  Committee on F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s .  He 
very  q u i c k l y  d i s p e l l e d  any f e a r s  t h a t  the  R e p u b l i c a n s  would 
a t t e m p t  any s e r i o u s  change i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  "Our f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  has been d e v e lo p e d  and e x e c u te d  on a n o n p a r t i s a n  
b a s i s , "  i n s i s t e d  Vandenberg.  " I  have done my b e s t  t o  
s t r e n g t h e n  and e x tend  t h i s  p r a c t i c e . H i s  new r o l e  
m eant ,  however ,  t h a t  he would have t o  r e s t r i c t  h i s  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  work t o  W ashing ton .  I n  a l e t t e r  t o  Mrs. F r a n k l i n  D. 
R o o se v e l t  e x p l a i n i n g  why he had  j u s t  d e c l i n e d  an  i n v i t a t i o n  
t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  s p r i n g  m ee t ing  of  th e  C o u n c i l  o f
'^^The New York T im es , November 12 ,  1946, p .  1.
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F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r s ,  Vandenberg s a i d  t h a t  a f t e r  such m ee t ings  
" I  am no t  a f r e e  a g e n t  when I  r e t u r n  t o  the  S e n a t e . ” 77 The 
S e n a t o r ,  i n  s h o r t ,  s im p ly  d i d  no t  want t o  f u n c t i o n  i n  a 
p o s i t i o n  i n  which he would have t o  f o l l o w  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
o f  th e  P r e s i d e n t  w he ther  he a g re e d  w i t h  them o r  n o t .  He 
c o n c e n t r a t e d ,  however ,  i n  h i s  new p o s i t i o n  on the  a t t a i n m e n t  
o f  h i s  dream f o r  a b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
The L e a d e r  f o r  C on ta inm ent  P o l i c i e s  
As l e a d e r  o f  the  S e n a t e ,  Vandenberg gu id ed  many o f  
t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  c o n ta in m e n t  p o l i c i e s  t h ro u g h  C ongress .
He had been a p a r t  o f  th e  American d i p l o m a t i c  team which 
t r i e d  t o  f i n d  agreement  on such v i t a l  i s s u e s  as  c o n t r o l  of 
a to m ic  en e rg y ,  peace  t r e a t i e s  f o r  Germany and A u s t r i a , ,  w o r ld  
d i sa rm a m e n t , and the  S o v i e t  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  E a s t e r n  Europe.
He a l s o  w i t n e s s e d  t h e  g r i p  which R u s s i a  was g a in i n g  in  Europe  
and A s ia .  His  r e a c t i o n  was a p l e a  to  t h e  Truman a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
t o  c h a r t  a " g e t - t o u g h ” p o l i c y  i n  d e a l i n g s  w i th  the  S o v ie t  
Union. When t h i s  p o l i c y  f a i l e d  t o  s t o p  t h e  R u ss ian  g o a l  o f  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  f o r  i t s  own e n d s ,  he was r e a d y  t o  j o i n  the 
Truman a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  e a r l y  1947 i n  more o v e r t  moves t o  
r e s i s t  S o v ie t  e x p a n s io n .
Containment  p o l i c i e s . — When P r e s i d e n t  Truman t o l d  t h e  
Congress  on March 12 ,  1947,  t h a t  " i t  must  be th e  p o l i c y  of
77p a p e r s , p. 331.
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t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  s u p p o r t  f r e e  peo p le  who a r e  r e s i s t i n g  
s u b j e c t i o n  by armed m i n o r i t i e s  or  o u t s i d e  p r e s s u r e s , " ? ^  
Vandenberg v o i c e d  immediate  ag reem en t .  He took  the  l e a d  
i n  s e c u r i n g  p a s s a g e  of the  b i l l  which  g r a n t e d  a i d  t o  Greece 
and Turkey (Truman D o c t r i n e ) .  He s t a t e d  b l u n t l y  t h a t  th e  
" P r e s i d e n t ’ s message f a c e s  f a c t s  and so  must C o n g re ss .  The 
in d ep en dence  o f  Greece and Turkey must  be p r e s e r v e d . ”79 
L a t e r  t h a t  y e a r  he a l s o  pushed th ro u g h  Congress  the  Rio 
P a c t ,  and in  t h e  s p r i n g  of  194o, he worked fo r  the  passage  
o f  the  European Recovery Program ( M a r s h a l l  P l a n ) .  He was, 
i n  a d d i t i o n ,  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  th e  "Vandenberg R e s o l u t i o n "  i n  
1948 which paved th e  way f o r  the  North A t l a n t i c  T r e a ty  
O r g a n i z a t i o n .
A f t e r  t h e  Democrats  r e g a i n e d  Congress  i n  1949, 
Vandenberg a g a i n  found h i m s e l f  as  l e a d e r  of  the  m i n o r i t y .  
But he c o n t i n u e d  t o  e x e r t  i n f l u e n c e  on th e  f o r m a t io n  of 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  He g a t h e r e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  the North  A t l a n t i c  
P a c t  and the  M i l i t a r y  A s s i s t a n c e  Program. His c o n t in u e d  
i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  c o u rs e  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
n o t i c e a b l e  i n  t h e  c a se  of the  l a t t e r  m easu re .  A f t e r  th e  
Truman a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s u b m i t t e d  a  r e q u e s t  fo r  a  sum o f  
money which th e  Michigan S e n a t o r ' t h o u g h t  e x o r b i t a n t  i n  view 
o f  t h e  need ,  he went t o  work on an amendment which c u t  th e
2 , 1981.
^^R eo o rd , 80th Cong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1947,  X C II I ,  P a r t  
79p a p e r s , p .  343.
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o r i g i n a l  r e q u e s t .  S e n a t o r  Vandenberg and S e n a t o r  D u l l e s  
r e w r o te  the  b i l l  i n  a cc o rd a n c e  w i t h  what t h e y  t h o u g h t  t h e  
Congress  would a c c e p t .  The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a g re e d  t o  t h e  
r e v i s i o n ,  s a id  Vandenberg ,  a f t e r  he " b l u n t l y  l a i d  th e  ' f a c t s  
o f  l i f e ’ b e f o r e  S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e  Acheson and S e c r e t a r y  o f  
D efense  J o h n s o n . "  ^ The Michigan S e n a to r  made h i s  l a s t  
f u l l - d r e s s  speech i n  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  m easure .  He to ld ,  th e
C on g ress :  " I t  i s  a l l  i n  the  c l e a r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o f  our
Ô1own n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y . "
Symbol of  b i p a r t i s a n s h i p . — Between 1946 and 1950,
S e n a to r  Vandenberg came t o  e p i to m iz e  " b i p a r t i s a n s h i p . "
As t h e  r a n k i n g  R e p u b l i c a n  member of  the  S e n a te  Committee 
on F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s ,  h i s  s u p p o r t  u s u a l l y  meant C o n g r e s s io n a l  
a p p r o v a l  of  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o p o s a l s .  This  c o o p e r a t i o n  was 
v iewed by Vandenberg as  a b s o l u t e l y  e s s e n t i a l  fo r  th e  
s e c u r i t y  of  h i s  c o u n t r y .  With a Democrat i n  the  P r e s id e n c y  
and t h e  R e p u b l ic a n s  i n  c o n t r o l  o f  C o n g re ss ,  "you e i t h e r  go t  . 
b i p a r t i s a n  c o o p e r a t i o n  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o r  you d id  n o t  have 
a  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a t  a l l . "  Vandenberg th u s  combined h i s  
i n t e r e s t  and knowledge of f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  w i th  h i s  C o n g r e s s io n a l  
i n f l u e n c e  t o  b r i n g  abou t  a b i p a r t i s a n  c l i m a t e  which he
^^P a p e r s , p .  508 .
o^R e co rd , 8l s t  Cong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1949, ÏCV, P a r t  
1 0 , 13044.
^2npeop le  of the  Week," U n i t e d  S t a t e s  News, IXVIII  
( F e b r u a r y  10,  1 9 5 0 ) ,  17.
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e x p la in e d  as  "an a t t i t u d e  i n  t h e  minds o f  i n d i v i d u a l  men."
He added:
I t  was an a cc e p ta n c e  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  w orld  
peace was to o  im p o r ta n t  t o  be  a p l a y t h i n g  o f  d om es t ic  
p a r t y  p o l i t i c s .  I t  was a r e c o g n i t i o n  by c e r t a i n  men 
t h a t  good c r i t i c i s m  and r e s p o n s i b l e  o p p o s i t i o n  had t o  
be b ased  on f a c t s  and n o t  on p r e j u d i c e  o r  s u p p o s i t i o n .
I t  was an  a cc e p ta n c e  by t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t h a t  f a c t s  
in  i t s  p o s s e s s i o n  sh o u ld  be made a v a i l a b l e  t o  r e s p o n ­
s i b l e  R e p u b l i c a n s .
. . . i t  d id  not  t a k e  away the  o p p o s i t i o n ’ s  r i g h t  
or w i l l  t o  oppose .  I t  d i d  n o t  p r e v e n t  d i s c u s s i o n  and 
d e b a te  i n  Congress o r  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y .  I t  d id  n o t  a t  
any p o i n t  in  t h e  c o n t a c t s  between the  l e a d e r s  commit 
th e  o p p os i t ion ,  to  su p p o r t  a g iven  p o l i c y  b e f o r e  t h a t  
p o l i c y  went  th rou g h  th e  f u l l  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o c e s s .
W ithout  the  i s o l a t i o n i s t  ep iso d e  i n  h i s  l i f e ,  much 
o f  h i s  s u c c e s s  i n  s to p p in g  p o l i t i c s  a t  the  " w a t e r ’ s edge" 
might  n e v e r  have been p o s s i b l e .  B efore  P e a r l  H a r b o r ,  he 
worked c l o s e l y  with, t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e s  in  h i s  p a r t y .  When 
he becan'.e f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  l e a d e r  in  th e  S e n a te ,  he c o n t in u e d  
to  m a in ta in  t h e  r e s p e c t  and s u p p o r t  o f  S e n a to r s  T a f t  o f  
Ohio,  M i l l i k i n  o f  C o lo rad o ,  B r id g e s  o f  New H am psh ire ,  and 
Wherry o f  N ebraska ,  a l l  o f  whom he ld  p o s i t i o n s  on th e  
R ep u b l ica n  p o l i c y  comm ittee .  These r e l a t i o n s ,  n o t e s  Acheson, 
e n a b le d  Vandenberg " t o  perfo rm  . . . nhe s e r v i c e  of  b r i n g ­
in g  t o g e t h e r  in  su p p o r t  o f  a f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  . . .  an admin­
i s t r a t i o n  which: cou ld  c a r r y  I t  ou t  and an o p p o s i t i o n  which 
could  have p r e v e n t e d  i t  from do ing  so ." '^^
G^The New York T im es , J a n u a r y  l u ,  _949, p. 3-
^^Acheson, loc.'cit., p. 79.
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I n  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  h i s  e f f o r t s  t o  o b t a i n  b i p a r t i s a n ­
s h i p  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  C o l l i e r ' s  m agaz ine  tw ic e  awarded 
Vandenberg th e  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Award f o r  d i s t i n g n i  shed s e r v i c e  
t o  th e  n a t i o n .  Both  i n  1945 and a g a i n  i n  1949,  Vandenberg 
won the  award as a t r i b u t e  t o  h i s  work i n  h e l p i n g  to  a c h i e v e  
b o th  f o r m u l a t i o n  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  American f o r e i g n  
p o l i c i e s  by the  two p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  I t  was to  t h i s  work 
t h a t  Vandenberg d e d i c a t e d  th e  l a t t e r  y e a r s  o f  h i s  l i f e .
His  e f f o r t s  were p a r t  o f  h i s  c o n s t a n t  s e a r c h  fo r  s e c u r i t y  
w hich  he t r a n s p o s e d  from h i s  p e r s o n a l  w e l l - b e i n g  to  t h a t  o f  
s e c u r i t y  f o r  h i s  c o u n t r y  and t h e  e n t i r e  w o r ld .
C o n c lu s io n
F a t e  d id  n o t  p e rm i t  t h e . M i c h i g a n  S e n a t o r  t o  comple te  
h i s  f o u r t h  te rm .  I l l n e s s  f o r c e d ’him t o  l e a v e  the  Sena te  
i n  t h e  f a l l  of  1949» The New York Times r e f e r r e d  to- h i s  
a b ^ n c . e  as the  " m i s s i n g  v o i c e , "  a d d in g  t h a t  h e ,  "more th a n  
any  o t h e r  American,  ha s  l i n e d  up b e h in d  i t  the  m ass ive  
p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t  t h a t  has  been our  g r e a t e s t  a s s e t  i n  t h e  
p o s tw a r  y e a r s . "^5 He r e t u r n e d  t o  th e  S e n a te  f o r  a veTy 
b r i e f  v i s i t  on May 2 0 ,  1950— h i s  l a s t .  His S e n a t o r i a l  work 
f o r  the  r e s t  o f  h i s  l i f e  was c o n f i n e d  t o  l e t t e r  w r i t i n g  and 
t e l e p h o n e  c a l l s .  P r e s i d e n t  Truman w r o te  him: "You j u s t
d o n ' t  r e a l i z e , "  he s a i d ,  "what a vacuum t h e r e  has  been i n  
t h e  Sena te  and i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  o u r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  s i n c e
^^The New York Times, March 25, 1950, p. 24.
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you l e f t . ”^6 The "vacuum" t o  which th e  P r e s i d e n t  r e f e r r e d  
was o b se rv e d  i n  the  breakdown of  b i p a r t i s a n  p o l i c y  f o l l o w i n g  
V a n d e n b e rg ' s  r e t i r e m e n t .  Jo sep h  Harsch d e s c r i b e d  th e  
s i t u a t i o n :
Today ou r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i s  dom inated  by a lmost  
a  t o t a l  r e v e r s a l  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  which p r e v a i l e d  
i n  t h e  V an d en b e rg -M a rsh a l l  p e r i o d .  S e n a to r  T a f t  
has  t a k e n  over th e  Vandenberg p o s i t i o n  among S e n a te  
R e p u b l i c a n s .  Dean Acheson i s  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e .  .
. . They do n o t  a g re e  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  p u r p o s e s .
They do n o t  s h a r e  a s e n s e  of  the  p r o p e r  means.  They 
do n o t  t r u s t  each o t h e r  t o  be n o n p a r t i s a n .  . . . The 
two men have become symbols  o f  p a r t i s a n  b a t t l e ,  n o t  
p a r t n e r s  i n  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  as  were  t h e i r  
p r e d e c e s s o r s . o ?
The end came f o r  Vandenberg on A p r i l  15 ,  1951, a t  
h i s  home i n  Grand R a p id s ,  M ich igan .  Only a  month b e f o r e  
' t h e  S e n a te  had p a s se d  a unanimous r e s o l u t i o n  by s t a n d in g  
v o t e  i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  h e i g h t s  to  which Vandenberg 
many e f f o r t s  f o r  h i s  c o u n t r y  had t a k e n  him. I t  was a 
f i t t i n g  t r i b u t e  f o r  one who had d e d i c a t e d  most o f  h i s  l i f e  
t o  the  c a u s e  o f  p e ac e .
I n  b r i e f  r e v i e w ,  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  Vandenberg’ s 
c h i l d h o o d  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  l o s s  of  p e r s o n a l  s e c u r i t y  which he 
l a t e r  came to  r e g a r d  a s  t h e  u n d e r l i n i n g  i n f l u e n c e  o f  hii s 
l i f e .  The c a r e e r  a s  a newspaperman b r o u g h t  him p e r s o n a l  
s e c u r i t y  and r e g i o n a l  i n f l u e n c e  as  a  p a r t y  f a i t h f u l .  The
^^v^il l iam Hil lman ( e d . ) ,  Mr. P r e s i d e n t  (New York: 
F a r r a r ,  S t r a u s  and Young, 1 9 5 2 ) ,  pp .  5 5 -5 4 .
p .  1 .
^^The Christian Science Monitor, April 23, 1951,
ÿV
y e a r s  as  a S e n a t o r  were  marked by an i n c o n s i s t e n t  v o t i n g  
r e c o r d  i n  dom es t ic  a f f a i r s ,  and a d ra m a t i c  s w i t c h  from a 
b e l i e f  i n  i s o l a t i o n i s m  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  i n  f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s .  His i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  c o u rse  o f  American i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  i n c r e a s e d  n e a r  t h e  end of h i s  c a r e e r  
a s  he c o n c e n t r a t e d  h i s  e n e r g i e s  on the  a t t a i n m e n t  of  a 
b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  In  e l e v a t i n g  the  n a t i o n ’ s 
s e c u r i t y  above p e r s o n a l  and p a r t y  i n t e r e s t ,  he r e a c h e d  a 
h ig h  l e v e l  o f  s t a t e s m a n s h i p  which he employed t o  h i s  
c o u n t r y ’s ad v an tag e  i n  moments o f  n a t i o n a l  c r i s e s .
A g a in s t  t h i s  b a ck g rou n d ,  t h e  f o l l o w in g  t h r e e  chap ­
t e r s  w i l l  be g iv en  o v e r  t o  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  p a t t e r n s  
o f  t h e  i d e a s  which he advanced  i n  s e l e c t e d  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
a d d r e s s e s .  The sp e e c h e s  a r e  g rouped  in  such a manner t h a t  
t h e y  s e r v e  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  h i s  m ajor  c o n c e p ts  on 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  between 1937 and 1949 , and so t h a t  th e y  
r e p r e s e n t  t h e  t h r e e  ph a ses  of  th e  ’’t r a n s i t i o n ” o f  h i s  
i d e a s  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
CHAPTER I I I  
THE RHETORIC OF ISOLATIONISM
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The f o r e g o i n g  c h a p t e r  i s  an a t t e m p t  t o  d e s c r i b e  
t h e  e v e n t s  i n  Vandenberg’ s l i f e  be tween 1937-1949 which 
have a s i g n i f i c a n t  b e a r i n g  on h i s  s p e e c h e s .  S in c e  t h i s  
s tu d y  i s  p r i m a r i l y  co nce rned  w i t h  th e  changes  i n  V andenberg ’ s 
i d e a s  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d u r in g  t h e s e  y e a r s ,  the  emphasis  
o f  C hap te r  I I  has  been  on t h e  c h ro n o lo g y  of  p o l i t i c a l  e v e n t s  
i n  which Vandenberg was an a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a n t .  I t  i s  t h e  
pu rpose  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  and th e  two which f o l l o w  t o  d e s c r i b e  
t h e  ” i d e a - s y s t e m ” i n  Vandenberg’ s sp e ec h es  as  th e y  p a r a l l e l e d  
t h e s e  c r i t i c a l  e v e n t s  in  American h i s t o r y .
From t h e  b e g in n in g  of  t h e  a g g r e s s i o n  of  th e  F a s c i s t  
powers u n t i l  J a p a n ’ s a t t a c k  on P e a r l  H a rb o r ,  Vandenberg 
s p e n t  g r e a t  e n e rg y  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  b lock  t h o s e  a c t i o n s  
which would have e n a b le d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  p l a y  a more 
p o s i t i v e  r o l e  i n  w o r ld  a f f a i r s .  He d id  s o ,  i t  seems e v i d e n t ,  
b ecau se  h i s  supreme o b j e c t i v e  was t o  keep  America ou t  o f  t h e  
c o n f l i c t .  He s u p p o r t e d  a l l  l e g i s l a t i o n  d e s ig n e d  t o  keep  th e  
c o u n t r y  n e u t r a l  and j o i n e d  i n  a l l  a t t e m p t s  to  b lo c k  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  which he t h o u g h t  might l e a d  t o  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  His
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p u b l i c  sp e e c h e s  made between 1937 and 1941  a r e  a  r e c o r d  o f
h i s  a t t e m p t s  t o  mold p u b l i c  a t t i t u d e s  i n  tlie " i s o l a t i o n i s t "
d i r e c t i o n .
Four  o f  V and en b e rg ’ s sp e ec h es  w i l l  s e r v e  as  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e  o f  the  m a jo r  themes which  r a n  th ro u g h  h i s  r h e t o r i c  
from 1937 t o  1941 , nam ely ,  n e u t r a l i t y ,  p r e p a r e d n e s s ,  and 
i n t e r v e n t i o n .  These f o u r  sp e ec h es  s e l e c t e d  f o r  r e p o r t  and 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
1 .  The N e u t r a l i t y  Act o f  1937 A d d r e s s . Vandenberg 
spoke  i n  f a v o r  of  the  m a jo r  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  
a c t  on March 1 ,  1937» He a l s o  s u p p o r t e d  an 
amendment which would h a v e  d e n ie d  the  P r e s i d e n t  
any d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power i n  d e a l i n g  w i th  t h e  
embargo of war  m a t e r i a l s .
2 .  The Bmbargo-Repeal  Speech  o f  19 3 9 . Vandenberg 
spoke  on F e b r u a r y  27 ,  1939 a g a i n s t  the  admini s -
t r a t i o n ’ s r e q u e s t  t h a t  t h e  embargo be l i f t e d
on war  m a t e r i a l s ,  and a  " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  pro­
v i s i o n  be s u b s t i t u t e d  i n  i t s  p l a c e .
3 .  The S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e  A ddress  o f  1 9 40 .
Vandenberg  spoke on August  2 ,  1940 a g a i n s t  
t h e  d r a f t i n g  o f  American men.
4 .  The L en d -L ease  Address of 1 9 41 . Vandenberg 
spoke on F e b r u a r y  1 3  ̂ 1941 a g a i n s t  t h e  p ro p o s a l  
t o  a i d  G re a t  B r i t a i n .
Each speech  i s  t r e a t e d  i n  t i i r e e  s e c t i o n s  fo r  purposes  
o f  e s t i m a t i n g  the  e x p r e s s e d  and i m p l i e d  m ean in gs .  The f i r s t  
s e c t i o n  t r e a t s  th e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  i n  which t h e  
speech  was g i v e n .  The se co n d  s e c t i o n  a t t e m p t s  a  r e p o r t  of  
t h e  i d e a s  i n  t h e  speech  i n c l u d i n g  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the  
o v e r t  p r o p o s i t i o n s  and t h e  a p p a r e n t  v a l u e s  a c c e p t e d  by t h e  
a u d ie n ce  t o  which  t h e  a rgum ents  were  g e a r e d .  The t h i r d  
s e c t i o n  i n t e r p r e t s  t h e  s p e a k e r ’ s i d e a s  i n  t e rm s  of h i s
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p u rp o se  and h i s  c h o ic e  o f  p e r s u a s i o n s .  The c h a p t e r  
c o n c lu d e s  w i th  a suminar}’- o f  Vandenberg^s d e f e n s e  of 
i s o l a t i o n i s m .
The Address  on t h e  N e u t r a l i t y  Act of  1937 
From M u s s o l i n i ’ s a t t a c k  on E t h i o p i a  i n  O c to b e r ,  1935,  
t o  J a p a n ’ s a t t a c k  on t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  on December 7 ,  1941, 
Vandenberg  n e v e r  l o s t  f a i t h  i n  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  America cou ld  
r e m a in  ou t  o f  the  war  i f  she  wanted to  do so .  He d e d i c a t e d  
t h i s  p o r t i o n  o f  h i s  l i f e  t o  s e e k in g  C o n g r e s s io n a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  
d e s i g n e d  t o  keep  h i s  c o u n t r y  a t  p e a c e .  One o f  h i s  m a jo r  
e f f o r t s  came i n  s u p p o r t  o f  the b i l l  t o  e x te n d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  1937*. His r>/Iarch 1 ,  1937 S e n a te  
s p e e c h  i n  su p p o r t  o f  the  m easure  c o n t a i n s  a r a t i o n a l e  f o r  
h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  America c o u ld  s t a y  a t  peace  by a d h e r i n g  t o  
a  p o l i c y  of  s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y .  To u n d e r s t a n d  h i s  t h i n k i n g  
on t h i s  v i t a l  i s s u e ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  examine t h e  c o n t e x t  
i n  which t h e  spe ec h  was g i v e n ,  th e  sequence  of  e v e n t s  o f  
which  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i v e  b a t t l e  was a p a r t .
The C o n tex t  o f  the Speech 
America i n  t h e  e a r l y  t h i r t i e s , — Although Americans 
e n t e r e d  the  1930 ’ s f i l l e d  w i th  d e s p a i r  about t h e  gr im  e f f e c t s  
o f  economic d e p r e s s i o n ,  t h e y  w ere  h o p e f u l  f o r  a p e a c e f u l  
w o r l d .  The hew wave of op t im ism  swept the  w or ld  w i t h  t h e  
s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  K e l lo g g - B r i a n d  Anti-War T r e a ty  i n  1 9 2 0 ,1
I p o s t e r  Rhea D u l l e s ,  America’ s R ise  t o  World Power 
(New York: H arper  & B r o s , ,  1 954) ,  p,  157.
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Most o f  th e  w o r l d ’ s g r e a t  powers i n c l u d i n g  G rea t  B r i t a i n ,  
J a p a n ,  Germany, and I t a l y  j o i n e d  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  in  
r e n o u n c in g  war a s  a  means of  s e t t l i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o ­
v e r s i e s .  S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e  K e l lo g g  promoted t h e  t r e a t y  
w i t h  t h e  encouragem ent  o f  P r e s i d e n t  C oo l idge  and S e n a to r  
Borah ,  Chairman of  tne  S e n a te  F o r e ig n  R e l a t i o n s  Committee, 
who lo o k ed  upon the  measure  a s  an a t t e m p t  t o  ou t law  war 
i r i t i i  m oral  s u a s i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  w i th  the  use  o f  f o r c e .
Although th e  p a c t  c o n t a i n e d  no p r o v i s i o n s  w h a tso ­
e v e r  f o r  e n f o r c i n g  i t s  p l e d g e s ,  the  American people  viewed 
t h e  t r e a t y  a s  a s t e p  to w ard  th e  i d e a l  o f  peace  among 
n a t i o n s .  To be s u r e ,  a  few warned a g a i n s t  such na ive  
f a i t h  i n  a  s ig n e d  document.  The young Henry Cabor Lodge, 
f o r  exam ple ,  n o te d  t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  was an " a t t e m p t  to  g e t
som eth ing  f o r  n o t h i n g , "  and th u s  promoted  a  " s e n s e  o f  f a l s e  
2s e c u r i t y . "  But f o r  the  most  part- ,  the  American people  f e l l  
i n t o  l i n e  and the  S e n a te  gave a lm o s t  unanimous a p p ro v a l  t o  
t h e  p a c t
In  t h e i r  g e n e r a l  a t t i t u d e  tow ard  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  
t h e  American peo p le  were t h u s  u n a b le  t o  f a c e  the  f a c t s  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .  But t h e y  co u ld  n o t  evade the 
r e a l i t y  of a  c r e e p i n g  p a r a l y s i s  o f  t h e  d o m es t ic  economy.
By 1932 , t i  e g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t  s to o d  a t  107 .6  b i l l i o n s
2
Henry Cabot Lodge,  "The Meaning of the  Kellogg 
T r e a t y , "  H a r p e r s , CL7III  (December, I 928 ) ,  41 .
^ D u l l e s ,  op .  c i t . ,  p .  160 .
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o f  1947 d o l l a r s ,  a d rop  o f  4 1 .7  b i l l i o n  o v e r  t h a t  of  1929.
P e r  c a p i t a  d i s p o s a b l e  income had dropped f rom  927 b i l l i o n  
in  1929 to  703 b i l l i o n  i n  1932.4  p i t e  and Reese n o t e  t h a t  
" t h e  d r o p  i n  income was accompanied by low er  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
more b u s i n e s s  f a i l u r e s ,  i n c r e a s e d  unemployment,  and f a l l i n g
p r i c e s . "5
But the  s t a t i s t i c s  t e l l  on ly  p a r t  o f  t h e  r e a l  s t o r y .
The i l l  e f f e c t s  a r e  b e s t  n o te d  in  t h e  d i s r u p t i o n  which the  
economic c o l l a p s e  caused  i n  t h e  l i v e s  of  A m er icans .  F r e d e r i c k  
Lewis A l l e n  d e s c r i b e s  the s i g n s  o f  t h e  American c i t ; -  in  
d e p r e s s i o n :
F i r s t ,  t h e  b read  l i n e s  i n  t h e  p o o r e r  d i s t r i c t s .
Second,  th o s e  b l e a k  s e t t l e m e n t s  i r o n i c a l l y  known 
a s  " H o o v e r v i l l e s "  on t h e  o u t s k i r t s  of  t h e  c i t y  a'nd 
v a c a n t  l o t s - - g r o u p s  o f  m a k e s h i f t  sh a c k s  c o n s t r u c t e d  . 
o u t  o f  pack in g  boxes ,  s c r a p  i r o n  . . . sh acks  iv. 
which  men and sometimes whole f a m i l i e s  o f  e v i c t e d  
p e o p le  were s l e e p i n g  on au to m o b i le  s e a t s .  . . . T h i r d ,  
t h e  hom eless  p e o p le  s l e e p i n g  in  doorways o r  on p a rk  
benches  and go ing  t h e  rounds  of r e s t a u r a n t s  f o r  
l e f t - o v e r  h a l f - e a t e n  b i s c u i t s .  . . . F o u r t h ,  t h e  
v a s t l y  i n c r e a s e d  number on t h e  h ig hw ays .  . . . °
Faced w i th  t h i s  c r i s i s ,  i t  i s  l i t t l e  wonder t h a t  
Americans  were r e l u c t a n t  to  t a k e  up th e  burdens  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c o . f l i c t .  The e l e c t i o n  of  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  in 
1932 marked no immediate  d e p a r t u r e  from t h i s  a t t i t u d e .  The
4-Gilbert C. F i t e  arid J im  E. R eese ,  An Economic 
H is to ry  o f  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n
Company, 1 95 9 ; ,  p .  579.
^ I b i d . ,  p .  577.
^ F r e d e r i c k  Lewis A l l e n ,  S ince  Y e s t e r d a y  (New York: 
H arper  & B r o s . ,  1939) ,  pp .  59-6ÏÏT
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new P r e s i d e n t  was i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s o c i a l  and economic re fo rm .  
He co nce rn e d  h i m s e l f  w i th  dom es t ic  p ro b le m s ,  sp e a r h e a d in g  
t h e  c o n c e p t  which  came t o  be known a s  the  New D e a l . In  
h i s  con ce rn  f o r  r e c o v e r y  and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  he seemed 
c o n t e n t  t o  l e a v e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  t o  S e c r e t a r y  of 
S t a t e  H u l l . 7 The o n ly  r e f e r e n c e  to f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  i n  f a c t ,  
which R o o s e v e l t  made i n  h i s  1932 I n a u g u r a l  Address  was an 
a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  b e l i e v e d  i n  t h e  good 
n e ig h b o r  p o l i c y .  For the  most p a r t ,  he a c c e p t e d  the  
i s o l a t i o n i s t  s e n t im e n t  of the  n a t i o n  i n  r e m a in in g  a l o o f  
from f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .
But a s  the  R o o se v e l t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a d h e re d  t o  the  
i s o l a t i o n i s t  p o l i c y .  Fasc ism  grew i n  Germany and I t a l y ,  
m i l i t a r i s m  i n  J a p a n  and Marxism i n  R u s s i a .  These  e v e n t s  
were a l a r m i n g ,  b u t  the  shadows o f  d e p r e s s i o n  crowded them 
i n t o  t h e  b a ck g ro u n d .  Americans were  a b s o r b e d ,  i n  p a r t .
^ C o r d e l l  H u l l ,  The Memoirs o f  C o r d e l l  H u l l  (2 v o l s . ;  
New York: The M acm il lan  Co . ,  1948) ,  I ,  194.  H e r e c a l l e d :
"During h i s  f i r s t  t e rm  i n  o f f i c e  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  was 
so  immersed i n  an  a v a la n c h e  o f  dom es t ic  q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  he 
l e f t  me i n  a lm o s t  f u l l  charge  of . f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  I  kep t  
him t h o r o u g h l y  in fo rm e d  on a l l  major  d e v e lo p m e n t s ,  b u t  he 
e x p e c te d  me t o  f u r n i s h  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  p o l i c y  and  a c t i o n ” ; 
and R ic h a r d  H o f s t a d t e r ,  The American P o l i t i c a l  T r a d i t i o n  
(New York: V in t a g e  Books,  1 9 5 7 ) ,  p .  343.  He s t a t e s :  "Busy
w i t h  d o m e s t i c  a f f a i r s ,  he [Roosevel t ]  showed no i n t e r e s t  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c t i o n  up  t o  t h e  f a l l  o f  19 3 7 , e x c e p t  f o r  an 
u n s u c c e s s f u l  a t t e m p t  t o  g e t  Congress  to  a f f i l i a t e  w i th  the 
World C o u r t .  ( I n  1933,  he had i m p l i c i t l y  e n d o r s e d  t h e  
'S t im s o n  d o c t r i n e '  o f  n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n  of  J a p a n e s e  p e n e t r a t i o n  
o f  C h ina ,  and h i s  i n t i m a t e s  h e a r d  him e x p r e s s i n g  a d e s i r e  
i n  the ç  r i n g  o f  1935 ^to  do so m e th in g '  about  H i t l e r . )  His 
o v e r t  p o l i c y  may n o t  have  r e f l e c t e d  h i s  p r i v a t e  c o n v i c t i o n s .  
. . .  But he was i n  no mood t o  t r y  t o  remold th e  dominant 
i s o l a t i o n i s t  and p a c i f i s t  f e e l i n g  o f  th e  c o u n t r y . "
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w i t h  t h e  everyday  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  of  l i f e .  P r o h i b i t i o n  r e p e a l ,  
t h e  L in d b e rg h k id n a p  c a s e ,  John  D i l l i n g e r  and the  l i k e  were 
i n  t h e  news. But t h e  main a t t r a c t i o n  was an economic 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  sym bol ized  by th e  New D ea l .  In  s h o r t ,
America  was a b so rb e d  i n  economic d e p r e s s i o n  and had no 
t im e  f o r  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .
D r i f t i n g  i n t o  w a r . —The f i r s t  b ig  b reak  i n  th e  
p e a c e f u l  a p p ea ra n c e  of  the  w o r ld  o c c u r r e d  i n  1931 when 
J a p a n  in v ad e d  Manchur ia— a b o l d  move which made a mockery 
o f  t h e  -League o f  N a t i o n s ,  tne- Nine-Power T r e a t y ,  and t h e  
K e l lo g g  P a c t .  At t h a t  t i m e ,  most Americans d id  n o t  seem 
t o  t h i n k  t h a t  the  F a r  E a s t e r n  s i t u a t i o n  was a s e r i o u s  
p rob lem  because  so few o f  them " to o k  J a p an  s e r i o u s l y  in  
t h o s e  d a y s . "  The p i c t u r e  d a r k e n e d ,  however,  when " th e  
f o u n d a t i o n s  of peace  were o v e r t u r n e d  i n  E u r o p e . H i t l e r  
t o u c h e d  i t  o f f  by h i s  w i th d r a w a l  from the  League o f  N a t io n s  
i n  1933- The s i t u a t i o n  was f u r t h e r  i n t e n s i f i e d  i n  1935 by 
t h e  German c o n s c r i p t i o n  program , i n  d i r e c t  d e f i a n c e  o f  th e  
V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y .  M u s s o l ih i  added t o  t h e . u n r e s t  by h i s  
f r e q u e n t  t h r e a t s  a g a i n s t  E t h i o p i a .
Americans were d e te r m in e d  t o  s t a y  out  of t h e s e  c o n f l i c t s ,  
b u t  the  w or ld  f a c e d  J a p a n e s e  m i l i t a r i s t s  i n  the F a r  E a s t  and 
Nazism in  Europe.  D isa p p o in tm en t  over  t h e  T r e a t y  of  V e r s a i l l e s
^ A l len  Nevins  and L o u is  H acker ,  The U n i te d  S t a t e s  and 
I t s  P l a c e  i n  World A f f a i r s ,  1918-1943 (Boston:  D. C. Heath
& Company, 1943J,  pp.  3 08-89 .
67
a lon g  w i t h  f a i l u r e  of t h e  World War I  European A l l i e s  t o  
s e t t l e  t h e i r  war d e b t s  w i th  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  combined t o
make many Americans shy away from any m en t ion  o f  c o l l e c t i v e
9
s e c u r i t y .
The Nye Committee . —The g e n e r a l  d i s t r u s t  o f  Europeans 
was i n t e n s i f i e d  by t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  Nye Committee i n  1934. 
These f i n d i n g s  grew out of a r e s o l u t i o n  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  the  
S en a te  e a r l y  i n  1945 by S e n a to r  Vandenberg and S e n a to r  
G e ra ld  P. Nye of  North  Dakota  vciich c a l l e d  fo r  an i n v e s ­
t i g a t i o n  o f  the  m a n u f a c tu r e ,  s a l e ,  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  
i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  w a r .  A s p e c i a l  co m m it tee ,  headed by S e n a to r  
Nye, was o r g a n i z e d  f o r  t h a t  p u r p o s e .  Drummond n o t e s ,  how­
e v e r ,  t h a t  i t s  e f f o r t s  were f o c u s e d  on t r y i n g  to  prove t h a t  
" t h e  t r u e  c a u s e s  o f  America’ s r e c e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  were t o  
be found  i n  the  p o l i c i e s  which b a n k e r s  and i n d u s t r a l i s t s
1 n
had s e l f i s h l y  f o i s t e d  upon the  g o v e rn m e n t ."  The end 
r e s u l t  w a s ' a  number of p u b l i c  h e a r i n g s  which d id  much t o  
conv ince  a  l a r g e  p o r t i o n  of  th e  American people  t h a t  th e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  World War I  t o  p r o t e c t  the  
economic i n t e r e s t s  o f  American m u n i t i o n s  makers .  Langer and 
G leason  c r e d i t  the  Nye Committee w i th  p l a y in g  a m ajor  r o l e  
i n  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  1935 - 1937»
9 j u l i u s  W . P r a t t ,  A H i s t o r y  o f  U n i ted  S t a t e s  Fore ign  
P o l i c y  (New York: P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  1 9 5 5 ) ,  p .  596.
^^Donald F. Drummond, The P a s s i n g  o f  American 
N e u t r a l i t y ,  1937-1941 (Ann Arbor:  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Michigan
P r e s s ,  1 955) ,  p .  4 0 .
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The C o n g r e s s io n a l  I n v e s t i g a t i n g  Committee u n d e r  
S e n a t o r  N y e 's  c h a i rm a n sh ip  had j u s t  d e m o n s t r a te d  t o  
t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of most Americans t h a t  t h e  F i r s t  
World War had  r e s u l t e d  c h i e f l y  f rom mad i m p e r i a l  
a m b i t io n s  o f  the  European a n t a g o n i s t ^  and t h a t  .phe 
U n i te d  S t a t e s  had been  sucked i n t o  the  c o n f l i c t  
th r o u g h  i n s i d i o u s  p ropaganda  and the  m a c h in a t io n s  
o f  p o w e r fu l  m u n i t io n s -m a k in g  i n t e r e s t s .  The new 
n e u t r a l i t y  laws were d e s ig n e d  to  f o r e s t a l l  a
r e p e t i t i o n  of  such a c a l a m i ty .  ^
N e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  of 1935»— A number o f  o t h e r  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  c o i n c i d e d  w i th  the  Nye Committee f i n d i n g s  t o  
make p o s s i b l e  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  of 1935.  The 
m arke t  was f l o o d e d  w i th  r e v i s i o n i s t  books and magazine  
a r t i c l e s  " ex p o s in g  the d i a b o l i c a l l y  c l e v e r  i n t r i g u e s  and 
t h e  h o r r i b l y  f a t  p r o f i t s  of  the European ’rr ierchants of  
d e a t h , '  t h e  p r i v a t e  m a n u f a c tu r e r s  of the  i m p l e m e n t s ■of  war .
In  Europe ,  M u s s o l i n i  began m o b i l i z i n g  f o r  w a r ,  and  Congress
th o u g h t  i t  t im e  t o  e n a c t  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  remove p r o f i t s
from w a r ,  p r o h i b i t  t h e  s a l e  of  war m a t e r i a l s  t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s ,  
and r e s t r i c t  Americans from t r a v e l  i n  war z o n e s .  Conse­
q u e n t l y ,  a j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n  was ru sh e d  tr irough C o n g re s s ,  
l a t e r  known a s  t h e  F i r s t  N e u t r a l i t y  Act .
S e n a t o r  Vandenberg s u p p o r te d  the  r e s o l u t i o n  w i th  
e n th u s ia sm  b e c a u se  he b e l i e v e d  i t  would "keep  u s  e n t i r e l y  
d e ta c h e d  from f o r e i g n  w a r s . " ^ ^  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  d id  no t  
s h a r e  th e  S e n a t o r ’ s e a g e rn e s s  f o r  t h e  b i l l ,  but  s i g n e d  i t
^^W il l iam  L. Langer  and S. E v e r e t t  G le a so n ,  The C h a l l e n g e  
t o  I s o l a t i o n , 1937-1940 (New York: H arper  & B r o s . ,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  p .  14.
1 2 Nevins and Hacker, op. cit., p. 390.
^^The New York Times, October 27, 1935, p. 34.
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r e l u c t a n t l y .  The P r e s i d e n t  and S e c r e t a r y  H u l l  had hoped 
f o r  a  b i l l  t h a t  would p e rm i t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  f o r b i d  weapons 
o f  war t o  an a g g r e s s o r  n a t i o n ,  b u t  a t  th e  same t im e ,  r e t a i n  
t h e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power t o  a id  a n a t i o n  t h a t  had been 
a t t a c k e d .  C o n g r e s s ,  i n s t e a d ,  p a s s e d  a s u b s t i t u t e  which 
r e q u i r e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  f o r b i d  th e  s e l l i n g  o f  arms t o  
a l l  b e l l i g e r e n t s .
The r e s o l u t i o n  a l s o  p r o h i b i t e d  American s h i p s  from 
c a r r y i n g  sh ip m e n ts  t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s ,  and i t  empowered t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  to  warn Americans  t r a v e l l i n g  i n  b e l l i g e r e n t  s h i p s  
t h a t  t h e y  d i d  so a t  t h e i r  own r i s k .  The a c t  was e x te n d e d  i n  
1936 w i th  new p r o v i s i o n s  which f o r b a d e  American lo a n s  t o  
any b e l l i g e r e n t ,  and i n  a d d i t i o n ,  exempt from ban of war  
goods any American s t a t e  engaged i n  c o n f l i c t  w i th  a n o n -  
American s t a t e .
The N e u t r a l i t y  Act o f  19 3 7 . — Ey th e  t ime th e  N e u t r a l i t y  
Act o f  1935 came b e f o r e  C ongress  f o r  e x t e n s i o n  in  1937, 
world  t e n s i o n s  had c l im bed  t o  a  new h i g h .  M u s so l in i  had 
c o m p le t e ly  o v e r ru n  E t h i o p i a  in  1936,  i n t i m a t i n g  a s  he d i d  
t h a t  League s a n c t i o n s  meant w a r ,  and  th e  weak League was no t  
p r e p a r e d  t o  go t h i s  f a r .  With the  League s h a t t e r e d .  H i t l e r  
marched i n t o  the  d e m i l i t a r i z e d  R h in e la n d .  He fo l lo w e d  t h i s  
move by s i g n i n g  an A n t i -C om in te rn  P a c t  w i th  I t a l y  and J a p a n ,  
which combined th e  f o r c e s  of  two p o w e r fu l  European d i c t a t o r s  
w i th  t h e  war l o r d s  of t h e  F a r  E a s t .  With the  a g g r e s s o r s  
" c a l l i n g  s i g n a l s , "  t h e  world  was f a c e d  w i th  a s e r i e s  o f  
r e c u r r i n g  c r i s e s .
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America r e a c t e d  t o  t h e  w o r ld  s i t u a t i o n  i n  1937 w i th  
a  t h i r d  N e u t r a l i t y  Act. The 1935 and  1936 r e s o l u t i o n s  were 
e x p e r i m e n t a l  e f f o r t s .  O p in io n  m easurem ents  th e n  i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  a b o u t  n i n e t y - f i v e  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  American p e o p le  th ou g h t  
t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  sh o u ld  n o t  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  a n o t h e r  
w a r ,  and about  s e v e n t y  p e r c e n t  t h o u g h t  t h a t  the  c o u n t r y  
b l u n d e r e d  i n  i n t e r v e n i n g  i n  World War The t im e  seemed
r i p e  f o r  a  permanent  n e u t r a l i t y  m easu re .  The new b i l l  was 
s i g n e d  i n t o  law on May 1 ,  1937 .^^
The new r e s o l u t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  from th e  1935 law 
s e v e r a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  which  were t o  o p e r a t e  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  i n  
c a s e  o f  war ,  a n d ,  which gave the  P r e s i d e n t  no d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
a u t h o r i t y .  There  were r e s t r i c t i o n s  on: (1)  e x p o r t  o f
a rm s ,  am m uni t ion ,  and im plem ents  o f  war t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s ;
( 2 ) p u r c h a s e  o f  s a l e  of s e c u r i t i e s  o r  o t h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s  of  
b e l l i g e r e n t s ;  ( 3 ) s o l i c i t a t i o n  of  war  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ;  (4 ) 
t r a n s p o r t  o f  implements  o f  war i n  American v e s s e l s  t o  
b e l l i g e r e n t s ;  (5) t r a v e l  by Americans  on b e l l i g e r e n t  v e s s e l s ,  
and ( 6 ) arming of  American merchantmen.  However, t h e  b i l l  
d i d  g iv e  the  P r e s i d e n t  s e v e r a l  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers .  I f  
n e e d e d ,  he c o u ld  a u t h o r i z e :  ( 1 ) t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n
a r t i c l e s  o r  commodities  on an American v e s s e l  t o  a b e l l i g e r e n t
^^George G a l lu p  and Claude R o b inso n ,  "American I n s t i t u t e  
o f  P u b l i c  Opin ion  S u rv e y s ,  1935-193&,"  P u b l i c  Opin ion  Q u a r t e r l y . 
I I  ( J u l y ,  1933) ,  3SÔ. Also  see  Drummond, op.  c i t . ,  p .  43.
^^Nevins and Hacker, op. cit., p. 395.
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s t a t e ;  (2 ) t h e  e x p o r t  o f  any goods t o  a b e l l i g e r e n t  a f t e r  
t r a n s f e r  of t i t l e  t o  the  f o r e i g n  governm ent;  (3 ) t h e  use  
o f  American p o r t s  a s  a b a s i s  o f  s u p p ly  f o r  b e l l i g e r e n t  
w a r s h i p s ;  and (4 ) u se  of  such  p o r t s  by f o r e i g n  submarines 
and armed m erchan t  s h i p s  b u t  o n ly  i n  acco rd a n c e  w i th  
s p e c i f i c  r e g u l a t i o n s .
The p h a se s  of  the  b i l l  which would r e s t r i c t  sh ipm en ts  
o f  arms to  b e l l i g e r e n t s  and th e  m a t t e r  of p r o h i b i t i n g  l o a n s  
t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s  were g e n e r a l l y  a g re e d  upon by most Congressmen. 
Sha rp  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  o p in io n  o c c u r r e d ,  however,  over t h e  
" c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  p r o v i s i o n s  of uhe a c t .  O the rs  o b j e c t e d  t o  
t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  g iv en  to  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i n  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of. 
c e r t a i n  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  Vandenberg was o f  t h e  l a t t e r  g roup .
R ep o r t  o f  t h e  Speech
S e n a to r  Vandenberg a d d r e s s e d  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  S en a te  
i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  N e u t r a l i t y  Act o f  1937 on March 1 ,  1937.
He e n d o rsed  a l l  p h a se s  o f  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  w i th  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  
o f  th e  l a t t e r  group of d i s c r e t i o n a r y  p r o v i s i o n s  g iven  th e  
P r e s i d e n t ,  a s  l i s t e d  a'oove. He p ro po sed  an amendment which 
would have e l i m i n a t e d  t h i s  p a ru  o f  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n .  His 
c h i e f  g o a l  i n  t ’ne speech  was t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c ou ld  s t a y  a t  p eace  by a d o p t i n g  a p o l i c y  of  
s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y .  The speech  was con ce rned  w i th  t h e  most 
e f f e c t i v e  means of  im p lem en t ing  t h i s  p o l i c y .




The a d d re s s  d i v id e s  i n t o  two p a r t s .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  
d i v i s i o n ,  Vandenberg p r e s e n t e d  h i s  argum ents  i n  f a v o r  of  
t h e  p r o p o s a l .  These were p r e s e n t e d  i n  f o u r  b r i e f  p a ra g r a p h s  
i n  which  l i t t l e  o r  no a t t e m p t  was made a t  r h e t o r i c a l  
deve lo p m en t .  The rem ainder  of  the b r i e f  a d d r e s s  was g iven  
o v e r  t o  a d e fe n s e  o f  h is  amendment to  s t r i k e  out  t h e  d i s c r e ­
t i o n a r y  powers a f f o r d e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  by the  b i l l .
I n t r o d u c t i o n . —In  h i s  opening  r em a rk s ,  Vandenberg 
v o i c e d  agreem ent  w i th  S e n a to r  P i t t m a n ,  Chairman o f  t h e  
F o r e ig n  R e l a t i o n s  Committee,  who had j u s t  i n t r o d u c e d  th e  
b i l l  t o  the  S e n a t e .  Vandenberg r e g i s t e r e d  "co m p le te  
a p p r o v a l " ^ ^  o f  the  f o u r  main argum ents  which S e n a t o r  , 
P i t tm a n  had advanced in su p p o r t  o f  the  measure.-
The case  f o r  the  n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n . — Vandenberg 
u n e q u i v o c a l l y  endorsed  " t h e  com ple te  mandatory  embargo upon 
l o a n s ,  c r e d i t s ,  a rm s ,  ammunition,  and im plem ents  o f  war to  
a l l  p e o p le s  i n  a g iven  c r i s i s . "  His s u p p o r t  o f  t h i s  
s e c t i o n  of  the b i l l  was a p p a r e n t l y  based  on the  a ssum pt ion  
t h a t  a rem ova l  o f  th e  commercial  m otive  from th e  war 
s i t u a t i o n  would a u t o m a t i c a l l y  remove "an i n e v i t a b l e  so u rc e
1 Go f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e n tm e n t s  and f r i c t i o n s . "   ̂ N e i t h e r  he 
n o r  S e n a to r  P i t tm a n  made any a t t e m p t  t o  p rove  t h i s  
a s s e r t i o n .  Vandenberg a p p a r e n t l y  t h o u g h t  t h a t  Americans 
a c c e p t e d  the  v a l i d i t y  of  th e  Nye Committee f i n d i n g s  and th e
l? lb id .  l^ lb id .  ^^Ibid.
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r e v i s i o n i s t  l i t e r a t u r e  which r e p o r t e d  t h a t  the  U ni ted  S t a t e s  
had  been  drawn i n t o  World War I  by t h e  m a c h in a t io n s  o f  
pow e r fu l  m u n i t io n -m a k in g  i n t e r e s t s .  His su p p o r t  of t h e  
measure  was th u s  b a sed  on th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  would h e l p  
t o  avo id  a r e p e t i t i o n  o f  such  a c a l a m i t y .  S ince  he a l luded  
t o  World War I  b u t  d i d  not  even draw on h i s t o r i c a l  com par i ­
s o n s ,  i t  seems e v i d e n t  t h a t  Vandenberg th o u g h t  h i s  countrymen 
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  an embargo on sh ip m e n ts  o f  m u n i t io n s  to  
b e l l i g e r e n t s  would e l i m i n a t e  one o f  t h e  m a jo r  causes  o f  
f r i c t i o n  between the  U n i ted  S t a n e s  and o t h e r  n a t i o n s .  He 
was c o n t e n t  t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n c i d e n t s  growing 
o u t  o f  t r a d e  "can  c l im a x  i n  a d e a d l y  menace t o  our own
t r a n q u i l l i t y . "20
I n  a second  a s s e r t i o n ,  Vandenberg approved  th e  
p r o h i b i t i o n  " a g a i n s t  American t r a v e l  i n  b e l l i g e r e n t  s h i p s . "
He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  when a c i t i z e n  e n t e r e d  a war zone "he 
c a r r i e s  h i s  c o u n t r y  i n t o  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  same e lement  o f  
d a n g e r . "  An A m erican ’ s r i g h t s  end "where t h e y  i n t r u d e  upon 
t h e  r i g h t s  and s a f e t y  o f  125 , 0 00 ,000  o f  h i s  f e l l o w  c i t i z e n s . "  
R e c o g n iz in g  t h a t  such a  p o l i c y  would s a c r i f i c e  i n d i v i d u a l  
f reedom ,  he s a i d  t h a t  such r i g h t s  were " i n f i n i t e l y  l e s s  
i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  ’f reedom  from th e  w a r ’ which  might  f i n a l l y  
have t o  be f o u g h t  t o  v i n d i c a t e  a f r u i t l e s s  principle."2 ^ 
Again ,  he a p p a r e n t l y  s u p p o r t e d  t h i s  b e l i e f  because  he t h o u g h t
ZOfbid. ^̂ Ibid.
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any l o s s  of  American l i v e s  t h ro u g h  war o p e r a t i o n s  was l i k e l y  
t o  draw h i s  c o u n t r y  i n t o  the  c o n f l i c t .  S e n a to r  P i t tm a n  had 
j u s t  co n tended  t h a t  " i t  was t h i s  d e s t r u c t i o n  of  the  l i v e s  o f  
o u r  c i t i z e n s "  t r a v e l l i n g  .in b e l l i g e r e n t  w a te r s  which "was 
one o f  the  c h i e f  cau se s  t h a t  d rag g ed  us i n t o  t h a t  t e r r i b l e  
and f u t i l e  w a r . "22 W ithout  e n u m e ra t io n ,  Vandenberg a l s o  
a l l u d e d  t o  such i n c i d e n t s  as  the  s i n k i n g  of  the L u s i t a n i a  
t o  which P i t tm a n  had made b r i e f  r e f e r e n c e .  Vandenberg 
i m p l i e d  t h a t  Americans had the  r i g h t  to. s t a y  out o f  war a t  
any  p r i c e ,  i n c l u d i n g  s u r r e n d e r  of freedom of  the  s e a s  in  
t im e  o f  war.
T h i r d ,  he a rgued  t h a t  t h e , "mandatory  s o - c a l l e d  
' c a s h - a n d - c a r r y '  fo rm u la  r e s p e c t i n g  t h e  sh ipm ent  o f  
c o m m o d i t ie s ,  o t h e r  tiian a rm s ,  ammunition and implements  o f  
w a r ,  t o  a l l  b e l l i g e r e n t s , "  would h e l p  to  av o id  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  g o in g  to  war " i n  d e fe n s e  o f  t h e  commercial  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  
i s  n o t  w or th  t h e  h a z a rd  i n v o l v e d . "23 He made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  
i n  h i s  mind American n e u t r a l i t y  h in g ed  on w he ther  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  had any economic  i n t e r e s t s  t o  s a f e g u a r d  w i th  
b e l l i g e r e n t  n a t i o n s .  He wanted t o  i n s u r e  t h i s  a s p e c t  of  
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  o u t la w in g  a l l  d e a l i n g s  with  f o r e i g n  n a t i o n s  
a t  w a r .  The r e s o l u t i o n  a u t h o r i z e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  p r e v e n t  
t h e  e x p o r t  o f  any goods t o  a b e l l i g e r e n t  u n t i l  a f t e r  owner­
s h i p  had been t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  a f o r e i g n  a g e n t .  He r e c o g n iz e d
22i b i d . . p. 1668. 2 3 i b i d . , p . 1673 .
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t h a t  t h i s  was c o n t r a r y  t o  " t r a d i t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e , "  but  he 
a rg u ed  t h a t  th e  s a c r i f i c e  i n  t r a d e  was worth  t h e  r i s k .
I n  s u p p o r t i n g  th e  " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  p r o v i s i o n ,
Vandenberg a g a in  assumed a g e n e r a l  a cc e p ta n c e  o f  the  
c o n c l u s i o n s  of  t h e  .Nye Committee which i n s i s t e d  t h a t  A m e r ic a ' s  
e n t r y  i n t o  World War I  had been p a r t i a l l y  th e  r e s u l t  o f  
e f f o r t s  t o  p r o t e c t  American t r a d e  w i t h  A l l i e s .  Ke was 
w i l l i n g  f o r  C ongress  t o  abandon t h e s e  American n e u t r a l i t y  
r i g h t s ,  b e cause  he t h o u g h t  t h a t  a d e fe n s e  o f  them might  
in v o lv e  h i s  c o u n t r y  i n  war.  Such a p o l i c y  might  i s o l a t e  
America.  But such i s o l a t i o n ,  he o b v io u s ly  b e l i e v e d ,  would 
have th e  e f f e c t  o f  k e ep in g  Amierica ou t  o f  war.  His f a i l u r e  to  
o f f e r  e v id e n c e  i n  s u p p o r t  of  t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  a g a in  seems t o  
i n d i c a t e  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  American people  had a l r e a d y  
a c c e p t e d  a s u r r e n d e r  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  r i g h t s  as a bulwark 
a g a i n s t  i n v o lv e m e n t .
Vandenberg ,  f o u r t h ,  would f u r t h e r  i n s u r e  n e u t r a l i t y  
by a v o id in g  any p o s s i b l e ' c l a s h  of  arms. For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  
he e n d o rs e d  th e  b i l l ' s  p r o v i s i o n  p r o h i b i t i n g  armed m erchant  
s h i p s  from e n t e r i n g  American p o r t s  a long  w i th  -the "mandatory  
p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  arming our  own m erchant  men when engaged 
i n  t r a d e  w i th  b e l l i g e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s . "  This  p r o v i s i o n ,  he 
b e l i e v e d ,  would " e l i m i n a t e  a l a r g e  measure  of i n c e n t i v e  t o  
f r i c t i o n  and t r o u b l e . "^4 I m p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e  was made i n  t h i s
24ibid. , p. 1674.
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case  t o  t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  which a r o s e  out o f  t h e  arming o f  
merchant  s h i p s  d u r in g  World War I .  S e n a to r  P i t tm a n  had 
j u s t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  W i l s o n ’ s arming o f  American 
merchant  s h i p s  was " t h e  g r a v e s t  m is t a k e  t h a t  our  government  
made,"  ad d in g  t h a t  he could " co n c e iv e  o f  no argument a g a i n s t  
t h e  a d o p t i o n  of  the  s e c t i o n  of t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  p r o h i b i t i n g  
t h e  a rming o f  our merchant  ships,"^5 N e i t h e r  d id  Vandenberg .  
Ke seemed c o n f i d e n t ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  th e  American peop le  
wanted  t o  avo id  any d i r e c t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  t r o u b l e s  o f  
t h e  w or ld  and would be w i l l i n g  t o  l e t  American s h i p s  be 
sunk and s t i l l  r e f u s e  t o  defend  t h e s e  i n t e r e s t s .  A p a r a l l e l  
c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  Vandenberg th o u g h t  such c h a l l e n g e s  t o  
American honor  would never  a r i s e  once n e u t r a l i t y  had been 
l e g a l i z e d .  His f a i l u r e  to o f f e r  ev id e n ce  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  
t h e s e  c la im s  i n d i c a t e s  h is  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  American p e op le  
th o u g h t  a s  he d id  about  the m a t t e r ,  and ex tend ed  p r o o f  o r  
p e r s u a s i o n  was u n n e c e s s a r y .
As a  t r a n s i t i o n  between th e  f i r s t  d i v i s i o n  o f  th e  
speech  and t h e  d e f e n s e  of t h e  p ro po sed  amendment, Vandenberg 
made r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  b r i e f  t ime he a l l o t t e d  t o  a d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n .  "The b r e v i t y  o f  th e  endorsem ent  i n  no 
s e n se  b e sp ea k s  any l i m i t a t i o n  upon t h e  e n th u s ia sm  with  which  
I  approve  th e  s e c t i o n s  to  which  I  have r e f e r r e d , "  he s t r e s s e d .  
" I t  i s  my p ro found  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  wisdom o f  a l l  t h e s e  o t h e r
25lbid., p. 1669.
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p o r t i o n s  o f  the  b i l l  t h a t  l e a d s  ine t h e  more e a r n e s t l y  t o  
s e e k  t o  save  i t  from what I  b e l i e v e  to  be- an u t t e r l y  s e r i o u s
f a l l a c y , h e  added.
Defense  of h i s  amendment to  deny th e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
p o w e rs . —V andenberg’ s amendment was d e s ig n e d  t o  remove t h e  
p r o v i s i o n s  which gave  th e  P r e s i d e n t  some d i s c r e t i o n  i n  
d e c i d i n g  which commodities  o t h e r  th an  m u n i t i o n s  o f  war 
would be a l lo w ed  t o  t r a v e l  t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s  on American . 
s h i p s .  He a rgued  t h a t  t h i s  pcwer i n  the  hands of  the  
P r e s i d e n t  was "an a lm o s t  u n e s c a p a b l e  t h r e a t  to  a l l  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e s "  o f  the b i l l ,  b e c a u se  once the  P r e s i d e n t  removed 
American s h i p s  out  o f  t r a d e  " t h e  e f f e c t  o f  h i s  d e c i s i o n  i s  
t o  p r e c i p i t a t e  r e s e n t m e n t ,  i f  n o t  r e p r i s a l ,  from the  
b e l l i g e r e n t  which g e t s  t h e  w o r s t  o f  i t . "  On th e  o t h e r  
h and ,  i f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  " p i c k s  and ch oo ses  th e  commodities 
t o  be i n c l u d e d  and e x c l u d e d , "  i n s i s t e d  Vandenberg ,  "he 
b r i n g s  us  f a c e  to  f a c e  w i t h  d ou b le  j e o p a r d y . "  He con tended  
t h a t  t h i s  would e n ra g e  the  b e l l i g e r e n t  which was " p r i n c i p a l l y  
p e n a l i z e d  by h i s  s e l e c t i o n  o f  com m odi t ies  t o  be p r o s c r i b e d ,
. . . and t h u s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  v i t i a t e s  th e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  j o i n t  
r e s o l u t i o n . "^7 i n  o t h e r  w ords ,  he was opposed to  the  
P r e s i d e n t  w a i t i n g  u n t i l  t h e  c o n f l i c t  began b e f o r e  the d e c i s i o n  
was made as  t o  which American goods would be w i t h h e l d .
2&I b i d . , p . 1674.
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Vandenberg t r i e d  t o  keep  t h e  i s s u e  on a b i p a r t i s a n  
l e v e l .  He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  h i s  f e a r  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  t o  m a i n t a i n  n e u t r a l i t y  u nder  t h e s e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  
was not  a " r e f l e c t i o n  upon t h e  wisdom o r  p a t r i o t i s m  w i th  
which  a  P r e s i d e n t  might  t r y  t o  u se  t h i s  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  pow er ,"  
a d d in g  t h a t  the  " t r o u b l e  was i m p l i c i t  i n  the  f o rm u la  i t s e l f .
He t h u s  made an e t h i c a l  a p p e a l  i n  an obv ious  e f f o r t  t o  
d i s c r e d i t  t h e  argument  of  t h o s e  who might say  t h a t  Vandenberg 
opposed  t h i s  power i n  the  hands of the  P r e s i d e n t  s im p ly  because  
he was i n  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t y .
The s o l u t i o n  to  th e  p rob lem ,  he b e l i e v e d ,  was f o r  
Congress  t o  make t h e  embargo on a l l  m a t e r i a l s  to  b e l l i g e r e n t s '  
m anda to ry .  "Bas ic  n e u t r a l i t y  d e c i s i o n s  canno t  be s a f e l y  
made a f t e r  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  them a r i s e s , "  he a r g u e d .  By 
s p e c i f y i n g  which goods c ou ld  be s o l d  t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s  b e f o r e  
war  had s t a r t e d .  C ongress  c o u ld  demand t h a t  a l l  such p u r c h a s e s  
be p l a c e d  on a " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  b a s i s .  "They a r e  f o r e i g n  
co m m o d i t ie s— i ^ t  American com m odi t ies— i f  a n y th i n g  happens 
t o  th e m ."  T h is  he s p e c i f i e d  as  the  " t h e o r y  of  t r a n s f e r r e d  
r i s k — namely,  t h a t  t i t l e  p a s s e s  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n e r  ahead o f  
e x p o r t . "  T h is  t y p e  o f  " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  d id  no t  p r e c l u d e  
t h e  u s e  of  American s h i p s  i n  t r a n s p o r t i n g  t h e  goods .  But 
Vandenberg d i d  i n s i s t  i n  r e p l y  t o  an i n q u i r y  from a n o th e r  
S e n a t o r  t h a t  " t h e  American v e s s e l  v h ich  goes  t o  s e a  w i th
2* I b i d .
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f o r e i g n  goods u n d e r  t h e s e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  . . .  i s  on n o t i c e  
t h a t  i t  i s  p r o c e e d in g  a t  i t s  own r i s k .  . .
C o n c lu s io n . — Vandenberg c lo s e d  with a q u o t a t i o n  o f  
W a l te r  L ippm ann 's  i n  which t h e  c o lu m n is t  a l l e g e d ,  on t h e  
b a s i s  o f  a  s t a t e m e n t  from an e x p e r t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law, 
t h a t  th e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power a l l o t t e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i n  t h e  
b i l l  would i n v o lv e  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  w ar .  This  was t h e  one 
t h i n g  Vandenberg hoped to  a v o i d .  "We have p rob ab ly  r e a c h e d  
th e  p o i n t  i n  a  f o r e s h o r t e n e d  w o r l d , "  s a i d  tne S e n a t o r , "where 
we canno t  be i s o l a t i o n i s t s ,  b u t  we c e r t a i n l y  have not  rea c h e d  
a p o i n t  where we c an n o t  be i n s u l a t i o n i s t s . ”39.
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  Speech 
C o n t r o l l i n g  the c a u se s  o f  w a r . —S e n a to r  Vandenberg^‘s 
s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  N e u t r a l i t y  Act o f  1937 r e p r e s e n t e d  an e a r n e s t  
a t t e m p t  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  f o r c e s  which he b e l i e v e d  had ta k e n  
h i s  c o u n t r y  i n t o  World War I .  With h i n d s i g h t ,  of c o u r s e ,  
i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  n o t e  the n a i v e  a ssum p t io n s  t h a t  t h o s e  who 
su p p o r te d  t h i s  measure  were making.- But i n  1937, the  
ev id e n ce  was mounting t h a t  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  had been t r i c k e d  
i n t o  t ' le  c o n f l i c t  o f  1917. H is  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  no d o u b t ,  were 
based  on a number o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  n o t  the  l e a s t  o f  which 
was t h e  e f f e c t  o f  American e x p o r t  t r a d e  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s  o f  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w i th  th e  b e l l i g e r e n t s .
29 i b i d . . p.  1675. 
^Of b i d . ,  p.  1676.
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The f i g u r e s  show t h a t  American e x p o r t s  t o  G re a t  B r i t a i n ,  
F ra n c e ,  Belgium, and I t a l y  made an a g g re g a t e  g a in  o f  I 76O 
m i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s  i n  t r a d e  between 1912 and 1916 w h i le  t h e  
t r a d e  with  Germany and A u s t r ia -H u n g a ry  shwed an a g g r e g a t e  
l o s s  o f  321 m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  d u r in g  t h e  same p e r i o d .
Angel l  n o ted  t h a t  " b e f o r e  the  w ar ,  Germany a lo ne  had 
im por ted  from us a lm os t  t h r e e  t im e s  as  much a s  F r a n c e ,  
n e a r l y  f i v e  t im es  as  much as I t a l y , "  b u t  added t l i a t  w i th  
the war Blockade i n  f o r c e  t h e r e  a r o s e  " t h e  enormous 
consuming power of  the A l l i e s i "  Tii is  change ,  he a l l e g e d ,  
added up t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  American p r o d u c e r s  " a c q u i r e d  
a ' v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t '  i n  t h e  c o n t in u a n c e  o f  the  w a r -m ark e t  
p ro v id ed  by th e  A l l i e s '  d e s p e r a t e  need .  . .
Vandenberg a l s o  had knowledge o f  American i n v e s tm e n t s  
in  A l l i e d  l a n d s .  Angell  a f f i r m e d  t h a t  between 1914 and 
1917 "American i n v e s t o r s  had s t a k e d  over  two b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  
upon th e  f i n a n c i a l  so lvency o f  the  A l l i e s . "32 R ig h t  or  wrong,  
many a g re e d  t h a t  the  " f l a g  f o l lo w s  the d o l l a r , "  and nad done . 
j u s t  t h a t  in  1917 .
The q u e s t io n  o f  c o n t r a b a n d  i n  the sh ipm ent  o f  American 
goods between 1914 and 1917 was a l s o  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  As 
German subm arines  took a l a r g e  t o l l  of  B r i t i s h  s n i p s  c a r r y i n g  
m u n i t i o n s .  G reat  B r i t a i n  r e t a l i a t e d  w i th  a t t e m p t s  t o  shu t
3 ^ E rn e s t  A n g e l l ,  "Can We S ta y  Out o f  War,"  H a rp e rs  
CLXXI (August ,  1935 ),  4 66 .
3 2 .'Ibid., p. 4 6 7 .
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o f f  v i t a l  s u p p l i e s  t o  the  German m a in la n d .  Her l i s t  o f  
c o n t r a b a n d  expanded t o  i n c l u d e  j u s t  about a l l  comm odit ies .
I n  an e f f o r t  t o  p a r a l y z e  t h e  economy o f  Germany, England 
se a rc h e d  and s e i z e d  American sh ip m en ts  d e s ig n e d  f o r  t h e  
Germans. The f i n a l  r e s u l t  was t h a t  Germany "was d r iv e n  a t  
l a s t  t o  t h e  u se  o f  t h e  o n ly  r e m a in in g  weapon, u n r e s t r i c t e d  
submarine w a r f a r e . "  When American s h i p s  were a t t a c k e d ,  t h e  
n a t u r a l  c ry  was one o f  d e f e n s e .  "Had we i n  America d e c l i n e d  
th e  v e n tu r e  o f  s e n d in g  our  goods and s h i p s  i n t o  the  da n g e r  
zone we would have been  f a r  l e s s  a f f e c t e d  and ro u sed  by th e  
i n e v i t a b l e  c o n s e q u e n c e s , "33 a rg u e d  A n g e l l .
F i n a l l y ,  American memories o f  the  r a g e  which swept 
t h e  c o u n t r y  when 124 Americans went down on t h e  L u s i t a n i a  
i l l u s t r a t e d  t h a t  i t  was dangerous  f o r  Americans to  t r a v e l  
i n  war z o n es .  Vandenberg a g re e d  w i t h  o t h e r s  o f  h i s  t im e  
t h a t  i f  Americans were k e p t  out  o f  b e l l i g e r e n t  w a t e r s ,  t h e n  
a n o th e r  p o s s i b l e  s o u r c e  of  c o n f l i c t  would be removed.
V andenberg ’ s s u p p o r t  o f  the '  n e u t r a l i t y  law was o b v i ­
o u s ly  b ased  on t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  l e g i s l a t i o n  could  p re v e n t  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  from d o in g  t h o s e  t h i n g s  which th e  Nye Committee 
i n d i c a t e d  had t a k e n  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n t o  World War I .  The cause  
f o r  American e n t r y  i n t o  t h a t  s t r u g g l e ,  he had co n c lu d ed ,  was 
p r i m a r i l y  economic .  I t  was t h i s  cause  which he hoped 
n e u t r a l i t y  would e r a s e .  He d i d  n o t  e n t e r t a i n  o t h e r  r e a s o n s
33ib id . , p. 4o£.
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f o r  A m e r ic a 's  e n t r y  i n t o  the  s t r u g g l e .  His  a n a l y s i s  d id  not  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l ,  p h i l o s o p h i c a l ,  o r  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of American e n t r y .  . In  f a c t ,  he d id  no t  
q u e s t io n  the  i d e a  t h a t  Americans might  be w i l l i n g  to  fi .giit  
t o  p r o t e c t  n e u t r a l  r i g h t s .  He s im ply  concluded  t h a t  th ey  
• sh o u ld  n o t .  And the  f a c t  t n a t  he f e l t  no compulsion t o  o f f e r  
r h e t o r i c a l  p r o o f  f o r  h i s  a s s u m p t io n s  would i n d i c a t e  u h a t  he 
b e l i e v e d  he spoke to  an a g r e e i n g  a u d ie n c e .
I f  one i s  p r e p a r e d  t o  a c c e p t  V andenberg 's  c o n c lu s io n  
t h a t  the  c a u se s  of  war a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  economic ,  t n e n  h i s  
brand of n e u t r a l i t y  was c e r t a i n l y  l o g i c a l .  He made a cho ice  
among ty p e s  o f  n e u t r a l i t y .  The f i r s t  type  would have meant 
t h a t  America c o n t in u e d  to t r a d e  w i th  b e l l i g e r e n t s  w i th o u t  
any l i m i t a t i o n ,  e x c e p t  on e q u a l  t e r m s .  • He was r i g h t  in  
conc lud in g  t i i a t  World War I  d e m o n s t ra te d  the  in v o lv e m en ts  
to  which t i l l s  p o l i c y  would l e a d .  The o t h e r  type  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  
was t h a t  p r e s c r i b e d  i n  tne N e u t r a l i t y  Act. of 1937. T h is  
brand s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  American t r a d e  would be r e s t r i c t e d ,  but  
on equa l  term.s t o  a l l  b e l l i g e r e n t s .  Such a p o l i c y  would keep 
American e x p o r t e r s  out  of  th e  c e n t e r  of a c t i v i t i e s .
N e u t r a l i t y  and the d i s c r e t i o n a r y  pow ers . — Assuming 
t h a t  t h i s  p ro p o se d  ty p e  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  was d e s i r a b l e ,  th en  
h i s  amendment a l s o  becomes d e f e n s i b l e .  He o b j e c t e d  t o  th e  
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power a f f o r d e d  the  P r e s i d e n t  in  d e c i d i n g  which 
commodities  o t h e r  th a n  m u n i t i o n s  o f  war would be p e r m i t t e d  
on American s h i p s  fo r  t r a y e l  t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s .  There i s  l o g i c
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i n  h i s  argument t h a t  such  a p o l i c y  would i n v i t e  c r i t i c i s m  
b e c a u se  t h e  d e c i s i o n  would be made a f t e r  the  c o n f l i c t  had 
d e v e lo p e d .  Even American e x p o r t e r s  might  o b j e c t  to  h a v in g  
a f low o f  goods c u t  o f f  once the  o r d e r s  had a l r e a d y  been  
r e c e i v e d  i n  h i s  c o u n t r y .  I f  t h e  i s s u e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  was 
s im p ly  one o f  d eg re e  of  in v o lv e m e n t ,  t h e n  h i s  argument t h a t  
a l l  such  d e c i s i o n s  sh o u ld  be made b e f o r e  the c o n f l i c t  began 
was c e r t a i n l y  a v a l i d  one.
But t h e r e  were o th e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Another m ajor  
f a c t o r  was how n e u t r a l  was American n e u t r a l i t y ?  I f  t r a d e  
were w i t h h e l d  from two b e l l i g e r e n t s  i n  c o n f l i c t  w i th  each 
o t h e r  and one had a Naval  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  c a r r y  on and p r o t e c t  
t r a d e  and the o t h e r  did not  h a v e ,  t h e n  th e  American p o l i c y  
a id e d  one bu t  harmed t h e  o t h e r .  Such was the case  i n  t h e  
I t a l y - E t h i o p i a n  war  o f  1935 i n  which American goods were 
w i t h h e l d  from E t h i o p i a  w h i l e  I t a l y  c o u ld  come t o  the  U n i ted  
S t a t e s  f o r  her own. The new b i l l  was worded i n  such manner 
t h a t  the  P r e s i d e n t  could  have had d i s c r e t i o n  i n  the  sh ipm ent  
o f  goods o t h e r  t h a n  m u n i t i o n s .  But V a n denb e rg 's  amendment 
would have d e n ie d  the  P r e s i d e n t  t h i s  power.  Vandenberg 
wanted  no d i s t i n c t i o n  made between an a g g r e s s o r  n a t i o n  and 
t h e  v i c t i m  o f  an a t t a c k .  He, t h e r e f o r e ,  e x p re s s e d  i n d i f f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of  th e  c o n f l i c t .  N e u t r a l i t y  in  h i s  mind was 
d e s ig n e d  to  p re v e n t  American p a r t i s a n s h i p  in  any f o r e i g n  
c o n f l i c t .  His i m p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  economic s a n c t i o n s  
would l e a d  to  m i l i t a r y  s a n c t i o n s .  ” I  do not  b e l i e v e , "  s a i d
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Vandenberg ,  " t h a t  t h e r e  i s  any t e n a b l e  m id d le -g ro u n d  i n  
d e a l i n g  with  the  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  f a c t o r  i n  t h i s  e q u a t i o n . "34
I t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  V andenberg ’ s i n s i s ­
t e n c e  on denying  th e  P r e s i d e n t  t h i s  l i m i t e d  d i s c r e t i o n  in  
t h e  c h o ic e  of  commodities  t o  be d e n ie d  a g g r e s s o r s  in  p a r t  
r e f l e c t e d  a p o l i t i c a l , b i a s .  D u l l e s  n o t e s  t h a t  " t h e  r e f u s a l  
t o  heed  the  p l e a s  t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t  sh o u ld  be g iven  some 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers . . . r e f l e c t e d  i n  some measure  t h e  
s t r o n g  a n t i - R o o s e v e l t  f e e l i n g  a t  a t im e  when the  P r e s i d e n t  
was r e p e a t e d l y  b e in g  charged  w i t h  s e e k in g  d i c t a t o r i a l  
p o w e r s . "35 i t  must be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  S e n a t o r  Vandenberg 
was a t  t h i s  t im e  a m ajor  spokesman f o r  t h e  R epu b l ican  P a r t y .
The N e u t r a l i t y  Act o f  1937 came b e f o r e  the  S e n a te  s h o r t l y  
a f t e r  th e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s p r o p o s a l  t o  "pack"  th e  Supreme Court  
had shaken th e  c o u n t r y .  Although Vandenberg e x p r e s s l y  d en ie d  
any c a s u a l  c o n n e c t io n  between h i s  amendment and h i s  d i s t r u s t  
o f  P r e s i d e n t  Roosevelt . ,  i t  i s  not  beyond the  r ea lm  o f  
p o s s i b i l i t y .
E f f e c t s  o f  "Vandenberg n e u t r a l i t y . " — I t  must be a d m i t t e d  
t h a t  Vandenberg b u i l t  a good case  to  s u p p o r t  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  
America c o u ld  s t a y  n e u t r a l  i n  the  f a c e  o f  a n o th e r  war .  But 
i t  was based  on the  assum pt ion  t h a t  wars  a r e  f o u g h t  p r i m a r i l y  
f o r  economic r e a s o n s .  He o f f e r e d  a n lan  to  b r i n g  u n de r  c o n t r o l
i
^^R e co rd , 7$ th  C o n g . , 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1937, LXXXI, P a r t  
2 , 1675.
' 35puiies, op. cit., p. 177.
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th e  economic f o r c e s  which had been p a r t i a l l y  r e s p o n s ib l e ,  
and in  h i s  mind- almost  s o l e l y ,  f o r  America’ s entrance  i n t o  
World War I .  This  p o l i c y  was a planned withdrawal from thie 
scene  of  tne c o n f l i c t .  I t  was cased on tne assumption th a t  
i t  was g e o g r a p h ic a l ly  p o s s i b l e  f o r  the United S t a t e s  t o  
i s o l a t e  h e r s e l f  from the r e s t  o f  the world.  His rea son s  
fo r  b e l i e v i n g  t h i s  p o s s i b l e  were not o v e r t l y  expressed  in  
th e  speech .  He im p l ie d  th a t  n e u t r a l i t y  would probably have 
kept the country out o f  World War I ,  and the same p o l i c y  
would hold tr u e  twenty  years l a t e r .  While he concluded such 
n e u t r a l i t y  was p o s s i b l e ,  he never quest ioned  t:;e f a c t  tha t  
i t  was d e s i r a b l e .
In the f i r s t  p l a c e ,  i t  i s  open to  quest ion  j u s t  how 
much of an economic p r ic e  Americans should pay for n e u t r a l i t y .  
I t  i s  d ou b tfu l  that  Americans would .have kept the law on tne  
books i f  i t  s e r i o u s l y  i n t e r f e r e d  w ith  any attem pts  t o  procure  
the  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f  economic growth.
Vandenberg’ s p o s i t i o n  ignored  s e v e r a l  o ther  i.mportant 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  His  overt  argument in support of n e u t r a l i t y  
did not d e a l  with the  v i t a l  q u e s t io n  of  whether i t  was 
America’ s b e s t  course  o f  a c t io n  to  remain s t r i c t l y  n e u tr a l  
in  the face  of  world d i s a s t e r .  This was t a k e n . fo r  granted .  
N e ith er  did he ask the economic qu es t io n  of whether America 
had anyth ing  a t  s take  in  the remainder o f  the f r e e  world,  
not did he r a i s e  the moral qu es t io n  o f  whether i t  was r ig h t  
f o r  a g rea t  democracy to stand i d l e  w h ile  la r g e  p o r t io n s  o f
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the  f r e e  world were "swallowed up ."  B u e l l  noted th a t  "the 
i s o l a t i o n i s t  f a i l s  to r e a l i z e  that  even i f  America does not  
e n t e r  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  the p r e se n t  type of ’ p ea ce ’ and ’n e u t r a l i t y ’ 
i s  s lo w ly  . . . undermining American i n s t i t u t i o n s  and v a l u e s .  
Vandenberg’ s 1937 speech did not show any concern for  the  
type  of  world in  which America might wish t o  l i v e  a f t e r  o u t ­
s i d e  wars took p la c e .  His s o l e  e f f o r t  was concentrated  on 
how the  United S t a t e s  might s t a y  out of war. In t i . i s  frame 
o f  mind, he seemed w i l l i n g  to put E th io p ia ,  who appealed t o  
the  United S t a t e s  for  h e l p ,  i n  the same c l a s s  with I t a l y — tne  
r a th e r  obvious ag g resso r .
.N e i th er  does Vandenberg’ s speech in d ic a t e  th a t  he 
was bothered by the  p o s s i b i l i t y  thiat n e u t r a l i t y  might th r ea te n  
any attempt by th e  League o f  Nations to r e s i s t  aggress ion  
by c a l l i n g  fo r  economic sa n c t io n s  from the United S t a t e s .
The N e u t r a l i t y  Act,  i n s t e a d ,  might even punish the League 
members w ith  c o u n t e r s a n c t io n s .  The Senator proposed to make 
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  worse by o f f e r in g  an amendment to tne  
N e u t r a l i t y  Act which would nave bound tne e x e c u t i v e ’ s hand 
in such manner t : iat  he could not have d i s t in g u i s h e d  amon- 
a g g r e s s o r s  w itn  an y commodities of trade;  in  e f f e c t ,  then,  
s a n c t io n s  would have been app l ied  a g a i n s t  League members 
r e s i s t i n g  a g g r e s s io n .  His d e s i r e  to  keep h is  country out o f  
war at  any p r ic e  apparent ly  forced  him in to  such a p o s i t i o n .
^^Raymond L e s l i e  B u e l l ,  I s o l a t e d  America (New York: 
A lfred  A. Knopf, 1940) ,  p. 340.
F i n a l l y ,  the Senator never  r e a l l y  cons id ered  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a t o t a l  Nazi v i c t o r y  and i t s  consequences  
for t h e  United S t a t e s .  Ke proceeded on the assumption that  
no f o r e ig n  power could ever  p h y s i c a l l y  a ttack  the American 
c o n t in e n t .  He even assamed the v a l i d i t y  of  the d o c tr in e  o f  
American economic and p o l i t i c a l  immunity. In t h i s  n a iv e te  
he, o f  c o u r s e ,  was not a lo n e .  But Americans had been 
warned. As e a r l y  as 1935, an American o f f i c i a l  in B e r l in ,  
Douglas M i l l e r ,  admonished th a t  H i t l e r  planned to expand 
u n t i l  Germany "dominates the e n t i r e  g lob e ,"  adding that  
"Germany i s  to, engage in a g i g a n t i c  s t r u g g le  witn t h e  r e s t  
o f  the world to grow at  the expense o f  i t s  n e ig h b o r s ."3/ 
Ambassador Will iam E. Dodd in  B e r l in  a l s o  reported that  
" s in ce  American i n t e r v e n t io n  w i l l  not be repeated ,  the  
Third Reich w i l l  a t  [thej  s t r a t e g i c  moment s e i z e  the jP o l ish  
corridor  or A u str ia  and i f  war f o l l o w s  win wi.at was l o s t  in
I 9 IB. . . . "  He added; " C iv i l i z e d  Europe o f f e r s  a sad 
and barbaric  p i c t u r e . A n d  in  193b, P res ident  R oosevelt  
t o l d  the  coLintry tha t  "no matter how w e l l  we are supported  
by n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  we must remember that  no laws
5 . ,  Department o f  S t a t e ,  Peace and War: U. S. 
Foreign P o l i c y ,  1931-1941 , No. 19o3 (Washington: U. S. 
Government P r in t in g  O f f i c e ,  1943)> pp. 211-13.
5 . ,  Department of  S t a t e ,  Foreign R e la t io n s  o f  
the  United S t a t e s ,  1935: The B r i t i s h  Commonwealth, Europe,
No. 4564, I I  (Washington: U. S. Government P r in t ing  O f f i c e ,
195 2), 32 1 .
can be provided to  cover  every c o n t i n g e n c y .” '̂  ̂ H i t l e r ' s  
dr ive  to  P ar is  and h i s  threatened  in v a s io n  o f  England began 
t o  awaken the American people to  the f u l l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  
th e s e  warnings. In the case  of Senator  Vandenberg, i t  took 
bombs on Pearl  Harbor. With 3 ,000  m i le s  o f  ocean between 
the United S t a t e s  and any p o t e n t i a l  a g g r e s s o r ,  Vandenberg 
jo in e d  many of h i s  countrymen in  b e l i e v i n g  th a t  A;nerica 
could and must i s o l a t e  h e r s e l f  from a t ta c k .
The Address on the Embargo Repeal  
Vandenberg shared with a m ajority  o f  h i s  countrymen 
in  1937 a pass ion  for  peace so acute  th a t  America p r a c t i c a l l y  
shunned a l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  to the r e s t  o f  t.ie world.  As 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  anarchy continued to  spread over Europe and 
A sia ,  however, a d m in is t r a t iv e  l e a d e r s  began to c h a l len g e  
the wisdom o f  the n e u t r a l i t y  p o s i t i o n .  Vandenberg stood  
s t e a d f a s t  with a group of Americans who s t r o n g l y  opposed 
any change in  the e x i s t i n g  n e u t r a l i t y  laws.  By 1939, 
world ev en ts  consp ired  to  force  Vaidenberg t o  defend a 
p o s i t i o n  which he had taken for  granted o n ly  two years  
e a r l i e r .  For a f_:11 understanding of  h i s  speecn in  defense  
o f  n e u t r a l i t y ,  i t  i s  necessary  t o  r e c a l l  the c o n tex t  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  even ts  in  which tne soeech was r iv e n .
^9samuel I .  Rosenman ( e d . ) .  The Pub lic  Papers and 
and Addresses o f  Franklin  D. R o o s e v e l t , V o l .  V: The
People  Approve (New York; Random House, 19 3S) ,  p. 291.
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The Context o f  the  Speech
The "Quarantine" sp ee ch . — The f i r s t  rea l  c h a l l e n g e  
to  n e u t r a l i t y  came in  th e  ceremonial  d e d ic a t io n  o f  a br idge  
in  1 9 3 7 . I t  was an o c c a s io n  which many h i s t o r i a n s  c o n s id e r  
the  f i r s t  s t e p  in  America’ s departure from a p o l i c y  o f  
i s o l a t i o n i s m  in  world a f f a i r s . 40 I t  was here ,  on C hicago’ s 
Outer D r ive ,  t h a t  P re s id e n t  Franklin D. Rooseve lt  d e l iv e r e d  
h i s  now famous ’’quarantine” speech .  Although " b i l l e d ” as  
a s imple  cerem onial  a d d re ss ,  i t  condemned ’’interr^ational  
anarchy," and s u b s t i t u t e d  in  i t s  p lace  a l im i t e d  concept  o f  
c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  Whether intended as a ’’t r i a l  b a l l o o n ” 
or a ’’f e e l e r , ” a f i r s t  s t e p  in  a d e l i b e r a t e  e f f o r t  t o  ' 
cnange the mind of  a n a t io n ,  or as s im ply  a su b t le  warning  
of  impending world war, may never be known. It i s  r e c o g n ize d ,  
however, th a t  the speecii was d e l iv e r e d  in  tne face  o f  a world 
growing c l o s e r  to  war and an America r e t r e a t in g  i n t o  a s h e l l  
o f  c o n t in e n t a l i s m .
R o o s e v e l t ,  f i r s t ,  reviewed the p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  
which he d e sc r ib ed  as a cause of ’’grave concern and a n x i e t y .  
The landmarks and t r a d i t i o n s , ” he s a i d ,  ’’wliich have marked 
tne  prog ress  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n  toward . . . law, order  and 
j u s t i c e  are be ing wiped o u t . ” He appealed to  the American 
t r a d i t i o n a l  b e l i e f  in  m ora l i ty  and j u s t i c e .  Hé did not  
c a l l  names, but i t  was not d i f f i c u l t  to  see  that he spoke
^^Langer and Gleason,  op. c i t . ,  p. 11; P r a t t ,  op. c i t . ,  
p. 624; and D u l l e s ,  0 0 . c i t . ,  p. 179.
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01 Gerrr;any, I t a l y ,  and Japan. Witn s trong emotional language ,
he reminded Americans th a t  "innocent p e o p le s ,  innocent
n a t io n s  are being c r u e l t y  s a c r i f i c e d  t o  a greed fo r  power
41and supremacy which i s  devoid of a l l  sense  o f  j u s t i c e . "
For the  i s o l a t i o n i s t  wno f e l t  that  the answer was fo r
America to  witndraw and r e l y  on d i s ta n c e  and s trength  a t
/:Ome, Rooseve lt  had an answer;
I f  th o s e  t i l in gs  come to  pass  in  other  parts  
o f  tne world,  l e t  no one imagine tnat  America 
w i l l  e sca p e ,  t h a t  America may expect  mercy, that  
t h i s  Western Hemisphere w i l l  not be a t ta ck ed  and 
that  i t  w i l l  cont inue  t r a n q u i l l y  and p e a c e f u l ly  
to  carry on the  e t h i c s  and tne a r t s  of  c i v i l i z a t i o n . 42
But R oo sev e l t  went f u r t h e r .  He gave a new answer
t o  those  seek ing  to avoid war. He o f f e r e d  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y
in  place of n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  as a formula for keepinu
tn e  peace.  "Tne p e a c e - lo v in g  n a t io n s ,"  ne c laimed, "must
make a co n c er te d  e f f o r t  t o  uphold laws and p r i n c ip l e s  on
which .peace  can r e s t  s e c u r e .  "2-3 To calm any fea rs  t i .a t  tne
freed om -lov in g  n a t io n s  were not s trong  enougn to stop
a g g r e s s io n ,  R ooseve lt  reminded America th a t  i t  would be
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t io n  ny t.^e "n inety  percent of  the population
o f  tne world" t.-.at was be ing  " jeopard ised  by the remaining
t e n .
^^Samuel I .  Rosenman ( e d . ) .  The Pub lic  Paners and 
Addresses o f  Franklin  D. R o o s e v e l t , Vol. VI: The C o n s t i t u t io n
P r e v a i l s  (New York: The Macmillan Co. ,  1941) ,  p- 40t .
^^I b i d . , p. 408.
43lbid. 44ibid., p. 410.
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The P res id en t  a c t u a l l y  asked the American people  
t o  r e - e v a l u a t e  the n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  in  the l i g h t  of  
i t s  o b j e c t i v e .  Could i t  keep the nat ion  out o f  wars?
A v a i la b le  e v id en ce  i n d i c a t e s  that  a m ajor i ty  of Americans 
s t i l l  b e l i e v e d  th a t  i t  cou ld .  The r e a c t io n  to  h i s  proposed 
change in  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  was f a s t  and f u r io u s .  James Burns’ 
comprehensive,  v i v i d  account t e l l s  the story:
Back in  Washington, H ul l ,  su rp r ise d  and shocked  
by R o o s e v e l t ’ s s tro n g  words, remained q u ie t .  Other 
p a rty  l e a d e r s  were s i l e n t .  I t  was the o p p o s i t io n  
t h a t  spoke up. P a c i f i s t s  charged the P res ident  with  
s t a r t i n g  the  people  down the  road to  war. I s o l a ­
t i o n i s t  Congressmen th rea tened  with impeachment. The 
AFL r e s o lv e d  a g a in s t  involvement in  fo r e ig n  wars. A 
t e l e g r a p h i c  p o l l  o f  Congress showed a heavy m ajor i ty  
a g a i n s t  common a c t i o n  with the League in the Far E a s t . 45
Vandenberg r e c e iv e d  R o o s e v e l t ’ s ’’quarantine” su g g es t io n  
w ith  l i t t l e  enthusiasm. .He t o ld  a Michigan rad io -aud ience  
th a t  ”we s h a l l  pursue an i n s u l a t i n g  n e u t r a l i t y  d e s p i t e  the  
P r e s i d e n t ’ s r e f u s a l  thus far  to f o l l o w  the mandate o f  the  
l a s t  C o n g r e s s ,” .adding th a t  ”our r e c e n t  f l i r t a t i o n s  with  
s a n c t i o n s  and w i th  the  punishment' of  a g g r e s s o r s ,  and with  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a l l i a n c e s ,  s h a l l  s top  short  of  p u t t in g  America’ s 
f e e t  upon even th e  f i r s t  s t e p s  th a t  lead  to w a r .” He sa id  
th a t  a l though ’’the  alarms of  war are wracking the nerves  o f  
th e  w o r l d , ” the  United S t a t e s  has a s e d a t iv e  that  i s  ’’c l e a r l y
James M. Burns, R o o s e v e l t ,  the Lion and the Fox 
(New York: Harcourt. Brace Sc C o . ,  1 9 56 ) ,  p. 3 1 : .
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prescr ib e d  by contemporary n e c e s s i t i e s .  I t  i s  prayerln^Iy  
wisned f o r  by 99 Americans out o f  190."^’
?.:= P res id en t  bowed to  the pressure  o f  the i s o l a t i o n i s t s .  
Th.e world w aited  for e la b o r a t io n  on the meaninj o f  " q u a r a n t in e ,” 
but the P res id en t  r e t r e a t e d .  "As t..e year 1937 yrew toward 
i t s  c l o s e , ” w r i te s  Beard, "advocates o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
. . . seemed unable to d is c o v e r  any proof  tn a t  P re s id e n t  
R ooseve lt  contemplated any e f f e c t i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  h i s  
quarantine d o c t r i n e . b a n g e r  and Gleason n o te ,  however,  
tn a t  "though f o r  the t ime being he sh e lv e d  n i s  p lan ,  tne  
P re s id e n t  remained f i r m ly  convinced th a t  the United S t a t e s ,  
in  i t s  own i n t e r e s t  could no longer  stand w h o l ly  a l o o f  from 
the  world a f f a i r s .
In creased  app ro p r ia t io n s  for  d e f e n s e . — A second  
c h a l le n g e  t o  i s o l a t i o n i s m  came in the year  o f  1938, and 
fo rced  the  i s su e  of war or peace out i n t o  the open ag a in .
H i t l e r  was on the  march. Austr ia  f e l l ,  and the world looked  
on in dismay while  tne  democracies gave H i t l e r  C zechos lovakia  
at  Kunich. The a d m in is tra t ion  r eac ted  wit:,  a request  fo r  a 
l a r g e r  app rop r ia t ion  f o r  the Navy. In s p i t s  o f  tne f a c t  tha t  
" t h i s  per iod  was the low point  in  popular d isregard  o f
^°Record, 75th Con- . ,  2d S e s s . ,  193^, LXXXll, Part
3 ,  I d .
^^Charles A. Beard, American Foreizn P o l i c y  in  the  
Makint, 1932-1949 (New Haven: Yale U . iv e r s Z ty  P r e ss ,  191'-) ,  p. 203
4G,banger and Gleason, o p .  cit., p. 24.
'̂ 3.
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and o b l i g a t i o n s ,  and a l s o  the  d a n g e r s ,  t i i a t  
were t h e  i n e s c a p a b l e  consequence  o f  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of w or ld  
power t n a t  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  nad a t t a i n e d , " ^ 9  a p p r o ­
p r i a t i o n  was g r a n t e d .  But s e v e r a l  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  opposed 
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n .  Vandenberg v o ted  a g a i n s t  i t  b e c a u se  he 
d i d  no t  b e l i e v e  " a  showing was nade to  j u s t i f y  i t , ” add ing  
t ' . iat " I  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d id  n o t  want America ,  whi le  p r o t e s t  in ■ 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  a g a i n s t  a w or ld  n a v a l  r a c e ,  t o  le  the  f i r s t  
government  on e a r t h  o f f i c i a l l y  t o  s e t  t..e new b a t t l e s h i p  
tempo a t  4 5 ,00 0  t o n s . ” ^^
In h is  annual message t o  Congress in 1 9 3 / ,  R o oseve l t  
warned again o f  ti .e impending dangers to  the w or ld 's  peace.  
Altnough he d id  not s p e c i f i c a l l y  po int  them out,  he made 
i n d i r e c t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  H i t l e r ’s conquest  o f  Czecnos lovahia ,  
M u s s o l i n i ’ s r o l e  i n  E t h io p ia ,  and Japan’ s war in Cnina.
Using tones  o f  h i s  1937 add ress ,  the P res ide / . t  rem'nded 
Congress of the ’’o l d ,  old l e s s o n  that  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a t ta c k  
i s  m ig h t i ly  decreased  by the assurance  of  an ever ready  
d e f e n s e . A  week l a t e r  the  P r e s id e n t  c a l l e d  for addit iozta l  
a p p ro p r ia t io n s  for  n a t lo n a l  d e fe n se .  T / i s  time on.by tne  
extreme i s o l a t i o n i s t s  o b je c te d  t o  h i s  r e q u e s t .  Senator
^^Dulles, op. cit., p. 11.3 .
^^Record, 7ct/: Conn., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1 /3 7 ,  LKXXIV, Part
2 , 1920 .
Cl
Rosenman, The Public  Papers and Addresses of  Franklin  
D. R o o s e v e l t ,  Vol .  VIII: War and N e u t r a l i t y , p. 1+.
9 4
Vandenberg was one o f  t h o s e  wno opposed t h e  measure .  He 
enipiiasized t h a t  he o b j e c t e d  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c a l l i n g  f o r  
more arms t o  make t n e  d e f e n s e s  o f  t n e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  a d e q u a te  
w i t h o u t  d e f i n i n g  " a d e q u a t e " :
Adequate f o r  what? Adequate t o  implement 
n a t i o n a l  d e fe n se  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  American 
s e n se  o f  minding our own b u s i n e s s ?  To t h a t  I 
can uncom prom is ing ly  answ er ,  " Y e s ."
Adequate f o r  what? Adequate to  s u s t a i n  th e  
r e a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  Monroe D o c t r in e  in  t h e  sense  t h a t  
we cannot  a l lo w  a l i e n  i d e o l o g i e s  to  c l o s e  i n  upon 
us t h rougi: W estern  Hemisohere a o o ro ach es?  A^ain,
"Y e s ."  ‘ .
Adequate fo r  w..at? To implement the  P r e s i d e n t ' s  
Chicago speech  which t a l k e d  o f  q u a r a n t i n e s  and 
su g g e s t e d  th e  use  o f  Æueri c a n  s a n c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  
s o r c a l l e d  " a g g r e s s o r  n a t i o n s "  on o t h e r  c o n t i n e n t s ?
Tinis t im e ,  "No," u n l e s s  the  s a n c t i o n s  a r e  the  
d e l i b e r a t e  and c o n s c i o u s  o r d e r  o f  C o ng re ss ,  r e f l e c t ­
in g  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  of the wnole Æaeri c a n  p e o p le .
Adequate f o r  wr.at? To n e lp  p o l i c e  th e  world  
u nd e r  t h e o r i e s  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y ?  Again,  "No.”
I t  would l e a v e  u s  th e  r e s i d u a r y  l e g a t e e  o f  a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t n a t  would r e q u i r e  so v a s t  an 
e n g in e r y  of  war t h a t  even th e  pending mair.motn 
program would be w no l ly  i m p o t e n t . ^2
But i n  s p i t e  o f  the  o p p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  e x t r e m i s t s ,  
t h e  b i l l  fo r  i n c r e a s e d  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  p a s s e d  C ongress .
When the  s e s s i o n  ended .  Congress  had i n c r e a s e d  the  p r e v io u s  
y e a r ' s  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  y abou t  t w o - t n i r d s .  "The in c r e a s e  
was o b v io u s ly  made,"  w r i t e s  R a u c h , , " i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of  war 
i n  Europe and i n  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  and the  Japanese  war,  
a l r e a d y  i n  p r o g r e s s ,  were v e r y  r e a l  d a n g e r s  to  the  Uni ted  
S t a t e s .
32Record, 7 c th  C o;:r . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1939, LXXXIV, Part 
2 , 1920 .
5 3 S a s i l  Rauch, R ooseve lt :  From Munic' .̂ t o P e a r l
H arbo r  (New York: C r e a t i v e  Age P r e s s ,  1 95 0 ) ,  pp. 110-11.
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The r ep ea l  o f  the embargo l a w s . — A th ir d  ch a l le n g e  
to  i s o l a t i o n i s m  came in  the sp r in g  of  1939 when H i t l e r  
made a mockery o f  the Munich agreement by tak ing  Czechoslovakia  
and p ressed  Poland f o r  consent to  annexation of Danzig.  
P re s id e n t  R o o sev e l t  and S e c re tary  Hull  hoped to counteract  
th e se  a s s a u l t s  with a r e v i s i o n  of  the n e u t r a l i t y  laws which 
would l e t  the world know America’ s "determination to support  
the  cause o f  the  democracies by u n s t i n t e d  m a ter ia l  a i d . "^4 
P ub l ic  op in ion  p o l l s  at the  t ime i n d i c a t e  that  the country  
supported th e  ad m in is tra t io n  i n  i t s  v iew s ,  but strong  
o p p o s i t i o n  remained in  C o n g r e s s . W h e n  R ooseve lt  turned  
to  the  Senate  fo r  h e lp ,  he met with s t i f f  o p p o s i t io n .  The 
Senate  Foreign R e la t io n s  Committee l e t  the p r o p o s a l .d i e  in  
committee by a vote  o f  12-11 .  D u l l e s  n o te s  t h a t  t h i s  was 
the  f i n a l -  v i c t o r y  f o r  the i s o l a t i o n i s t s .  "Never again ,"  
he s a y s ,  "would they  hold the s t r a t e g i c a l l y  dominant p o s i t i o n  
which was t h e i r s  in  mid-summer 1 9 3 9 .
H i t l e r ’ s march on Poland in  September, 1939 demon­
s t r a t e d  th a t  pu b l ic  op in ion  in  America could not be counted 
on t o  remain i n d i f f e r e n t .  N e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  could 
prevent the a c t  of lend ing  money to  b e l l i g e r e n t s ,  but i t  
could  not outlaw the f e a r  tha t  the  su c c e s s  o f  the Nazis
5^Langer and Gleason, oo. c i t . ,  p. 137.  
^^I b i d .
'̂̂ Dulles, op. cit., p. Icc.
96
might mean the  d ow nfa l l  o f  America. A fter  invoking the  
n e u t r a l i t y  law, P re s id en t  Roosevelt  c a l l e d  Congress in t o  
s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n  and requested  a r ep ea l  o f  the arms embargo, 
ask ing  for a s u b s t i t u t e  measure wi.icn wouId per:r.it b e l l i ­
g e r e n ts  t o  purchase from America on a ’’ca sh -a n d -c a rr y ” 
b a s i s ,  : i l e  the P re s id e n t  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  ”by the r e p e a l  
o f  the embargo the United S t a t e s  w i l l  more probably remain 
a t  peace than i f  the law remains as i t  s t a n d s , "57 .t h e r e  was 
never much doubt but tn a t  the P re s id en t  wanted a means to  
aid B r i t a in  and France.  S ecre tary  Hull  po in ted  to  the  
r e a l  i s s u e :  ’’The new l e g i s l a t i o n  would a f fo r d  us a b e t t e r
chance o f  keeping out o f  war than th e  old l e g i s l a t i o n  
b eca u se ,  i f  B r i t a in  and Fra.’.ce won tne war, we could remain 
a t  peace ,  whereas ,  i f  Germany won, th e re  was every l i k e l i h o o d  
th.at we would soon na /e  to  f i g h t . ”58 Public  opin ion p o l l s  
showed that  a m ajor i ty  o f  Americans had come to  s:;are tne  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s view.^^ But the  i s o l a t i o n i s t  block i n  
Congress s t r o n g ly  opposed a;;y chan, .'e in  the e x i s t i n '  
n e u t r a l i t y  laws.  Vandenberg stood s t e a d f a s t  with, t h i s  group.
Vandenberg became the Senate lead er  o f  the o p p o s i t i o n  
t o  R o o s e v e l t ’ s req uest  for the embargo r e p e a l .  Time magazine
5 7' Rosenma.n, T:.e Public  Papers and Addresses o f  
Franklin  D. Roosevel t ,  VIII ,  518.
5̂ Hu11, o p .  c i t . ,  p. 6 8 4 .
^^Hadley C a n tr i l  ( e d . ) .  Public  Opinion. 1935-194u  
(P r ince to n :  P r inceton  U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  1951] ,  pp.- 967-68
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viewed i t  as "the g r e a t e s t  l e g i s l a t i v e  b a t t l e  s in c e  the  
1 9 1 9  Senate f i g h t  over r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the V e r s a i l l e s  
Treaty and entrance  o f  the  United  S t a t e s  in to  the League 
o f  N a t ions ."  Gathered t o  Vandencerg’ s s id e  were a mixture  
o f  s o - c a l l e d  c o n s e r v a t iv e s  and l i b e r a l s .  They inc luded  
P r o g r e s s iv e  Bob L a F o l l e t t e ,  J r . ,  Harry Byrd of V i r g i n i a ,  
M is s o u r i ’ s Bennett  Champ Clark,  and Senator  Claude Pepper 
o f  F lo r id a .  "It  looked as i f  Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg 
was the b i g g e s t  paradox o f  a l l , "  i n s i s t e d  Time, adding t h a t  
he was chosen to l ead  the d e fen se  o f  the embargo because  he 
"best  symbolized a l l  phases and shades o f  the o p p o s i t io n  to  
embargo r e p e a l ."  Reported Time:
To weatherwise  p o l i t i c a l  o b s e r v e r s ,  Vandenberg’s 
stand looked l i k e  f i r s t - c l a s s .  Grade A p o l i t i c s .
For he s too d  to  win much— t o  l o s e  l i t t l e .  He had 
in  h i s  grasp the  kind o f  i s s u e  p o l i t i c i a n s  dream, 
about; n a t i o n a l ,  e m o t io n a l ,  impeccably honorable.
With t h a t  s t i c k  he c o u ld  drum a r o l l  th a t  would be 
f e l t  by every mother’ s h e a r t  i n  the U. S . ;  "I w i l l  
never v o te  t o  send your so n s  t o  war."^^
But Americans were a lr e a d y  adhering to the b e l i e f  
t h a t  America’ s b e s t  p r o t e c t i o n  from war might be aid to 
B r i t a i n .  The Gallop p o l l  showed i n  March o f  1939 th a t  ?b 
percent  of Americans favored  the s e l l i n g  of  goods to 
England and France in  case  of w ar .°^  After  the a t ta ck  on 
Poland, the R o o sev e l t  a d m in is t r a t io n  contended that  t h e
°0"N ationa l  A f fa ir s "  Tonne, XXXIV (October 2 ,  1 9 39 ) ,
l o .
OiAllen, 0 0 . cit. , p. 332.
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embargo c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  d e f e a t  o f  the A l l i e s .  Although 
Vandenberg’ 3 group i n s i s t e d  th a t  r e p e a l  wonld lea d  to  war,  
th e  n a t io n  took th e  advice  of P r e s id e n t  R o o s e v e l t ,  w'.o 
e n ter ed  the Senate  debate with a r a d io  address on October 2c 
t o  announce th a t  "no person in  any r e s p o n s ib l e  p lace  . . . 
has ever  su g ges ted  . . . sendinm she b o ;s o f  American mothers
t o  f i g h t  on the b a t t l e f i e l d s  o f  Eurooe ."’-^
Report o f  th e  Speech  
Vandenberg jo in ed  in  t h e  debate  on the repeal  i s s c e  
e a r l y  in  the  s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n .  He occupied the Senate f l o o r  
fo r  two hours w it  ho u: Irmerruption on October 2 ,  1939,°^  
i n  an e f f o r t  to  prove h i s  case  that  any c lanje ir. the  
N e u t r a l i t y  Act of 1937 meant war for America as w e l l  as a 
complete  r e p u d ia t io n  of the b a s ic  t e n e t s  o f  American fo r e ig n  
p o l i c y .  He must have sensed that  the mood of the country  
had changed s in c e  1937 for  in  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  he f e l t  compelled 
t o  muster ev id en ce  in  support o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n  wnereas in 
.1937 he assumed i t s  acceptance  without  p roo f .
Vandenberg designed h i s  address  t o  accomplish four  
o b j e c t i v e s :  F i r s t ,  ;ie wanted to s .ow t . .at  war was not
d e s i r a b l e  for  Ame r i  c a ; second, ne d e s ir e d  to  pro /e th a t  a 
r e p e a l  of  the  embargo would take the United S t a t e s  a s t e p
'^^Rosenman, The P ub lic  Papers and Addresse s  o f  
F rankl in  D. R o o s e v e l t , V III ,  35c.
^^Record, ?oth C on - . ,  2d S e s s . ,  1939 LXXV, Part
1,. 95.
c l o s e r  t o  war;  t h i r d ,  he wanted to  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  a ' fcash -  
a n d - c a r r y ” p o l i c y  was no t  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  
t h e  embargo; and f o u r t h ,  he wanted t o  r e f u t e  t h o s e  who 
seemed t o  t h i n k  t h a t  Am erica’ s e n t r a n c e  i n t o  war was 
i n e v i t a b l e .
The M ichigan  S e n a to r  chose  t o  p i t c h  h i s  d e f e n s e  of  
t h e  arms embargo on t h e  i s s u e  o f  war or  p e ac e .  He seemed 
to  have r e a l i z e d  t  .a t  Americans were growing i n c r e a s i n g l y  
s y m p a th e t i c  w i th  the  B r i t i s h .  He d o u b ted ,  however,  t h a t  a 
. . a j o r i t y  had re a c h e d  th e  s t a g e  where they f a v o r e d  a id  to  
B r i t a i n  even  a t  t h e  r i s k  of  w ar .  His hope f o r  s u c c e s s ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  was c e n t e r e d  around h i s  e f f o r t s  t o  c o n v in c e  h i s  
countrymen t h a t  r e p e a l i n g  t h e  embargo would l e a d  t o  war.
I n t r o d u c t i o n . — Vande.'iber - open.ed wLtn a r e m in d e r  o f  
th e  t rem endous  im p o r tan c e  o f  t h e  i s s u e  b e f o r e  the  C ongress .
” I b e l i e v e  t h i s  d e b a t e , "  he i n s i s t e d ,  " i n v o lv e s  t h e  most 
momentous d e c i s i o n , in  th e  ey es  of America and of  the  w o r ld ,  
t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  S en a te  has c o n f r o n te d  in  a g e n e r a t i o n . "  
Then he p lu n g ed  i n t o  h i s  t h e s i s  s t a t e m e n t  -diic':.. hot;,  
sum.xiarized h i s  b a s i c  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  r e p e a l  and emphasized 
h i s  own p o s i t i o n .
. . .  i n  t h e  m ids t  o:' f o r e i g n  war and th e  a la rm s  
o f  o t h e r  w a r s ,  we a re  a shed  t o  d e p a r t  b a s i c a l l y  fro.:, 
t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  which th e  American Congress  has  tw ice  
t o l d  t h e  w o r ld  s i n c e  113 3, wo : Id be our  r u l e .  . . .
We a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a sked  to  d e p a r t  from i t  t : . ro  
t h e  r e p e a l  o f  e x i s t i n g  n e u t r a l i t y  law e s t a b l i s h i n g  
an embargo on arms,  a . t .munit ion, and implements  of 
w ar .  We a r e  a sked  t o  d e p a r t  from i t  i n  v i o l a t i o n  
o f  our  own o f f i c i a l l y  a s s e r t e d  d o c t r i n e .  . . . We
luU
are asked to  depart from i t  in  b e h a l f  o f  one b e l l i ­
gerent  whom our personal  sympathies l a r g e l y  fa v or .
. . .  In my o p in io n ,  t h i s  i s  the rqad t h a t  may l e  ad 
us t o  war, and I w i l l  not v o l u n t a r i l y  take i t . 64
Vandenberg then moved t o  an e t h i c a l  p lea  f o r  b ip a r ­
t i s a n  c o n s id e r a t io n  of  the  measure ending with an appeal th a t  
tne  measure be divorced from domestic  p o l i t i c s .  "To p r o s ­
t i t u t e  the peace of America to  p o l i t i c s , "  he i n s i s t e d ,  "would 
be sheer  t r e a s o n . "^5 in  t h i s ,  he agreed w ith  P re s id e n t  Roose­
v e l t  who had ::.ade tine sat.e p l e a .  He a l s o  echoed the P r e s i d e n t ' s  
wish th a t  a i l  Americans " ascr ib e  an honorable d e s i r e  f o r  
peace to  those who hold d i f f e r e n t  v i e w s . V a n d e n b e r g ' s  
r e p ly  was an assurance th a t  he would "respect  the motives  
behind every vote  t h a t  s h a l l  be c a s t  upon the r o l l  c a l l ." ^ ?
Argument a g a in s t  war fo r  America. — Before c u i ld in g  
h i s  case  f o r  r e t e n t i o n  o f  the embargo, Vandenberg r a i s e d  the  
q u es t io n  o f  the d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  America remaining at peace.
Two years  e a r l i e r ,  he assumed the  acceptance  o f  t h i s  g o a l .
He seemed t o  sense that  many Americans were growing more 
sympatnetic  to the  A l l i e d  cause and might r i s k  war t o  he lp  
the democracies.  He sa id :  "There i s  the group th a t  i s  so
r i g h t e o u s l y  s e n s i t i z e d  t o  the cause  of one b e l l i g e r e n t  a g a in s t  
the  o ther  . . . th a t  they  do not w h o l ly  r e j e c t  the hazards  
o f  our involvement.  . . . Al t hough he did not mention
^^I b i d . c^I b i d . , p . . 9 c .
° ° I b i d .  - c i b i d .
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the  P r e s id e n t  at t h i s  p o i n t ,  t h e r e  was an apparent awareness  
o f  the  streii.pth of  R o o s e v e l t ’ s s ta tem ent:  ”We know what
might happen to  us in th e  United S t a t e s  i f  the new p h i l ­
o so p h ie s  o f  f o r c e  were t o  encompass the other c o n t i n e n t s  and 
invade our o w . i " I;, e s s e n c e ,  Vandenierg’ s r e p ly  was that
a war t o  p reser v e  a democracy cannot produce the  c o n d i t io n s  
e s s e n t i a l  to  maintain a democracy. He a l luded  to  the Treaty  
o f  V e r s a i l l e s  and t o  the  r e d u c t io n s  o f  the r i g h t s  of the  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n  time o f  war. He added: ”We cannot order
Europe’ s d e s t i . r ; ,  not even i f  we took i t  as a permanent  
ass ign m en t .  I t  i s  not our war,  d e s p i t e  our devot ion  t o  
democracy.
Vandenlerg h ; i l t  a s tron g  c a se  to  support h i s  
p o s i t i o n  t h a t , war does not  b u i ld  democracy. He capitalized 
on American e x p e r ie n c e s  a t  V e r s a i l l e s  in  parading the f a l s e  
hopes o f  I 9 I 0  be fore  h i s  audience as an example o f  America’ s 
attem p ts  t o  r i g h t  the wron-s o f  Europe. America can render  
a g r e a t e r  s e r v i c e  t o  humanity, im p l ied  Vandenberg, by s e t t l n  
a good example than by j o i n i n g  in  the c o n f l i c t .  He reduced 
America’ s r o l e  to  th a t  o f  m a in ta in in g  l i b e r t y ,  freedom and 
f r e e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  on t h i s  s i d e  of th e  world.  He 'a /e  n.o 
h in t  o f  an awareness t h a t  t h r e a t s  t o  peace might a l s o  be a
^^Rosenman, The P u b l ic  Papers and Address o f  
F ra n kl in  D. R o o s e v e l t . V I I I ,  514.
70Record, 76th Con?., 2d S e s s . ,  1939,  LXXV, Part
1 , 93. '
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t r i r e a z  z o  democracy, Ke asked ,  i n s t e a d ,  what would we 
get?
F i r s t ,  we would get  such a r eg im en ta t ion  of  our 
own l i v e s  a d  l i v e l i h o o d s ,  21 minutes a f t e r  we 
entered  the war, th a t  the B i l l  o f  Rights  would 
need a gas mask, and in d iv id u a l  l i b e r t y  of  a c t i o n  
would s w i f t l y  become a mocking memory. . . .  I f  
the war went long  enough, I doubt whether we s h a l l  
ever  ge t  the Republic back. . . .
Second, we should come out of  the v i c t o r y  with  
an i n f i n i t e l y  pyramided debt .  . . . Repudiation or 
ruinous i n f l a t i o n  would be i n e v i t a b l e .  Our eco .o :.ic 
v a lu e s  would c o l l a s p e .  Nothing but a l l  powerful^ 
c e n t r a l  government coaid save t;.e p i e c e s .  . . . '
Argument th a t  rep ea l  i s  a s t e p  toward war . — To 
e s t a b l i s h  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  rep ea l  o:' t..e eu. bar go would lead  
t o  war, Vandenberg f i r s t  had t o  meet th;e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s 
argument th a t  r e p e a l  would sdreugt-.e". n e u t r a l i t y .  The 
demand f o r  r e p e a l ,  s a id  Vandenberg, came not from a d e s ir e  
t o  keep the country n e u t r a l ,  but from a d e s i r e  to  a id  o^e 
b e l l i g e r e n t  over ano th er .  This  a c t i o n ,  he contended, would 
’’s t r i k e  down a g r e a t ,  i n d i s p e n s a b l e , i n s u l a t i n -  d e fe n se  
'a y a i n s : o .r involvement in  t h i s  war."'^ After .-aKing t h i s  
o b s e r v a t io n ,  :.e s a i d ,  .owever, that  he was w i l l i n g  t o  over­
look  t h i s  obvious motive of r i s k i n g  war to  help  A1 i .ies a..u 
debate the  i s s u e  pu re ly  on the dec la red  o b j e c t i v e  of the 
proponents o f  r e p e a l — the b u s in e s s  o ' keep ' - A .er ica  at
peace .  ”I oppose r ep ea l  because I b e l i e v e  r ep ea l  makes us 
r e l a t i v e l y  v u l n e r a b l e , ” he a r g u e d , ’’w h i l e  the embargo l e a v e s  
us r e l a t i v e l y  immune. And th e re  the major i s s u e  l i e s . ” '3
T^I b i d . , p. 97- . 72%bid. . p. 96.  73j b i d .
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With h i s  t h e s i s  r ep ea ted ,  Vanaenberg turned t o  the  
b u s in e s s  o f  meeting R o o s e v e l t ’ s a s s e r t i o n  that  rep ea l  o f  
the  embargo would be a b e t t e r  guarantee o f  peace than the  
e x i s t i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n .  The Michigan Senator attempted to  
prove th a t  the  "change must be l e s s  s a f e ,  l e s s  i n s u l a t e d ,  
l e s s  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  ach ieve  the American detachment to  which 
we say we are d e v o t e d . H i s  major argument in  support o f  
t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  was s imply t h a t  r ep ea l  would p lace  America' 
in  v i o l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law s i n c e  she would be 
changing her p o l i c y  toward b e l l i g e r e n t s  a f t e r  war had begun. 
"When we pass t h i s  b i l l , "  he s a i d ,  "we abandon our own 
solemnly announced concep t ion  of what our n e u t r a l i t y  ought 
to  be ,  no m atter  what a l i e n s  should be i n v o l v e d . "7$ He 
s t r e s s e d :
. . . th e  arms embargo i s  the dominating  
symbol of the n e u t r a l i t y  which we almost un an i­
mously sa id  we would p r e ser v e .  I t s  rep ea l  must 
be the dominating symbol o f  a c o n s c io u s  d r i f t  
away from n e u t r a l i t y  as we o u r s e lv e s  def ined  i t .
He then pushed th e  f e a r  o f  war in  h i s  e f f o r t s  to  
show th a t  i t  would be "unneutral" to  change the r u l e s  durin .  
the co u r se  of  war. "We know t h a t  r e p e a l  w i l l  be construed  
abroad," he s a i d ,  "as the f r u i t i o n  o f  a d e l ib e r a t e  purpose 
to  he lp  one b e l l i g e r e n t  . . . and an encouragement t o
^Record, 7 6 th Cong.,  2d S e s s . ,  1939,  LXXV, Part
1,  9d.
75ibid.
^^Ibid ., p. 100.
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77b e l i e v e  t;iat we :::ay l a t e r  coze c l o s e r  t o  the b a t t l e  l i n e . " '  
I m p l i c i t  in  t n i s  argument was both the b e l i e f  th a t  Germany 
might s t r i k e  back i f  Arr.erlca should r e l e a s e  arms to Nazi 
enemies in tne ::;iddle o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  and t  :at tne  A l l i e s  
would be encouraged to  tn ink  tn a t  k r .e r ' ica  had jo in e d  t h e i r  
c a u se .  The f e a r  o f  war, he- t l iougnt,  was g r e a te r  than the  
d e s i r e  o f  ..-.a:.y A-tericans to see  Germany d e f e a t e d .  He 
a l lu d e d  to  1916 again to  show th a t  America si;ould not 
permit o ther  nat ions ,  to  p u l l  .ner in t o  war which she would 
l a t e r  r e g r e t .
But Vandenberg seemed to  sense  t.'.at h i s  wnole case  
hinged on wnetner ne could demonstrate th a t  r ep ea l  o f  the 
embargo v i o l a t e d  American n e u t r a l i t y .  "Th.e code ,  I say  
again  and a ga in ,  i s  the  symijol o f  non - invo lvem ent . To 
change the smriool i s  to cnange tne a t t i t u d e , " r.e i n s i s t e d .  
Ke then  c i t e d  numerous a u t h o r i t i e s  in c lu d in g  Roscoe Pound 
o f  Harvard Law School  who contended that  Alter 1 car. attempts  
to  change i t s  n e u tr a l  p o s i t i o n  were in v i o l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  law. He a l s o  a l lu d ed  to  i n c id e n t s  d u r in ;  World 
War I in  wnich s e v e r a l  s t a t e  department o f f i c i a l s  inad frowne: 
upon any American attempts t o  change i t s  n e u t r a l  p o s i t i o n  
in  the war as i n d i c a t i v e  o f  "unneutral" a c t s .  "I do not 
b e l i e v e , "  he s a i d ,  "that u n n e u t r a l i t y - - n o  m atter  what you 
c a l l  i t  i s  the s a f e r  or the w i s e r  road to  o e a c e . " / t
/ / i b i d .  " - I b i d . / " I b i d . ,  p. 101.
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Argrument a g a in s t  th e  “cash-an d-ca rry ” p r o v i s i o n . — 
Vandenberg next  attempted t o  meet R o o s e v e l t ’ s im p l i c a t i o n  
t h a t  a ’’c a sh -a n d -c a rr y ” p o l i c y  would be s a f e r  than a 
complete embargo. He depended upon the memory o f  1917-191^- 
a s  proof t h a t  enemy sh ip s  would attempt to s ink v e s s e l s  
carry ing  contraband the  moment they l e f t  American sh o re s .
He contended chat  R o o s e v e l t ’ s request  was an i n v i t a t i o n  to  
enemy s h ip s  t o  come in t o  America’ s ’’front  door” where con­
f l i c t s  and m isunderstandings would occur. He s im ply  asked:  
”I s  i t  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  anyone can s e r i o u s l y  argue t h a t  ’’cash-  
and-carry” i s  l e s s  hazardous and l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  involvem ents  
than no trade  in  munitions a t  a l l ? ”^^
Vandenberg warned o f  a second hazard in the ’’cash-  
and-carry” p o l i c y .  Ke took i m p l i c i t  advantage once again  
o f  the Nye Committee report  t o  remind h i s  audience  tha t  
once manufacturers had a t a s t e  o f  war p r o f i t s ,  they  would 
want more. When t h a t  t im es  comes, sa id  Vandenberg, i f  
n a t io n s  cannot pay cash ,  the cry w i l l  go up to  extend  
c r e d i t .  ’’And does not a l l  of  t h i s , ” continued Vandenberg,  
’’land us p r e c i s e l y  where i t  d id in 1 9 1 7 - l c ? ”''-'̂  This argument 
was c l e a r l y  a t tach ed  t o  t h e  p u b l i c ’ s hatred o f  war p r o f i t s  
a t  the  expense o f  human s u f f e r i n g .  Whiile a c o n t in u a t io n  o f  
t h e  embargo, i n s i s t e d  Vandenberg, would be ’’tem p o ra r i ly
GOl b i d . , p. 102.
- ' ^ I b id .
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harder on our cash r e g i s t e r s ,  but in wonld be e a s i e r  upon 
our permanent s t a b i l i t i e s  and c e r t a i n l y  i t  would be
ftp
i n f i n i t e l y  e a s i e r  upon our sons ."°^
Those Americans wl.o were w i l l i n g  no run some r i s k  i f  
r e p e a l  would he lp  England and France were the t a r g e t  o f  
Vandenberg’ s f i n a l  argument a g a in s t  the ’’cash -a n d -c a rr y ” 
p r o v i s i o n .  ’’Our e x p e c t a t i o n s  are d i s t o r t e d , ” s a id  
Vandenberg, ’’and our r.opes are dece ived  when we t r y  to  be 
n e u t r a l  and unneutra l  in  the same b r e a n n . W i t h  h i s t o r i c  
prophecy,  he warned th a t  once n a t ion s  lad no .cas :, t:.ey would 
want c r e d i t ,  and when t h e i r  c r e d i t  was %on e , t r e y  would ask 
f o r  g i f t s ,  and when m unit ions proved t o  be inad eq uate ,  they  
would c a l l  f o r  men. In o th er  words, ne i n s i s t e d  th a t  
p a r t i a l , a i d  u l t i m a t e l y  meant complete involvem ent .  He knew 
t h a t . e v e n  t h o s e  who favored  r e p e a l  did so in the name of  
peace .  He did not  h e s i t a t e  then to  demand n e u t r a l i t y  or 
t o t a l  invo lvem ent .  ”I f  we ever  reach the po in t  . . . that  
American d e s t in y  i s  l in k e d  with . . .  a European war, . . . 
l e t  us go a l l  the  way w ith  every th in g  we have g o t . ”ô4
Ar.gument a g a in s t  i n e v i t a b l e  invo lvem ent . - - I t  i s  c l e a r  
t h a t  the Senator d id  not f o r e s e e  how c l o s e  the world had 
come t o  conquering space when h.e argued th a t  ’’two g r ea t  
oceans . . . s t i l l  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s u l a t e  our sh o re s  a g a in s t
32l b i d . , p. 1 0 3 .
^ ^Ib id .  3^Ibid,
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t h i s  curse  o f  war and the c la s h in g  European r i v a l r i e s  and 
menaces out o f  which i t  seems p e r p e tu a l ly  to  grow."85 This 
argument was d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  th o se  who had come to  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  American involvement was i n e v i t a b l e .  On t n i s  i s s u e ,  
he probably shared the  t h in k in g  of  a m ajority  o f  h i s  country­
men who b e l i e v e d  th a t  a g rea t  ocean provided an i s o l a t e d  
l o c a t i o n  and se p a r a t io n  from Europe. He appears to  have 
been profoundly unaware o f  the r e v o lu t io n  in  warfare ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  regard to a i r  power, which H i t l e r  had forced  
upon h i s  enemies.
C on c lu s io n . —Vandenberg’ s conc lu s ion  in d ic a te d  h i s  
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  compromise on the repeal  i s s u e .  He sa id:
"We may d isag re e  among o u r s e lv e s  as to  the w i s e s t  means to  
win and save t h i s  b e n e d i c t io n .  But in  the face  o f  t h i s  
o b j e c t i v e ,  we must . f i n a l l y  be one p e o p l e . T h e  s i n c e r i t y  
o f  t h i s  remark i s  ev idenced  by the  f a c t  that  a f t e r  tne  
embargo was r ep ea led  and the P res ident  had sign'ed the new 
a c t  i n t o  law,^^ Vandenberg accepted  the v e r d ic t  and voted  
f o r  funds to  adm in is ter  th e  new o r o v i s io n s .
35l b i d . , p. 104.^
^ ^ I b i d .
^"^Langer and Gleason,  op. c i t . , p. 231. They w rite :  
"The f i n a l  vo te  on the conferen ce  rep o rt ,  November3,1.19391 
was 55-24 in  the Senate and 243-172 in  the House. . . .
The P re s id en t  s ign ed  the b i l l  on November 4,  1939.  . . . "
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In t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  the Speech  
The i s s u e  o f  war or p e a c e . —P re s id e n t  Roosevelt  
req u ested  the Congress to  rep ea l  the  embargo and i n s t i t u t e  
a p o l i c y  o f  ’’cash-and-carry” in  i t s  p l a c e .  "Our a c t s  must 
be gu id ed ,"  s a id  the P r e s id e n t ,  "by one s i n g l e  hardheaded 
thou ght—keeping  America out o f  t h i s  war."°° R o osev e lt  had 
thus presen ted  the request  for r e p e a l  on a war or peace theme.
Vandenberg agreed to  meet the  P res id en t  on rûs terms.
But he im p l ied  a t  severa l  p o in ts  in  the speecii th a t  he 
su sp ec ted  th e  P res ident  of  other m o t iv e s .  R ooseve lt  had 
s a id  on o c c a s io n s  that an embargo deprived  c o u n tr ie s  witl; ■ 
powerful n a v ie s  o f  natural  advantages over  land powers. In 
o ther  words, the  embargo worked a g a in s t  England and France.
I t s  r e p e a l  would work f o r  them. Vandenberg probably opposed 
th e  move because  he was a f r a id  th a t  R o o sev e l t  would use i t  
as a means to  aid England and France and thus edge America 
c l o s e r  to  involvement.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to a s c e r t a i n  why he viewed the new 
law as l e s s  n e u tr a l  than the 1937 a c t .  Under tne new a c t ,  
no American v e s s e l  could carry goods or passengers  to any 
b e l l i g e r e n t ,  no American goods could be shipped to  b e l l i g e r e n t s  
u n t i l  t i t l e  had been t r a n s f e r r e d ,  no American could t r a v e l  
in  c e r t a i n  combat areas ,  no American c i t i z e n  could t r a v e l  
on any b e l l i g e r e n t  sh ip ,  no American merchant sh ip s  could
^■^Rosenman, The Public  Papers and Address o f  Franklin  
D. R o o s e v e l t ,  V l l I ,  513.
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be armed,  and  no American bu s inessm an  could  engage i n  th e  
exchange o f  bonds o r  s e c u r i t i e s  w i t h  any b e l l i g e r e n t  s t a t e .
The P r e s i d e n t ’ s d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power o v e r  American f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  was s t i l l  l i m i t e d .  The on ly  m ajor  change was the  
p r o v i s i o n  w hich  would p e rm i t  America t o  s e l l  t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s .
The o n ly  d e f e n s i b l e  argument a g a i n s t  the  p r o p o s a l  
was p r o b a b ly  t h e  one employed by Vandenberg,  namely ,  t h a t  
r e p e a l  would i n v o l v e  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  i n  a r u l e  s change 
a f t e r  the  c o n f l i c t  had begun and th u s  would be i n  v i o l a t i o n  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law .  The i n h e r e n t  danger  was the  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  r e p r i s a l s  by an angry  Germany s i n c e  i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  
t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  had j o i n e d  th e  s i d e  of G rea t  B r i t a i n  and 
F r a n c e .  H i t l e r  was no doubt  aware t l i a t  American sy m pa th ies  
were w i th  t h e  A l l i e s .  Vandenberg ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  was a l s o  
aware o f  t h i s .  H is  r e a l  f e a r ,  though  den ied  i n  t h e  s p e e c h ,  
was t h a t  the  P r e s i d e n t  would u se  th e  new p r o v i s i o n  t o  h e lp  
q u a r a n t i n e  a g g r e s s o r s — a s t e p  which Vandenberg v iewed as 
moving away from c o n t i n e n t a l i s m  tow ard  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .
He p r o b a b ly  f e l t  t h a t  R o o se v e l t  p r e f e r r e d  v i c t o r y  f o r  England 
and F r a n c e — even a t  the  expense  of  American in v o lv e m e n t .  In  
t h i s  c a s e ,  h i s  f e a r  was n o t  so much o f  r e p e a l ,  b u t  of  th e  
c h a in  o f  e v e n t s  i t  might  p r e c i p i t a t e .  As Vandenberg s a i d ,  
once B r i t a i n  c o u ld  no l o n g e r  pay c a s h ,  th en  the  P r e s i d e n t  
might  r e q u e s t  l o a n s .  Once B r i t i a n  could  not come f o r  he r  
own s u p p l i e s ,  t h e n  America would t a k e  them to  h e r .  That  
would mean w a r .  This a c t u a l l y  happened l a t e r .  By opposing  
r e p e a l ,  Vandenberg hoped to  p r e v e n t  i t .
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The n e u t r a l i t y  argiiment.— In arguing that, embargo 
r e p e a l  might i n v i t e  r e p r i s a l s  from Germany, Vandenberg, no 
doubt, advanced the  s t r o n g e s t  argument a g a in s t  the measure.  
Although American sympathies were on -thé s id e  o f  England 
and France, th e re  was no e v id en ce  th a t  t h e y  were ready to  
get  in  the s t r u g g l e .  But did the rep ea l  of the measure 
r e a l l y  in c r e a se  the  r i s k  o f  war? The United S t a t e s  was 
already  sh ipp ing  every th ing  j u s t  short  o f  m unit ions to  the  
A l l i e s  as f a s t  as they could  be go t ten  th e r e .  Vandenberg 
gave no h in t  t h a t  he was w i l l i n g  to  add such i tem s as s t e e l ,  
c o t t o n ,  corn,  and o i l  to  the r e s t r i c t e d  l i s t .  He probably  
knew the  r e a c t i o n  which he would get  from American b u s i n e s s ­
men and farmers.  Yet,  England in  1917 cons id ered  many o f  
t h e s e  i tems contraband. The tru th  was triat most Americans 
were probably w i l l i n g  t o  take on a s l i g h t  r i s k  i f  i t  me a.- . 
th a t  in  adding m unit ions i t  o f f e r e d  help t o  mhe A l l i e s .
Americans had no d e s i r e  t o  see  H i t l e r  dominate  Europe .  They 
were no t  n e u t r a l  i n  t h o u g h t .  Many p ro b a b ly  t-iOugnt t h a t  
t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  the  " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  p r o v i s i o n  o f f s e t  any 
s l i g h t  deg ree  o f  i n c r e a s e d  d an g er  which the  r e p e a l  o f  th e  
embargo might  in v o k e .
The " r e a l "  i s s u e s . — Although Vandenberg m u s te re d  
s t r o n g  l o g i c a l  and e m o t io n a l  a p p e a l s  to  s u p p o r t  h i s  c o n t e n t i o n s ,  
he n e v e r t h e l e s s  c o m p l e t e ly  ig n o re d  some of  the  m a jo r  m easures  
advanced by t h o s e  s u p p o r t i n g  r e p e a l .  As s t a t e d ,  he chose  t o  
a rgue  the  i s s u e  s o l e l y  on the  b a s i s  t h a t  i t  was p r e s e n t e d
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by the a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  i . e . ,  the  s tren g th en in g  o i  American 
n e u t r a l i t y .  But the r e a l  i s s u e  was hidden in  the h e a r ts  o f  
th e  American p eo p le .  D u l le s  n o te s  th a t  with the outbreak  
o f  the war, th e r e  was "almost u n iv e r s a l  sympathy f o r  th e  
A l l i e d  c a u s e . V a n d e n b e r g  recogn ized  t h i s  a t t i t u d e ,  but 
he appeared to have missed i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  He narrowed 
the  i s s u e  to  war or peace.  B u e l l  notes  that  the r e a l  i s s u e  
r evo lv ed  around the b e l i e f  t h a t  "should Germany become the  
dominate power as a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  war, America would be 
l e f t  the only  g r ea t  democracy in  th e  w o r l d . "90 One might 
add t o  t h i s  i s s u e  th e  q u e s t io n  of  i n t e r n a t io n a l  j u s t i c e .
T h is ,  perhaps,  accounted in  part  fo r  the American sympathy 
f o r  the A l l i e d  cause .
In in tr o d u c in g  the  b i l l ,  the Senate Majority  Leader,  
f o r  example, urged the r e p e a l  o f  the embargo "because i t  
prevents  Great B r i t a i n ,  which i s  surrounded by water ,  from 
purchasing in  our m a r k e t . S u c h  a law was sa id  to  work fo r  
Germany and a g a in s t  Great B r i t a i n  and France. Many Americans,  
perhaps,  found i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  support a n e u t r a l i t y  law 
which worked in  favor  of  the a g g r esso r  and a ga ins t  the  
democracies .  But Vandenberg f a i l e d  to d i s c u s s  t h i s  c o n ten t ion .  
Ke d id ,  o f  c o u r se ,  r e c o g n i s e  th a t  rep ea l  might d i s c r im in a t e
‘̂9pulles,’ op. cit. , p. Ic7.
90:
■Record,■7bth Cong.,  2d S e s s . ,  1939, LXXV, Part 1, 53.
^Buell,  OP. c i t ; ,  p. 454.  
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i n  f a v o r  o f  G rea t  B r i t a i n  and F ra n ce  b e cause  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
had c o n t r o l  of  th e  s e a s ,  b u t  t h i s  move he viewed as  a s t e p  
to w ard  w ar .  He m is judged  th e  m ora l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  h i s  
c o u n t r y  i f  he t h o u g h t  i t  would s u p p o r t  a p o l i c y  t h a t  might  
en co u rag e  a g g r e s s i o n  j u s t  because  th e  o p p o s i t e  move might  
mean war.
But Vandenberg’ s b i g g e s t  m i s t a k e ,  p e r h a p s ,  was h i s  
f a i l u r e  t o  come to  g r i p s  w i th  the  most  s i g n i f i c a n t  argument  
o f  t h o s e  who su p p o r t e d  r e p e a l ;  i . e . ,  t h e  b e l i e f  i n  many 
q u a r t e r s  t h a t  ’’c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  s u p p l i e s  from America might  
h e l p  England and F ran ce  t o  d e f e a t  th e  a g g r e s s o r s .  T h is  
p o s i t i o n  was n e v e r  e x p re s s e d  by the  P r e s i d e n t .  But Langer 
and G leason  b e l i e v e  tl ' iat i t  was i m p l i c i t  i n  the  P r e s i d e n t ’ s 
r e q u e s t  t o  r e v i s e  the law . They n o t e  t h a t  Americans d id  no t  
want to  send a rm ie s  a b ro a d .  But " i n  the  P r e s i d e n t ’ s and th e  
p u b l i c ’ s mind, was ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  d e s i r e  t o  see  t h e  Axis
q u i c k l y  d e f e a t e d  and t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h a t  end i n s o f a r  as
Q2
d a n g e r s  of  invo lvem ent  c o u ld  be s a f e l y  a v o id e d . " ^
While i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  Vandenberg made a s t r o n g  s ta n d  
i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  prove t h a t  war d id  no t  i n s u r e  democracy,  
he n e v e r  r e a l l y  met the  argument t h a t  a Nazi v i c t o r y  might  
s e r i o u s l y  t h r e a t e n  the  s e c u r i t y  of  America.  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  
3 ,0 0 0  m i le  s e p a r a t i o n ,  the  op ponen ts  o f  t h e  embargo a rgued  
t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  had an i n t e r e s t  in  t h e  m a in ten a n ce  o f
'̂ ^Langer and Gleason, op. cit. , p. 212.
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a w or ld  b a l a n c e  o f  pcv;er. The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a s s e r t e d ,  i n  
f a c t ,  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o u ld  no t  i n s u l a t e  i t s e l f  
a g a i n s t  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  which a Nazi v i c t o r y  cou ld  have  on 
America.  I t  was h e l d ,  t r i a t  i f  England and France l o s t  t o  
Germany, t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would be menaced th ro u g h o u t  t h e  
g l o b e .  I t  was n o t  h a rd  t o  co nv in ce  Americans t h a t  an A l l i e d  
v i c t o r y  d id  not  pose such a t i i r e a t .  Vandenberg s im ply  c o u ld  
n o t  e r a s e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a Nazi  v i c t o r y  might t h r e a t e n  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  he found i t  d i f f i c u l t  
to  meet the  a rgument  t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  should  do n o t h i n g  
to a i d  the  d e m o c r a c ie s .
N e i t h e r  d id  Vandenberg s u c c e s s f u l l y  r e f u t e  the  argument  
t h a t  " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y ” would, be a s a f e  method o f  s e l l i n g  t o  
b e l l i g e r e n t s .  The S e n a t o r  s im p ly  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  s h i p s  m igh t  
be f i r e d  on n e a r  American s h o r e s .  But the  o p p o s i t i o n  
c o n te n d ed  t h a t  t h i s  r e a l l y  i n v o lv e d  no danger  to  America 
s i n c e  the  p u r c h a s e r  must pay cash  and come to  America f o r  
h i s  goods i n  h i s  own s h i p .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  o n ly  r e a l l y  l o g i c a l  
r e p l y  t h a t  Vandenberg c o u ld  make was s im p ly  to  i n f e r  t h a t  
England and F ran ce  would do  j u s t  t h a t  and Germany cou ld  n o t ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s t a t e s  would t a k e  i t  a s  an 
" u n n e u t r a l "  a c t  a g a i n s t  them. But t h i s  d id  n o t  answer t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n ’ s o b v io us  r e p l y  t h a t  as  long a s  the  o p p o r t u n i t y  
was open t o  them t o  buy i n  America ,  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  had 
made no v i o l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
f u r t h e r  a rgu ed  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  law was even a g r e a t  d a n g e r
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t o  the  p e a c e ,  b e ca u se  i t  p e r m i t t e d  American s h i p s  to  carry-
uncom ple ted  implements  o f  war t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s .  On th e  o t h e r
hand ,  t h e  new b i l l  would n o t  p e rm i t  American s h i p s  to  carry
any goods t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s .  The P r e s i d e n t  s a i d :  "Let  us
be f a c t u a l  and r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  a b e l l i g e r e n t  n a t i o n  o f t e n
needs  wheat and l a r d  and c o t t o n  as much as  he needs  a n t i -  
go
a i r c r a f t . "  V an denb e rg ’ s r e p l y  was s im p ly  t h a t  America 
c o u l d ,  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  s h u t  o f f  a l l  sh ipm en ts  to  b e l l i g e r e n t s .
The American C o n g re s s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  was n o t  w i l l i n g  
to r i s k  wreck ing  the  American economy i n  t h e  m idd le  o f  a 
d e p r e s s i o n  by s t o p p i n g  a l l  t r a d e  w i th  the  m a jo r  p u r c h a s e r s  
o f  American goods .  Americans would n o t  p u r c h a s e  peace  a t  
any p r i c e .  N e u t r a l s  s t i l l  had r i g h t s .  The American peo p le  
i n  s u p p o r t i n g  r e p e a l  were i n  e f f e c t  sa y in g  t h a t  j u s t  b e ca u se  
one n a t i o n  a t t a c k s  a n o t h e r ,  t h i s  does no t  mean t h a t  t h e  
b e l l i g e r e n t s  g a i n  a l l  t h e  r i g h t s .  Vandenberg c a l l e d  f o r  
t h i s  r e t r e a t ,  and a m a j o r i t y  r e j e c t e d  h i s  r e q u e s t .
In  summary, Vandenberg c e n t e r e d  h i s  a rgum ents  a g a i n s t  
t h e  r e p e a l  o f  t h e  arms embargo on th e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  
embargo i n  keep in g  America ou t  o f  war.  Ke i n s i s t e d  t h a t  
r e p e a l  would l e a d  the  c o u n t r y  i n t o  war.  He t r i e d  t o  show 
t h a t  any e f f o r t  to. s u p p ly  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  w i t h  m u n i t i o n s  was 
an i n v i t a t i o n  f o r  A m erica ’ s i n v o lv e m e n t .  He was aware ,
^^Rosenman, The P u b l i c  P ap e rs  and A ddresses  o f
F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t ,  V I I I ,  517 .-
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however ,  t h a t  American s>nnpathy was overwhelmingly  w i th  th e  
d e m o c r a c ie s ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  was a growing American en th u s ia sm  
f o r  s a c r i f i c e s  t o  a v e r t  a German v i c t o r y .  Ke r e c o g n iz e d ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h a t  Americans wanted  to a v o id  war .  With 
t h i s  a w a re n e s s ,  he c o n t in u e d  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  America’ s 
g e o g r a p h i c a l  a l o o f n e s s  e n a b le d  h e r  to  a v e r t  the  s t r u g g l e ,  
bu t  a b reak  in  n e u t r a l i t y  m igh t  p u l l  h e r  i n t o  the  b a t t l e .
What he f a i l e d  t o  show, however ,  was how t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  
c o u ld  e scape  the co nsequences  o f  a p r e d o m in a te ly  t o t a l i t a r i a n  
w o r l d .
The Address on the  S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e  Act
The German sweep o f  th e  low c o u n t r i e s  and the f a l l  o f  
F r a n c e  i n  1940 removed any r e m a in in g  American complace.icy 
to w a rd  war.  I t  was g e n e r a l l y  b e l i e v e u  up to  t h a t  t ime both 
i n  W ashington and among the  American peop le  t i i a t  the  A l l i e d  
powers would w i n . ^ ^  The r e a l i t y  o f  the  European s i t u a t i o n  
a f t e r  the  summer o f  1940 b r o u g h t  f r a n t i c  demands in  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  ’’pu t  the  n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e s  i n  o r d e r , ” and 
” t o  do e v e r y t h i n g  p o s s i b l e  t o  save  F rance  and B r i t a i n  from 
d e s t r u c t i o n . ”25 The P r e s i d e n t  f a c e d  t h e  f i r s t  demand by 
c a l l i n g  fo r  i n c r e a s e d  m i l i t a r y  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s ,  a two ocean 
Navy, and t h e  a d o p t io n  o f  p e a c e t im e  c o n s c r i p t i o n .  The l a t t e r  
p r o p o s a l  a ro u s e d  th e  o ld  i s o l a t i o n i s t  b lo c k .  S e n a to r
/^Aanger and Gleason, oo. cit., pp. 469-80.
95lbid., p. 472.
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Vandenberg a g a i n  j o i n e d  w i th  t h i s  g roup t o  s t a g e  a d e f e n s i v e  
/
b a t t l e .  His r a t i o n a l e  f o r  o pp o s in g  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  can 
b e s t  be u n d e r s to o d  by an e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
e v e n t s  which o c c u r r e d  between th e  r e p e a l  o f  t h e  embargo 
i n  1939 and th e  f a l l  o f  F rance  i n  t h e  summer of 1940.
The C o n tex t  of  t h e  Speech 
American a t t i t u d e s  in  1939. - - I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e i r  d e s i r e s  
t o  a i d  t h e  d e m o c r a c ie s ,  Congress  and th e  American peop le  in  
l a t e  1939 d e s i r e d  t o  keep  America a t  p e a c e . .
A f t e r  Germany and R u ss ia  o v e r r a n  P o la n d ,  th e  world 
go t  a b r e a t h i n g  s p e l l  d u r in g  a s i x  months "phony w a r . "96 
A l though  men l i k e  Bernard  Baruch warned Am ericans  t h a t  t h e i r  
f o r c e s  were " p i t i f u l l y  sm a l l ,  u n t r a i n e d ,  l a c k i n g  modem 
arms and u p - t o - d a t e  m u n i t i o n s , "97 t h e  c o u n t r y  r e f u s e d  to  
g r a p p l e  w i th  t h e  impending d a n g e r .  U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y  o f  
S t a t e  Welles w arned ,  a f t e r  a t r i p  a b ro a d ,  t h a t  t h e r e  was 
l i t t l e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  n e g o t i a t e d  peace  t a l k s  u n l e s s  t h e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s  t h r e a t e n e d  to  i n t e r v e n e .  Even s o ,  t h e  " c o u n t r y  
had s e t t l e d  down t o  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  a lo n g -d raw n  c o n f l i c t  
e n d in g  e v e n t u a l l y  in  an A l l i e d  v i c t o r y , "  w h i l e  even th e  
" B r i t i s h  and F rench  governments  th e m s e lv e s  had remained
A te rm  o f t e n  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  i n a c t i o n  by 
H i t l e r  between t h e  f a l l  of  Po land  i n  Sep tem ber ,  1939, and 
t h e  i n v a s io n  o f  Norway i n  t h e  s p r i n g  o f  1940.
^^The New York Times, September 17, 1939, p. 20.
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c o n f i d e n t  o f  u l t i m a t e  v i c t o r y  and were i n t e n t  on f i g h t i n g  
a cheap w a r . " / ^
American a t t i t u d e s  a f t e r  the  f a l l  o f  F r a n c e . - - H i t l e r ' s  
i n v a s i o n  of  Norway and Denmark i n  A p r i l  o f  1940, t h e  f a l l  
o f  t h e  low c o u n t r i e s  i n  May, and the  c o l l a p s e  o f  F ra n ce  i n  
June  awakened Americans to  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  B r i t a i n  
might be d e f e a t e d  and t h e  whole  c o n t i n e n t  l o s t .  When th e '  
P r e s i d e n t  t o l d  Congress  t h a t  " t h e  p a s t  few weeks have made 
i t  c l e a r  t o  a l l  our c i t i z e n s  t h a t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a t t a c k  
on v i t a l  American zones ought  t o  make i t  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  we 
have uhe p h y s i c a l ,  the r e a d y  a b i l i t y  to  meet t h o s e  a t t a c k s , " ' t V  
he met w i t h  l i t t l e  o p p o s i t i o n .
The P r e s i d e n t ’ s f i r s t  move was an a t t e m p t  uo add 
s t r o n g e r  l e a d e r s h i p  t o  th e  Navy and War D e p a r tm en ts .  On 
June  19, 19 4 0 , he a sked  Frank  Fox t o  become S e c r e t a r y  of  t h e  • 
Navy, and Henry L. S t im so n ,  S e c r e t a r y  o f  War. Both were 
R e p u b l i c a n s .  His a p p o in tm e n t  o f  Knox, a newspaperman who 
was A l f r e d  Landon’ s r u n n i n g  mate i n  193o, met w i th  l i t t l e  
o p p o s i t i o n .  But a g roup o f  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  i n c l u d i n g  A r thu r  
Vandenberg t r i e d  t o  b lo c k  S t i m s o n ’ s a p p o in tn . e n t . While a l m i t -  
t i n g  t n a t  S t i m s o n ’ s " p a t r i o t i s m ,  h i s  c o n s c i e n c e ,  h i s  i n t e g r i t y ,  
and h i s  c a p a c i t i e s  a r e  above r e p r o a c h , t h e  M ichigan  S e n a to r
9u I b i d .
o t
' ' I b i d .
lOpR e c o r d , 7oth C on g . ,  3 rd  S e s s . ,  1940,  LXIXVI, 
P a r t  8 ,  9260.
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i n s i s t e d  t h a t  S t im s o n ’ s w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  t r a n s p o r t  American 
goods t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  in  American s h i p s  and h i s  a p p ro v a l  
o f  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  made h i s  a p p o in tm en t  dangerous  f o r  t h e  
c o u n t r y .  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h i s  o p p o s i t i o n ,  however, the  S e n a te  
approved  t h e  a p p o in t m e n t .
The P r e s i d e n t ’ s second  move was an appea l  to  Congress  
f o r  an en la rg em en t  of the  armed f o r c e s  and a d d i t i o n a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  of war m a t e r i a l s .  The C ongress  approved a d e fe n s e  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of  f i v e  b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  and. a u t h o r i z e d  s i x t e e n  
b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  c o n t r a c t s .  The a u t h o r i z e d  
s i z e  o f  the  armiy was i n c r e a s e d  from 280,000 men to  1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;  
t h e  a i r  f o r c e  was g iven  p e r m is s io n  to  add l c , 0 0 0  p l a n e s  t o  
i t s  s t r e n g t h ,  and th e  Navy was a u t h o r i z e d  to  i n c r e a s e  i t s  
t o t a l  t o n n a g e . t o  1 ,3 2 5 ,0 0 0  t o n s  making the  " tw o-ocean  Navy" 
a  r e a l i t y .
The P r e s i d e n t ’ s n e x t  move was a recommendation t h a t  
Congress  e n a c t  a s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  law .  • S t im son ,  i n  f a c t ,  
i s  s a i d  t o  have a c c e p t e d  R o o s e v e l t ’ s a p p o in tm e n t 'w i th  t h e  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  the  P r e s i d e n t  s u p p o r t  h i s  views or. 
s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e . B u t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  was slow t o  announce 
h i s  avowed s u p p o r t  o f . t h e  m easure  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
p o l l s  showed t h a t  by August  o f  1940 over  86 p e rc e n t  of  t h e
l^-Pratt, op. cit., p. 637.
1 0 2 Langer and Gleason, op. cit., p. 680.
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American people  f a v o r e d  c o n s c r i p t i o n . " T h e  P r e s i d e n t  
seems to  have been on h i s  g u a r d , "  w r i t e s  Langer  and G leason ,  
" a g a i n s t  th e  s t a n d p a t  i s o l a t i o n i s t  e lem en ts  i n  C o n gress ,  o f  
whom he had more t h a n  a m ere ly  wholesome f e a r . " ^ ^ ^  E v e n t u a l l y ,  
however ,  the P r e s i d e n t  r e l u c t a n t l y  announced h i s  s u p p o r t ,
and was soon j o in e d  by a s t a t e m e n t  from Wendell W i l l k i e ,  who
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  i s  " th e  on ly  d e m o c ra t i c  way
i n  which  t o  a s s u r e  the t r a i n e d  and competent  manpower we
need f o r  n a t i o n a l _ d e f e n s e . "^^5
But i n  s p i t e  of  the  s u p p o r t  of  R o o s e v e l t ,  W i l l k i e ,  
G en era l  P e r s h i n g ,  and G e n e ra l  M a r s h a l l ,  a lo n g  with  a m a j o r i t y  
o f  th e  p u b l i c ,  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  f a c e d  a b a t t l e  i n  C ongress .  . 
The i s o l a t i o n i s t s  viewed i t  a s  a n o th e r  e f f o r t  to  f o r c e  th e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  to  p la y  a more p o s i t i v e  r o l e  i n  w or ld  a f f a i r s .  
Vandenberg j o i n e d  th e  o r a t o r i c a l  e f f o r t s  o f  t h i s  g roup  t o  
d e f e a t  t h e  b i l l .
A n a ly s i s  of  th e  Speech 
Debate  over  the  Burke-Wadsworth B i l l ,  which c a l l e d  
f o r  the  r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  a l l  men i n  A a e r ica  between the  ages 
o f  tw e n ty -o n e  and t h i r t y - f i v e ,  e r u p te d  i n  August ,  1940. 
Vandenberg made h i s  m ajor  speech  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  the  a c t
lO ^ I b i d .
lO^i b i d .
1 OS ■The New York Times, August I c ,  1940, p. 33*
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on August 12, 1940 . ^^^  He advanced two major  a rgum ents  a g a i n s t  
t h e  b i l l .  He m a i n t a i n e d ,  f i r s t ,  t h a t  c o n s c r i p t i o n  was i n  
d i r e c t  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  the  s p i r i t  of  democracy, and se co n d ,  
t h a t  c o n s c r i p t i o n  was n o t  needed f o r  n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e .  Both 
o f  h i s  c o n t e n t i o n s  a p p e a le d  t o  the American b e l i e f  t h a t  no 
l i b e r t y  should  be s a c r i f i c e d  w i thou t  due p r o v o c a t i o n .
I n t r o d u c t i o n . —Vandenberg’s open ing  remarks took  him 
s t r a i g h t  i n t o  the  co re  of h i s  a d d r e s s .  ” I  am opposed to  t h e  
p eace t im e  c o n s c r i p t i o n , ” he announced,  " u n l e s s  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l y  
e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  a p o s i t i v e  n a t i o n a l  emergency can be s e r v e d  
and saved i n  no o t h e r  w a y .” - ^ ^  From t h i s  a s s e r t i o n ,  he moved 
i n t o  h i s  f i r s t  argument  a g a i n s t  the p r o p o s i t i o n .
C o n te n t io n  t h a t  c o n s c r i p t i o n  d e s t r o y e d  Democracy. - -  
Vandenberg f i r s t  a t t e m p t e d  t o  prove t h a t  compulsory  s e r v i c e  
v i o l a t e d  the s p i r i t  of  democracy. For  t h i s  c h o r e ,  he r e l i e d  
p r i m a r i l y  upon b a re  a s s e r t i o n s .  "Peace t im e  m i l i t a r y  c o n s c r i p t i o n  
i s  r ep u g nan t  t o  th e  s p i r i t  o f  democracy and th e  s o u l  o f  
R e pu b l ican  i n s t i t u t i o n s , " - h e  i n s i s t e d .  He p i c t u r e d  p eace t im e  
c o n s c r i p t i o n  a s  a form of i n v o l u n t a r y  s e r v i t u d e  which was 
i n c o m p a t ib le  w i th  American democracy. Such a p ro g ram , he 
a rg u e d ,  would mark a r a d i c a l  d e p a r t u r e  from "150 y e a r s  o f  
peace t im e  h i s t o r y  and t r a d i t i o n , "  add ing  t h a t  such a p o l i c y
lO^R eco rd , 76 th  Cong. ,  3 rd  S e s s . ,  1940, LXXXVI,
P a r t  9 ,  10123- 3 0 .
107i b i d . . p .  10123 .
121
would t a k e  from Asierica "a  p r e c i o u s  p o s s e s s io n  with  which
we sh o u ld  n o t  l i g h t l y  p a r t . " ^ 0 8
The M ichigan  S e n a t o r  f l a t l y  d e n i e d  t h a t  America must
subm it  t o  p e ac e t im e  c o n s c r i p t i o n  i n  the  name o f  f reedom .
In  c o n t r a s t ,  he a r g u e d  t h a t  m i l i t a r y  c o n s c r i p t i o n  was a
m ajo r  p rem ise  o f  t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m .  ’’The American v o l u n t a r y
s y s t e m , ” on the  o t h e r  hand,  was p i c t u r e d  as  "one of the
g l o r i o u s  t r a d e m a r k s  o f  our d e m o c r a c y . ” ^ ^ 9  He c a l l e d  on h i s
a u d ie n c e  n o t  to  abandon t h a t  sys tem  w i th o u t  due p r o v o c a t i o n .
The i s s u e ,  he i n s i s t e d ,  was w h e th e r  ’’t h e  f a t e f u l  t im e - h a s
now come, i n  1940, when t h e  American ways,  from 1707 t o  1939,
must be abandoned.
T h is  i s  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  Has the v o l u n t e e r  sy s te m ,
under  a d e q u a te  t r i a l ,  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  i t  can n o t  
be t r u s t e d  t o  p roduce  the  r e c r u i t s  r e q u i r e d  by thé  
Army and Navy a s  s w i f t l y  as  may be n e e d e d f u l l y  t o  
match and man o u r  n e w ' f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  t h e  d e f e n s e  
o f  America  and h e r  e s s e n t i a l  o u t p o s t s ? l d l
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  Vandenberg a p p a r e n t l y
was t e l l i n g  h i s  a u d ie n c e  t h a t  he would v o te  f o r  c o n s c r i p t i o n
in  s p i t e  o f  i l l  e f f e c t s  i f  i t  were n e c e s s a r y  t o  m o b i l i z e  t h e
e n t i r e  f o r c e  of  the  c o u n t r y  a g a i n s t  an enemy. " I f  and when
t h e  j u s t i f i e d  answer i s  ’Y e s , ’ I  w i l l  v o te  for p e ac e t im e
c o n s c r i p t i o n , ” he in v o k e d .  ”So lo n g  as  the  j u s t i f i e d  answer
i s  ’N o , ’ I  w i l l  n o t  v o t e  f o r  p e a c e t im e  c o n s c r i p t i o n .
iO^I b i d . , p .  10124. iO^I b i d . , p. 10123
l lO l b id . l l l l b i d .
, l l Z p b i d .
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Argument t h a t  c o n s c r i p t i o n  was n o t  needed f o r  d e f e n s e . 
A f t e r  a t t e m p t i n g  to  p ro v e  t h a t  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  was incom­
p a t i b l e  w i th  democracy ,  Vandenberg conceded t h a t  such a 
s t e p  might be n e c e s s a r y  u nd e r  ex treme c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  But 
he d en ie d  t h a t  the  w o r ld  s i t u a t i o n  in  1940 demanded the a c t .  
He asked:
Has th e  v o l u n t e e r  sys tem under  a d e q u a te  t r i a l  
d e m o n s t r a te d  t h a t  i t  c ann o t  be t r u s t e d  t o  produce  
th e  r e c r u i t s  r e q u i r e d  by th e  Army and the Navy as  
s w i f t l y  as may be n eed ed ,  f u l l y  t o  match and man 
our  new f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  d e fe n se  o f  America and 
h e r  e s s e n t i a l  i d e a l s ?  I answer "No" and I  now 
p ropose  to  exam.ine my p r o o f s . 1-3
He t u r n e d  t o  i n d u c t i o n  t o  prove  t h a t  c o n s c r i p t i o n  ■
was no t  needed .  F i r s t ,  he shaved from o f f i c i a l  r e c o r d s  t h a t
" th e  Army and Navy have  f i l l e d  e v e ry  v o l u n t e e r  quo ta  th ey
have sough t  t h i s  y e a r . " I l l  Second ,  he a s s e r t e d  t h a t  th e
government  iiad made no r e a l  e f f o r t  to  make the  v o l u n t e e r
system work. Here he a t t e m p te d  to  blame any d e f i c i e n c y  i n
t h e  s t a t u s  quo d i r e c t l y  on the  in ad e q u ac y  o f  the  P r e s i d e n t ’ s
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of  i t .  In  a  d i s p l a y  o f  f i n e  s c o r n ,  he  s a i d :
Has th e  P r e s i d e n t  i s s u e d  a r i n g i n g  c a l l  f o r  v o l u n t e e r s ?  
He has  n o t .  Has t h e r e  been a p e r s u a s i v e  f i r e s i d e  
c h a t  upon th e  s u b j e c t ?  There  has n o t .  Has t h e r e  
been a r i g o r o u s  campaign t o  i n s t r u c t  young America 
i n  i p s  c o u n t r y ’ s need  f o r  v o l u n t e e r s ?  There has 
n o t . ^15
Vandenberg t h e n  p o i n t e d  to  s p e c i f i c  s t e p s  which th e  
government laight t a k e  to  make th e  v o l u n t a r y  system w o rk a b le .
1 1 3 % b i d . , p .  1 0 1 2 b .
llllbid. -‘■•̂ îcid.
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He s u g g e s t e d  i n c r e a s e d  p ay ,  a o n e -y e a r  i n s t e a d  o f  a  t h r e e -  
y e a r  t e r m ,  and s t e p p e d  up q u o t a s .  "Compulsion s h o u ld  be 
e m b raced ,"  i n s i s t e d  V andenberg ,  "on ly  when the  v o l u n t e e r  
sys tem  shows a t  l e a s t  some s i g n  of  f a i l i n g  . . .  i t  has 
shown no such  s i g n .  . . He c i t e d  numerous newspaper
r e f e r e n c e s  t o  show t h a t  q u o ta s  were be ing  met t h r o u g h o u t  
t h e  c o u n t r y .  At t h i s  p o i n t .  S e n a to r  Burke i n t e r r u p t e d  w i th  
th e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e  v o l u n t a r y  system was f a i l i n g  u n t i l  
. t a l k  o f  compuls ion  began .  Vandenberg evaded him, and con­
t i n u e d  w i t h  th e  q u e s t i o n :  "How about  the  t h o u s a n d s  cf c o lo r e d
p a t r i o t i c  c i t i z e n s  . . . who canno t  g e t  i n t o  th e  v o l u n t a r y  
s e r v i c e  b e ca u se  so r e l a t i v e l y  few u n i t s  a r e  p ro v id e d  f o r
them?"̂ 17
In  a r g u i n g  t h e  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  i s s u e  on t h e  b a s i s  
o f  "no need"  and a l o s s  o f  p e r s o n a l  l i b e r t y ,  V andenberg ’ s 
r e a s o n i n g  d i f f e r e d  somewhat from o t h e r s  who opposed th e  
s t e p .  Many o f  the  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  t r i e d  t o  p rove  t h a t  th e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . w a n t e d  a l a r g e  army a s  a p r e l i m i n a r y  even t  
t o  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  w a r .^ ^ ^  Vandenberg h i n t e d  
t h r o u g h o u t  h i s  speech  t h a t  he would l i k e  to  make war or 
peace  th e  m a jo r  i s s u e ,  bu t  he was c a r e f u l  t o  a t t a c h  h o n o ra b le  
i n t e n t i o n s  to  th o s e  w i t h  whom he d i s a g r e e d .  But a t  one o r
^^^ I b i d . , p. 10128.
U T l b i d .
^^^L anger  and G le a so n ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 681.
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two p o i n t s ,  he i n d i r e c t l y  q u e s t i o n e d  t h e  r e a l  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  
t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  p r o p o s in g  t h e  m ea su re .  Sa id  Vandenberg:
" I  can  u n de rs tan d  why t h e  d e f e n s e  needs  t o o k  on a new c o l o r  
o f  u r g e n c y - - p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  minds of  t h o s e  who f e a r f u l l y  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  our invo lvem en t  i n  t h e  European war so o n e r  o r  
l a t e r  i s  i n e v i t a b l e ,  and who f a v o r  a f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  which 
m ig h t ,  however,  u n w i t t i n g l y  t a k e  u s  n e a r e r  t o  t h i s  h a z a r d .
But Vandenberg l e t  t h e  p o i n t  p a s s  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  comment.
L a t e r ,  however, he h i n t e d  a t  u l t e r i o r  m o t iv e s  on t h e  
p a r t  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  when he q u e s t i o n e d  t h e  p ro p o se d  s i z e  
o f  t h e  Army. R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e q u e s t  f o r  
4 00 ,000  men by O ctober  1, t h e  S e n a t o r  a sk ed ,  "Why? I  w i l l  
a c c e p t  t h e  f i g u r e , "  he s a i d ,  " i n  s p i t e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  I 
c a n n o t  u n d e rs t a n d  i t . "  But t h e  d i g  a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  was 
i m p l i c i t .  ."What l i e s  a h e a d , "  s a i d  Vandenberg,  "depends  . . .  . 
upon d e c i s i o n s  a lm ost  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n  t h e  hands  of  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  
and I  have no means o f  knowing what he c o n t e m p l a t e s . "  Then 
hav ing  made h i s  p o i n t ,  he s a i d :  " I  d i s m i s s  a l l  c o l l a t e r a l
c o n t r o v e r s y ,  and I  come back t o  t h e  one and s i n g l e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
upon which I  s t a n d :  T h is  democracy  can n o t  a f f o r d  . . .  t o
embrace peace t im e  m i l i t a r y  c o m p u ls io n .  . . . "120
C o n c lu s io n . - -V a n d e n b e rg  conc luded  w i t h  a r e s t a t e m e n t  
o f  h i s  o b j e c t i o n s  to  t h e  p r o p o s a l :  " F i r s t ,  b e cau se  i t  i s
^^^Record, 76th Cong. ,  3 rd  S e s s . ,  1940, LXXXVI,
P a r t  9, 10126.
IZOl b i d . ,  p .  10129.
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p r e s e n t l y  u n n e c e s s a r y  i n  b e h a l f  o f  f u l l  d e f e n s e ;  s econd ,
b e ca u se  i t  i s  a wrenching  d e p a r t u r e  from t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l
American i d e a l  o f  l i b e r t y .  . . . ” 121 And then c o n t r a r y  t o
h i s  u s u a l  p r a c t i c e ,  he added  two a d d i t i o n a l  o b j e c t i o n s  t o
c o n s c r i p t i o n  which he had n o t  m en t ion ed  i n  the  speech and
which  he l e t  pass w i th o u t  a d e q u a te  d ev e lo p m e n t .  Almost as
an a f t e r t h o u g h t ,  he o b j e c t e d  to  tiie b i l l
. . .  b e c a u s e  i t  i n j e c t s  i n t o  our economy a 
p h i lo s o p h y  o f  f o r c e d  c o n t r o l s  which sh o u ld  
be r e s i s t e d  b e cause  o f  t h e i r  d i r e c t i o n  and 
t h e i r  f u r t h e r  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  . . . and because  
Congress  i s  h e re  and can  p ro m pt ly  s u p p ly  any 
c o r r e c t i o n  i f  i t  be r e q u i r e d  by u n f o l d i n g  d e s t i n y . 122
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  Speech 
The e x t e n t  o f  th e  em ergency . — V andenberg ’s o b j e c t i v e  
i n  t h i s  speech  was r e f u t a t i o n  o f  t h e  argument t h a t  America 
needed a  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  a c t .  Those who fav o red  th e  
compulsory  p la n  were a la rm ed  by th e  p r e s s u r e  o f  e v e n t s  in  
Europe.  In  August  o f  1940 ,  t h e r e  were no s i g n s  t h a t  H i t l e r  
was ab o u t  to  be d e f e a t e d  o r  t h a t  J apan  was w i thdrawing  from 
th e  power r a c e .  Many, i n c l u d i n g  th e  P r e s i d e n t ,  viewed a 
s t r o n g  army a s  a  n e c e s s i t y  i n  th e  f a c e  o f  a  world s i t u a t i o n  
which seemed d e s t i n e d  t o  grow even w o rs e .  Vandenberg 
c h a l l e n g e d  t h i s  p o i n t  o f  v iew .  He c o u ld  see  no need f o r  
a n a t i o n  a t  p e ac e  to  m a i n t a i n  a l a r g e  p e ac e t im e  army.
^Z^i b i d . , p. 10130.
122ibid.
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Thus,  V an d en b e rg ’s c a s e  was b a sed  on a f a l s e  p re m ise .  
I n  1940 , t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  was no t  r e a l l y  a t  peace .  I t  was 
t r u e  t h a t  war had  not  been d e c l a r e d  and t h e  Ameri can peo p le  
hoped t h a t  the  u s e  of American s o l d i e r s  would n ever  be 
n e c e s s a r y .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  c o u n t r y  was a c t u a l l y  l i v i n g  
i n  a s t a t e  o f  w a r ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  a t  l e a s t ,  t h a t  would 
e x i s t  as  lo n g  a s  H i t l e r  r em a ined  u nchecked .  This was a 
r e a l i t y ,  which Vandenberg a p p a r e n t l y  c o u l d  n o t  ad m i t .  His 
d e f e n s e  o f  the  v o l u n t a r y  sys tem  was b a s e d  on the  a ssu m p t io n  
t h a t  America was n o t  i n  t h e  war and need  n ever  be.
The d i s t r u s t  o f  R o o s e v e l t . — A lthough  d i f f i c u l t  no 
d e t e c t  i n  h i s  s p e e c h ,  Vandenberg’s r e a l  f e a r  of  s e l e c t i v e  
s e r v i c e  was p r o b a b l y  h i s  d i s t r u s t  of  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t ’ s 
u s e  o f  American f o r c e s .  Vandenberg had no t  u s u a l l y  b a lk e d  
a t  p r e p a r e d n e s s .  The Burke-Wadsworth B i l l  was not  by any 
means a u n i v e r s a l  m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g  p rogram .  I t  was advanced 
s im p ly  a s  a d e f e n s e  m easu re .  Vandenberg p r o b a b ly  d id  n o t  
have s e r i o u s  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l .  He had ,  i n  f a c t ,  
v o t e d  o n ly  th e  week b e f o r e  f o r  a p e a c e t im e  compulsory  d r a f t  
f o r  the  N a t io n a l  Guard. Why th e n  d id  he o b j e c t  t o  t h i s  
measure?  He m igh t  have s u s p e c t e d  th e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  s e e k in g  
t h e  measure  as  a  p r e p a r a t o r y  s t e p  to  i n t e r v e n t i o n  on the  s id e  
o f  th e  A l l i e s .  The S e n a t o r  had been s u s p i c i o u s  o f  R o o se v e l t  
s i n c e  he spoke i n  f a v o r  o f  q u a r a n t i n i n g  a g g r e s s o r s  i n  1937» 
and he h i n t e d  a t  t h i s  in  the  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  sp e ec h .  ”I 
am f r a n k  t o  s a y , ” he c o n te n d e d ,  ’’t h a t  I  t h i n k  we sometimes
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a r e  e n t i r e l y  t o o  prone  to  a sk  f o r  t r o u b l e . ”^23 But he 
d i s m i s s e d  t h i s  ph ase  a s  " c o l l a t e r a l  c o n t r o v e r s y , "  which i n  
r e a l i t y  may have been  h i s  r e a l  o b j e c t i o n  to  the  p r o p o s a l .
I t  i s  n o t  so  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  Vandenberg would v iew 
s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  a s  an a t t e m p t  t o  "meet f o r c e  w i t h  f o r c e "  
o r  t o  add t o  the  b a l a n c e  o f  power a g a i n s t  the  N a z i s .  While 
he p r o b a b ly  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  the p o s s e s s i o n  of manpower might  
make o t h e r s  l e s s  l i k e l y  to  c h a l l e n g e  the U n i ted  S t a t e s ,  he 
seemed a l s o  to  f e e l  t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  R o o se v e l t  would be more 
r e l u c t a n t  t o  f a c e  a  c h a l l e n g e r ,  to  l e a d  th e  c o u n t ry  i n t o  war ,  
i f  America d id  no t  have t h a t  manpower ready  a t  hand. When 
he s a i d  he d id  no t  know the  P r e s i d e n t ' s  p l a n s ,  he was 
i m p l i c i t e d l y  v o i c i n g  f e a r  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  might have  
viewed th e  b i l l  a s  a s t e p  to w a rd  war .
The c a se  f o r  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e . —In  1940 America s to o d  
a t  the  c r o s s r o a d s  o f  w or ld  a f f a i r s  and few Americans c la im e d  
t o  know t h e  s a f e  r o a d  t o  f o l l o w .  An e v a l u a t i o n  o f  V a n d en b e rg 's  
argument r e v e a l s  s e r i o u s  w eaknesses  i n  h i s  p r e m is e s .  But i n  
August o f  1940,  bombs had n o t  f a l l e n  on P e a r l  Harbor  and most 
Americans had never,  h e a r d  o f  a tom ic  e n e rg y .  Europe s t i l l  
seemed 3 ,0 0 0  m i l e s  away.
I n  a r g u i n g  h i s  c ase  a g a i n s t  c o n s c r i p t i o n  on the  grounds 
t h a t  t h e r e  was no " s i g n "  o f  a n e e d ,  Vandenberg was p ro b a b ly  
r i g h t  i n  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  q u o ta s  had, been  met. Wiiat he f a i l e d
iZjibid., p. 10129.
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t o  emphasize was t h a t  th e  a u t h o r i z e d  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  army 
was l i m i t e d  by law. A f t e r  th e  t e r r i f y i n g  f a l l  o f  F rance  
and the  c o n s t a n t  t h r e a t  hanging  ove r  G re a t  B r i t a i n ,  American 
m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  G e n e ra l  M a r s h a l l ,  began c a l l i n g  
f o r  a t  l e a s t  a  r e g u l a r  army o f  one m i l l i o n  men. "There  was 
no chance of  s e c u r i n g  so many men by v o l u n t a r y  e n l i s t m e n t , "  
w r i t e s  Langer and G leaso n ,  "which had n e v e r  y i e l d e d  l a r g e  
numbers and which of l a t e  had been f a l l i n g  o f f  t o  an a la r m in g  
d e g r e e . V a n d e n b e r g  r e p l i e d  t i a t  the  v o l u n ta r y  sys tem 
sho u ld  be t r i e d  and i f  and when i t  f a i l e d  the  c o u n t r y  s h o u ld  
t u r n  t o  c o n s c r i p t i o n .
But Vandenberg had b e f o r e  him the  h a rd  e a rn e d  l e s s o n s  
o f  r e c e n t  h i s t o r y .  W ashing ton  o f f i c i a l s ,  i n c l u d i n g  Henry 
L. S t im so n ,  h a s t e n e d  to  p o i n t  out  t h a t  v o l u n t a r y  c o n s o r i p t i o n  
had n ev er  worked i n  t im e  of  s e r i o u s  t h r e a t s . ^2$ America 
had t u r n e d  t o  t h e  s e l e c t i v e ,  compulsory  system i n  191Ô. 
Although a d m i t t i n g  t h i s  f a c t ,  Vandenberg i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  in  1940 cou ld  not  be compared to  t h e  one i n  1918 
because  a t  t h a t  t im e  America was a t  war .  B u t .he  i g n o r e d  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  n a t i o n s  no l o n g e r  d e c l a r e d  w ar— th e y  waged i t  
f i r s t .  Americans f a c e d  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  Germany d id  
n o t  d e c l a r e  war  on H o l l a n d ,  Norway, Belgium, and F r a n c e — she 
s im p ly  waged i t .  In  o t h e r  w ord s ,  h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  t h e
^^^Langer and Gleason, op. cit., p. 680.
^^^Ibid.. p. 6 8 1 .
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v o l u n t a r y  system could  produce  a d e q u a te  p re p a re d n e s s  f a i l e d  
t o  come t o  g r i p s  w i th  t h e  d e f e n s e  n eeds  o f  Nazi  B l i t z k r i e g .
He c o n t i n u e d  t o  c l i n g  t o  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  the  v o l u n ta r y  sys tem 
c o u ld  meet t h e  demands of  t h e  h o u r  by ad d in g  some inducem ents  
f o r  young men t o  v o l u n t e e r .  But he c o u ld  m us te r  no  e v id e n c e  
t o  p rove  t h a t  such a sys tem  c o u ld  y i e l d  a m i l l i o n  or  more 
men. A p a n ic k y  American p u b l i c  f a c e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
h a v in g  to d e fe n d  i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  unprovoked  and unannounced 
a t t a c k .
F u r t h e r ,  Vandenberg^s argument  i g n o r e d  the n e c e s s i t y  
o f  a  r e s e r v e  o f  t r a i n e d  manpower. M i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  had 
r e p e a t e d l y  shown t r a t  a  m ajo r  w eakness  o f  America’ s d e fe n s e  
sy s tem  i n  1940 was th e  absence  o f  a l a r g e  r e s e r v o i r  o f  
t r a i n e d  men from w hich ,  i n  t im e  of  a t t a c k ,  adequa te  f o r c e s  • 
c o u ld  be d r a w n . I f  V and en be rg ’s a d v ic e  had  been a c c e p t e d ,  
t h e  a t t a c k  on December 7 ,  1940,  would have found America 
t r y i n g  t o  wage a war i n  b o th  Europe and A s ia  with v o l u n t a r y  
e n l i s t m e n t s .  The S e n a t o r  was,  i n  e f f e c t ,  c a l l i n g  on h i s  
countrymen t o  depend upon t h r e e  t h o u s a n d  m i l e s  of ocean f o r  
p r o t e c t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  t r a i n e d ,  e q u ip p e d  manpower r ea d y  f o r  
s e r v i c e .  P e a r l  Harbor  p roved  t h a t  America was v u l n e r a b l e  
t o  a t t a c k  in  s p i t e  o f  d i s t a n c e .
There  i s  a l s o  some r e a s o n  t o  q u e s t i o n  Vandenberg’ s 
i n s i s t e n c e  on p r e s e r v i n g  v o l u n t a r y  c o n s c r i p t i o n  a s  a
126o ib id .
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" g l o r i o u s  t r a d e m a rk "  o f  democracy.  With d i s a s t e r  t h r e a t e n i n g ,  
Americans became more con ce rn ed  w i th  s a f e t y  t h a n  t r a d i t i o n .
Even Vandenberg^s a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  c o n s c r i p t i o n  d e s t r o y e d  
i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  met w i th  s e r i o u s  c h a l l e n g e  when f a c e d  
w i t h  t h e  a rgum en t  t h a t  the  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  d e fe n d  o n e ’ s c o u n t r y  
sho u ld  be r e c o g n i z e d  as  a c o r o l l a r y  to  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e n jo y  t h e  
p r i v i l e g e s  o f  o n e ’ s governm ent .  As a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,
Vandenberg d id  not  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  i t  might be u n d em o cra t ic  
t o  ask  a man to  u n d e r t a k e  a m i l i t a r y  o b l i g a t i o n  w i th  l i t t l e  
t ra in ing ' -T-a  d i s t i n c t  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  case  o f  sudden a t t a c k .
The s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  i s s u e  was t h e  o n ly  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  measure  be tween  1937 and 1941 on which Vandenberg 
d id  n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  would l e a d  t h e  
c o u n t r y  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  war. He a rg u e d ,  i n s t e a d ,  t h a t  
com pulsory  c o n s c r i p t i o n  was u n d e m o c ra t ic  and u n n e c e s s a r y .
He s a i d  t h a t  s i n c e  c o n s c r i p t i o n  r e p r e s e n t e d  a r e s t r i c t i o n  
on i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  t h e  move should  no t  be t a k e n  w i t l io u t  
due p r o v o c a t i o n .  He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the need  d id  no t  e x i s t ,  
t h a t  Am erica ’ s g e o g r a p h i c a l  rem o ten e ss  from t h e  European 
c o n f l i c t  d id  n o t  demand a l a r g e r  army t h a n  th e  v o l u n t a r y  
sys tem c o u ld  p r o v i d e .  But a p p re h e n s io n s  r e s u l t i n g  from th e  
f a i l u r e  o f  the  Maginot  Line and the  B r i t i s h  F l e e t  were more 
pow erfu l  a s  f o r c e s  o f  p e r s u a s i o n  t h a n  was Vandenberg’ s r h e t o r i c ,  
The Burke-Wadsworth B i l l  was s ig n e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  on 
September  16, 19 40 .^2?
^2?Ib id . .  p. 683.
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The Address  on th e  Lend-Lease Act 
By e a r l y  1941,  f o l l o w in g  th e  " b l i t z , ” England had 
a lm os t  e x h a u s t e d  t h e  fu nd s  w i th  which to  buy " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "  
goods from the  U n i t e d . S t a t e s .  The American peop le  were 
f o r c e d  to, f i n d  a means o f  a i d i n g  h e r  and th e  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  
f i g h t i n g  H i t l e r i s m .  At t h i s  h o u r ,  many Americans f a v o re d  
a i d i n g  B r i t a i n  even a t  the  c o s t  of  war.  Most, however ,  hoped 
f o r  a " s h o r t - o f - w a r "  p o l i c y .  The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  came up w i t h  
an answer i n  J a n u a r y ,  1941. A b i l l  was i n t r o d u c e d  i n  Congress 
which the  p u b l i c  came t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  as  " L e n d -L e a se ."  The 
p r o p o s a l  a u t h o r i z e d  the  P r e s i d e n t  to  l e n d ,  l e a s e ,  s e l l . a n d  
t r a n s f e r  any American goods in c lu d in g  fo o d ,  m u n i t i o n s  of  
w ar ,  and weapons to  any c o u n t r y  whose n a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  he 
th o u g h t  c o n n e c te d  w i t h  American s e c u r i t y .  The P r e s i d e n t ,  . 
f u r t h e r m o r e ,  was p e r m i t t e d  t o  make such t r a n s a c t i o n s  u n d e r  
any t e r m s  he so  d e s i r e d .  S e n a to r  Vandenberg spoke a g a i n s t  
t h e  measure  i n  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S e n a te .  The r a t i o n a l e  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  h i s  speech  oppos ing  Lend-Lease can b e s t  be 
u n d e r s to o d  by an e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e  e v e n t s  which p r e c i p i t a t e d  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  p r o p o s a l .
The C o n tex t  o f  the  Speech 
The B r i t i s h  a p p e a l  f o r  a i d . —By t h e  end of 1940, i t  
was e v i d e n t  t h a t  n e u t r a l i t y  had f a i l e d .  The f a l l  o f  France 
a long  w i th  the  s i g n i n g  o f  the  T r i p a r t i t e  P a c t  on September  27,
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1940^2b conv inced  many Americans t h a t  t h e  d e fe n se  o f  t h e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s  meant more t h a n  a l a r g e  army c ap a b le  o f  
d e fe n d in g  the  h em isp h e re .  I t  had become a p p a r e n t  t h a t  t h e r e  
was a l i m i t  t o  t h e  amount o f  war s u p p l i e s  t h a t  England c o u ld  
p u rc h a se  from the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  on a " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y ” b a s i s ,  
and t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  sough t  a means t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  a i d  
t o  B r i t a i n  beyond th e  l i m i t s  s e t  by t h e  e x i s t i n g  n e u t r a l i t y  
l a w s .  The P r e s i d e n t  p r e s e n t e d  h i s  f i r s t  w arn ing  in  J a n u a r y  
o f  1940 . He s a i d :  ”I  hope t h a t  we s h a l l  have few er  American
o s t r i c h e s  in  our m id s t .  I t  i s  n o t  good f o r  the u l t i m a t e  
h e a l t h  o f  o s t r i c h e s  to  bury  t h e i r  heads  i n  the  s a n d . ” ^29 
Lord  L o th ian  came t o  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  i n  November t o  
emphasize  t h a t  G re a t  B r i t a i n ’s war e x p e n d i t u r e s  had d e p l e t e d  
B r i t i s h  d o l l a r s .  The m a t t e r  was brougi . t  t o  a c l im ax  on 
December c ,  1940 i n  a 4 ,000  word l e t t e r  f rom Winston C h u r c h i l l  
t o  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  in  which t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  a s s e r t e d  
t h a t  t h e  American p e o p le  must n o t  ’’c o n f i n e  th e  h e lp  which t h e y  
have so g e n e r o u s l y  p rom ised  on ly  t o  such  m u n i t io n s  o f  war 
and commodities  as  cou ld  be im m e d ia te ly  p a id  f o r , ” add ing
1 2 c Dru:mnond, op. c i t . , p . 17$. He n o te s  t h a t  t h e  
P a c t  s t i p u l a t e d  ’’t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  s i g n a t o r y  n a t io n s - - G e r m a n y , 
I t a l y ,  a n d , J a p a n - - w o u ld  a s s i s t  one a n o t h e r  by a l l  p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic ,  and m i l i t a r y  means s h o u ld  any one of  them be 
a t t a c k e d  by a  power n o t  t h e n  in v o lv e d  i n  the  European war 
o r  t h e  S in o - J a p a n e s e  c o n f l i c t .  . . . ”
^^^Rosenman, The P u b l i c  P a p e r s  and A ddresses  o f  
F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t , Vol. IX: War and Aid to  D e m o crac ie s ,
p .  4 .
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t h a t  t h i s  was " n o t  an a p p e a l  f o r  a i d ,  b u t  a  s t a t e m e n t  f o r
t h e  minimum a c t i o n  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a c h ie v e  our common p u r p o s e . "^^0
The P r e s i d e n t ' s  r e a c t i o n  t o  C h u r c h i l l ' s  a p p e a l . — The 
P r e s i d e n t  in  h i s  u s u a l  manner pu t  out a " f e e l e r "  a t  h i s  news 
c o n f e r e n c e  on December 17,  1940. In  an e f f o r t  to  avo id  
p u t t i n g  t h e  " d o l l a r  s i g n "  on h e l p  fo r  B r i t a i n ,  he p roposed  
a i d  i n s t e a d  of  t r a d e .  He s t r e s s e d  t h a t  war s u p p l i e s  cou ld  
be b e t t e r  u t i l i z e d  t o  de fen d  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  " i f  t h e y  
were  s e n t  to G rea t  B r i t a i n  th a n  i f  th ey  were k e p t  i n  s t o r a g e  
h e r e . "  He compared a i d  t o  G rea t  B r i t a i n . t o  l e n d i n g  o n e ’ s 
g a rden  hose  t o  a  n e ig h b o r  t o  p u t  out  a f i r e .  " I  d o n ’t  say 
t o  him b e f o r e  t h a t  o p e r a t i o n , "  s a i d  R o o s e v e l t ,  " n e i g h b o r ,  
my g a rd e n  hose  c o s t  me $15;  you have t o  pay me $15 f o r  i t .
What i s  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  t h a t  goes  on? I  d o n ’ t  want $15— I 
want my g a rd e n  hose  back  a f t e r  the  f i r e  i s  o v e r . " ^ ^ l  This  
was Lend-Lease  i n  a n a lo g o u s  form.
The c o u n t r y ’s r e a c t i o n  t o  R o o s e v e l t ’ s s u g g e s t i o n . —
While the  P r e s i d e n t  p r e p a r e d  a more s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l ,  he 
w a i t e d  f o r  r e a c t i o n s  t o  h i s  p r o p o s a l  from A m ericans .  Only 
t h e  " d i e - h a r d  i s o l a t i o n i s t s "  made s t r o n g  o b j e c t i o n s .  S e n a to r  
V a nd en b e rg ’ s r e a c t i o n  was t y p i c a l  o f  t i l l s  g r o u p .  He viewed 
t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s s u g g e s t i o n  as an a t t e m p t  t o  r e p e a l  the
^^^Winston S. C h u r c h i l l ,  The Second World War, Vol.
I I :  T h e i r  F i n e s t  Hour (Boston :  Houghton M i f f l i n  G o . , 1 9 49 ) ,  404.
^^^Rosenraan, The P u b l i c  P a p e rs  and A d d re s s e s  of  
F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t ,  IX, 60?.
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n e u t r a l i t y  l a w s .  He c o u n te r e d  w i t h  a p r o p o s a l  c a l l i n g  f o r  
"an  American i n q u i r y  t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s  a s  to  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  a n e g o t i a t e d  peace  which would su g g e s t  t h a t  the  p r i c e  o f  
r e f u s a l  t o  a c c e p t  a  j u s t  and r e a l i s t i c  fo rm u la  might  be a 
p o w e r f u l l y  e n l a r g e d  a c t i v i t y  on the  p a r t  o f . t h e  U n i ted  
S t a t e s . H e  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  he was "opposed  t o  se n d in g  
American s h i p s  i n t o  b e l l i g e r e n t  zones o r  p r o v i d in g  American 
convoys"  b e cause  he t h o u g h t  such  a c t i o n  would i n v i t e  our  "own 
u n a v o id a b le  p a r t i c i p a t i o n . "  He i n d i c a t e d  a mellowing t o n e  
i n  r e g a r d  t o  B r i t a i n ,  however, when he s t r e s s e d  t h a t  he 
f a v o r e d  a id  t o  England " w i t h i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  l i m i t s . "^33
R o o s e v e l t ' s  Lend-Lease  p r o p o s a l . —R o o se v e l t  p r e s e n t e d  
th e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  h i s  Lend-Lease  p r o p o s a l  i n  h i s  famous 
" a r s e n a l  of  democracy" speech  on December 29 ,  1940. " I f  
G re a t  B r i t a i n  goes  down, t h e  Axis powers w i l l  c o n t r o l  t h e  
c o n t i n e n t s  of E u ro pe ,  A s ia ,  A f r i c a ,  and A u s t r a l i a ,  and t h e  
h ig h  s e a s , "  s a i d  R o o s e v e l t .  " I t  i s  no e x a g g e r a t i o n  t o  say  
t h a t  a l l  o f  u s ,  i n  a l l  the  A m ericas ,  would be l i v i n g  a t  th e  
p o i n t  o f  a g u n . "  Then he s t r e s s e d  h i s  main p o i n t :  "We must
be t h e  g r e a t  a r s e n a l  o f  democracy . . .  no d i c t a t o r ,  no 
co m bin a t ion  of  d i c t a t o r s ,  w i l l  weaken t h a t  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  by 
t h r e a t s  of how th ey  w i l l  c o n s t r u e  t h a t  d e t e r m i n a t i o n . "134
^^^The New York T im es , December 2? ,  1940, p.  1.
^^^I b i d . , p. 4.
^^^Samuel I .  Rosenman, Working w i th  R o o se v e l t  
(New York: H a rp e r  and B r o s . ,  1 9 3 2 ) ,  p .  259.
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F o l lo w in g  h i s  f i r e s i d e  c h a t ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f f i c i a l l y  
p r e s e n t e d  h i s  p r o p o s a l  t o  C on g re ss .  House R e s o l u t i o n  1776,  
symbolic  o f  a n o th e r  g r e a t  l e g i s l a t i v e  s t r u g g l e ,  gave t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  power " t o  make a v a i l a b l e  to  th e  governments  o f  any 
c o u n t r y  whose d e fe n se  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  deems v i t a l  t o  th e  d e f e n s e  
o f  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  any d e fe n s e  a r t i c l e ,  any s e r v i c e ,  o r  any 
d e fe n se  i n f o r m a t i o n . " - 3 5  Two months o f  deb a te  bo th  in  and 
ou t  o f  Congress  ensued  b e f o r e  th e  b i l l  became law on March 11,
1941.^36
R o o se v e l t  r e c e i v e d  s u p p o r t  fo r  h i s  p r o p o s a l  from t h e  
Committee t o  Defend America by A iding  the  A l l i e s .  This  group 
was o r g a n i z e d  i n  May o f  1940 under  the  l e a d e r s h i p  of  William: 
A l len  White  o f  Emporia,  K ansas ,  who had d e c l a r e d  t h a t  " t h e  
t im e  had come when t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  should  throw i t s  
m a t e r i a l  and moral  w e ig h t  on the  s id e  of t h e  n a t i o n s  of 
W estern  Europe t h a t  a r e  s t r u g g l i n g  i n  b a t t l e  f o r  a c i v i l i z e d  
way of  l i f e . "  The m o t i v e ,  he i n s i s t e d ,  was s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n .  
" T e r r i b l e  as  i t  may seem ,"  he s a i d ,  " th e  peo p le  o f  our 
c o u n t ry  can n o t  avoid  the  consequences  o f  H i t l e r ’ s v i c t o r y  
and o f  th o s e  who a r e  or  may be a l l i e d  w i th  h im ."^^?  By t h e  
t im e  R o o s e v e l t ’ s Lend-Lease  p r o p o s a l  r e a c h e d  Congress ,  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  had th o u s a n d s  o f  members on i t s  r o l l  books from
^ 3 5 p j . a t t ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 639 . 
l ^ ^ i b i d .
3 -37^a l te r  J o h n s o n ,  The B a t t l e  A g a in s t  I s o l a t i o n  
(Chicago:  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Chicago P r e s s ,  1 9 4 4 ) , p .  6 9 .
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a l l  w a lk s  of  l i f e .  I t  was n o n p a r t i s a n  i n  n a t u r e ,  c o u n t in g  
among i t s  r e c r u i t s  such p e r s o n a l i t i e s  as  A d la i  E. S te v e n s o n ,  
P a u l  H. D ouglas ,  Dr. Henry Noble MacCracken, P r e s i d e n t  o f  
V a s s a r  C o l l e g e ,  Dean Acheson,  and s c o r e s  o f  o t h e r s .  Among 
t h o s e  who spoke f o r  t h e  m easu re ,  f o r  example ,  was Wendell  
W i l l k i e ,  t h e  1940 R e p u b l ica n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  nominee. This  
group welcomed R o o s e v e l t ’s p r o p o s a l  and p u t  t h e  whole w e ig h t  
o f  i t s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  b e h in d  t h e  m easure  to  g a in  C o n g r e s s io n a l  
s u p p o r t .
But t h e  b i l l  a l s o  had i t s  o r g a n i z e d  o p p o s i t i o n .
Another  pow erfu l  p r e s s u r e  group worked a g a i n s t  t h e  a c t  
e q u a l l y  as  h a rd  as th e  Co.-'ii.-.ittee t o  Defend America worked 
f o r  i t .  T h is  group c a l l e d  i t s e l f  t h e  America F i r s t  Committee, 
and i t s  c h i e f  aim was t o  keep  America ou t  o f  war .  I t  was 
o r g a n iz e d  u n d e r  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  R. Douglas  S t u a r t ,  J r .  o f  
Chicago on September 4, 1940, and had a s  i t s  f i r s t  n a t i o n a l  
cha i rm an  G e n era l  R ober t  E. Wood.^^O ’J'v.q men.cership r e a c h e d  
th o u s a n d s  i n c lu d in g  such wel l-known names as  C o lonel  C h a r l e s
L in d b e rg h ,  John  T. F lynn ,  George N. Peek ,  C h e s t e r  Bov,ues,
S e n a t o r s  Bur ton  K. W hee le r ,  B e n n e t t  Champ C la r k ,  and G e ra ld
P. Nye, and Robert M. H u tc h in s .  A l though  Vandenberg was
n e v e r  a member, he s u p p o r t e d  most of  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ’ s g o a l s .
The America F i r s t  Committee announced immediate  
o p p o s i t io n ,  t o  the  Lend-Lease  p r o p o s a l .  G enera l  Wood t o l d
13&Wayne S. C o le ,  America F i r s t  (Madison: The
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Wisconsin  P r e s s ,  1 9 53 ) ,  p. 43*
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t h e  n a t i o n  on J a n u a r y  11 ,  1941 t h a t  the  o r g a n i z a t i o n  would 
oppose Lend-Lease  "w i th  a l l  t h e  v ig o r  i t  can e x e r t . "  He 
s a i d  t h a t  R o o s e v e l t  "was n o t  a sk in g  f o r  a b l a n k  check ,  he 
wants  a b l a n k  c^ieckbook w i t h  t h e  power t o  w r i t e  away your  
manpower, our laws and our l i b e r t i e s . "139 From t h i s  p o i n t  
u n t i l  t h e  b i l l  became law ,  the o r g a n i z a t i o n  engaged i n  an 
a l l - o u t  e f f o r t  t o  d e f e a t  t h e  m easure .  I t  u rg ed  a l l  Americans 
t o  w r i t e  or  w i r e  C o n g re s s ,  i t  o r g a n iz e d  s p e a k e r s ’ b u r e a u s ,  
i t  demanded f u l l  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  h e a r i n g s ,  i t s  members t e s t i f i e d  
b e f o r e  C o n g r e s s ,  and i t  made f u l l  use  o f  r a d i o  t im e  and 
newspaper  s p a c e .  I n  s h o r t ,  no avenue o f  p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  
was s l i g h t e d  by the  group i n  an e f f o r t  t o  g e t  i t s  message 
b e f o r e  t h e  p u b l i c . B ur ton  K. Wheeler p r o b a b ly  s t r u c k  th e  
most t e l l i n g  blow. He c a l l e d  th e  program " t h e  New D e a l ’ s 
T r i p l e  ’ A’ f o r e i g n  p o l i c y — i t  w i l l  plow u n d e r  e v e r y  f o u r t h  
American b o y . " ^ ^ ^  P r e s i d e n t  R o o se v e l t  f e l t  com pe l led  t o  
r e p l y .  He d e s c r i b e d  W h e e le r ’s comment as  " th e  most  
u n t r u t h f u l ;  a s  the  most  d a s t a r d l y ,  u n p a t r i o t i c  t h i n g  t h a t  
has  e v e r  been  s a i d .  Quote me on t h a t .  That  r e a l l y  i s  t h e  
r o t t e n e s t  t h i n g  t h a t  h a s  been s a id  in  p u b l i c  l i f e  i n  my 
g e n e r a t i  on . ”^41
3-39'The New York T im es , J a n u a r y  12,  1941,  p .  7.
^^^The New York T im es , Januar>' 15,  1941,  p. 1.
1 4 ^ I b i d .
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America r e j e c t e d  the p l e a s  o f  th e  America F i r s t  
Committee .  With the p a ssa g e  of th e  Lend-Lease  m easu re ,
B r i t a i n  o f f i c i a l l y  became Am erica’s f i r s t  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e .
I t  was i n  t h e  h e a t  o f  t h i s  b a t t l e  t h a t  Vandenberg spoke t o  
Congress  on the  Lend-Lease  B i l l .
Repor t  of  t h e  Speech
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  Lend-Lease  came from two 
g r o u p s .  One s c h o o l  o f  th o u g h t  viewed the m easure  as  a d i r e c t  
s t e p  to w a rd  American i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Another  g rou p ,  w h i l e  
w i l l i n g  t o  admit  t h a t  a i d  to  B r i t a i n  was n e c e s s a r y ,  e x p re s s e d  
t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  b i l l  p rop o sed  by th e  a d m i n i s ­
t r a t i o n -  p l a c e d  t o o  much power i n  t h e  hands  o f  the  P r e s i d e n t  
and s a c r i f i c e d  A m erica ’ s own d e f e n s e .  S e n a t o r  Vandenberg 
a l l i e d  h i m s e l f  w i th  t h e  l a t t e r  p r o p o n e n t s .  His m a jo r  a d d r e s s  
a g a i n s t  the b i l l  on February  I S ,  1 9 4 1 , r e v e a l s  no t  on ly  
h i s  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  the  p r o p o s a l ,  b u t  a l s o  a l lo w s  one to  n o te  
t h e  c l e a r  changes  i n  h i s  t h i n k i n g  on American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
s i n c e  1937.
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  d i v id e  V an denb e rg ’ s a d d r e s s  a g a i n s t  
t h e  L end-L ease  p r o p o s a l  i n t o  two p a r t s .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  d i v i s i o n ,  
Vandenberg made a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  d e fe n s e  o f  h i s  c u r r e n t  a t t i t u d e s  
to w a rd  n e u t r a l i t y ,  war and p e a c e ,  and a id  f o r  B r i t a i n .  In 
t h e  seco nd  p a r t ,  he p r e s e n t e d  fo u r  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  the  P r e s i d e n t ’ s
R ecord ,  77 th  C ong . , 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1941, LXXXVII, 
P a r t  1 ,  1102.
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b i l l .  These  a r b i t r a r y  d i v i s i o n s ,  however,  a re  n o t  d i s t i n c t ,  
s e p a r a t e  e n t i t i e s .  The S e n a t o r ,  i n  f a c t ,  f e l t  com pel led  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  speech  t o  keep  b e fo r e  h i s  a ud ien ce  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  he was no t  opposed t o  a i d i n g  B r i t a i n ,  bu t  i n s t e a d ,  
was on ly  a g a i n s t  the  s p e c i f i c  a id  b e in g  p roposed  i n  t h e  
L end-L ease  B i l l .
I n t r o d u c t i o n . —Vandenberg began w i th  an e t h i c a l  a p p e a l
i n  which he r e c o g n i z e d  the  im por tance  of t h e  d e c i s i o n  b e f o r e
C o n g re s s .  " I t  l e a d s  t o  momentous c o n c l u s i o n s , "  he i n s i s t e d ,
"which i n e v i t a b l y  a f f e c t  the  peace ,  the  s e c u r i t y ,  and t h e
f r e e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  f o r  g e n e r a t i o n s  to
come."  He a d m i t t e d  t h a t  " t h e r e  i s  no s a f e  s u r e  way . . . '
t h e r e  a r e  r i s k s  a t  e v e ry  t u r n . " ^ ^ ^  In  an e f f o r t  t o  p l a c e  .
t h e  d e b a t e  on a s t a t e s m a n ' s  l e v e l ,  he' i n s i s t e d  t h a t  " i f  we
e v e r  r e s p e c t e d  each  o t h e r ' s  m otives  and sough t  to  avoid  t h e
acr im ony  and the i n t o l e r a n c e  which k i l l s  r e a s o n  . . . h e r e
i s  the  o c c a s i o n . "  Then he announced I d s  t e x t .  " I  s t a t e
my r e a s o n s  f o r  op p os in g  H. R. 1776 which . . .  i s  i n t e n d e d
t o  promote  t h e  d e f e n s e  o f  the  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and f o r  o t h e r
p u r p o s e s . "  F i n a l l y ,  he p rev iewed the  r e a s o n s  fo r  h i s  s t a n d
on the b i l l .
. . .  I  must oppose i t  because  I  d e ep ly  b e l i e v e  
t h a t ,  i n  i t s  p e n d in g  form, i t  i s  a  p o t e n t i a l  and 
n e e d l e s s  t h r e a t  to  the  peace and s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ;  t h a t  i t  im p a i r s  democracy a t  home 
i n  t h e  prom ise  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  i t  a b ro a d ;  t h a t  i t
143ib id . . p. 1101.
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may l e a d  us  even c l o s e r  t o  d i r e  invo lvem en t  in  
the  f i r e s  o f  war i t s e l f ;  t h a t  i t  cou ld  s t r i p  us 
o f  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  means,  i n  t h e  l a s t  a n a l y s i s ,  
t o  implement  our own p ledge  t o  m a i n t a i n  hem is­
p h e r i c a l  d e fe n se  i n  t h i s  New World . . . t h a t  
i t  s t i l l  n u l l i f i e s  th e  checks  and  b a l a n c e s  . . . .  
which have been th e  bu lwark  o f  150 y e a r s  o f  
American freedom, and t h a t  i t  i s  an u n n e c e s s a r y
means t o  a ch ie v e ,  s h o r t  o f  w ar ,  t h a t  " a i d  t o  England"
w hich  h as  come to  be pur  d o m in a t in g  a s p i r a t i o n
which  I  s h a r e .  . .
Background o f  th e  p r o p o s a l . — B efo re  d e v e lo p in g  h i s  
m a jo r  r e a s o n s  f o r  opposing  the  m e a su re ,  Vandenberg t u r n e d  
t o  t h e  background  o f  h i s  s tand . .  He a rg u e d  t h a t  America 
had d e p a r t e d  from n e u t r a l i t y  on tiie P r e s i d e n t ’s a s s u r a n c e  
" t h a t  t h e  pu rpose  was t o  keep u s  out o f  war and bu t  o f  any 
h a z a r d s  t h a t  would d rag  us i n . "^^5 The r e s u l t ,  he a s s e r t e d ,  
was " a i d  t o  England s h o r t  o f  w a r . "  Then he a d m i t te d :
"Having l o s t  the b a t t l e  of  n e u t r a l i t y ,  I  moved fo rw a rd  in  
c o o p e r a t i o n  w i th  th e  w i l l  o f  the  m a j o r i t y , "  add ing  t h a t  " I  
s u p p o r t e d  . . . and -1 c o n t in u e  to  s u p p o r t  . . . a i d  to  B r i t a i n . "
Then t o  make s u r e  no one would t h i n k  he s t i l l  p o s s e s s e d  any
i l l u s i o n s  a b o u t  American n e u t r a l i t y ,  he announced h i s  sympathy 
w i t h  " t h e  i n t r e p i d i t y  of  t h e s e  amazing B r i t a i n s  who g l o r i f y  
t h e  f i n e s t  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  f r e e  men."^46
But he drew back when f a c e d  w i t h  the s p e c i f i c  p ropo­
s i t i o n  o f  w h e th e r  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  sh o u ld  i n t e r v e n e  a s  a
^ ^ I b i d . , p. 1102,
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f u l l  b e l l i g e r e n t .  He rem inded  America o f  R o o s e v e l t ' s  prom ise  
a t  P h i l a d e l p h i a :  "We s h a l l  n o t  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  f o r e i g n  wars
and we w i l l  n o t  send our  army, n a v a l  or  a i r  f o r c e s  t o  f i g h t  
i n  f o r e i g n  l a n d s  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  Americas e x c e p t  i n  c a s e  o f  
a t t a c k . V a n d e n b e r g ,  t o o ,  had prom ised  t h e  peop le  o f  
M ich igan  t h a t  America would n o t  become a " c o b e l l i g e r e n t . "
"T ha t  i s  my p o s i t i o n  t o d a y , "^48 he s a i d .
N e i t h e r  would he adm it  t h a t  B r i t a i n  was A m e r ic a ' s  f i r s t  
l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e .  He r e g a r d e d ,  i n s t e a d ,  the  b u i l d i n g  o f  
A m e r i c a ' s  own r e s o u r c e s  as the  f i r s t  s t e p  i n  n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e .  
But h i s  t h i n k i n g  had s h i f t e d  s i n c e  1939. During the  embargo , 
r e p e a l  d e b a t e  he had made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  he r e g a r d e d  n e u t r a l i t y  
a s  A m e r ic a ' s  f i r s t  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e .  He had now sw i t c h e d  t o  
m i l i t a r y  p r e p a r e d n e s s  a s  A m e r ic a ' s  m ajor  means of a v o id in g  
w a r .  While  a d m i t t i n g  " t h e r e  i s  no c l e a r  ro ad  a h e a d , "^^5 he 
s t i l l  t h o u g h t  i s o l a t i o n  was th e  s a f e s t  p o l i c y .  He was w i l l i n g ,  
however ,  t o  s a c r i f i c e  t h a t  i s o l a t i o n  f o r  a id  to  B r i t a i n ,  s i n c e  
H i t l e r  m ight  d e c l a r e  war on t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  
w h e th e r  America h e lp e d  B r i t a i n  or n o t .  This  was an a d m iss io n  
he would no t  make in  1939.
Although  Vandenberg had abandoned n e u t r a l i t y ,  he had 
n o t  g iv e n  up hope t h a t  America cou ld  a v o id  t h e  war i n  Europe.  
While he a d m i t t e d  t h a t  " i t  w i l l  be a f a r  s a f e r  world  f o r .  us
W i b i d . , p .  1103.
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i f  B r i t a i n  w i n s , ” ^50 >̂ g r e f u s e d  to  work f o r  t h a t  v i c t o r y  a t  
t h e  p r i c e  o f  American i n t e r v e n t i o n  o r  the  s u r r e n d e r  o f  
American war m a t e r i a l s  needed f o r  s e l f  d e f e n s e .  He t r i e d  
t o  prove  t h a t  Lend-Lease  m igh t  s a c r i f i c e  t h o s e  two o b j e c t i v e s .  
But h i s  ca se  a g a i n s t  the  m easure  was no t  b u i l t  s o l e l y  around  
t h e  i s s u e  o f  war or peace  fo r  America.  He a l s o  t r i e d  t o  show 
t h a t  Lend-Lease  c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  American way o f  l i f e .  He 
seemed t o  se n se  t h a t  the  American p u b l i c  was w i l l i n g  t o  a i d  
G rea t  B r i t a i n  even a t  the  r i s k  of w ar ,  b u t  he assumed t h a t  
t h e y  were no t  w i l l i n g  t o  g i v e  t l d  s h e lp  a t  any p r i c e .  His 
a rgum ents  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  r e p r e s e n t e d  h i s  a t t e m p t  t o  
d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  " p r i c e "  h i s  countrym en would have t o  pay i f  
t h e  Lend-Lease Act were  approved .
The powers g i v e n  the  P r e s i d e n t . — He o b j e c t e d  to  t h e  
Lend-Lease  Act b e c a u s e  i t  o f f e r e d  th e  P r e s i d e n t  d i c t a t o r i a l  
powers.  I n  a d v a n c in g  t h i s  a rgum ent ,  he a p p e a le d  t o  th e  
c u r r e n t  worldwide f e a r  of d i c t a t o r s .  p o i n t e d  out  t h a t
t h e  b i l l  a u t h o r i z e d  th e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  g r a n t  Lend-Lease  t o  
any c o u n t r y  whose s a f e t y  was g e a re d  t o  Am erica ’s .  This  s t e p ,  
he a rg u e d ,  would e n a b l e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  c o n t r o l  "war s t r a t e g y  
e v e r y w h e r e , "^51 ad d in g  t : i a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  made " t h e  White 
House the  war c a p i t a l  of h a l f  th e  e a r t h ,  and our  P r e s i d e n t  
t h e  No. 1 power p o l i t i c i a n  o f  the w o r l d . "^52 ye used
150l b i d . ,  p. 1103.
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h i s t o r i c a l  com par ison  t o  d e v e lo p  the  a rgument.  He argued  
t h a t  R o o s e v e l t ’ s power would be g r e a t e r  t h a n  Woodrow W ilso n ’ s 
i n  1918 , or  even t h a t  which G re a t  B r i t a i n  had bes tow ed  upon 
W ins ton  C h u r c h i l l  i n  th e  c u r r e n t  c r i s i s .  ” I  canno t  escape  
t h e  c o n c l u s i o n , ” s a i d  Vandenberg ,  ’’t h a t  t h i s  i s  t o o  much 
power f o r  any one man t o  have i n  a democracy o f  130 ,000 ,000  
p e o p l e ,  and t h a t  i t  i n v i t e s  commitments , c o m p l i c a t i o n s ,  and
i n v o l v e m e n t s . ”^53
Vandenberg t h e n  t r i e d  t o  show t i a t  the  b i l l  s a c r i f i c e d  
t r a d i t i o n a l  American v a l u e s  by t h e  v i r t u a l  s u r r e n d e r  of 
powers g iv en  t o  Congress  t o  d e c l a r e  war.  The P r e s i d e n t  
would be in  a p o s i t i o n ,  he. s a i d ,  to  ’’roam a w a r - t o r n  world 
and t o  rew ard  w h a te v e r  way he p l e a s e s . ”^^4 The i m p l i c i t  
d a n g e r ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  was t h a t  the  P r e s i d e n t  cou ld  g e t  th e  
c o u n t r y  in v o lv e d  w i th o u t  t h e  consen t  o f  C ongress .  Vandenberg 
o b v i o u s l y  hoped t h a t  w h i l e  h i s  countrymen were w i l l i n g  to  
h e l p  B r i t a i n ,  t h e y  were n o t  w i l l i n g  t o  w r i t e  a b l a n k  check 
t o  invo lvem en t  w i th  n a t i o n s  th ro u g h o u t  the  w or ld .  With a 
s e r i e s  o f  f r e e - s t a n d i n g  a s s e r t i o n s ,  he t r i e d  to  p rove  t h a t  
t h i s  would be the c a s e .  ’’Not even J o v e ,  v/ith h i s  monopoly 
o f  l i g h t n i n g  b o l t s ,  was more pow erfu l  . . . he re  on 
P e n n s y l v a n ia  Avenue i s  the  h e a r t  and c e n t e r  of t h e  wars of
t h e  w o r l d . ’’^55
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The "America F i r s t "  a rg u m e n t . —Vandenberg a l s o  hoped 
t o  d e f e a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  by showing t h a t  i t  would s a c r i f i c e  
Am erica’ s own d e f e n s e .  Although Americans were w i l l i n g  t o  
h e lp  B r i t a i n ,  Vandenberg a p p a r e n t l y  d id  n o t  t h i n k  most o f  
them were w i l l i n g  t o  do so a t  the  expense  of American 
s e c u r i t y .  The theme o f  h i s  argument became "America F i r s t . "
He a rgued t h a t  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  b i l l  would p e r m i t  the  P r e s i d e n t  
t o  s e l l  A m erica ’ s d e fe n s e  s h o r t  i n  a f r a n t i c  e f f o r t ,  t o  a i d  
th e  A l l i e s .  " I  b e l i e v e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  once s a i d , "  d e c l a r e d  
Vandenberg,  " t h a t  the  d i v i s i o n  o f  p l a n e s  should  be on a 
50-50 b a s i s  . . . t h e  r e c e n t  d i v i s i o n  h a s  been  ru n n in g  
9 0 -1 0 —the  10 f o r  u s . " ^ ^ ^  O bv ious ly  f e a r f u l  t h a t  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  would c o n t in u e  t h e  same p o l i c y ,  Vandenberg c a l l e d  
f o r  a r e j e c t i o n  o f  the  p r o p o s a l  s i n c e  i t  p l a c e d  no l i m i t a t i o n  
upon the  q u a n t i t y  o f  goods s e n t  a b ro a d ,  and th u s  t h r e a t e n e d  
Am erica’ s d e f e n s e .  S t i l l  he f a v o r e d  a l l  a i d  t o  England 
t h a t  America could  s p a r e . ^57
• Aware o f  the growing o p in io n  t h a t  B r i t a i n  was A m erica ’ s 
f i r s t  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e ,  Vandenberg warned t h a t  "we have no 
r i g h t  t o  b a se  our  program on the  c o n v e n i e n t  a ssu m p t ion  t h a t  
even w i th  o u r  a i d  B r i t a i n  can no t  l o s e . "  Adding t h a t  he 
t h o u g h t  England would w in ,  he pushed the  p o i n t  t h a t  "we 
canno t  de fen d "  the  Western  Hemisphere " w i t h  American m u n i t io n s  
t h a t  have been  s e n t  to  our f r i e n d s  a b r o a d — p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f
^^^Ibid., p. 1105. ^^^Ibid.
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t h o s e  American m u n i t i o n s  have f a l l e n  i n t o  th e  hands o f  our  
e n e m ie s . "  A p p e a l in g  t o  n a t i o n a l i s m ,  he announced: " I  am
s o r r y  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  enough f o r  me t o  h e a r  . . . ’Give t h e  
A l l i e s  a l l  t h e y  need  t o  win i f  p o s s i b l e , ’ My answer must 
b e ,  ’ save  enough f o r  America so  America is  s a f e .  ” ’1^^
Vandenberg was a l s o  c o n ce rn e d  w i th  the  c o s t  o f  t h e  
p r o p o s a l .  He c a l l e d  i t  a " b la n k  check"  power w hich  c o u ld  
wreck the  American economy. "The m ain tenance  of  a sound 
p u b l i c  c r e d i t , "  he a r g u e d ,  " i s  th e  f i r s t  l i n e  o f  American 
n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e . "^^9 Taking a s t a b  a t  the New D e a l ,  he 
n o te d  t h a t  t h e  bu dg e t  was a l r e a d y  d r a i n e d  b y  e l e v e n  y e a r s  
o f  d e f i c i t  s p e n d i n g .  " I f  the  b l a n k  check p r o v e s  t o  be b ig  
e n o u g h ,"  he i n s i s t e d ,  " i t  can underm ine  us a t  home beyond 
any p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  co m p en sa to ry  s a l v a t i o n  a b r o a d . " ,  He 
w a rn ed ,  i n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  danger  o f  sq u a n d e r in g  
money w hich  America needed  f o r  h e r  own d e fe n s e .  " D e s p i t e  
t h e '  e a sy  p h i lo s o p h y  t h a t  American r e s o u r c e s  a r e  w i t h o u t  
l i m i t - - a n d  t h a t  i s  h i g h l y  p o p u la r  t o d a y —t h e  f a c t  i s  t h e y  
a r e  n o t . " ^ ° ^
The i n c r e a s e d  d a n g e r  o f  a t t a c k  on Am erica . — The i s s u e  
o f  war or peace  was n o t  c o m p le t e ly  o m it ted  from V andenberg ’ s 
s p e e c h .  He u se d  i t  e x p l i c i t l y  when d i s c u s s i n g  th e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  b i l l  would e n a b le  b e l l i g e r e n t  s h i p s  to e n t e r  American
I5blbid.
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p o r t s .  The d a n g e r ,  he t h o u g h t ,  was t h a t  Nazi  subm arines  
would come c l o s e  uo U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ h a r b o r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  
a t t a c k  t h e i r  enem ies .  A ppeal ing  t o  t h e  p u b l i c ’ s f e a r  o f  
a t t a c k ,  he i n s i s t e d  c h a t  Lend-Lease  would expose  America 
t o  such c a t a s t r o p h e s .  " I n t i m i d a t i o n  a c t s , "  he warned,
" a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t  u s . " ^ ^ ^
A g a in s t  t h i s  b a ck g ro un d ,  Vandenberg reduced  th e  
p r o p o s a l  t o  an a l l  o r  n o th in g  s i t u a t i o n .  O bv ious ly  t h i n k i n g  ■ 
t h a t  Americans were n o t  w i l l i n g  to  r i s k  " a l l "  f o r  B r i t a i n ,  
he i n s i s t e d :  " I f  we a r e  g o in g  t o  war . . .  I  would go a l l
t h e  way t o  war . . . and no t  d r i f t  i n  o r  back i n ,  d e l i b e r a t e l y  
p r e t e n d in g  t o  be u n c o n sc io u s  of an y th in g  b u t  peace  i n  o u r  
h e a r t s . I n  t h i s  manner ,  he made h i s  p o i n t  t h a t  t h e  
p r o p o s a l  would t a k e  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n t o  w ar ;  y e t  he a v o id e d  
a d i r e c t  a c c u s a t i o n  t h a t  t h o s e  who f a v o r e d  the  b i l l  were 
a d v o c a t in g  w ar .  He a rg u e d :  " I t  i s  n o t  enough t o  say  t h a t
s i n i s t e r  t h i n g s  would no t  o c c u r .  . . .  I t  i s  enough t o  say 
t h e y  cou ld  o c c u r .  And th ey  c o u ld  occur  to  our e v e r l a s t i n g  
damage.
An a l t e r n a t i v e  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a i d  t o  B r i t a i n . —The Michigan 
S e n a t o r ,  however ,  d id  no t  p ro p o se  t h a t  America abandon B r i t a i n .  
He s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  " B r i t a i n  s h a l l  have l o a n s  o r  g i f t s .  But I  




ends  i s  t o  l e t  one man— a l th o u g h  a d m i t t e d l y  he be e v e r  so 
g r e a t  a man—have s o l e  and e x c l u s i v e  power to  nominate  who 
s h a l l  be our i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f r i e n d s . A l t h o u g h  he made 
l i t t l e  a t t e m p t  t o  d e v e lo p  h i s  c o u n t e r - p l a n ,  he t r i e d  to  imply 
t h a t  t h o s e  who r e j e c t e d  i t  f o r  Lend-Lease were se ek in g  d i r e c t  
i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Sa id  Vandenberg:
I f  we s h a l l  s t o p  s h o r t  o f  the  a r e n a  of war 
i t s e l f ,  t h e r e  i s  p r e c i o u s  l i t t l e  i n  t h i s  b i l l  which 
can a i d  England  i n  her  approach ing  c r i s i s .  I f  we 
s h a l l  not  s t o p  s h o r t  o f  war .  Congress  shou ld  say  so 
d i r e c t l y  on i t s  own c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s e s .
I f  we s h a l l  s t o p  s h o r t  o f  war,  t h e r e  i s  p r e c i o u s  
l i t t l e  i n  t h i s  b i l l  f o r  B r i t a i n  save loans  and  g i f t s — 
and t h o s e  can be p ro v id e d  i n  a s i n g l e  s e n t e n c e  amend­
ment t o  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  a c t  . . and .  ̂^ . i t  would
p a ss  Congress  a lm o s t  unanim ously .  . .
C o n c lu s io n . — I n  c o n c lu d in g  the  a d d r e s s ,  he s a i d ,  " I  
have  n e v e r  f a c e d  an i s s u e  vh ich  has  d i s t u r b e d  me i n  my mind 
and s o u l  l i k e  t h i s  o n e . "  Then he r e p e a t e d  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  
"we defend  America by d e fe n d in g  America r i g h t  h e re  a t  home."^^^ 
He was f i r m  i n  the c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  America cou ld  s u r v i v e  no 
m a t t e r  what happened i n  England,  and t h a t  h i s  countrymen 
shou ld  n o t  s a c r i f i c e  American democracy to  save i t  ab road .
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  Speech 
The i s s u e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n . — In most Vandenberg s p e e c h e s ,  
he promoted an e x p l i c i t  and c l e a r  s t a te m e n t  o f  what he r e a l l y  
b e l i e v e d .  His sp e ec h  on t h e  Lend-Lease p r o p o s a l  a p p e a r s  to
I 6 4 i b i d . , p .  1107. l o ^ I b i d .
iG^I b i d . , p.  1108.
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be an e x c e p t i o n .  Only by a p r o c e s s  o f  i n f e r e n c e  can  h i s  
r e a l  purpose  be l o c a t e d .  He seemed t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  w i th  
Lend-Lease  the  P r e s i d e n t  was both  t r y i n g  t o  l e a d  t h e  c o u n t r y  
i n t o  the  war on the s i d e  o f  B r i t a i n  and a t  the  same t im e  
e s t a b l i s h  h i m s e l f  a s  d i c t a t o r .
Although Vandenberg s t r e s s e d  t h a t  he was no t  a s s i g n i n g  
d i s h o n o r a b l e  i n t e n t i o n s  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  s t i l l  he s a i d ,  
" e v e r y t h in g  f lo w s  h e r e a f t e r  th ro u g h  om nipo ten t  P r e s i d e n t i a l  
hands .  He w r i t e s  t h e  t i c k e t  f o r  the whole round  e a r t h . "
L a t e r  he a s s e r t e d  t h a t  no e x e c u t i v e  h e ld  such power u n l e s s  
i t  "be i n  Rome, Moscow or B e r l i n . "^^7 The o f f i c e  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  of the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  was grouped  w i th  t h a t  o f  
H i t l e r ,  M u s s o l i n i ,  and S t a l i n .  T h is  t a c t i c  was no t  an o r d i n a r y  
one f o r  Vandenberg.  I t  i s  d o u b t f u l  t h a t  ■ Vandenberg r e a l l y  
h e ld  th e  extreme b e l i e f  t h a t  - the b i l l  would make t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
d i c t a t o r .  The Congress  s t i l l  c o n t r o l l e d  the  p u r s e  s t r i n g s .
I t  i s  p ro b a b ly  more a c c u r a t e  to  say t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t aken  
r e f l e c t s  h i s  aw areness  t h a t  he was l o s i n g  the  b a t t l e  o f  
n e u t r a l i t y .  He needed something s t r o n g e r  t h a n  th e  f e a r  o f  
invo lvem en t  i n  war t o  d e f e a t  L end-Lease .  His s e a r c h  f o r  
p e r s u a s i v e  t o o l s  b rough t  him to  an i n d i r e c t  a t t a c k  on th e  
c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
N e i t h e r  d id  Vandenberg h id e  the f a c t  t h a t  he viewed 
th e  measure a s  an a t t e m p t  by the P r e s i d e n t  t o  i n t e r v e n e  on
I67lbid.. p.. 1103.
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b e h a l f  o f  B r i t a i n .  " I f  we a r e  going  t o  war—^which God 
f o r b i d — I  would go a l l  t h e  way t o  w a r , " ^ ° ^  he admonished ,  
c l e a r l y  im p ly ing  t h a t  even though  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  had p r e s e n t e d  
t h e  m easure  as  a s t e p  tow ard  p e a c e ,  he p robab ly  had i n  mind 
a s t e p  tow ard  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  He hoped,  o f  c o u rs e ,  t h a t  Congress  
would n o t  a id  B r i t a i n  a t  the  p r i c e  o f  American s e c u r i t y .  He 
was w a rn in g  Americans t o  beware ;  t h e  man who would q u a r a n t i n e  
a g g r e s s o r s  was no t  t o  be g iven  th e  power to f o r c e  t h e  
c o u n t r y  i n t o  war.
Why was Vandenberg n o t  more e x p l i c i t  i f  i t  were h i s  
i n t e n t i o n  t o  q u e s t i o n  the m o t iv e s  o f  th e  P r e s i d e n t?  The 
answer i s  found both i n  th e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t ie  s p e a k e r  and 
i n  the  a d d r e s s  i t s e l f .  I t  was n o t  Vandenberg’s p r a c t i c e  to  
engage i n  p e r s o n a l i t y  a t t a c k s .  He u s u a l l y  t r i e d  t o  keep t h e  
d e b a te  on the l e v e l  of  i s s u e s .  He a l s o  fe a re d  d i s u n i t y  among 
American l e a d e r s  when th e  n a t i o n ’ s s u r v i v a l  was i n v o lv e d .
"Out of t h i s  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  when th e  f i n a l  answer i s  w r i t t e n  
f o r  Am erica ,  must come the n e a r e s t  p o s s ib l e  approach  t o  t h a t  
n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  which i s  o u r  s o u r c e  o f  g r e a t e s t  s t r e n g t h  when 
we f a c e  the  w o r l d , " lo 9  he s a i d .  To t h i s  rnustfbe added th e  
f a c t  t h a t  he had knowledge of t h e  s e r i o u s  rebuke -which th e  
p r e s s  had g iv en  S e n a t o r  Wheeler^^O f o r  h i s  u n s c r u p u lo u s  
a t t a c k  on the m o t iv e s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i n  s p o n s o r in g  t h e  b i l l .
I 6 3 l b i d . , p.  1106 .  l&^I b i d . , p .  1102.
1 7 0 su p ra ,  p. 137.
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V a n d e n b e rg 's  speecr i , however,  was n o t  i n  any sense  
a  campaign a g a i n s t  a i d  t o  B r i t a i n .  ' Ke. f r e e l y  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  
he had l o s t  the  b a t t l e  o f  n e u t r a l i t y ,  and he made no i n t e n s e  
e f f o r t  t o  stem th e  t i d e .  He was aware t h a t  the  American 
peop le  wanted  a i d  f o r  the A l l i e s  in  an e f f o r t  t o  i n s u r e  t h e  
d e f e a t  o f  the A xis .  His  p u rp o se  in  t h i s  speech  was to  
d i s c o u r a g e  t h e  k ind  o f  a id  which th e  measure  e n t a i l e d ,  and 
t h e  methods t h r o u g h  which t h a t  a id  would be c h a n n e le d .  With 
s e n t im e n t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c o u n t r y  ru n n in g  so s t r o n g  i n  f a v o r  
. o f  the  a c t ,  a t  b e s t  he c o u ld  o n ly  hope tor d e t a i n  t h e  
movement t o  a i d  th e  B r i t i s h  a t  any c o s t .
The i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  L end -L ease . —With the  h i n d s i g h t
o f  h i s t o r y ,  i t  i s  e a s y  t o  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  V a n d enb e rg 's  p o s i t i o n
%
was q u e s t i o n a b l e .  I t  cou ld  be a rg u ed  t h a t  t h e  on ly  a l t e r -  
• n a t i v e s  t o  Lend-Lease were p ro b a b ly  appeasement  of  the  Axis 
powers Or comple te  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Americans ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
d id  no t  want e i t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e .  I t  i s  e v id e n t  now t h a t  
Lend-Lease  a lo n e  cou ld  not  have h a l t e d  the  Axis powers. But 
i t  was a l s o  e q u a l l y  c l e a r  t h a t  American w i th d ra w a l  from t h e  
s t r u g g l e  was im p o s s i b l e .
C l e a r l y ,  Vandenberg made a s t r o n g  s t a n d  a g a i n s t  Lend-  
L ease  f o r  a n a t i o n  a t  p e ace .  There i s  l i t t l e  q u e s t io n  b u t  
t h a t  the program i n v o lv e d  g r a v e  r i s k s ,  both i n  i t s  d r a i n  on 
■ t h e  t a x p a y e r  and in  t h e  powers i t  gave t o  the  e x e c u t i v e .  I t  
c a l l e d  f o r  emergency t r e a t m e n t ,  and R o o se v e l t  n e v e r  t r i e d  t o  
h i d e  t h i s  f a c t .  "Fo r  us t h i s  i s  an emergency a s  s e r i o u s  as
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war i t s e l f , ^71 he c o n te n d ed .  S t i l l  Vandenberg t r i e d  to  
deny t h a t  the  P r e s i d e n t  needed such  b r o a d  powers.  I t  was 
c l e a r  t h a t  i f  the  program was t o  t u r n  back th e  A x is ,  i t  
would have to  be done with  sp e ed .  I f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  had to  
t u r n  t o  t h e  Congress  a t  every  move i n  h e lp i n g  B r i t a i n ,
Germany could  s t r i k e  th e  t e l l i n g  blow w h i l e  t h e  i s s u e  was 
b e in g  d e b a te d  i n  W ashington .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  R oo sev e l t  
c a l l e d  on the Congress  to  l e t  him send B r i t a i n  w ha tev e r  h e lp  
she n eeded .
I n  the  f a c e  o f  R o o s e v e l t ’ s r e q u e s t ,  Vandenberg viewed 
h i s  t a s k  as  t h a t  of  p e r s u a d in g  h i s  countrymen t h a t  the  
emergency was not  t h a t  g r e a t .  He a rg ued  t h a t  B r i t a i n  was - 
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  Am erica’ s f i r s t  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e .  He 
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  might not  be a b le  t o  
s o l v e  the p roblem i n  Europe.  He a g r e e d ,  however, t h a t  i t  ■ 
was w ise  t o  o f f e r  some a i d .  He p ro p o se d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  ex tend on ly  l o a n s  and g i f t s  to  the  B r i t i s h  
as  a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  Lend-Lease .
The c o u n t e r  p r o p o s a l  of g i f t s  and l o a n s . —Vandenberg’s 
c o u n t e r  p r o p o s a l  may be viewed as  an a t t e m p t  to  "have h i s  
cake and e a t  i t  t o o . "  He o f f e r e d  t o  h e l p  the  B r i t i s h ,  bu t  
he w an ted  t o  do i t  w i th o u t  extreme r i s k s  o r  s a c r i f i c e s .  He 
r e f u s e d  t o  adm it  t h a t  i f  a i d  t o  B r i t a i n  were t o  t u r n  th e  t i d e  
of  war t h a t  a i d  had t o  be " a l l  o u t"  a i d ,  s h o r t  o f  war.  He
l? lR osenm an ,  The P u b l ic  P a p e rs  and A ddresses  o f  
F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t , IX, 633%
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a l s o  r e f u s e d  t o  acknowledge t h a t  a d e f e a t e d  B r i t a i n  would 
f a c e  America w i th  an even g r e a t e r  c h a l l e n g e .  The bu rden  of  
p r o o f  f e l l  on Vandenberg to  show a s a f e r  c o u rs e  t h a n  Lend- 
L ease ,  and h i s  c o u n t e r - p r o p o s a l  a p p a r e n t l y  was i n a d e q u a t e .
In  e f f e c t ,  Vandenberg was c a l l i n g  on t h e  American 
peop le  to  p r e p a r e  to  f a c e  the N azis  a lo n e .  While he was 
w i l l i n g  t o  h e l p  G rea t  B r i t a i n  to  some d e g r e e ,  he was no t  
w i l l i n g  t o  gamble a l l  out  a id  to  h e lp  h e r  d e f e a t  Germany.
I f  the  American peop le  had f o l lo w e d  h i s  a d v ic e ,  t h e  U n i ted  
S t a t e s  might  have w a i t e d  u n t i l  a l l  o f  Europe and p o s s i b l y  
Asia  had f a l l e n .  This  view n o t  o n ly  ig n o r e d  the  f a c t  t h a t  
America was no t  i s o l a t e d ,  bu t  i t  a l s o  l o s t  s i g h t  of  the  f a c t  
t h a t  many Americans f e l t  an e t h i c a l  o b l i g a t i o n  t o . h e l p  
p r e v e n t  an i n j u s t i c e  a g a i n s t  i n n o c e n t  men, women and c h i l d r e n  
i n  th e  o t h e r  d e m o c ra c ie s .  Congress  may have  r e a l i z e d  t h i s  
i n  pass ing  the Lend-Lease p r o p o s a l .  B u e l l  c a p t u r e d  th e  
d i f f e r e n c e  be tween Vandenberg^s r o u t e  and th e  one chosen 
by Congress :
American to d ay  i s  c o n f r o n t e d  with, t h e  c h o ic e  
e i t h e r  o f  t r a v e l i n g  a s o l i t a r y  i n d e p e n d e n t  r o a d ,  
end ing  p o s s i b l y  i n  d i c t a t o r s h i p  and w a r ,  or  o f  
u s in g  i t s  v a s t  pewers t o  a s s i s t  i n  b r i n g i n g  t h i s  
war to  an e n d ,  c u lm in a t in g  i n  a peace  b a sed  on 
j u s t i c e ,  and some new and r e a l i s t i c  form o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n . 1 ? 2
The i n t e r v e n t i o n  c o n t r o v e r s y  was n e v e r  s e t t l e d ;  th e  
d eb a te  was n e v e r  ended.  Before  f i n a l  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  o f
^72Buell, op. cit., p. 453.
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t h i s  s o r t  were  r e q u i r e d ,  J a p a n  a t t a c k e d  P e a r l  H arbor ,  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  was i r r e v o c a b l y  a t  war a long  w i th  t h e  A l l i e s ,  
and t h e  whole  i s s u e  o f  t h e  Lend-Lease  d e b a t e s  became i r r e l e ­
v a n t .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  t h a t  phase  o f  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
in  which i s o l a t i o n i s m  was an i s s u e  had ended.  Begun i n  t h e  
m id d le  1930’ s ,  t h i s  s e t  o f  d e b a t e s  was c l o s e d  on December 7 ,  
1941 . The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
p a t t e r n  o f  i d e a s  and p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  which a r e  r e f l e c t e d  
i n  th e  Vandenberg s p e e c h e s  o f  t h i s  p e r i o d  f rom  1937 th r o u g h
1941 .
The D efense  o f  I s o l a t i o n i s m  
As s t a t e d  i n  C h a p te r  I ,  t h e  b a s i c  h y p o t h e s i s '  from 
which t h i s  s tu d y  p r o c e e d s  i s  t h a t  the  t w e l v e - y e a r  p e r i o d ,  . 
1937 t o  1 9 4 9 , i s  d i v i s i b l e  i n t o  t h r e e  m ajor  ph a ses  o f  . 
American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y :  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  t h e
p e r i o d  of c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y ,  and the  p e r i o d  of  S o v i e t  
c o n ta in m e n t .  The f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  speech es  of S e n a to r  A r th u r  
Vandenberg a r e  t a k e n  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  chang ing  i d e a s  which 
accompanied t h e s e  t h r e e  p h a s e s .  T h is  s e c t i o n  rev iew s  t h e  
chang ing  p a t t e r n  o f  V a n d e n b e rg ' s  i d e a s  du r in g  th e  p e r i o d  o f  
i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  as  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e s e  s p e e c h e s ,  and t h e  
ch ang ing  p a t t e r n  o f  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  h i s  e f f o r t s  
t o  o b t a i n  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  implement the  c o n c e p ts  as deduced 
from the  s t r a t e g y  o f  h i s  s p e e c h e s .
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The P a t t e r n  o f  t h e  Speeches
Review o f  th e  s p e e c h e s . —Vandenberg l o s t  e v e ry  m ajor  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  c o n t e s t  i n  C ongre ss  be tween  1937 and 1941- 
While  he was on t h e  w inn ing  s i d e  o f  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  b a t t l e  
i n  1937; h i s  amendment t o  deny t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c e r t a i n  
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers was d e f e a t e d .  He a lso  l o s t  i n  h i s  
e f f o r t s  t o  p r e v e n t  the  r e p e a l  o f  de embargo in  1939,  to  
d e f e a t  t h e  S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e  Act i n  1940, and t o  d e f e a t  
t h e  Lend-Lease  Act in  1941. The b a s i c  id e a  beh ind  
V andenberg ’s sp e ak in g  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  to  a l l  o f  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  
was c o n s i s t e n t .  He b e l i e v e d  America  could  and should  remain 
i s o l a t e d  from f o r e i g n  w ars -  He changed the  form o f  h i s  
p e r s u a s i o n ,  however ,  as  c o n d i t i o n s  changed i n  American 
p o l i t i c s  and i n  w or ld  e v e n t s .
I n  a r g u in g  the  case  f o r  t h e  N e u t r a l i t y  Act o f  1937, 
Vandenberg assumed an a g r e e i n g  a u d ie n c e  and th u s  p r e s e n t e d  
h i s  case  f o r  n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  w i th  l i t t l e  s u p p o r t i n g  
a rgum ent .  He was c o n t e n t  t o  remind h i s  aud ie n ce  o f  t h e  
f i n d i n g s  o f  the  Nye Committee and  the  r e v i s i o n i s t s  who 
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  America had been  t r i c k e d  i n t o  the c o n f l i c t  
by m u n i t io n  m akers ,  Americans t r a v e l i n g  on b e l l i g e r e n t  s h i p s ,  
and the  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  in s t r 'u m e n t s  o f  war on American 
s h i p s .  The way to  avoid  a r e p e t i t i o n  o f  t h i s  f u t u r e  i n c i d e n t ,  
he i n s i s t e d ,  was t o  p a ss  a law making such i n c i d e n t s  
i m p o s s i b l e .  He made no e f f o r t  t o  p rove  t h a t  America cou ld
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g e o g r a p h i c a l l y ,  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  e c o n o m ic a l ly ,  o r  m o r a l ly  
i s o l a t e  h e r s e l f  from t h e  r e s t  of  the  w or ld ;  t h i s  he took  
f o r  g r a n t e d .
When the R o o s e v e l t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c h a l l e n g e d  h i s  
p o s i t i o n  i n  1939 by c a l l i n g  for  a r e p e a l  of  t h e  embargo 
s e c t i o n  of  t h e  N e u t r a l i t y  Act ,  Vandenberg p o i n t e d  h i s  
d e fe n s e  a t  the  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  was a v i o l a t i o n  of  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l .  law t o  change the r u l e s  in  t h e  m idd le  of th e  war,  
and he a rg u e d  t h a t  the r e p e a l  of th e  a c t  would l e a d  th e  
c o u n t r y  i n t o  w ar .  On t h i s  o c c a s io n ,  however ,  he r e c o g n i z e d  
t h a t  American sy m p a th ie s  were mounting f o r  th e  B r i t i s h  c a u s e ,  
and he e n d e a v o re d  to  m u s te r  a volume of  l o g i c a l ,  e t h i c a l  and 
p a t h e t i c  p r o o f  t o  de fend  h i s  c a se  t h a t  r e p e a l  would l e a d  
to  war .
> As war came even c l o s e r  i n  1940, t h e  American peop le  
began t o  seek  b e t t e r  m i l i t a r y  p r e p a r e d n e s s  f o r  d e f e n s e .
The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  recommended th e  adop t ion ,  o f  a p eace t im e  
s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  a c t .  Vandenberg was c o n ce rn e d  t h a t  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was u s i n g  th e  a c t  as  a n o t h e r  i n  a s e r i e s  o f  
s t e p s  t o  draw t h e  c o u n t r y  i n t o  i n t e r v e n t i o n  on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  
A l l i e s .  He a v o id e d  t h e  a s s i g n i n g  of  such  i n t e n t i o n s  t o  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t ,  however ,  and a rgued  th e  case  on th e  grounds t h a t  
s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  was b o th  undem ocra t ic  and u n n e c e s s a r y .
F u l l y  aware t h a t  Americans viewed w i th  a la rm  th e  e v e n t s  i n  
Europe ,  he f e l t  com pe l led  t o  m u s te r  a v a r i e t y  o f  i n d u c t i v e  
e v id e n c e  t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  p o s i t i o n .
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By t h e  t im e t h e  Lend-Lease  p r o p o s a l  r e a c h e d  t h e  
Sena te  i n  1941, Vandenberg a d m i t t e d  d e f e a t  on the  n e u t r a l i t y  
i s s u e .  He se n se d  t h a t  the mood o f  Americans had s e r i o u s l y  
s h i f t e d .  They were  now f i r m l y  on the  s id e  o f  the  B r i t i s h .
The r e m a in in g  i s s u e s  t o  be s e t t l e d  were  what kind and how 
much a i d  sh o u ld  America c o n t r i b u t e  to  t h e  B r i t i s h ?  He b a sed  
h i s  argument, a g a i n s t  th e  p r o p o s a l  on the  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
America would become a c o b e l l i g e r e n t  i f  she a d o p te d  th e  
Lend-Lease p r o p o s a l ,  and f u r t h e r ,  t h a t  the  measure  would 
s a c r i f i c e  American d e fe n s e  f o r  B r i t i s h  d e f e n s e .
D uring  t h i s  p e r i o d  Vandenberg n e v e r  a l t e r e d  h i s  
b e l i e f  t n a t  thie 3 ,0 0 0  m i l e s  o f  oceai.  s e p a r a t i n g  America 
from o t h e r  c o n t i n e n t s  a t  war could  p r o t e c t  h i s  c o u n t r y .
He was c o n v in c ed  t h a t  a f r e e  America c o u ld  s u r v i v e  i n  a 
t o t a l i t a r i a n  w o r ld .  N e i t h e r  d i d  Vandenberg l o s e  f a i t h  i n  
h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  America had n o th in g  f u n d a m e n ta l ly  a t  s t a k e  
in  t ' l e  c o n f l i c t .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  he e x p r e s s e d  sympathy in  
the Lend-Lease  d e b a t e ' w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  c a u s e ,  b u t  he s t i l l  
c lung  t o  t h e  b e l i e f ,  based  on A m e r ic a ' s  World War I  e x p e r i e n c e ,  
t h a t  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  needed to  be c o n ce rn e d  on ly  about  
h e r s e l f .  I n  o t h e r  w ords ,  he n e v e r  r e a l l y  c o n n ec te d  th e  
American n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  w i th  th e  w e l l - b e i n g  o f  other.,  
c o u n t r i e s .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  he viewed a l l  a t t e m p t s  t o  a i d  
the A l l i e s  and many of t h e  d e f e n s i v e  m easures  p ro p o se d  by th e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  as  a t t e m p t s  t o  i n v o lv e  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  a war 
which America b o th  c o u ld  and should ' a v o id .
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The s h i f t  i n  th e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  r a t i o n a l e . - - I n  r e a l i t y ,  
t h e  m ajo r  changes  from i s o l a t i o n i s m  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  t o  
c o n ta in m e n t  be tween 1937 and 1949 a r e  not  s h a r p l y  d i v i s i b l e .  
American p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  s l i d  a lo ng  t h i s  continuum and ,  w i th  
t h e  p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  P e a r l  H a rb o r ,  d id  n o t  e v e r  s h i f t  
q u i c k l y  and d r a m a t i c a l l y  from one p o s i t i o n  to  a n o t h e r .  I n  
t h i s  s e n s e ,  the  t e r m  " i s o l a t i o n i s m ” names a p e r i o d  d u r in g  
w hich  American o p i n i o n  s l i d e  from tn e  extreme of  o p p o s i t i o n  
t o  war on any b a s i s  ( i n  1935-1932) toward  a p o s i t i o n  in  
I 94O -I94I  where Americans  c o u ld  ca lm ly  e s t i m a t e  t h e  l i k e l i ­
hood o f  s e n d in g  s o l d i e r s  o v e r s e a s  i f  u l t i m a t e l y  n e c e s s a r y .  
Americans were more p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  p r e p a r e d  fo r  P e a r l  Harbor  
t h a n  i s  commonly t h o u g h t .
T h is  h y p o t h e s i s  r e c e i v e s  c l e a r  support ,  from t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Vandenberg sp eech es  p r e s e n t e d  in  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  
I t  seems e v i d e n t  t h a t  Vandenberg,  i n  p l an n in g  t h i s  s e r i e s  o f  ■ 
p e r s u a s i v e  sp e ec h es  f o r  the  n a t i o n - w i d e ’ a u d ie n c e ,  was f o r c e d  
t o  a l t e r  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  p re m ise s  which he c o u ld  e x p e c t  
Americans t o  a c c e p t  w i th o u t  o v e r t  p r o o f .  In  th e  t h r e e  y e a r s  
from 1937 to  t h e  f a l l  o f  F rance  he c o u ld  and d i d  a rg u e  American 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  the  s q u a b b le s  of  E uropeans .  But d u r in g  th e  
n e a r l y  two y e a r s  from t i e  f a l l  of  F rance  to  P e a r l  H arbor  he 
had t o  f a c e  a p u b l i c  a t t i t u d e  of s t r o n g  concern  and commitment 
t o  the  s u p p o r t  o f  B r i t a i n  and tue  a n t i - N a z i  c au se .
When war t h r e a t e n e d  America i n  the  m i d - t h i r t i e s ,  
Vandenberg s u p p o r t e d  the  co n ce p t  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  as  a means o f
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im p lem en t in g  h i s  view t h a t  America c o u ld  and s h o u ld  i s o l a t e  
h e r s e l f  from the c o n f l i c t .  The aim o f  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  which he e nd o rsed  was to  a v o id  a l l  p r o v o c a t i o n s  t h a t  
might  l e a d  to  war .  H i t l e r  d e a l t  t h e  f i r s t  s e r i o u s  blow t o  
V a n d en b e rg ’s p o s i t i o n  by in v a d in g  Po land  in  March o f  1939.
The S e n a t o r  was f o r c e d  to  de fen d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  f a c e  
o f  a growing s e n t im e n t  in  America to  su p p o r t  P r e s i d e n t  
R o o s e v e l t ' s  r e q u e s t  f o r  a r e p e a l  o f  th e  embargo s e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  N e u t r a l i t y  Act.  Vandenberg,  a lo n g  with  o t h e r s  who f e l t  
a s  he d i d ,  f a i l e d  w i t h  tne argument t h a t  " c a s h - a n d - c a r r y "
' was n o t  a s  " n e u t r a l "  a s  the  embargo; t h a t  i s s u e  had become 
i r r e l e v a n t .
American n e u t r a l i t y  ended c o m p le t e ly  w i t h  th e  f a l l  
o f  F ran ce  i n  1941. From t h a t  t im e  on ,  the  American people  
gave  com ple te  endorsement  to  t h e  B r i t i s h  c a u s e .  S e n s in g  
t h e  mood o f  the  c o u n t r y ,  Vandenberg sw i tc h e d  h i s  d e f e n s e  
o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m  from n e u t r a l i t y  f o r  peace  to  t h a t  of  
i s o l a t i o n i s m  f o r  p e ace .  I n s t e a d  o f  a i d  s h o r t - o f - w a r , he 
p ro p o se d  t h a t  America meet the Nazi t h r e a t  t h r o u g h  p r e p a r e d n e s s  
and t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  lo a n s  and g i f t s  to  B r i t a i n .  He, t o o ,  
iiad j o i n e d  the B r i t i s h  cause  i n  s p i r i t ,  b u t  no t  a t  the  
expense  o f  s a c r i f i c e s  o r  r i s k s .
From 1937 t o  1939, Vandenberg i.ad e n jo y ed  v ig o r o u s  
b a ck in g  from the  American peop le  f o r  h i s  n e u t r a l i t y  p o s i t i o n  
as  a means of a v o id i n g  t h e  war i n  E urope ,  bu t  a f t e r  H i t l e r  
marched on P o la n d ,  he was t;irown i n t o  a s t r a t e g i c  but  slow
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r e t r e a t .  From t h e  summer o f  1940 u n t i l  P e a r l  H a rb o r ,  h i s  
v iew s  l a g g e d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  beh ind  t h o s e  o f  th e  p u b l i c .  His 
sp e e c h e s  show t h a t  he was on the  d e f e n s i v e  i n  b o th  th e  
d e b a t e  on s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  and th e  Lend-Lease m easure .  He, 
t o o ,  had come t o  s h a r e  the hope t h a t  B r i t a i n  would win and 
t h a t  American a i d  shou ld  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h a t  end ,  b u t  he 
r e f u s e d  ’’a l l  o u t ” a i d  because  he t h o u g h t  i t  more im p o r ta n t  
f o r  America t o  keep  ou t  o f  t h e  war than  i t  was to  h e lp  a s s u r e  
a  B r i t i s h  v i c t o r y  ove r  the  Axis .  In  t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  h i s  
t h i n k i n g  la g g e d  b e h in d  a m a j o r i t y  of  Americans .
V andenberg’ s g o a l s . —Vandenberg’s g o a l  i n  s u p p o r t i n g  
i s o l a t i o n i s m  and n e u t r a l i t y  f o r  America was, a t  the  o u t s e t ,  
p eace  i n  h i s  own t i m e .  He connec ted  Am erica ’ s n a t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t  with  p e a c e .  I n  t h i s ,  he was n e v e r  ou t  o f  s t e p  w i th  
h i s  countrym en.  H is  o r i g i n a l  su p p o r t  o f  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  
l e g i s l a t i o n  was i n  k e ep in g  with  t h e  s e n t im e n t s  o f  t h e  n a t i o n .  
• A f t e r  1937,. however ,  he r e t r e a t e d  from th e  p o p u l a r  view.
He opposed t h e  r e p e a l  o f  t h e  embargo because  he b e l i e v e d  
such  a c t i o n  would l e a d  t o  war;  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  American 
p e o p l e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, su p p o r t e d  t h e  ’’c a s h - a n d - c a r r y ” 
s u b s t i t u t e  as  a means o f  a i d i n g  B r i t a i n  w h i le  s t i l l  a v o id in g  
t h e  c o n f l i c t .  The c o u n t ry  gave i t s  s u p p o r t  t o  s e l e c t i v e  
s e r v i c e  on t h e  t h e o r y  t h a t  p r e p a r e d n e s s  would d e t e r  a g g r e s s i o n ,  
and  t a c i t l y  t h a t  Americans needed t o  be ready  f o r  war i f  i t  • 
came; Vandenberg opposed  th e  a c t  as  a s t e p  t o  w ar .  F i n a l l y ,  
Americans s u p p o r t i n g  Lend-Lease hoped t h a t  a B r i t i s h  v i c t o r y
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would a v e r t  t h e  s t r u g g l e  f o r  America, and b e cause  some r i s k  
was j u s t i f i e d  t o  a s s u r e  a d e m o c ra t i c  v i c t o r y ;  Vandenberg 
a rg u e d  t h a t  the  s t e p  would l e a d  t o  war ,  and t h a t  America ,  
n o t  B r i t a i n ,  was t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  f i r s t  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e .
A nother  g o a l  r a n  c o n s i s t e n t l y  th ro u g h  h i s  sp e ec h es  
from 1937 t o  1941.  He wanted  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  war or  peace  
t o  be s e t t l e d  by Congress  r a t h e r  t h a n  the White  House.
T h is  a t t i t u d e  r e f l e c t e d  h i s  d i s t r u s t  o f  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t .
He o b j e c t e d  t o  a l l  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers g iv e n  th e  P r e s i d e n t  
i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  l e g i s l a t i o n  because  he f e a r e d  t h a t  R o o s e v e l t  
would b rea k  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  and i n v i t e  an a t t a c k .  Vandenberg 
viewed w i t h  g r e a t  a l a r m ,  f o r  example , t h e  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
N e u t r a l i t y  Act o f  1937 which gave t h e  P r e s i d e n t  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
power i n  th e  u se  of  t h e  embargo on n o n -m u n i t io n s  o f  w ar ,  
t h e  l a t i t u d e  e n t a i l e d  by the  r e p e a l  o f  the  embargo, and t h e  
wide ran g e  f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n  and d e l e g a t e d  power 
g r a n t e d  i n  t h e  Lend-Lease  m easu re .  A l l  o f  t h i s ,  he t h o u g h t ,  
was a means o f  g i v in g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  C ongress  t h e  
f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  w he ther  America would go t o  
war.
The Changing P a t t e r n  o f  P o l i t i c a l  L e a d e r s h i p
The r o l e  o f  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n . —For  the  most  p a r t ,  t h e  
R e p u b l ica n  P a r t y  as t h e  m i n o r i t y  i n  the  S e n a te  between 1937 
and 1941 l i n e d  up a g a i n s t  t h e  R o o se v e l t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  But t h e  d eg ree  o f  o p p o s i t i o n  v a r i e d  w i th
lo i
each  S e n a t o r .  The membership  i n  the  party  s p l i t  r o u g h l y ,  
however ,  i n t o  two g r o u p s .  One camp, under the  l e a d e r s h i p  
o f  S e n a t o r  W il l iam  E. Borah and S e n a t o r  Hiram Jo h n so n ,  was 
o f  t h e  ’’America F i r s t ” t y p e  who i n s i s t e d  t h a t  America had 
n o t h i n g  a t  s t a k e  in  t h e  European s t r u g g l e  and  t h u s  r e f u s e d  
t o  s u r r e n d e r  any g round  on th e  n e u t r a l i t y  i s s u e  a t  any t i m e .  
Another  camp, a l t h o u g h  d e v o te d  t o  i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  s h i f t e d  
g round  as  American s e n t i m e n t s  moved i n  sympathy and s u p p o r t  
o f  th e  B r i t i s h  c a u se .  I n  t h i s  camp were S e n a t o r  R o b e r t  A.
T a f t  and S e n a to r  C h a r le s  McNary. Vandenberg, w ish in g  t o  
p r e s e r v e  the  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  a u n i t e d  f r o n t ,  assumed the  r o l e  
o f  m e d i a t o r  between t h e  two camps. ’ His  speech es  show t h a t  
he was t r y i n g  t o  a d a p t  t o  b o th  p o s i t i o n s  by a v o i d i n g  e i t h e r  
ex t re m e .  He, t h e r e f o r e ,  s u p p o r t e d  ’’c a s h - a n d - c a r r y ” b u t  n o t  
embargo r e p e a l ,  he s u p p o r t e d  d e f e n s e  bu t  n o t  c o n s c r i p t i o n ,  
he s u p p o r te d  a i d  to  England  and France , ,  but, not  L end-L ease .
He o b v io u s ly  loo k ed  f o r  a middle  g r o u n d , around w hich  b o th  
e le m e n t s  c o u ld  r a l l y .
The r o l e  of  t h e  p u b l i c .-—Vandenberg g r a s p e d  th e  s i g n i ­
f i c a n c e  o f  the f a l l  o f  F r a n c e .  He acknowledged t h a t  ’’n e u t r a l i t y ” 
was dead .  He was f e a r f u l  t h a t  t h e  S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e  Act and 
Lend-Lease  were  war m e a s u r e s ,  b u t  he r e a l i z e d  t h a t  i n d i f f e r e n c e  
t o  the  B r i t i s h  cause  m igh t  b ran d  him as  an ’’i r r e s p o n s i b l e ” 
i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  c r i s i s .  How to  oppose the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s 
p r o p o s a l s ,  w i t h o u t ,  a t  t h e  same t im e ,  s t r i p p i n g  h i m s e l f  of  
sympathy f o r  the  o t h e r  d e m o c rac ie s  was w i th o u t  d o u b t ,  t h e
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g r a v e s t  p r o b i e n  he f a c e d .  He c o u n te r e d  w i th  a l t e r n a t e  
s u g g e s t i o n s  t o  meet i t .  He, t h e r e f o r e ,  p roposed  l i m i t e d  
a i d .  He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  h i s  h e a r t  was on the  s i d e  o f  B r i t a i n ,  
b u t  t h a t  America s h o u ld  n o t  s a c r i f i c e  h e r  own d e fe n se  t o  
a i d  the B r i t i s h .
The r o l e  o f  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s . —On t h e  s i d e  o f  
t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  to  R o o s e v e l t ’ s f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  were  a number 
o f  Democrats ,  b o th  i n  and ou t  o f  C o n gress ,  who c o n s i s t e n t l y  
s u p p o r t e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  on do m es t ic  i s s u e s .  I n  o r d e r  n o t  
t o  a l i e n a t e  t h i s  g ro up ,  Vandenberg w ished  t o  remove f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  from t h e  a p p ea ra n c e  o f  p a r t i s a n  c o n t r o v e r s y .  He 
r e a l i z e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t r i a t  i f  the  m a t t e r  were re d u c e d  t o  a 
q u e s t i o n  of p a r t y  a l i g n m e n t ,  s e v e r a l  l o y a l  Democrats might  
v o t e  w i t h  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  who would o t i ie rw ise  su p p o r t  
the  c ause  o f  t h e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  
he a v o id ed  c h a r a c t e r  a t t a c k s  on the  P r e s i d e n t .  He u s e d  th e  
p u b l ic  p l a t f o r m  to  l e t  t h e  w or ld  know tr. a t  he to o k  tn e  
P r e s i d e n t  a t  h i s  word t h a t  such m easu re s  as  Embargo R epea l ,  
S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e ,  and Lend-Lease  were s i n c e r e l y  d e s ig n ed  
t o  keep America a t  p e ace .
Vandenberg was w e l l  s u i t e d  fo r  t h i s  r o l e ,  because  he 
■played th e  p a r t  o f  the  i n t e l l i g e n t  o p p o s i t i o n  i n  both 
dom es t ic  and f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  T h is  r o l e ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
i t s  f u n c t i o n  i n  h e lp i n g  t o  keep th e  d e b a te  on a n o n - p a r t i s a n  
b a s i s ,  s u r ro u n d e d  h i s  c au se  w i t h  a d eg ree  o f  r e s p e c t i b i l i t y  
wi'dch i t  might  n o t  o th e r w i s e  have e n jo y e d .  I t  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e
lo3
t-hat th e  p u b l i c  would p l a c e  more emphasis  on zhe v o ice  o f  
one who e x p re s s e d  h i s  d i s a g ree m e n ts  in  a r a t i o n a l  manner,  
t h a n  i t  would a S e n a t o r  who o b je c te d  t o  e v e r y t h i n g  the  
P r e s i d e n t  p roposed  i n  f o r e i g n  and dom es t ic  a f f a i r s .  Thus,  
i t  s e r v e d  the S e n a t o r ’ s cause  t o  make f u l l  u s e  o f  h i s  
r e p u t a t i o n  a s  a compromiser  and as  a member o f  an i n t e l l i g e n t  
and l o y a l  o p p o s i t i o n .  I t  can be a rgued  t h a t  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  
l e d  t o  i n c r e a s e d  acknowledgment o f  Vandenberg as  the  
R e p u b l i c a n  l e a d e r  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
CHAPTER IV 
THE RHETORIC OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The a t t a c k  on P e a r l  Harbor  s i l e n c e d  i s o l a t i o n i s t ,  i n  
tn e  U n i ted  S t a t e s .  Americans not  on ly  had a war t o  win,  
b u t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a s s a u l t  e n p h a s i z e d  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  U ni ted  
S t a t e s  c o u ld  n o t  i n s u l a t e  i t s e l f  from w or ld  a f f a i r s .  " I t s  
t remendous e m o t io n a l  i m p a c t , "  n o t e s  D u l l e s ,  " u n i t e d  th e  
c o u n t r y  a lm o s t  o v e r n i g h t  in  t h e  f i n a l  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s  . . . could  n o t  e scap e  d i r e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  the  war b e c a u se  o f  i t s  g e o g r a p h i c a l  p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g  
t o  W ilson ,  " t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  of  th e  months im m e d ia te ly  b e fo r e  
P e a r l  Harbor might  seem as  remote  from p o l i t i c a l  a c t u a l i t y
a s  the  d e b a te  on t h e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  Union, and o f  s l a v e r y
2
t h a t  p receded  t h e  C o n fe d e ra te  War."
S e n a to r  Vandenberg a p p a r e n t l y  was among t i io se  wnose 
o p in io n s  were a l t e r e d  i n  r e g a r d  t o  America’ s p l a c e  i n  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  " In  my own m ind ,"  he s a i d ,  "my c o n v i c t i o n s
^ F o s t e r  Rhea D u l l e s ,  A m erica ’ s Rise  to  World Power 
(New York: H arper  & B r o s . ,  1 9 5 4 ) ,  p. 207.
2
F r a n c i s  Graham W ilson ,  The American P o l i t i c a l  Mind 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book C o . ,  1949) ,  pp. 459- tO .
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r e g a r d i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  and c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  
f o r  peace  to o k  f i r m  form on th e  a f t e r n o o n  o f  the  P e a r l  Harbor  
a t t a c k .  That  day ended i s o l a t i o n i s m  f o r  any r e a l i s t . ”3 But 
he  made no such  imm edia te  p u b l i c  s t a t e m e n t .  I n s t e a d ,  he l e t  
t h e  w or ld  know t h a t  the  " i s o l a t i o n i s t "  f o r c e s  could  be c oun ted  
upon CO a s s i s t  i n  t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n  of t h e  war.
The Michigan  S e n a t o r ’ s new concept  o f  Am erica ’ s p o s i t i o n  
i n  world a f f a i r s  was no t  f o r m a l l y  announced u n t i l  l a t e  1943 
when d i s c u s s i o n  began t o  c e n t e r  upon t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  U n i ted  
S t a t e s  i n  t h e  p o s tw ar  w o r ld .  As the S e n a t o r  j o i n e d  in  t h e  
e f f o r t s  t o  commit America t o  a r o l e  i n  a p o s tw ar  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  he g r a d u a l l y  made th e  s h i f t  from a b e l i e f  in  
t h e  c o n ce p t  o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m  t o  t n a t  of c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .
T h is  c h a p t e r  i s  d e v o te d  to  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  i d e a s  e x p r e s s e d  
i n  V andenberg’ s sp e e c h e s  d u r i n g  t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n .  The t h r e e  
sp e ec h es  s e l e c t e d  f o r  r e p o r t  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a r e  as 
f o l lo w s :
1.  The Address  on the  C onna l ly  R e s o l u t i o n  o f  1943 . 
Vandenberg spoke i n  f a v o r  o f  the  C onna l ly  
R e s o l u t i o n  on O c to b er  25, 1943. The R e s o l u t i o n  
p l a c e d  th e  S e n a te  on r e c o r d  in  f a v o r  o f  U n i ted  
S t a t e s  p o s tw a r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  e f f o r t s .
2 .  The Address  on American F o re ig n  P o l i c y .
Vandenberg a d d r e s s e d  the S en a te  on Ja n u ary  10,
1945, c o n c e rn in g  h i s  g e n e r a l  a t t i t u d e s  on 
Am erica ’ s p l a c e  i n  the  pos tw ar  w o r ld .  The 
speech  r e c e i v e d  w o r ld  a t t e n t i o n .and i s  g e n e r a l l y  
r e g a r d e d  as  th e  most famous of h i s  sp e a k in g  c a r e e r .
^ A r th u r  H. Vandenberg ,  J r .  ( e d . ) .  The P r i v a t e  P a p e rs  
o f  S e n a to r  Vandenberg (B os ton :  Houghton M i f f l i n  Co. ,  1 9 52 ) ,
D. 1. H e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as  P a p e r s .
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3. The Address on the  U n i t e d  N a t io n s  C h a r t e r . 
Vandenberg a d d r e s s e d  the S e n a te  on June 29,
1945,  g i v i n g  h i s  endorsem ent  t o  t h e  U n i ted  
N a t io n s  C h a r t e r .
As i n  th e  p r e c e d in g  c h a p t e r ,  each  speech  i s  t r e a t e d  
i n  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s :  th e  c o n t e x t  o f  e v e n t s ,  a r e p o r t  of  t h e
i d e a s  i n  the s p e e c h ,  and an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  s p e a k e r ’ s 
pu rpose  and p e r s u a s i o n s .  The c h a p t e r  c o n c lu d e s  w i t h  a 
summary o f  Vandenberg’ s r a t i o n a l e  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  
and the  n a t u r e  of  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p  d u r in g  t h i s  
second ’’p h a s e . ”
The Address  on t h e  C onna l ly  R e s o l u t i o n  o f  1943
By 1943, p r e s s u r e s  were i n c r e a s i n g  to  p l a c e  Congress  
on r e c o r d  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  a  p o s tw ar  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  keep th e  
p e ac e .  C o n f l i c t  d e v e lo ped  among t h o s e  who wanted a  r e s o l u t i o n  
which s e t  f o r t h  s p e c i f i c  American aims and th o s e  who f a v o r e d  
a r e s o l u t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  t e r m s .  Vandenberg s u p p o r t e d  t h e  
l a t t e r  p o s i t i o n .  He a rg u e d  f o r  t h e  C o n n a l ly  R e s o l u t i o n  
b e f o r e  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  S en a te  on O c to b e r  2$, 1943*^ The 
speech  shows h i s  f e a r s  about  the  i l l  e f f e c t s  on a l l i e d  war 
u n i t y  which a S e n a te  d e b a te  over  s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t i v e s  might  
in v o k e .  I t  a l s o  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  k in d  o f  c o l l e c f j ' v e  s e c u r i t y  
which he would l a t e r  s u p p o r t .
^U. S. C o n g r e s s i o n a l  R e c o rd , 78 th  Cong. ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  
1943,  LXÏ1IX, P a r t  7 ,  8665. H e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as  
Record .
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The Con tex t  o f  th e  Speech 
The impact  o f  w a r . —While the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  was 
a r g u i n g  about  t h e  i s s u e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  t h e  European 
c o n f l i c t ,  J apan  ended the d e b a t e  by a t t a c k i n g  P e a r l  Harbor.  
Altnough shocked by the  a s s a u l t ,  t h e r e  was no h e s i t a t i o n  
on the  p a r t  of the American peop le  i n  r e p l y i n g  t o  P r e s i d e n t  
R o o s e v e l t ’ s r e q u e s t  t n a t  America answer the  "unprovoked 
and d a s t a r d l y  a t t a c k " ^  w i t h  a d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  war. For most 
Americans i t  was f i n a l  p r o o f  t h a t  n e u t r a l i t y  had f a i l e d .
Even f o r  such s t r o n g  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  g roups  a s  the  
America F i r s t  Committee, i t  was e v id e n t  t h a t  the deba te  
had ended.  The o r g a n i z a t i o n  u rg ed  " a l l  of t h o se  who have 
f o l lo w e d  i t s  l e a d  t o  g iv e  f u l l  s u p p o r t  t o  the  war e f f o r t  
o f  the  n a t i o n  u n t i l  peace  i s  a t t a i n e d . " ^
Three days a f t e r  Americans answer t o  J a p a n ,  the  
Congress  d e c l a r e d  war on Germany and I t a l y  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  
a  s i m i l a r  move by t h e s e  two powers a g a i n s t  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s .  
T h is  immersed t h e  c o u n t ry  in  t o t a l  war.  The m o b i l i z a t i o n  
o f  n a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  the  s a c r i f i c e  of t ime and money, t h e  
w a r - t im e  c o n t r o l s  of  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t i e s  were a c c e p t e d  as  
a  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  v i c t o r y .  But o u t  of  t n i s  p a t t e r n  o f  
a c t i v i t y ,  emerged an i n s p i r a t i o n  t h a t  the war would add up 
t o  som eth ing ;  t h a t  i t  would no t  r e s u l t  i n  a n o th e r  V e r s a i l l e s .
^R o o s e v e l t ’ s F o re ig n  P o l i c y ,  1933-1941 (New York: 
W i l f r e d  Funk, I n c . ,  1 9 4 2 ) ,  p.  553-
^The New York Times. December 12, 1941, p* 22.
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In  the  background l a y  th e  g o a l s  f o r  t h e  po s tw a r  w or ld  a g re ed  
upon a t  a  m ee t in g  between P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  and Prime 
M i n i s t e r  C h u r c h i l l  o f f  the  c o a s t  o f  Newfoundland i n  August 
o f  1940 . I n  a  document known t o  h i s t o r y  a s  the  " A t l a n t i c  
C h a r t e r , "  t h e s e  two heads  of  s t a t e  a g r e e d  t h a t  th e  d em o crac ie s  
would s e t t l e  o n ly  f o r  a peace  w i t h  j u s t i c e .  While t h e  immediate  
g o a l  o f  Americans a f t e r  P e a r l  Harbor  was t o  win th e  w a r ,  t h ey  
e n v i s io n e d  a  p o s tw a r  w o r ld  based  on th e  A t l a n t i c  ag reem en t .  
American p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  S e n a to r  Vandenberg ,  
looked  f o r  tne  means t o  implement t h i s  g o a l .
Vandenberg^s s e a r c h  f o r  e x e c u t i v e - l e g i s l a t i v e  
c o o p e r a t i o n . —Although Vandenberg s u p p o r t e d  most of  R o o s e v e l t ’ s 
war  p o l i c i e s ,  he rem ained  an a r d e n t  c r i t i c  i n  a r e a s  i n  which 
he saw a need f o r  improvement.  He was e s p e c i a l l y  f e a r f u l  
o f  R o o s e v e l t ’ s conduc t  o f  t h e  war and h i s  p l a n s  f o r  a p o s tw a r  
w o r ld .  Above a l l ,  he th o u g h t  t h a t  members o f  Congress  were 
e n t i t l e d  t o  more i n f o r m a t i o n  about th e  war .  "The P r e s i d e n t  
. . .  i s  the one wiio m u s t  g e t  . . . n e w - v i s i o n  b e f o r e  i t  i s  
t o o  l a t e . O n  December 1 5 ,  1 9 4 1 ,  he w ro te  t o  R o o se v e l t  
s u g g e s t i n g  a J o i n u  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Committee on war  c o o p e r a t i o n  
f o r  the  purpose  o f  e s c a b l i s n i n g  "a  more i n t i m a t e  c o n n e c t in g  
l i n k "  between R o o se v e l t  and t h e  C o n g re ss .  R o o s e v e l t  made a 
p o l i t e  r e p l y .  " I f  Congress  t h i n k s  th e  p r o p o s a l  w i s e , "  s a i d  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  " I  w i l l  be d e l i g h t e d  t o  a c c e p t  i t s  j u d g m e n t .
^Papers, p. 27. ^Ibid., p. 2 5 .
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But n o th in g  imm edia te  came of V andenberg ’ s s u g g e s t i o n .  The 
b i p a r t i s a n  a p p ro a ch  t o  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  was y e t  t o  come.
The S e n a t o r ’ s l a c k  o f  communicat ion  w i th  the  e x e c u t i v e  
was a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  i n  h i s  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  Lend-  
L e a s e .  He v o te d  f o r  i t s  e x t e n s i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  war y e a r s  
b e c a u se  he b e l i e v e d  Lend-Lease t o  be the  ’’key t o  our c o o r d i ­
n a t i o n  f o r  A l l i e d  v i c t o r y , ” b u t  he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  program 
was e x c l u s i v e l y  "an  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  o f  w a r . ”9 I n  1943,  he 
su sp 'ec ted  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  o f  u s i n g  L end-Lease  in  c o n n e c t io n  
w i t h  a " g e n e r a l  p o s tw a r  commitment on ou r  b e h a l f  to w o r ld ­
wide  economic r e l a t i o n s , " - 0  to  which Vandenberg o b j e c t e d  
"no m a t t e r  how i n h e r e n t l y  w orthy  i n  t h e m s e l v e s . H e  
became e s p e c i a l l y  co n ce rn e d  i n  1944 upon d i s c o v e r i n g  t h a t  
the  Lend-Lease  ag reem en t  c o n ta in e d  a s e c t i o n  i n  which R o o s e v e l t  
had a g re e d  " t o  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  a l l  forms of  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  
t r e a t m e n t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commerce, and t o  the  r e d u c t i o n  
o f  t a r i f f s  and o t h e r  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s . F o r  one committed 
t o  a h igh  t a r i f f  p o l i c y  t o  p r o t e c t  American i n d u s t r y ,  such 
words were f r i g h t e n i n g .  " I t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c l e a r , " s a i d  
Vandenberg ,  " t h a t  t h e  s o l e  i n i t i a l  power to  d e a l  w i t h  any 
such  s u b j e c t s  does n o t  r e s t  i n  th e  E x e c u t i v e ,  b u t  . . .  i n
^R eco rd , ? 6 th  C ong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1943,  LXXXII,
P a r t  2 ,  IS4 6 .
lOl b i d . , p .  1347.
~^I b i d . , p .  1346 .
^^Record ,  ? 3 th  C ong . ,  2d S e s s . ,  1944, 2C, P a r t  3 ,  4096.
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t h e  C ongress  o f  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s . H e  t h e n  j o i n e d  i n  t h e  
su p p o r t  o f  an amendment which s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
made any a g reem en t  under  Lend-Lease  which i n  any way r ed u c ed  
t a r i f f s  i t  would be h e ld  v o id  b y  C on g re ss .
E a r l y  p l a n s  f o r  p o s tw a r  w o r l d . —While Americans were 
engaged i n  d e f e a t i n g  the  Axis p o w e rs ,  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  l e a d e r s  
were l o o k i n g  a head  t o  the  p o s tw a r  w o r ld .  R o o s e v e l t  q u i t e  
e a r l y  s e t  the s t a g e  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  he  would a d v o c a t e .  In  
1942 , he a s s e r t e d  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e r e  were  s t i l l  Americans who 
th o u g h t  "we can  t e l l  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w or ld  t o  s t e w  i n  i t s  
own j u i c e , "  he warned t h a t  " i t  i s  u s e l e s s  t o  win b a t t l e s  i f  
t h e  c au se  f o r  which we f i g h t  t h e s e  b a t t l e s  i s  l o s t . " ^ ^  At 
t h a t  t i m e ,  he i n i t i a t e d  s t u d i e s  w i t h i n  the  S t a t e  Department  
on t h e  p ro b lem s  i n v o lv e d  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  a f t e r  t h e  
peace  had  been  won.^^ I n  e a r l y  1943,  th e  P r e s i d e n t  became 
more s p e c i f i c  a b o u t  American p l a n s  f o r  the  p o s tw a r  w o r ld .
" I  have been  t o l d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  no t im e  t o  speak  o f  a b e t t e r  
America a f t e r  t h e  w ar .  . . .  I  d i s s e n t .  . . . Today th e  U n i ted  
N a t io n s  a r e  th e  m i g h t i e s t  m i l i t a r y  c o a l i t i o n  i n  a l l  h i s t o r y .  . 
. . [They] can  and  must rem ain  u n i t e d  f o r  p e a c e .  . .
.^^I b i d .
T  I
Samuel I .  Rosenman, Working With R o o s e v e l t ,
(New York: H a rp e r  & B r o s . , 1 9 5 2 ) ,  p .  363 .
^ ^ C e c i l  V. Crabb ,  J r . ,  B i p a r t i s a n  F o re ig n  P o l i c y ,  Myth 
o r  R e a l i t y  (E v a n s to n :  Row P e t e r s o n  & C o . ,  1 9 5 7 ) ,  p. 44.
^^Rosenman, Working With R o o s e v e l t , p . 368.
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At t h i s  t i m e ,  Vandenberg was going through a " p e r i o d  
o f  deep f r u s t r a t i o n . "  Acheson n o te s  t h a t  th e  S e n a t o r  "was 
v e ry  much on t h e  o u t s i d e  t r y i n g  t o  look  i n ;  and he c o u ld  see  
n o t h i n g .  S u s p i c i o n  consumed him. . . . " ^ 7  yg was,  p e r h a p s ,  
f i n d i n g  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d i s c a r d  America’s t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i c y  
o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  b u t  he was c l e a r l y  moving toward  a compromise. 
"Of c o u r s e , "  he s a i d ,  "we s h a l l  de fend  our i d e a l s  in  peace 
a s  w e l l  a s  w a r ;  and u n q u e s t io n a b ly  we must p r e p a r e  o u r s e l v e s
t o  a c c e p t  a l a r g e r  s h a r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  .
IS. . "  He c h a r a c t e r i z e d  h i m s e l f  a s  a " m i d d l e - o f - t h e - r o a d e r , "
. . . who w an ts  t o  win t h i s  war as  s w i f t l y  and 
as c h e a p ly  as  p o s s i b l e ;  who then  w an ts  a r e a l i s t i c  
peace which p u t s  an end t o  m i l i t a r y  a g g r e s s i o n ;  
who w ants  j u s t i c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  f o r c e  t o  r u l e  t h e  
pos tw ar  w o r l d ;  who i s  w i l l i n g  t o  t a k e  h i s  f u l l  
s h a r e  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  a l l  t h e s e  d i r e c t i o n s  
. . . and who wants  " e n l i g h t e n e d  s e l f i s h n e s s "  
mixed w i th  " g e n e ro u s  i d e a l i s m "  when our c o u rse  
i s  c h a r t e r e d . 19
V andenberg ’ s m id d le - r o a d  in  o p e r a t i o n . —Vandenberg
p u t  h i s  "m id d leg rou n d"  p o s i t i o n  to  work i n  March o f  1943.
At t l i a t  t i m e ,  he was named to a s p e c i a l  Sen a te  subcommittee
to s tu d y  th e  v a r i o u s  r e s o l u t i o n s  which were be ing  i n t r o d u c e d
i n  the  S en a te  c o n c e rn in g  A m erica ’ s r o l e  i n  a  pos twar
c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  He became a larmed t h a t
t h e  p r o p o s a l s  so u gh t  t o  " p a r t i c u l a r i z e  p r e m a t u r e l y , "  and he
^7pean Acheson, " Jou rney  I n t o  Our T im es ,"  American 





th o ug h t  t h i s  ’’could  e a s i l y  d i v i d e  our A l l i e s  a b ro a d  . . . 
could  j e o p a r d i z e  v i c t o r y  i t s e l f . A f ce'  c o n f e r e n c e s  w i th  
S e c r e t a r y  H u l l  and S e n a to r  George,  Vandenberg and S e n a to r  
White o f  Maine forrr .a l ly  i n t r o d u c e d  a r e s o l u t i o n  which gave 
t h e i r  v e r s i o n  of  A;r.erica’s r o l e  i n  the  p o s tw a r  w o r ld .  I t  
r e a d  a s  f o l l a v s :
Reso lved  cy tn e  S e n a te  ( t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
c o n c u r r i n g ) ,  t h a t  t h i s  Congress  f a v o r s :  (1)  t h e  p r o s e ­
c u t i o n  o f  the  war to  c o n c l u s i v e  v i c t o r y ; -  (2)  t h e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  i n  p o s tw a r  c o o p e r a t i o n  
between s o v e r e ig n  n a t i o n s  t o  p r e v e n t  by any n e c e s s a r y  
means, t h e  r e c u r r e n c e  o f  m i l i t a r y  a g g r e s s i o n  and to  
e s t a b l i s h  permanent  peace  w i th  j u s t i c e  i n  a f r e e  w o r ld ;  
(3) t h e  p r e s e n t  e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e s e  a im s ,  so  f a r  as  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  u n i t e d  war e f f o r t ,  and t h e i r  u l t i m a t e  
achievement  by due c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s  and w i th  
f a i t h f u l  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  American r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a.:d 
American i n t e r e s t s .
The R e p u b l ic a n  C onference  a t  Mackinac I s l a n d . — During 
a b r i e f  r e c e s s  i n  the  Congress  i n  September  o f  1943,  t h e  
R epu b l ican  Advisory  C o u n c i l  h e l d  a c o n fe r e n c e  f o r  t h e  purpose  
o f  p lann ing  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  p lank  i n  the  R e p u b l ica n  p l a t ­
form o f  1 9 4 4 . The c o n f e r e n c e  i n c l u d e d  a l l  tne  R e p u b l ic a n  
g o v e rn o r s ,  f i f t e e n  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and S e n a to r s  and t e n  
members o f  the R epu b l ican  Nat o n a l  C om m it tee .22 Vandenberg’ s 
r o l e  i n c l u d e d  th e  p l a n n in g  o f  a p lan k  on p o s tw a r  o b j e c t i v e s .
P a r t  5 ,  69 9 8 . 
22
^Ql b i d . . p .  40.
^^R e c o rd , ?0 th  Cong. ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1943, LXXÏIX,
Papers, p. 5:
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The M ich igan  S e n a t o r  was f e a r f u l  t h a t  he would 
e n c o u n te r  s t i f f  o p p o s i t i o n  from prew ar  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  on 
any appro ach  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  a f t e r  th e  war .
He announced in  advance  o f  the  c o n fe r e n c e  t h a t  he was 
" h u n t in g  f o r  t h e  m id d le  ground between t h o s e  ex trem es  
. . . who would c h e e r f u l l y  g iv e  America away and t h o s e
. . . .who would a t t e m p t  a t o t a l  i s o l a t i o n  which has come
t o  be an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . "^3 He c a l l e d  on the  c o n fe r e n c e  t o  
e x t i r p a t e  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  " t h e  R e p u b l ica n  P a r t y  would r e t i r e  
t o  i t s  fo x h o le  when t h e  l a s t  sh o t  i n  t h i s  war has  been 
f i r e d , a n d  t o  do s o  by w r i t i n g  a program t h a t  "must b e a t  
t h e  f o u r t h  t e r m . " ^ ^  T h is  t y p e  of  p o l i c y ,  he s a i d ,  would 
r e s p e c t  th e  s o v e r e i g n  power of  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  P r o c e s s  of  d e c i s io n - m a k in g  w i th o u t  l e t t i n g  
" t h e  w o r ld  r o t  i n  i t s  own a n a r c h y .
Vandenberg p ro v ed  t o  be th e  e n e r g i z e r  and m ed ia ­
t o r  o f  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e .  The s t i f f  o p p o s i t i o n  from p rew ar
i s o l a t i o n i s t s  never  d e v e lo p e d .  • The W i l l k i e  group which 
c a l l e d  fo r  a s t r o n g e r  p o s tw a r  r o l e  f o r  th e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  th a n  Vandenberg d e s i r e d  was n o t  p r e s e n t .  The 
f i n a l  r e s u l t  was a s t a t e m e n t  much l i k e  the  Vandenberg- 
White R e s o l u t i o n  which committed  t h e  R e p ub l ican  P a r t y  t o  
f a v o r i n g  " U n i t e d  S t a t e s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a pos tw ar  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  of s o v e r e i g n  n a t i o n s . "^7 His  d e fe n se  o f
^3I b i d . Z^ i b i d . , p.  5 6 .  25l b i d . , p .  5 7 .
2 ° I b i d . , p. 5 c .  ^ ' ^ I b i d . , p .  5 b .
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t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  r e s o l u t i o n  i n  the  S e n a te  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  h i s  t h i n k i n g  had t a k e n  by l a t e  1943. He had 
a l r e a d y  d e c id e d  t o  f a v o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  a s  lo n g  
as American s o v e r e i g n t y  was n o t  s a c r i f i c e d .  His m idd le  
ro ad  was n o t  a  s u p e r  s t a t e ,  b u t  n e i t h e r  d i d  i t  mark a 
r e t u r n  t o  a  p rew ar  b ran d  o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m .
The C o nn a l ly  R e s o l u t i o n . —A f t e r  th e  Mackinac Conference ,  
Vandenberg r e t u r n e d  t o  the  S en a te  where h i s  work on th e  Senate  
r e s o l u t i o n  f o r  p o s tw a r  c o o p e r a t i o n  was resumed. Soon a f t e r  
Congress  rec o n v en e d  i n  October  o f  1943, S e n a to r  C o n n a l ly  
i n t r o d u c e d  a new r e s o l u t i o n  which t h e  committee ap p ro v e d .  
Vandenberg s u p p o r t e d  i t  b e ca u se  i t  p led g e d  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
to  u se  " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s "  and t o  m a i n t a i n  "American 
s o v e r e i g n t y . "  He a l s o  took  o c c a s io n  t o  n o te  t h a t  t h e  
Committee R e s o l u t i o n  " i s  more l i k e  t h e  Vandenberg-White  
R e s o l u t i o n  t h a n  any o f  th e  o t h e r  p r o p o s a l s . "2# The 
r e s o l u t i o n  was a d o p ted  by the  S en a te  w i th o u t  change on 
November 5 ,  1 9 4 3 . Ob j e c t i o n s  t o  the  r e s o l u t i o n  came 
p r i m a r i l y  from t h o s e  who th o u g h t  America should  t a k e  a more 
s p e c i f i c  p o s i t i o n  on h e r  p o s tw ar  peace  p l a n s .  The r e s o l u t i o n  
r e a d  a s  f o l l o w s :
• R e so lv e d ,  t h a t  the  war a g a i n s t  a l l  our enemies 
be waged u n t i l  com ple te  v i c t o r y  i s  a c h i e v e d .
2&I b i d . , p .  62.
^^R e c o r d , ?S th  C o n g . , 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1943, LXXXIX, P a r t  
7̂  9222.
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T hat  ûhe U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o o p e r a t e  with i t s  com- 
r a d e s - i n - a r n i s  i n  s e c u r i n g  a j u s t  and h o n o rab le  
p e a c e .
That  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a c t i n g  th ro u g h  i t s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s ,  j o i n  w i th  f r e e  and 
s o v e r e i g n  n a t i o n s  i n  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and 
m a in ten a n ce  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  w i th  
power t o  p r e v e n t  a g g r e s s i o n  and to  p r e s e r v e  
t h e  peace  o f  t h e  world.30
R ep o r t  o f  th e  Speech
S e n a t o r  V andenberg’ s speech on O ctober  25 ,  1943»^“ 
i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  came im m ed ia te ly  a f t e r  S e n a to r  
C on n a l ly  p r e s e n t e d  the  m a t t e r  to  ûne S e n a te  w i th  t h e  
a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  ’’i s o l a t i o n  has f a i l e d .  Let  u s  t r y  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y . "32 Vandenberg recommended the a d o p t io n  o f  th e  
r e s o l u t i o n  " w i th o u t  change."33
Vandenberg began w i th  a b r i e f  s t a t e m e n t  o f  f o u r  
a rgum ents  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n ,  and th e n  p roceeded  
t o  e l a b o r a t e  on e a c h .
The c o n t in u a n c e  o f  war t im e  u n i t y . —He f i r s t  su p p o r te d  
th e  r e s o l u t i o n  beca u se  i t s  i n t e n t  was t o  m a in t a in  t h e  war­
t im e  u n i t y  "beyond our  v i c t o r y  a t  a r ra s ,"  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  
w o r ld  co u ld  e x p e r i e n c e  "a  h a p p i e r  and a s a f e r  c i v i l i z a t i o n , "34 
His main s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  l i e s  in  the  p h r a s e ,  " i t  
i s  o b v i o u s . "  He m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  "we a r e  indeed  a p h y s i c a l l y
30l b i d . , p .  8663.
3 ^ I b i d . , p .  8665 . 322 b i d .
33 i b i d . , p .  8666.  34%bid. , p. 8665.
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f o r e s h o r t e n e d  u n i v e r s e  i n  which Im eri  ca cannot  l i v e  u n to  
h e r s e l f  a lo n e ."^5 T h is  be ing  the  c a s e ,  a rgued  Vandenberg,
"we must o r g a n i z e  f o r  p e a c e  and f o r  the  power t o  p r e s e r v e  
i t .  . . , " 3 o  He t h u s  committed  America t o  a v e n t u r e  i n  
c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  I t  was t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d  t h a t  t h i s  was 
the  d i r e c t i o n  in  which  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  must now move. 
Although no mention of  th e  e v en t  was made, he i m p l i e d  t h a t  
P e a r l  Harbor has  made t h i s  an "obvious"move.
, C o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  and s o v e r e i g n t y . —He n e x t  a rgued  
t h a t  America should  s u p p o r t  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  because  i t  p ledg ed  
th e  U ni ted  S t a t e s  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  w i th o u t  i m p a r t i n g  
" th e  e s s e n t i a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  and in d ep e n d en c e  o f  our  own f r e e  
R e p u b l i c . "37 From the b e g in n in g  o f  h i s  i n t e r e s t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y ,  he  had s t r e s s e d  t h a t  America must no t  s u r r e n d e r  
any s o v e r e i g n t y  i n  h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  He now 
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  American p u b l i c  o p in io n  a g re e d  with  him. By 
a p r o c e s s  o f  i n d u c t i o n  he drew on the  c o n c u r r i n g  views o f  
t h e  American L e g io n ,  V e te r a n s  of F o re ig n  Wars, t h e  R e pu b l ican  
P a r t y  a t  Mackinac,  and t h e  e d i t o r i a l  views o f  The New York 
T im es, as  m ounting  e v id e n c e  t h a t  the  American peo p le  " d e n i e s  
our  d i s a p p e a r a n c e  i n  any  w o r ld  government o f  a w o r ld  s t a t e . "3^ 
The S e n a to r  assumed an a g re e in g  a u d ie n c e  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f
3^I b i d . , p .  8666.
^ ° I b i d . , p .  8665» ^^ I b i d .
3&I b i d . , p . 8667 .
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s o v e r e i g n t y .  His c o n c e r n  was p r o b a b ly  d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  
m i n o r i t y  g roup who hoped f o r  a  r e a l  w or ld  governm ent .
C o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  and e x e c u t i v e - l e g i s l a t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . — I n  a t h i r d  argument Vandenberg en d o rsed  th e  
r e s o l u t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  i t  c a l l e d  f o r  American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
tirie p o s tw a r  w o r ld  t h ro u g h  the  "due c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s . "39 
The S e n a to r  o f f e r e d  o n ly  s c a n t  e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p hase  o f  
t h e  r e s o l u t i o n .  But he d id  make h i s  c h i e f  concern  r a t h e r  
o b v io u s .  He wanted  a l l  b i n d i n g  commitments f o r  A m e r ic a ' s  
p a r t  i n  t h e  p o s tw a r  w o r ld  approved  by the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  
S e n a t e .  " I  f e r v e n t l y  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  o f  th e  h i g h e s t  co nce rn  
t h a t  t h e  S e n a te  and th e  E x e c u t iv e  s h o u l d  work i n  c l o s e s t  
p o s s i b l e  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  fo rm u la s  of 
p eace  so t h a t  we may avo id  th e  s t e r i l e  d e ad lock s  o f  25 
y e a r s  a g o . " ^ ^  The i m p l i c a t i o n  f o l lo w e d  t h a t  the  a d m in i s -  
t r a t i o n  shou ld  s e e k  the'  a d v ic e  and c o n s e n t  o f  th e  S e n a te  o r  
i t  m igh t  f a c e  the  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  Wilson  e n c o u n te re d  upon h i s  
r e t u r n  from V e r s a i l l e s .
G e n e r a l ,  no t  s p e c i f i c  commitments . —Vandenberg f i n a l l y  
a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  p r e s e n t e d  American p o s tw ar  
o b j e c t i v e s  w i t h o u t  the " c r y s t a l - g a z i n g  d e t a i l s  i n  r e s p e c t  
t o  h ap p en in g s  and a t t i t u d e s  which a r e  y e t  t o  r e v e a l  t h e  
a c t u a l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  which we s h a l l  c o n f r o n t  a t  t h e  peace
^^Ibid., p. Ô6 6 5 .
^^Ibid., p. S6 Ô7 .
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t a b l e .  . . . ”^1 He c a l l e d  upon the  S e n a te  " t o  w i t h h o ld  
ou r  b l u e p r i n t s  u n t i l  we a r e  a t  g r i p s  w i th  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  
of  t o m o r r o w . H e  wanted  to  a v o id  a S e n a t e  f i g h t  over  
t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  the  r e s o l u t i o n ;  t h e  g r e a t e r  p o r t i o n  o f  
h i s  t im e  i n  the  speech  was th u s  g iv en  o v e r  t o  an a t t e m p t  
to  c o n v in c e  h i s  a u d ie n c e  t h a t  the  r e s o l u t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  a l l  
t h a t  sh o u ld  be s t a t e d  a t  t h a t  t im e .
His f i r s t  a t t e m p t  t o  s u p p o r t  t h i s  c o n t e n t i o n  was 
p in ned  t o  t h e  b i p a r t i s a n  e f f o r t s  t h a t  went i n t o  the  w r i t i n g  
o f  the  r e s o l u t i o n .  He r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  u n t i r i n g  e f f o r t s  
o f  the  subcom m it tee  which p h ra s e d  the  r e s o l u t i o n .  He 
p r a i s e d  th e  work o f  " t h e  a b l e  c h a i rm a n sh ip  o f  the  d i s t i n ­
g u i s h e d  S e n a t o r  from T e x a s [ C o n n a l l y ] H e  made r e f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  committee  which drew up  the  r e s o l u t i o n  
c o n s i s t e d  of  f i v e  Democrats and two R e p u b l i c a n s — "men 
who p r o f o u n d l y  d i f f e r e d  i n  t h e i r  p r e - P e a r l  H a rb o r  v i e w s , "  
and c o n c lu d ed  t h a t  " t h e  pend in g  r e s o l u t i o n  was th e  common 
d e n o m in a to r  of  a l l  t h e s e  o f f i c i a l  and s e m i - o f f i c i a l  
c o n tem p ora ry  pronouncem ents  on American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y . "44 
But Vandenberg d id  not  r e s t  h i s  argument t h a t  th e  
S e n a te  sh o u ld  a c c e p t  the  r e s o l u t i o n  w i t h o u t  change s o l e l y  
on the  e t h i c a l  p ro o f  t h a t  co m pe ten t ,  u n b i a s e d  men w ro te  i t .  
He a rg u e d  t h a t  any change i n  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  a t  t h a t  hour
4^Ibid., p. 3665. 4 2 %
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 3663.
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c o u ld  harm n o t  o n ly  th e  p os tw ar  p e a c e ,  b u t  cou ld  a l s o  
’’p r e j u d i c e  t h e  war and our  v i c t o r i o u s  momentum.”^5 i n  
e s s e n c e ,  Vandenberg i s s u e d  a w arn ing  to t h o s e  who would 
r i s k  a f i g h t  o v e r  p os tw ar  peace  o b j e c t i v e s  b e f o r e  the  b a t t l e  
was won. He a rg u e d  t h a t  any a t t e m p t  t o  be more s p e c i f i c  i n  
t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  c o u ld  ”s p l i t  a  p a r t  our  A l l i e d  U n i ty  b e f o r e  
the  war i s  w o n ,” and concluded  t h a t  ’’our  f i r s t  job  i s  t o  
win the war and g e t . o u r  boys back home.”^&
F i n a l l y ,  the  S e n a to r  a rg u e d  t h a t  t o  go beyond a 
g e n e r a l  s t a t e m e n t  o f  pos tw ar  aims would pu t  ’’th e  c a r t  b e f o r e  
t h e  h o r s e . ” He p ro v id e d  an i n d i r e c t  rem inder  t h a t  t h e  war 
was n o t  y e t  won. ”The war map i s  chang ing  every  d a y , ”^? 
he s a i d .  ’’Y e s t e r d a y ’ s enemy i s  t o d a y ’ s a l l y . ” The a p p e a l  
was o b v i o u s l y  a  l o g i c a l  one. He hoped h i s  a u d ie n ce  would 
a g r e e  t h a t  one shou ld  no t  b l u e p r i n t  a  house u n t i l  he knows 
t h e  t e r r i t o r y  upon which i t  i s  to  be b u i l t .  A dm it t ing  t h a t  
t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  was vague,  he a rg u e d  t h a t  t h i s  gave i t  s t r e n g t h .
”I t  i s  n o t  a s t r a i t  j a c k e t  which o t h e r w i s e  might  b u r s t  asunder.”4# 
He co n c lu d ed  w i th  a f i n a l  a p p e a l  f o r  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  
the  r e s o l u t i o n  a s  s t a t e d .  R eco g n iz in g  t h a t  some o b j e c t e d  
t o  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  because  i t  f a i l e d  t o  say  more and o t h e r s  





was i t s  . v i r t u e .  "When we s t a n d  a t  such a po in t . ,  we s t a n d  
on common g ro u n d .  I t  i s  f o o l i s h  and f u t i l e  t o  s t a n d  a t  
any o t h e r . "^9
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  Speech
I n d i c a t i o n s  o f  a  new p o s i t i o n . — The C on n a l ly  Reso­
l u t i o n  was c l o t h e d  i n  such vague t e rm s  t h a t  even a s t r o n g  
i s o l a t i o n i s t  cou ld  have s u p p o r te d  i t  w i t h o u t  p led g in g  him­
s e l f  to  any  marked d e p a r t u r e  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  American a t t i t u d e s  
to w ard  w o r ld  a f f a i r s .  But Vandenberg went beyond mere s u p p o r t  
o f  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n .  He gave s e v e r a l  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  h i s  
t h i n k i n g  had  changed r e g a r d i n g  the  ro ad  t o  peace  and s e c u r i t y  
f o r  A m erica .  Vandenberg,  f o r  exam ple , i n f e r r e d  t h a t  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  cou ld  no l o n g e r  hope to  e s c a p e  war b ecau se  o f  
i t s  g e o g r a p h i c a l  p o s i t i o n .  He was now r e a d y  t o  c o o p e r a t e  
i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  th e  
m a in te n a n c e  of  peace  and s e c u r i t y .
Vandenberg a l s o  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  he was re a d y  to  
seek  t h i s  s e c u r i t y  th ro u g h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law r a t h e r  t h a n  
n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n .  In  1939, Vandenberg c a s t  a s i d e  
R o o s e v e l t ’s s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  America w i thd raw  th e  arms embargo 
and r e l y  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law t o  keep  t h e  p e a c e .  The S e n a to r  
had a rg u e d :  " I t  c e r t a i n l y  was th e  p r e c i s e  law un de r  which
we g o t  i n t o  the  World War i n  1 9 1 7 ."  I n  r e f e r e n c e  t o  th e  
n e u t r a l i t y  law, he had d e c l a r e d  t h a t  "we e s t a b l i s h e d  a g r e a t
^ ^ Ib id . ,  p. 366s.
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new dynamic p r i n c i p l e  i n  h e a l t h i e r  and s a f e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , "50 in  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law . Four 
y e a r s  l a t e r ,  he t o l d  t h e  S e n a t e  t h a t  he f a v o re d  the  C o n n a l ly  
R e s o l u t i o n  b e c a u se  "my own deep i n t e r e s t  i s  i n  the  p u r s u i t  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law on e f f e c t i v e  f o u n d a t i o n s , "  f o r  " i t  i s  
i n e v i t a b l y  i n c l u d e d  w i t h i n  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  p r e s e r v e  the  p e ac e  o f  th e  w o r l d , "5^ a lo n g  w i t h  
o t h e r  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s .  To Vandenberg ,  the  o ld  o r d e r  had 
f a i l e d ;  he was w i l l i n g  to  t r y  a new d i r e c t i o n .  The d e t a i l s  ■ 
o f  t h e  new p o l i c y  were o m i t t e d ,  b u t  he c l e a r l y  was w i l l i n g  
" t o  j o i n  w i th  f r e e  and s o v e r e i g n  n a t i o n s  i n  the  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment  and m a in ten a n ce  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  w i th  power 
t o  p r e v e n t  a g g r e s s i o n s  and t o  p r e s e r v e  peace  i n  the  w o r l d . "52
A t h i r d  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  h i s  b r o a d e n in g  o u t lo o k  was shown 
by h i s  r i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  i n  p e ac e  f o r  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  as  w e l l  
a s  America. B e fo re  P e a r l  H a r b o r ,  h i s  sp e ec h es  e x e m p l i f i e d  
h i s  sympathy f o r  o t h e r  d e m o c r a c i e s ,  b u t  he a l s o  made c l e a r  
t h a t  America must  be k e p t  s e p a r a t e d  from th e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
w o r ld .  S c a t t e r e d  comments t h r o u g h o u t  h i s  1943 speech  
showed h i s  in c re a s e d ,  c o n ce rn  f o r  j u s t i c e  f o r  a l l  n a t i o n s .
He a d m i t t e d ,  f o r  example ,  t h a t  o t h e r  A l l i e s  would have . " q u i t e
^OR e c o r d , 7 6 th  C ong . ,  2d S e s s . ,  1939,  L2XV, P a r t
1 ,  99.
^^R e c o r d , ? 8 th  C ong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1943,  LXXIÏ,
P a r t  7 ,  866S.
5^I b i d . , p .  8666.
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as  much t o  say"  about peace  p la n s  as  America f o r  " t h i s  
b u s i n e s s  i s  n o t  our monopoly ."  He r e f e r r e d  t o  the  newly 
p ro p o se d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  as " s o l i d  g round"  upon which the  
"U n i te d  N a t ion s  can b e g in  t o  b u i l d  a b e t t e r  w orld ."53 i n  
e s s e n c e ,  h i s  c o n c e p t  o f  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  had become w or ld  
i n t e r e s t .  His r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  
t o o k  on a g r e a t e r  concern  for  peace  and j u s t i c e  f o r  a l l  men.
C o n t in u in g  c o n c e p t s . —V andenberg ’ s O c to b e r ,  1943 
a d d r e s s  d id  m ore ,  however,  th an  pu t  him p u b l i c l y  on r e c o r d  
as  h av in g  abandoned " i s o l a t i o n i s m . " ^ ^  The M ichigan  S e n a to r  
a l s o  h i n t e d  a t  t h o s e  a s p e c t s  o f  h i s  p rew ar  t h i n k i n g  which 
he would c a r r y  i n t o  the  p o s tw ar  e r a .  America must go^.into 
t h e  p o s tw a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i t h - h e r  ’-’e s s e n t i a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  
and i n d e p e n d e n c e . "^5 He r e g a r d e d  the  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  
word " s o v e r e i g n t y "  as  American d i s a p p r o v a l  o f  a  "w or ld  
governm ent"  o r  "world  s t a t e . "  He was now w i l l i n g  f o r  
America to c o o p e r a t e  w i th  o t h e r  n a t i o n s ,  bu t  " c e r t a i n l y , "  
s a i d  Vandenberg ,  " s o v e r e i g n s  do not  c e a s e  to  be s o v e r e i g n s  
when th e y  . . . v o l u n t a r i l y  c o o p e r a t e . "54
53 Ib id .
. ^^P a p e r s , p .  41. Vandenberg n o t e s  i n  h i s  d i a r y  on 
March 24, 1943: " I t  was my p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s
o b v i o u s l y  must  be  a  f a r  g r e a t e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t o r  
a f t e r  t h i s  war th a n  ever  b e f o r e . "




The speech  a l s o  r e f l e c t s  Vandenberg’ s c o n t i n u e d  
s u s p i c i o n  o f  an e x e c u t i v e  who might  e n t e r  i n t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r e a t i e s  w i t h o u t  a p p ro v a l  by the S e n a te .  His f i g h t  a g a i n s t  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  g o v e rn m e n ta l  powers i n  t h e  hands o f  th e  
P r e s i d e n t  c o n t i n u e d .  He n o te d  i n  h i s  d i a r y  t h a t  t h e  p h r a s e ,  
"by due C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  P r o c e s s , "  e l i m i n a t e d  " th e  R o o s e v e l t  
h a b i t  and d e s i r e  t o  b y pass  Congress  i n  t h e s e  r e s p e c t s . "57 
He had c a r r i e d  the same d i s t r u s t  th ro u g h  t h e  i s o l a t i o n i s t  
e r a .  The M ichigan  S e n a t o r  was s e r v in g  n o t i c e  on t h e  Wliite 
House t h a t  Congress  must n o t  be ig n o re d  in  Americans p o s t ­
war p l a n s .  More i m p o r t a n t ,  however, was the  i m p l i e d  . 
announcement t h a t  i f  "due C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  P r o c e s s "  was 
observed  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c o u ld  depend upon Vandenberg^s 
su p p o r t  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n .
The m i d d l e - o f - t h e - r o a d . — I f  newspaper  commentary i s  
an a c c u r a t e  b a ro m e te r  o f  p u b l i c  s e n t im e n t ,  Vandenberg^s 
announced "ch an ge"  on O c tober  23 1943» from i s o l a t i o n i s m  
t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  made no pronounced  im p r e s s io n  
on t h e  American p e o p le .  One obvious  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  the  war n a t u r a l l y  h e ld  the  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e  n a t i o n  
a t  l a r g e .  C a s u a l ty  l i s t s  f rom the  b a t t l e f i e l d  f i g u r e d  more 
p ro m in e n t ly  i n  t h e  h e a d l i n e s  th a n  d id  the  t h i n k i n g  o f  a 
S e n a to r  on p o s tw a r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  But th e  
speech i t s e l f  o f f e r s  a n o th e r  e x p l a n a t i o n .  The S e n a t o r  was
C’y
' P a p e r s , p. $4.
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r a t h e r  vague on t h e  ty p e  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  he 
would s u p p o r t .  Such l a n g u a g e  may have i n v i t e d  many t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  S e n a to r  would r e s o r t  t o  h i s  p rew ar  p o s i ­
t i o n  a f t e r  v i c t o r y  was a c h i e v e d .  The m idd le  p o s i t i o n ,  
however ,  was j u s t i f i a b l e  in  view o f  the  d a n g e r s  o f  p ro lo n g ed  
S e n a te  d e b a te .
I t  should  be n o te d  t h a t  Vandenberg may have been i n  
1943 a t r u e  " m i d d l e - o f - t h e - r o a d e r . "  The speech  u n d e r  con­
s i d e r a t i o n  made i t  q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  he opposed the  c o n ce p t  
o f  a " s u p e r  s t a t e . "  I t  was a l s o  e q u a l l y  c l e a r  t h a t  he would 
n o t  r e t u r n  to  h i s  p o s tw a r  i s o l a t i o n i s t  a t t i t u d e s .  But j u s t  
where he would go from t h i s  p o i n t  was no t  made e v i d e n t  i n  
h i s  p u b l i c  o r  p r i v a t e  r em a rk s .  While  c o n ce d in g  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
he d i d  n o t  know j u s t  how f a r  he would go down the ro ad  
tow ard  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .
N e i th e r  does t h e  speech  r e f l e c t  Vandenberg’ s r e a s o n s  
f o r  moving i n  a new d i r e c t i o n  on t h e  m a t t e r  of  Am erica ’ s 
r o l e  i n  w orld  a f f a i r s .  He u s e d  t h e  word " o b v io u s" 5 °  i n  h i s  
d i a r y  i n  March o f  1943 to  j u s t i f y  t h e  change and th e  p h r a s e ,  
" i t  i s  i n e v i t a b l y  i n c l u d e d , " 5 9  i n  O ctob er .
Vandenberg,  p e rh a p s ,  was a d a p t i n g  h i s  views to  th e  
t h i n k i n g  o f  the t i m e s .  " I n  the  w i n t e r  o f  1943-44," w r i t e s
5^P a p e r s , p.  41.
59Record, 70 th  C o n g . , 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1943,  L ÏX IÏ ,  P a r t  
7 ,  8665 .
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D u l l e s ,  " t h e r e  was e v e r y  e v id e n c e  t h a t  a l a r g e  m a j o r i t y  o f  
t h e  p e o p le  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  sh o u ld  a c t i v e l y  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  w orld  o r g a n i z a t i o n  fo r  p e a c e . "60 The Michigan  
S e n a to r  showed an aw areness  o f  t h i s  f a c t  on October  25 ,  1943, 
when he s a i d :  "The p eo p le  have spoken ,  i n  v e ry  r e c e n t  m onths ,
t h r o u g h  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  o f f i c i a l  and  s e m i - o f f i c i a l  m edia .
I t  can t h u s  be c la im ed  t h a t  Vandenberg was moving w i th  t h e  
t i d e ;  i t  can f u r t h e r  be a rg u e d  t h a t  he d id  n o t  e l a b o r a t e  on 
h i s  s p e c i f i c  p l a n s  f o r  A m erica ’ s p o s tw a r  r o l e  b e cau se  he 
wanted  t o  w a i t  and see  where t h a t  t i d e  would t a k e  him. The 
d e s i r e  n o t  t o  i n t e r r u p t  the  war e f f o r t  w i th  American boys 
i n  b a t t l e  was a s t r o n g  r e a s o n ,  however ,  f o r  n o t  r i s k i n g  a 
S e n a te  f i g h t  o v e r  a s p e c i f i c  p l a n  even i f  he had one i n  
mind. With t h e  war map changing  the  w o r ld  d a i l y ,  p e r h a p s ,  
th e  w ise  move was t o  a w a i t  the  u l t i m a t e  c l im ax  o f  the  war 
b e f o r e  a t t e m p t i n g  to  d e a l  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w i t h  t h e  p l a n s  f o r  
peace .  F i n a l l y ,  he may have been very  s i n c e r e ,  and  more 
i m p o r t a n t ,  q u i t e  c o r r e c t ,  i n  say in g  t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  C o n g re ss ,  sh o u ld  speak  f i r s t  on t h e  " b l u e p r i n t s "  
f o r  p e a c e .
In  s h o r t ,  V and en be rg ’ s s u p p o r t  o f  the  C onna l ly  
R e s o l u t i o n  p ledged  h i s  a p p ro v a l  o f  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ p a r t i c i ­
p a t i o n  i n  a p o s tw ar  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  p r e s e r v e  p e a c e ,  p ro v id e d
66'Foster  Rhea D u l l e s ,  op. c i t . , p .  212.
°^R ecord ,  ? 8 th  C ong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1943, LXXIX 
P a r t  7 ,  8667.
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t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was b a s e d  on th e  s o v e r e i g n  e q u a l i t y  o f  
member n a t i o n s  and r e c e i v e d  th e  u l t i m a t e  a p p ro v a l  o f  t h e  
S e n a t e .  His speech  o f f e r s  few c lu e s  a s  t o  why he sw i tc h ed  
from t h e  concep t  of i s o l a t i o n i s m  i n  l a t e  1941 t o  t h a t  o f  
c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  i n  1943.  The sp e ec h ,  however,  i n d i c a t e s ,  
t h a t  h i s  view of America’ s n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  had sw i tc h ed  
from " p e a c e ” f o r  America i n  1941 t o  " p ea c e"  w i th  j u s t i c e  
f o r  th e  e n t i r e  world in  1943.  His r o l e  as  l e a d e r  o f  th e  
R e p u b l i c a n  p a r t y  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  was b e g in n in g  t o  be 
g e n e r a l l y  acknowledged,  and h i s  r o l e  i n  th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  b i p a r t i s a n  p o l i c y  had a l s o  begun.
The Address  on American F o re ig n  P o l i c y  
By e a r l y  1945, World War I I  a p p e a re d  t o  be n e a r i n g  a 
s u c c e s s f u l  c o n c l u s i o n  f o r  t h e  A l l i e s .  A no th e r  Big Three 
m e e t in g  was a b o u t  t o  take  p l a c e  a t  Y a l t a .  P r e s i d e n t  
R o o s e v e l t  had been s i l e n t  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  s i n c e  th e  1944 
e l e c t i o n .  Vandenberg th o u g h t  i t  t ime f o r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  to  
make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would n o t  su p p o r t  an 
u n j u s t  p e a c e .  In  s h o r t ,  he wanted R o o s e v e l t  to warn England,  
F r a n c e ,  and R u s s i a  t h a t  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s  would r e p u d i a t e  
a n y - a t t e m p t  a t  t;ie peace t a b l e  which d id  no t  p ro v id e  j u s t i c e  
f o r  a l l  n a t i o n s . ' The S e n a to r  i s s u e d  the  c h a l l e n g e  to  
R o o s e v e l t  on t h e  eve of t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s  d e p a r t u r e  f o r  Y a l t a .  
F o r  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of the  S e n a t o r ’ s famous J a n u a ry  10, 1945 
a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  S e n a t e ,  i t  i s  f i r s t  n e c e s s a r y  to  examdne th e  
seq u en ce  of  e v e n t s  which accompanied i t . .
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Vandenberg^s  new r o l e . - -D u r in g  t h e  1943 Mackinac 
C onference  and t n e  d e b a te s  o ^ e r  t  : : e pos war r e s o l : t L o n s ,  
Vandenberg emerged as  a c o n c i l i a t o r .  He d i s p l a y e d  v/'sdo,.  
i n  b r i n g i n g  t o g e t h e r  d i v e r g e n t  p o i n t s  of view azid in  working 
o u t  compromises f a v o r a b l e . t o  a l l  camps. Members o f  both 
p a r t i e s  were b e g in n in g  to  tak e  no te  o f  t h i s  " C e r t a i n l y  
you a re  e n t i t l e d  t o  warm p e r s o n a l  co..yra:u. .a"  Lons o:i a 
g r e a t  jo b  of c o n c i l i a t i n g  t h e  d i v e r g e n t  views no t  on ly  o f  
y ou r  committee  b u t  o f  t h e  whole C o u n c i l , "c2 Dewey w ro te  t o  
Vandenberg a f t e r  t n e  c o n fe re n c e  a t  Mackinac. S e n a to r  
C o nn a l ly  t o l d  t iie  SeLiate f o l lo w in g  th e  pa ssage  o f  t h e  
r e s o l u t i o n  on Americans pos tw ar  p o i i c y  t h a t  Vandenberg 
"gave  t h e  comm ittee  w h o le h e a r t e d ly  o f  h i s  t a l e n t s  and 
l e a d e r s h i p  i n  a c h i e v i n g  agreement and u n i t y  on the  
r e s o l u t i o n .  He d e s e r v e s  h ig h  c r e d i t  f o r  h i s  s e r v i c e s . " -3
Vandenberg was a l s o  a c t i v e  d u r in g  1943 and 1944 i n  
h e lp i n g  t o  e s t a o l i s r .  h i s  concep t  of  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
on a s y s t e m a t i c  b a s i s .  He s t r e s s e d  t h a t  " i t  would be a 
f i n a l  t r a g e d y  i f  p a r t i s a n  p o l i t i c s ,  a s  such ,  were t o  e n t e r  
i n t o  any phase  o f  t h e  pos twar  p l a n n i n g . T o  promote  t h i s  '
^^P a p e r s , p. 59.
c ^ I b i d . , p .  64.
^ ̂ R e c o rd , 76 th  Co::.-., 2d S e s s . ,  1944, XC, P a r t  4,
5747.
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g o a l ,  he c o n t in u e d  h i s  s e a r c h  f o r  a l i a i s o n  w i th  the  
e x e c u t i v e  b ra n c h .  " I  am p e s s i m i s t i c , "  s a i d  Vandenberg 
on March 11, 1944 "because  o f  the t o t a l  la c k  o f  C o n g r e s s io n a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  commitments -which a r e  b e ing  
made on our a cc o u n t  i n  a l l  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o n f e r e n c e s . "  He concluded  t h a t  uhe re  "must be a new 
cand o r  between the  White House and the  C a p i t o l .
Committee of E i g h t .-r-The "new can d o r"  which Vandenberg 
had so  e a r n e s t l y  sought  s i n c e  the b e g in n in g  o f  t h e  war was 
soon t o  d e v e lo p .  P r e s i d e n t  R o o se v e l t  and S e c r e t a r y - o f  S t a t e  
H u l l  had l e a r n e d  from W i l s o n ' s  m i s t a k e s  in  1913. They were 
d e te rm in e d  t h a t  a c o n f l i c t  ove r  d om es t ic  a f f a i r s  must no t  
d i s r u p t  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  a s  i t  had done i n  t h e  ca se  o f  
the League of N a t io n s .  As e a r l y  as  1942,  R o o se v e l t  had 
c r e a t e d  an Advisor}’- Committee on p o s tw a r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
When t h i s  group r e p o r t e d  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t h a t  a major  
f a c t o r  i n  th e  League o f  N a t i o n s ’ f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  U n i ted  
S t a t e s  was a l a c k  o f  l i a i s o n  between Wilson and C o n g re s s io n a l  
l e a d e r s ,  the  R o o se v e l t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to ok  s t e p s  to  avo id  
t h i s  m i s t a k e .  On March 22,  1944, S e c r e t a r y  H u l l  r e q u e s t e d  
the  S e n a te  to a p p o in t  a s m a l l  committee  t o  c o n f e r  w i th  t h e  
S t a t e  Department  on p o s tw a r  p l a n n i n g . && Vandenberg was
^bpapers, p. 9 2 .
‘̂ ^C o rd e l l  H u l l ,  The Memoirs of  C o r d e l l  H u l l , I I  
(New York: Macmillan  Company, 1948) ,  1658.
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s e l e c t e d  a s  a  member t o  s e rv e  with S e n a to r s  C o n n a l ly ,
B a r k le y ,  George,  G i l l e t t e ,  L a F o l l e t t e ,  W hite ,  and A u s t in .
Vandenberg^s  i n f l u e n c e  on the g ro u p  was n o t e d  
im m e d ia te ly .  At one of the  e a r l y  m e e t i n g s .  S e c r e t a r y  H u l l  
p r e s e n t e d  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s b l u e p r i n t  f o r  a  U n i ted  N a t io n s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  He r e q u e s t e d  a w r i t t e n  endorsement o f  t h e  
p l a n  so t h a t  he could  p r e s e n t  p roo f  of  a u n i t e d  America when 
he to o k  the  p la n  t o  C h u r c h i l l  and S t a l i n .  While Vandenberg 
th o u g h t  i t  t o  be a  ’’good p l a n , ” inasmuch a s  i t  " p r o t e c t s  
the  in d e p e n d e n t  a u t h o r i t y  o f  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s , "  he found 
i t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  e n d o rs e  t h e  "p lan  by s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e . " & 7  
The Committee a g r e e d  w i th  Vandenberg.  The group w ro te  H u l l  
t h a t  " t h e r e  can be no commitments i n  advance  o f  s p e c i f i c  
p r o p o s a l s  d e v e lo p ed  i n  th e  l i g h t  of g e n e r a l  peace  c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n s . V a n d e n b e r g  made the  same c o n t e n t i o n  i n  d e fe n s e  
of  th e  C on n a l ly  R e s o l u t i o n  i n  1943. H u l l  was not  happy w i th  
th e  d e c i s i o n ,  b u t  was p l e a s e d  t r ia t  the  " S e n a to r s  were i n  
agreement  on t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
to  keep the  p e a c e .  . . .
Dumbarton Oaks. — In August, 1944, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  
t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s ,  G re a t  B r i t a i n ,  S o v i e t  R u s s i a ,  and China 
met a t  Dumbarton Oaks t o  make s p e c i f i c  p l a n s  f o r  a U n i ted
'̂̂ Papers, p. 99.
'  ^^Ibid.
°°Hull, op. cit-., p. 1 6 6 9 .
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Nations Charter. Again the Roosevelt administration 
avoided Wilson’s mistakes'.’ Hull went to the conference 
only after his ’’exchange of views with Senators” had 
"achieved satisfactory results."^0
When S e c r e t a r y  H u l l  c a l l e d  t h e  Committee o f  E igh t  
t o g e t h e r  f o r  a  b r i e f i n g  on the c o n f e r e n c e ,  the  q u e s t io n  of 
" c o o p e r a t i v e  f o r c e "  was t h e  m a jo r  i s s u e  d i s c u s s e d .  Vandenberg 
s t r e s s e d  t o  H u l l  t h a t  he would n ever  v o te  to empower t h e  
d e l e g a t e s  t o  t h e  U n i ted  N a t io n s  with the  a u t h o r i t y  t o  commit 
t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  i n t o  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  w i th o u t  a v o te  
o f  C o ng ress .  He a d m i t t e d ,  however,  t h a t  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
p e r m i t s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  use  the armed f o r c e s  w i t h o u t  th e  
c o n s e n t  o f  Congress  i n  c a s e  o f  e m e rg en c ie s .  While a g re e in g  
t h a t  he c o u l d n ’ t  make t h e  f i n e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between s i t u a t i o n s  
i n  which the  P r e s i d e n t  can a c t  a lo n e  and when he can a c t  only 
w i t h  c o n se n t  o f  C o n g re ss ,  he was o f  the  o p in io n  t h a t  r e g i o n a l  
d e f e n s e  might  be p o s s i b l e  w i th o u t  C o n g r e s s io n a l  d e c l a r a t i o n  
o f  w a r . 71 He was t h u s  moving c l o s e r  to  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s 
p o s i t i o n  on p o s tw a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
The P r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  o f  1944. — By the  end o f  
t h e  Dumbarton Oaks C o n fe re n ce ,  Americans were engaged in  
t h e  1944 P r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n .  _ Im por tan t  as  was th e
7Ql b i d . ,  p.  1671.
7 1 P a p e r s , p. 117.
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R o o s e v e l t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s a t t e m p t  to  work w i t h  t h e  l e a d e r ­
s h i p  o f  both  p a r t i e s  i n  p l a n n in g  f o r  t h e  pos tw ar  w o r ld ,  
t h e  Michigan  S e n a t o r  was s t i l l  f e a r f u l  o f  the  r e - e l e c t i o n  
o f  R o o s e v e l t .  Vandenberg a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  
sho u ld  p l a y  an im p o r t a n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t i c  r o l e ,  b u t  ” I  
do n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  Mr. R o o s e v e l t ’ s i d e a  of ’ p r o t e c t i n g  
American i n t e r e s t s ’ would sq u a re  w i th  mine f o r  an i n s t a n t .
He was f o r e v e r  di s t u r b e d  t h a t  R o o se v e l t  may have made p e r s o n a l  
commitments w i th  S t a l i n  and C h u r c h i l l  o f  which t h e  Committee 
o f  E ig h t  had n o t  been k e p t  i n f o r m e d . 73 For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  he 
u rg ed  G e n e ra l  MacArthur to  ru n  a s  th e  R epub l ican  nominee.
When he r e f u s e d ,  Vandenberg hoped f o r  a  Dewey v i c t o r y .
During  t h e  campaign, he worked c l o s e l y  w i th  Dewey 
and h i s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a d v i s e r ,  John F o s t e r  D u l l e s .  He 
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e y  keep t h e  p ro p osed  pos tw ar  w or ld  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n  ou t  of p o l i t i c s .  G enera l  agreement was a l s o  r e a c h e d  
between D u l l e s  and S e c r e t a r y  H u l l  t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
i s s u e s  of the  campaign would be  k e p t  on a n o n p a r t i s a n  b a s i s .  
Both p a r t y  p l a t f o r m s  p ledged  a s t a n d  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o o p e r a t i o n .  But R o o seve l t  q u e s t io n e d  th e  s i n c e r i t y  o f  t h e  
i s o l a t i o n i s t  R e p u b l i c a n s .  A f t e r  c a l l i n g  the  names of  
Jo s e p h  M a r t i n ,  Hamil ton  F i s h ,  G era ld  Nye, and Hiram Jo h n so n ,  . 
R o o s e v e l t  a sk ed :  "Can anyone r e a l l y  suppose t h a t  t h e s e
?2lb id . . p .  92.
73lbid .
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i s o l a t i o n i s t s  have changed t h e i r  minds about world a f f a i r s , "  
add ing  " I  d o n ' t  t h i n k  they  a r e  r e l i a b l e  c u s t o d i a n s  o f  t h e  
f u t u r e  o f  A m e r i c a . V a n d e n b e r g  r e t o r t e d :  "His [R o o se v e l t ]
o t h e r  p r o p o s a l s  to  'k e e p  us  out  o f  w a r '  were opposed by 
many . . . b e ca u se  we were p e r f e c t l y  s u r e  t h e y  could  n o t  
and would no t  'k e e p  us  out o f  w a r , '  . . . and' they  d i d n ' t . " 7 5  
But in  s p i t e  o f  such  p o l i t i c a l  b i c k e r i n g ,  t h e r e  was much 
agreement  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  D u l l e s  n o t e s  t h a t  " th e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the  campaign f o r  the n a t i o n  was th e  added 
emphasis  p l a c e d  upon the  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  new c o u rse  on 
which the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  had e m b a r k e d , "7b
A f te r  R o o s e v e l t ' s  r e - e l e c t i o n  i n  1944, Vandenberg 
became con ce rned  with  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  the  n o n p a r t i s a n  
appro ach  t o  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  m ig h t  be d ropped .  At t h i s  t im e ,  
p l a n s  had a l r e a d y  been  com ple ted  f o r  the  Y a l t a  Conference  
and p r e p a r a t i o n s  were be ing  made f o r  the  c o n fe r e n c e  t o  w r i t e ,  
t h e  U n i ted  N a t io n s  C h a r t e r .  Vandenberg f e a r e d  t h a t  R o o se v e l t  
might commit t h e  c o u n t r y  t o  an u n j u s t  p e ac e .  He d e c id ed  on 
"a  c h a l l e n g e  t o  th e  . . . P r e s i d e n t , "77 and p r e s e n t e d  i t  i n  
a speech  on J a n u a r y  10,  1945.  The e v en t  p roved  to  be more
7^Rosenman, Working With R o o s e v e l t , p. 4^4-85 .
75p a p e r s , p .  123.
7 b p o s t e r  Rhea D u l l e s ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 2 1 ) .
7 7 ib id .
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than a challenge for Roosevelt. It also became the clear- 
cut public announcement of Vandenberg’s conversion to 
internationalism.
Report of the Speech 
As previously suggested, Vandenberg’s purpose was 
to set forth his attitudes bn America’s place in the post­
war world. Many of the sentiments voiced in this speech 
were sounded by Vandenberg months before on the floor of 
the Senate. But the setting for this address, perhaps, 
was more dramatic. The war was nearing an end. America 
was ready for a new look at collective security. Vandenberg 
offered his view in a forceful fashion which let the world 
know that he had fully abandoned isolationism.
The Senator presented two major contentions. He 
argued, first, that it was time for America to let the 
world know her postwar peace objectives. He then proceeded 
to outline what he thought American attitudes should be in , 
regard to these objectives.
The need for ”honest candor.”— He argued, first, that 
it was time for America to come forth with ’’honest candor” 
and tell the world just what she is "fighting for.” He 
asserted that there has been no hesitation in London or 
Moscow to express war and peace aims. Washington, on the 
other hand, ’’has not spoken out . . .  to our own people 
or to our Allies . . .  in such specific fashion as have
194
t h e  o t h e r s . "78 Aware t h a t  some would t h i n k  i t  to o  soon t o  
v o ic e  American peace  a im s ,  he a t t e m p t e d  t o  " t u r n  the  t a b l e s . "  
He a d m i t t e d  t h a t  many b e l i e v e  su c h  e x p r e s s i o n s  " w i l l  c o n t r i ­
b u te  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s s e n s i o n  and th u s  encourage  t h e  
very  t h i n g  we a l l  need  t o  c u r e . "  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  he a r g u e d ,
"ou r  s i l e n c e  has  m u l t i p l i e d  c o n fu s io n  a t  home and ab ro a d  . . .
t h i s  c o n f u s i o n  t h r e a t e n s  o u r  u n i t y . "  R e co g n iz ing  t h a t
Americans would n o t  a c c e p t  any p r o p o s a l  which m ight  d i s r u p t  
t h e  war e f f o r t ,  he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  u n i t y  was a l r e a d y  b e in g  
d i s r u p t e d  by American s i l e n c e .  He t u r n e d  t o . t h e  m etaphor .
Such u n i t y ,  he w arned ,  was comparable  t o  t h a t  which "Jonah '
7 9en joy ed  when he was swallowed by the  w h a l e . "  His  l o g i c a l  
p r o o f  was a  s t a t e m e n t  o f  C h u r c h i l l ’ s which a f f i r m e d  t h a t  
America had n o t  made her p o s tw ar  aims known.
The S e n a t o r ’ s f i r s t  c o n t e n t i o n  was a d i r e c t  c h a l l e n g e
to  the  White House. His d i s t r u s t  o f  P r e s i d e n t  R o o se v e l t  
was i m p l i c i t .  He was o b v io u s ly  a la rm ed  a t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  might l e a v e  f o r  Y a l t a  w i th o u t  f i r s t  
e x p r e s s i n g  t h e  White  House a t t i t u d e s  on peace  a im s .  He 
s a i d :  " I  v e n t u r e  t o  r e p e a t ,  with  a l l  t h e  e a r n e s t n e s s  o f
my.command, t h a t  a  new r u l e  of  h o n e s t  candor  i n  W ashing ton— 
a s  a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  m y s t i f y i n g  s i l e n c e  o r  f o r  c l a s s i c a l  
g e n e r a l i t i e s — i s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  we can  m a k e . "80
78& ecord , 7 9 th  G ong . , 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945, XCI, P a r t  1, 16$ 
?9lbid. ^°Ibid.
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In  s p i t e  o f  h i s  membership on t h e  Committee o f  E i g h t ,  he 
s t i l l  f e l t  t h a t  he was on t h e  o u t s i d e  lo o k in g  i n .  He 
wanted t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  sp e ak  up on h i s  p la n s  f o r  Y a l t a .
V a n d e n b e rg ' s  c a l l  f o r  an  immediate  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  
U n i ted  S t a t e s ’ peace  a im s,  however ,  must  n o t  be a s c r i b e d  
s o l e l y  t o  a b a s i c  d i s t r u s t  o f  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t ’ s d i p l o ­
macy. The a d d r e s s  a l s o  r e g i s t e r e d  a f e a r  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  
m ight  become so i n v o lv e d  i n  w inn ing  t h e  war t h a t  i t  would
l o s e  t h e  p e a c e .  ”We n o t  o n ly  have two wars t o  w in ,  we a l s o
have y e t  t o  a c h i e v e  such a peace  as  w i l l  j u s t i f y  t h i s  a p p a l l i n g
c o s t  . . . o t h e r w i s e  , . . we s h a l l  be a b l e  to  l o o k  fo rw a rd
o n ly  t o  t h e  c u r s e  o f  World War I I I . H e  assumed t h a t  
a l t h o u g h  v i c t o r y  was upperm ost  i n  t h e  minds and h e a r t s  o f  
Americans t h e r e  was a l s o  a s t r o n g  d e s i r e  to  a c h i e v e  a 
l a s t i n g  p e a c e .  A m erica ’ s c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h a t  e nd ,  he 
a s s e r t e d ,  was f o r  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  answer t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  
’’What a r e  we f i g h t i n g ,  f o r ? ” ^2 ^  b r i e f  r e f e r e n c e  t o  ”Mr.
S t a l i n ’ s p ro po sed  p a r t i t i o n  of  P o la n d ” se rved  a s  a warning  
t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  must b r a c e  i t s e l f  f o r  a d e c i s i v e  p o l i t i c a l  
s t r u g g l e .  I t  f u r t h e r  im p l ied  t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  would 
e i t h e r  have t o  a s s e r t  i t s e l f  on such i s s u e s  o r  be w i l l i n g  
t o  s a c r i f i c e  j u s t i c e  f o r  u n i t y .
The n a t u r e  o f  p o s tw a r  a im s . - - H a v in g  c a l l e d  f o r  an 
e x p r e s s i o n  o f  ’’h o n e s t  c a n d o r , ” Vandenberg t u r n e d  t o  t h e
B ^ Ib id . ,  p. 165. ' ^^Ibid.
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b u s i n e s s  of s p e c i f y i n g  what America sh o u ld  say  to  t h e  
w o r ld .  "What s h a l l  we s a y , "  he a s k e d ,  " t h a t  we have n o t  
a l r e a d y  sa id?"&3 He answered  h i s  own q u e s t i o n .  He had 
o u t l i n e d  th e  prob lem . He was r e a d y  t o  p r e s e n t  h i s  s o l u t i o n .
Vandenberg wanted  America t o  r e a s s u r e  the  w o r ld  t h a t  
she had n o t  abandoned the  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  A t l a n t i c  C h a r t e r .  
I t  was c l e a r  t h a t  he t h o u g h t  no n a t i o n  d o ub ted  America’ s 
i n t e n t i o n  o f  s t a y i n g  i n  th e  war u n t i l  t h e  end .  But what 
about  the  r o l e  of  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a f t e r  v i c t o r y ?  The 
memory o f  1919-1941 was f r e s h  i n  the  minds o f  m i l l i o n s  o f  
peop le  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  w o r ld .  The S e n a to r  seemed t o  be 
i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  w o r ld  must be r e a s s u r e d  t h a t  th e  American 
p e o p le  would n o t  t u r n  t h e i r  backs  upon t h e i r  f r i e n d s  a t  th e  ' 
end o f  th e  war and a g a in  seek  i s o l a t i o n .
But t h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  be a n o t h e r  b a s i c  r e a so n  why 
Vandenberg made r e f e r e n c e  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t o  t h e  A t l a n t i c  
C h a r t e r .  He was n o t  w i l l i n g  t o  s a c r i f i c e  " j u s t i c e  f o r  f o r c e  
among f r e e  m e n . "^4 N e i th e r  d i d  he t h i n k  Americans were- 
w i l l i n g  t o  t ak e  such  a r i s k  in  s p i t e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  winning 
t h e  war and c r e a t i n g  a sys tem o f  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  was 
upperm os t  i n  t h e i r  m inds .  He a p p e a le d  t o  th e  American’ s 
lo v e  o f  j u s t i c e .  "We s t i l l  p ropose  t o  s e e  so v e r e ig n  
r i g h t s  and s e l f -g o v e r n m e n t  r e s t o r e d  to  t h o s e  who have been 
f o r c i b l y  d e p r iv e d  o f  t h e m . O n l y  harm, he i n f e r r e d ,  can
^3ibid. °4ibid. Spibid., p. 166.
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corne from a policy which purchases collective security at 
the price of justice. He issued a subtle warning to Americans 
that such was possible, and again he returned to the Atlantic 
Charter. That document had promised disarmament of belligerents, 
self-determination of peoples, and the four freedoms— freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom 
from fear.
The Michigan Senator apparently had more in mind than 
simply to remind his countrymen of that for which they were 
fighting. He made an implicit plea for public opinion to 
remind President Roosevelt of the Atlantic Charter when he 
got to Yalta. He asserted: ”I am sure that the President
did not anticipate the shocking results of riis recent almost 
jocular, and even cynical, dismissal of the Atlantic Charter 
as a mere collection of fragmentary n o t e s . H e r e  was an 
implicit fear that Roosevelt would compromise the promises 
of the Atlantic Charter at the peace table. He knew that 
the President, like his fellow Americans, was eager for 
the destruction by force of those who made the war a 
reality. But the Senator warned that Americans should not 
become so zealous in that effort as to sacrifice postwar 
objectives. He concluded:
These basic pledges cannot now be dismissed 
as a mere nautical nimbus. They march with our 
armies. They sail with our fleets. They fly with
^ ° i b i d .
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our eagles. They sleep with our martyred dead.
The first requisite of honest candor, Mr. President,
. . . . is to relight this torch.8?
The second answer to his question, "What shall we 
say?" is often said to embrace his "confession." He called 
on the Allies to decide whether each shall "look out for 
himself," or join in concerted action "in which we under­
take to look out for each other." He left no doubt about 
his choice. He admitted that "the first way is the old way 
which has twice taken us to Europe’s interminable battle­
fields within a quarter of a century."S8 The Senator thus
made an overt admission that isolationism had failed. The
concept of neutrality had finally passed. Japan’s attack 
had shattered the myths of invulnerability and the illusion 
of continentalism.
Obviously fearful that some might question his 
sincerity in the new role of internationalist, Vandenberg 
proceeded to a more dramatic emphasis of his changed opinion. 
He was fully aware that it had been only four years since he 
pleaded with Americans to retreat into isolationism. It 
is true that he had been stressing since 1 9 4 3  America’s 
new role in international cooperation, but he was concerned 
with the possibility that some might still identify him 
with the isolationists. He was, perhaps, over-sensitive 
about Roosevelt’s recent attempt to charge many of the
°7ibid. ^^Ibid.
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R e p u b l ic a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s  w i t h  i n s i n c e r i t y .  Vandenberg 
wanted  t o  answer R o o s e v e l t ’s c h a rg e  i n  such a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  
manner t h a t  no one cou ld  a c c u s e  him o f  hedg ing .  His r e p l y  
was c h a rg ed  with  f e e l i n g :
I  h a s t e n  t o  make my own p e r s o n a l  v iew poin t  
c l e a r .  I  have a lways been f r a n k l y  one o f  th o s e  
who has b e l i e v e d  i n  our  own s e l f - r e l i a n c e .  I  
■ s t i l l  b e l i e v e  t h a t  we can n e v e r  a g a i n — r e g a r d l e s s  
o f  c o l l a b o r a t i o n s — a l lo w  o u r  n a t i o n a l  defense t o  
d e t e r i o r a t e  t o  a n y th in g  l i k e  a p o i n t  o f  im potence .
But I  do not  b e l i e v e  t h a t  any n a t i o n  h e r e a f t e r  can 
immunize i t s e l f  by i t s  own e x c l u s i v e  a c t i o n .  . . .
I  want maximum American c o o p e r a t i o n  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  
l e g i t i m a t e  American s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  w i th  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  • 
p r o c e s s  and w i t h  c o l l a t e r a l  e v e n t s  which w a r r a n t  i t . 8 9
A f t e r  p r o f e s s i n g  h i s  co m p le te  c o n v e r s io n  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y ,  Vandenberg looked  f o r  a means o f  g i v in g  h i s  new 
p h i lo s o p h y  a p ra g m a t ic  t e s t .  The r e s u l t  was h i s  " s t a r t l i n g  
p r o p o s a l  t h a t  the  m a jo r  A l l i e s  shou ld  a t  once conclude  ’ a 
h a rd  and f a s t  t r e a t y ’ t o  g u a r a n t e e  t h e  permanent disarmament 
o f  th e  Axis p o w e r s . For a  p r e - P e a r l  Harbor i s o l a t i o n i s t ,  
a p r o p o s a l  which c o u ld  i n v o lv e  America in  f o r e i g n  wars 
t l i rough  power t r e a t i e s  was in d e e d  a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s t e p .  But 
h i s  r e a s o n i n g  was e v i d e n t .  " I  am n o t  so i m p r a c t i c a l  as t o  
e x p e c t  any c o u n t r y  to  a c t  on any f i n a l  motive  o t h e r  th an  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t , " / I  he s a i d .  But he warned a g a i n s t  s h o r t ­
s i g h t e d  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a s  e x e m p l i f i e d . b y  R u s s i a ’ s i n s i s t e n c e
39l b i d .
9*^Foster Rhea D u l l e s ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 215.
91 Record,  79 th  Cong. ,  1 s t  S e s s .  , 1945,  IC I ,  P a r t  1 ,  166
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o f  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  a u n i l a t e r a l  p l a n  f o r  a c i r c l e  o f  
b u f f e r  s t a t e s  a round  Germany.
V a n d en b e rg 's  p roposed  t a r g e t  f o r  a c t i o n ,  p e rh a p s ,  
was no random s e l e c t i o n .  R u s s i a ' s  a t t i t u d e  toward  the  sm all  
s t a t e s  o f  E a s t e r n  Europe was o f  g rav e  co n ce rn  t o  the  S e n a t o r . 92 
He began with  a r e f e r e n c e  to  R u s s i a ' s  c o n te m p la te d  a b s o r p t i o n  
o f  s e v e r a l  su r r o u n d in g  b u f f e r  s t a t e s — an a c t i o n  " c o n t r a r y  
t o  our  c o n c e p t io n  o f  wliat we th o u g h t  we were f i g h t i n g  f o r  
i n  r e s p e c t  t o  the r i g h t s  o f  s m a l l  n a t i o n s .  . . . "  He s a i d ;  
" F e a r  of r e b o r n  German a g g r e s s i o n  i s  the  r e a s o n  a s s i g n e d  to  
t h e  p roposed  p a r t i t i o n  o f  P o l a n d . "  The S e n a to r  o f f e r e d  R u ss ia  
an a l t e r n a t i v e .  He p roposed  an immedia te  t r e a t y  w i t h  th e  
war A l l i e s  d e s ig n e d  t o  keep  Germany and J a p a n  permanently- 
d isa rm e d .  "When we d e a l  w i t h  E u r o p e ' s  f e a r — h e r  j u s t i f i e d  
f e a r — o f  a n o th e r  r e b i r t h  o f  German m i l i t a r y  t y r a n n y ,  . . . 
we a r e  a t  th e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  im m edia te  p rob lem . . . . "93  The 
P r e s i d e n t ,  a rg u e d  Vandenberg,  shou ld  have the  a u t h o r i t y  t o  
use  America:  t r o o p s  t o  e n f o r c e  such  a t r e a t y  even w i th o u t  
th e  c o n s e n t  o f  C on g re ss .  The t r e a t y ,  f u r t h e r m o r e ,  need not  
w a i t  f o r  the  p o s tw a r  peace  t a b l e ,  he i n s i s t e d ,  b e cause  " t h i s  
menace s t a n d s  a p a r t  by i t  s e l f . "94 Under t h i s  p r o p o s a l  th e
92p a p e r s , p. 122. Vandenberg n o te d  i n  h i s  d i a r y  on 
November 24 ,  1944, t h a t  Po land  seemed " d e s t i n e d  t o  be th e  
v i c t i m  r a t h e r  t h a n  th e  b e n e f i c i a r y  o f  the  much b r u i s e d  
A t l a n t i c  C h a r t e r . "
/ ^ R ecord ,  79th Cong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945, XCI, P a r t  1, 166.
/^Ibid., p. 167.
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Nazis were to become powerless, and Russia’s claims to 
buffer states denied.
Vandenberg wanted the world to know that America’s 
new internationalism had its limits. His was a practical 
idealism. In other words, he was willing for America to 
cooperate in the building of an international society, but 
he made it clear that this decision was fostered by a desire 
for self-survival. Any organization, furthermore, which 
America joined would have to adhere to the concept of 
sovereignty and independence. The Michigan Senator was 
so confident that the American people accepted this point 
of view that he offered no proof for his position. He simply 
asked; ’’Where does real self-interest lie?”
For the present, Vandenberg made it.evident that 
American self-interest lay in the protection of small countries. 
He also insisted that any agreements reached at Yalta or other 
conferences should be considered in the light of war demands 
and thus should be subjected to final review by the proposed 
international organization. He insisted that America should 
not be asked to ’’put a blank-check warrant behind a future 
status quo, which is unknown to us and whici; we might be 
unwilling to defend.Actually, the Senator was urging 
Americans not to become so over zealous in their desire to 
end the war that they sow the seeds of another conflict. He
95lbid.
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wanted  them t o  r e c a l l  H i t l e r ’ s m ass ive  moves a g a i n s t  A u s t r i a ,  
C z e c h o s lo v a k ia ,  and P o la n d  as  the  b e g in n i n g s  o f  World War I I I .  
I t  had become c l e a r  by J a n u a r y ,  1945, t h a t  t h e r e  would be 
some perm anen t  t e r r i t o r i a l  changes i n  r e g a r d  t o  P o l i s h  and 
P r u s s i a n  p r o v i n c e s .  The Michigan  S e n a t o r  s im p ly  w an ted  t o  
make s u r e  t h a t  any such  a r ra n g e m e n ts  would b e  s u b j e c t  to  
r e v ie w  by t h e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n .  T h a t ,  he t h o u g h t ,  was 
American s e l f - i n t e r e s t .
Having s u g g e s t e d  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  t h a t  A m er ica ’ s 
’’h o n e s t  c a n d o r ” s h o u ld  t a k e ,  Vandenberg t h e n  made a f i n a l  
a p p e a l  f o r  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  ” I  
r e a l i z e , ” s a i d  Vandenberg ,  ’’how much e a s i e r  i t  i s  t o  be 
c r i t i c a l  t h a n  t o  be c o r r e c t .  I  do n o t  w ish  t o  m eddle .  I  
want  o n ly  t o  h e l p . ” The S e n a to r  o b v i o u s l y  t h o u g h t  t h a t  
some m igh t  i n t e r p r e t  h i s  p r o p o s a l s  a s  a c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  
i n t e r r u p t i n g  the  war  e f f o r t .  For t h a t  r e a s o n ,  he i n s i s t e d  
t h a t  h i s  h o n e s t  can do r  would produce  a ’’r e a l i s t i c  u n i t y  
which would s w i f t l y  b r i n g  our v i c t o r i o u s  so n s  back hom e.”9&
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  Speech 
R e a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  s p e e c h . —The S e n a t o r ’ s speech  was 
t r u l y  ’’h e a r d  around t h e  w o r l d . I t  was n o t  h i s  p r o p o s a l  
f o r  an A l l i e d  t r e a t y  a s s u r i n g  th e  disarmament  o f  Germany
9&I b i d .
97 p a p e r s , p. 126.
203
and J a p a n ,  however,  which r e c e i v e d  wide a t t e n t i o n .  I t  was, 
i n s t e a d ,  V an d en b e rg 's  d ra m a t ic  p ledg e  o f  su p p o r t  f o r  
c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  The New York H era ld  T r ib u n e  p ro b ab ly  
c a p t u r e d  t h e  s e n t im e n t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n  w i th  the  o b s e r v a t i o n  
t h a t  V andenberg ’ s speech was "an  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  h o n e s t  
m inds ,  to  w h a tev e r  p a r t y  th e y  may b e lo n g  . . . c an ,  i f  t h e y  
a r e  w i l l i n g  to  f a c e  t h e  f a c t s ,  come t o g e t h e r  upon a f i r m  
and common g r o u n d . ” The T r ib u ne  concluded  t h a t  " i t  might be 
a rg u e d  t h a t  a main r e a s o n  why t h e  P r e s i d e n t  had c o n f in e d  
h i m s e l f  t o  vague and g e n e r a l i z e d  u t t e r a n c e s  had been t h e  
f e a r  o f  j u s t  t h a t  i s o l a t i o n i s t  s e n t im e n t  . . .  i f  so ,  t h a t  
i s  w a te r  ove r  the  dam. . . . And so i t  was. But t h e  
w a t e r  had been  ru n n in g  ove r  t h e  dam f o r  more th an  two y e a r s  
th ro u g h  th e  S e n a t o r ’ s numerous p u b l i c  u t t e r a n c e s .  For  t h i s  
r e a s o n ,  i t  i s  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  such  an e x p e r i e n c e d  newspaper­
man a s  James B. R es ton  o f  t h e  New York Times would r e f e r  t o  
t h e  speech  a s  Vandenberg’ s " c h a n g e . "  Says R es ton :  "He made
a t e n t a t i v e  p u b l i c  c o n f e s s io n  i n  th e  speech  o f  J a n u a r y  1 0 ,  
1 945»  and t h e  American p e o p le ,  by t h e i r  r e sp o n se  to  t h e  
s p e e c h ,  changed h i m . "99 V andenberg’s h i n d s i g h t  i s  p r o b a b ly  
more a c c u r a t e .  He s a i d  i n  1 9 4 8 :  "The w o r id  changed—t h e
9&Ibid.. p. 140.
99james B. R e s to n ,  "Case f o r  V a n d e n b e r g , "  L i f e , 
Ï Ï1 V  (May 2 4 ,  1 9 4 8 ) ,  1 0 1 .
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f a c t o r s  of t ime and sp ace  changed—w i th  World War I I ,  and
I  changed w i t h  th em ."^ ^ ^
” I c o n f e s s  t h a t  I  was c o m p le t e ly  s u r p r i s e d  by t h e
n a t i o n - w i d e  a t t e n t i o n  which the  speech p r e c i p i t a t e d , "^^1
s a i d  Vandenberg.  But t h e r e  i s  every  r e a s o n  to  conc lude  t h a t
Americans r e s p o n s e  t o  th e  speech had a t rem endous  e f f e c t  on
th e  S e n a t o r .  He saw e v idence  t h a t  the  p u b l i c  w h o l e h e a r t e d ly
a c c e p t e d  h i s  new c o u r s e .  The r e c e p t i o n  g iv en  h i s  a d d re s s
may have  en co u rag e d  him to  go fo rw a rd  with  h i s  new approach
t o  A m erica ’ s s e c u r i t y .  " I t  canno t  be  s a i d  o f  many s p e a k e r s
t h a t  th e y  a f f e c t  the  c o u rs e  o f  e v e n t s , "  s a i d  W al te r  Lippmann.
"But t h i s  may be w e l l  s a i d  of S e n a to r  V andenberg ’s s p e e c h . "^^2
The C le v e la n d  P l a i n  D e a le r  c a l l e d  i t  a  " s h o t  h e a rd  around
t h e  w o r l d , "  and the  Boston H era ld  a c c la im e d  the a d d r e s s  as
" th e  most i m p o r t a n t  t o  come from the  S e n a te  Chamber i n  th e
l a s t  Ô0 y e a r s . A  Vandenberg p r e s s  r e l e a s e  summarized
th e  r e s p o n s e  t o  the  speech :
The e l e c t r i c  e f f e c t  of t h e  speech  was i n s t a n ­
t a n e o u s .  I t  was p r i n t e d  i n  f u l l  by a l l  the  
m e t r o p o l i t a n  p r e s s .  The O f f i c e  o f  War I n f o r m a t io n  
p ro m p t ly  beamed i t  by r a d i o  t o  a l l  o u r  f i g h t i n g  
f o r c e s  . . . t h e  G a l lo p  p o l l  r e p o r t e d  American 
p u b l i c  s e n t im e n t  t o  be overw helm ing ly  i n  l i n e  w i th  
t h e  M ichigan  S e n a t o r ’s i d e a s .  . . .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
t o  n o te  . . .  t h a t  the  Communists im m e d ia te ly  took
^^^P ap ers , p. 139-
lO^I b id . -GZl b i d . , p. 141.
103l b i d . , p. 142.
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alarm when they saw the nation rising almost as 
one man behind Senator Vandenberg’s leadership.
. . . The U n i t e d  P re s s  i n t e r p r e t e d  t h i s  a s s a u l t  
a s  r i s i n g  from t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  ” i t  i s  h i s  purpose  
t o  p r e v e n t  the  Communization o f  E u ro pe . "1^4
I t  must be emphasized t h a t  th e  r e s p o n se  was n o t  made 
i n  r e p l y  t o  a  v a s t  new s e t  o f  c o n c e p t s  p roposed  by Vandenberg.  
The e v id e n c e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  American, people  were  h i g h l y  
i n  f a v o r  of  American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  
long  b e f o r e  J a n u a r y  10,  1945. The r e s p o n s e  was p r o b a b ly  t o  
t h e  s p e a k e r  and the  o c c a s io n .  A l e a d i n g  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
had d r a m a t i c a l l y  promised tl' iat America would n o t  be c h e a t  eu 
o f  h e r  second  chance a t  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  The t im e  was 
r i p e  f o r  such a p rom ise .  V i c t o r y  was a l r e a d y  in  s i g h t  i n  
E urope ,  and Americans were w a i t i n g  f o r  a  permanent p e ace .  
Vandenberg gave e x p r e s s i o n  t o  t h i s  hope.
V andenberg ’ s new d i r e c t i o n . —B efo re  J a n u a ry  10,  1945, 
Vandenberg had i n s i s t e d  b o th  p u b l i c l y  and p r i v a t e l y  t h a t  a 
s t r i c t  p o l i c y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  m igh t  have k e p t  America out  o f  
t h e  w a r .  But now in  a  d r a m a t i c  a d m is s io n ,  he acknowledged 
t h a t  A m er ica ’ s a t t e m p t s  t o  lo o k  o u t  fo r  h e r s e l f  had t w i c e  
i n v o l v e d  h e r  i n  E u ro p e ’ s b a t t l e s .  He now i n s i s t e d  t h a t  
America must j o i n  i n  ’’c o n c e r t e d  e f f o r t s ” with o t h e r  n a t i o n s  
f o r  h e r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  What changed Vandenberg’ s c o n c e p t  
o f  American s e c u r i t y ?  One can a rg u e  t h a t  i t  was h i s  
r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  the  p r i n c i p a l  body o f  American p u b l i c  o p in io n
^O^Tbid., p. 145.
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was now s o l i d l y  on the  s i d e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . ^ 0 5  But 
V andenberg^s  speech  o f f e r s  a n o th e r  e x p l a n a t i o n .  P u b l ic  
o p i n i o n ,  p e r h a p s ,  was i n f l u e n c e d  by th e  same i n c i d e n t s  
w h ich  had c h a n g e d  V andenberg’ s p o i n t  o f  v iew. ’’S in c e  P e a r l  
H a r b o r , ” s a i d  Vandenberg,  ’’World War I I  ha s  p u t  t h e  gory 
s c i e n c e  o f  mass murder  i n t o  new and s i n i s t e r  p e r s p e c t i v e .
Our o ceans  have cea sed  t o  be moats which . . . p r o t e c t  o u r  
r a m p a r t s . T o  Vandenberg and most A m ericans ,  p e rh a p s ,  
t h e  o n ly  ro a d  now t o  f o l l o w  was th e  h a r d ,  but  c l e a r l y  
i n d i c a t e d  p a t h  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n .
The S e n a t o r ’ s words were spoken w i t h o u t  e q u i v o c a t i o n .
He seemed t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  many Americans would f i n d  i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a l e a d e r  of  the  i s o l a t i o n i s t  
movement i n  t h e  p r e - P e a r l  Harbor  days had now embraced a 
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d o c t r i n e .  C l e a r l y ,  V andenberg ’ s d e s i r e  
was t o  show t h e  w or ld  t h a t  he had framed a new concep t  o f  
American r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  He had p r o f e s s e d  t h i s  new con­
c e p t  i n  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  C onna l ly  R e s o l u t i o n  i n  1943.  But t h a t  
move was n o t  s e n s a t i o n a l .  The w o r ld  remembered t h a t  Vandenberg 
v o t e d  a g a i n s t  the  arms embargo r e p e a l  i n  1939;  t h a t  he 
opposed  Lend-Lease  vdien i t  was f i r s t  p ro p o se d ;  t h a t  he v o t e d  
a g a i n s t  t h e  f i r s t  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  b i l l ;  t h a t  he even 
opposed  th e  a im in g  o f  American m erchan t  s h i p s .  To be s u r e .
^ ^ 5 p o s t e r  Rhea D u l l e s ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 212.  
^ ^^R e c o rd , 79 th  Cong. ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945,  XCI, P a r t
1, 166.
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t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  p l a t f o r m  i n  1944 promised  " r e s p o n s i b l e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  i n  po s tw ar  c o o p e r a t i v e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  among s o v e r e i g n  n a t i o n s . "^07 But H a r d in g ’ s 
p l a t f o r m  had  p ro m ised  t o  e x e r c i s e  i n f l u e n c e  and l e a d e r s h i p  
t o  p r e v e n t  w a r .  Yet the  w o r ld  w a i t e d  f o r  ev idence  from 
Hard ing  t h a t  America was w i l l i n g  to  p l a y  a r e s p o n s i b l e  
r o l e  i n  p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  peace o f  t h e  w o r ld .  I n  the  minds 
o f  many A m ericans ,  Vandenberg s t i l l  s to o d  i n  t h e  company 
o f  such  s t a u n c h  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  as  Hiram Johnson  o f  C a l i f o r n i a ,  
and G e ra ld  P. Nye o f  North Dakota ,  men who t a l k e d  a b o u t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,  b u t  were in  r e a l i t y  i s o l a t i o n i s t s .
The beginning of the fear of Russia.— In the light 
of his past association, Vandenberg apparently felt the 
necessity of going beyond a clear reaffirmation of his 
support for world cooperation. He needed a concrete plan 
of action that would prove to Americans that the same post­
war disillusionment and inaction would not follow World War 
II that had dominated America in the twenties. The result 
was his proposal for an immediate Allied treaty to insure 
that Germany would not rearm after the war.
Having lessened the fears of his countrymen that he was 
planning a revision of isolationism, Vandenberg was also calling 
the Russian bluff. With American boys still fighting on two 
fronts, the Senator would not dare, even if he desired, to
107"The Republican Platform," Nation, CLIÏ




question the sincerity of a major ally. But he was on 
safe ground in urging a proposal to prevent the rearming 
of Germany and Japan. Americans certainly did not want to 
run the risk of having to fight Germany a third time. His 
proposal was geared to this realization. Given such 
assurances, said the Senator, Russia would have no reason 
to lay claim on the smaller states of Europe. This was the 
Senator's real objective. He probably had no great fear that 
ample provisions would not be made to prevent the rearmament 
of Germany. But he had grave fears that a system of buffer 
states and bilateral military allinaces would spring up for 
the disguised purpose of guarding against a remilitarized 
Germany long before a peace treaty could be signed.
Vandenberg had shown how the United States could 
immediately seize the initiative in international politics. 
Such a bold move at that hour of history was obviously 
motivated by more than a desire to make his change to 
internationalism a reality. Here was an obvious concern 
about what was to happen to the small nations of Europe.
Alarm was expressed that President Roosevelt might deal 
too freely with Russian territorial claims. He wanted 
America allied on the side of those who supported the 
principle of self-determination. He thought most Americans 
championed the cause of the weaker state, and his appeal 
was to this belief. The public must let Roosevelt know 
before he left for. Yalta that the idea of equality of
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n a t i o n s ,  b o t h  l a r g e  and sm a l l ,  and the  prom ise  o f  s e l f -  
governm ent  were n o t  outmoded i d e a s .
But why d i d  Vandenberg, as a g r e a t  champion o f  
" C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  P r o c e s s e s , "  submit  a  s u g g e s t i o n  which would 
have  g i v e n  th e  P r e s i d e n t  v a s t  d i s c r e a t i o n  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  
American armed f o r c e s  t o  keep the  A l l i e d  enemies d isa rm ed?  
" R e g a r d l e s s  o f  what o u r  l a t e r  d e c iâ o n  s h a l l  be i n  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  power t h a t  s h a l l  be d e l e g a t e d  t o  the  P r e s i d e n t , "  s a i d  
V andenberg ,  " t h e r e  s h o u ld  be no l i m i t a t i o n  when i t  comes t o  
k e e p in g  th e  Axis ou t  of  p i r a c y  f o r  k e e p s . Aware t h a t  
t h e  American peop le  were w i l l i n g  to go th e  l i m i t  t o  a c h i e v e  
t h i s  o b j e c t i v e ,  he w an ted  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  s e p a r a t e d  from 
t h e  U n i t e d  N a t io n s  O r g a n iz a t i o n .  He a l s o  o b v i o u s l y  th o u g h t  
t h a t  t h i s  was t h e . o n e  i s s u e  upon which  the  A l l i e s  c o u ld  a g r e e .  
T h is  b e in g  t r u e ,  he wanted  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  made b e f o r e  d i s c u s s i o n  
began on o t h e r  m a t t e r s .  American d i p l o m a t s ,  t h o u g h t  Vandenberg,  
t h e n  would  n o t  have t o  compromise any American i d e a l s  in '  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  s t a t u s  of the  weaker n a t i o n s .  , In  s h o r t ,  an 
im m edia te  a s s u r a n c e  from t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  t h a t  she  c o u ld  
be c o u n te d  upon t o  h e l p  p re v e n t  a  r ea rm ed  Germany would 
s e p a r a t e  t h i s  i s s u e  from t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t io n s  O r g a n i z a t i o n .  P r e s i d e n t  R o o se v e l t  would 
n o t  have t o  a g re e  to  t u r n  Po land ,  f o r  exam ple ,  i n t o  a  b u f f e r
lOoR e c o r d , 79 th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945,  XCI, 
P a r t  1 ,  167 .
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s t a t e  i n  o r d e r  t o  a s s u r e  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  San F r a n c i s c o  
C o n f e re n c e .  V andenberg’ s s u g g e s t i o n  would p l a c e  t h e  
d isa rm am ent  o f  Germany i n  a c a t e g o r y  by i t s e l f .  To a c h ie v e  
t h i s ,  t h e  Michigan  S e n a to r  was w i l l i n g  t o  g i v e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
a f r e e  han d .  The rew ards  i n  h i s  o p i n io n  would be a d isa rm ed  
Germany and a s e p a r a t i o n  of  t h e  i s s u e  from power p o l i t i c s .
The M ichigan  S e n a t o r ’ s growing d i s t r u s t  o f  S o v i e t  
p e ac e  o b j e c t i v e s  was t h u s  made c l e a r  i n  t h i s  s p e e c h .  He 
t a l k e d  o p e n ly  a b o u t  R u ss ian  a c t i o n s  a s  b e in g  ’’c o n t r a r y  to  
o u r  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  what we t h o u g h t  we were f i g h t i n g  f o r . ’’^^^
But t o  say  b l u n t l y  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t ’ s c la im s  on much o f  
Europe were  f o r  s e l f i s h  g a in  would have s t r u c k  a t  t h e  h e a r t  of  
A l l i e d  u n a n i m i t y .  In  J a n u a r y  o f  1945, Americans  hoped no t  
j u s t  f o r  v i c t o r y .  There  was a s t r o n g  d e s i r e  f o r  p e a c e - -  
n o t  j u s t  a p e r s o n a l  p e a c e - - b u t  a s t r o n g  d e s i r e  t h a t  th e  
s a c r i f i c e  would mean so m e th ing .  Dumbarton Oaks h e lp e d  t o  
l a y  t h e  b a s i s  o f  th e  p l a n  f o r  peace  by b l u e p r i n t i n g  an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  which America and R u s s i a  would a c t i v e l y  
work t o g e t h e r  i n  peace  a s  t h e y  had done in  w ar .  Vandenberg--  
t h e  p o l i t i c i a n  o r  t h e  s ta te sm a n - -k n e w  th e  hopes  t h a t  t h e  
p e o p le  o f  t h e  w or ld  had p l a c e d  i n  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h i s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  He c e r t a i n l y  d id  n o t  want t o  k i l l  t h e  hope 
t h a t  t h e  t e r r i b l e  w as te  of  t h e  war w u l d  a c h i e v e  som eth ing  
p o s i t i v e .  For t h i s  r e a s o n - - n o t  i u s t  because  he was a f r a i d  
o f  p u b l i c  r e a c t i o n  bu t  b e cau se  he too  had h op e s - -V a n d en b e rg
^O^Ibid. , p. 166,
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was willing to give Russia the benefit of any doubts. He
credited her behavior in recent allied discussions to fear
of a rearmed G e r m a n y . H O  His proposal, however, would
?»
force a showdown.
Vandenberg’s proposition that the Allies come to an 
immediate agreement over the plans for postwar control of 
Germany and Japan received little attention from the public. 
Walter Lippmann viewed it as a proposal which would "end the 
policy of postponement and thus restore American influence 
in the settlement.of Europe. . . .  He has seen what so many 
of our anguished idealists have not seen, that what our 
Allies are seeking is first of all security against the 
revival of German militarism. . . It is questionable
-  i
that Vandenberg really thought this was tne basis of Russian 
advances in regard to territorial claims. Such statements 
as "I am not prepared to guarantee permanently the spoils
of an u n j u s t  peace," and the necessity for respecting the
11 ?"rights of small nations," would indicate that Vandenberg 
questioned the sincerity of the Russians. If this were true,
Although he hoped t h a t  t h i s  was the  c a s e ,  i n  
p r i v a t e ,  he had v o ic e d  s e r i o u s  m i s g i v i n g s  about  R u s s i a .
See P a p e r s , p. 96. The S e n a to r  w ro te  i n  h i s  d i a r y  on May 11, 
1944, f o r  example: "We a re  a l l  d i s t u r b e d  by R u s s i a ’ s u n i l a t e r a l
announcements  from t im e  to  t ime as  t o  what she i n t e n d s  t o  do, 
f o r  example ,  with Po land  and th e  o t h e r  B a l t i c  S t a t e s . "
^ ^^P a p e r s , p. 141.
^^^Record ,  79 th  Gong. ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945, XCI,
Part 1, 165-67.
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i t  i s  p r o b a b ly  obv ious  why American s t a t e s m e n  p a id  l i t t l e  
heed  to  V an den b e rg ’s p r o p o s a l .  The e x e c u t i v e  b ra n c h  may 
have sensed  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p r e s s i n g  t h e  R u s s i a n s  f o r  a 
showdown on P o la n d ,  f o r  exam ple ,  would both  d i s r u p t  t h e  
war e f f o r t  and b lo c k  p l a n s  f o r  the  San F r a n c i s c o  C o n fe re n ce .  
I f  t h i s  had happened ,  Americans p r o b a b l y  would no t  have 
r e g a r d e d  th e  c o s t  o f  a p ro lo n g e d  war w or th  a l l  the  e f f o r t  
on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  b u f f e r  s t a t e .
As l a t e  a s  194&, Vandenberg s t i l l  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  i f  
h i s  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a m i l i t a r y  p a c t  had been  p u rsu e d  a t  
Y a l t a ,  i t  would have changed th e  p o s tw a r  w o r ld .  He d e c l a r e d  
t h a t  i t  would have ’’d e p r i v e d  the S o v i e t  Union of  the  m a jo r  
r e a s o n s  . . . f o r  th e  s o - c a l l e d  ’p r o t e c t i v e  e x p a n s io n i s m ’ 
which has  s i n c e  become th e  c u r s e  of  t h e  w o r l d . This  
r a i s e s  the  whole  c o n t r o v e r s y  o v e r  the  wisdom o f  A m erica ’ s 
d e c i s i o n s  a t  Y a l t a ,  and t h i s  i s s u e  i s  beyond the  scope o f  
t h i s  s tu d y .  I t  w i l l  s u f f i c e  to  p o i n t  ou t  t h a t  American 
i n s i s t e n c e  f o r  Vandenberg’ s p r o p o s a l s  cou ld  have d r i v e n  a 
wedge i n  A l l i e d  u n i t y .  T h is  f e a r  may have prompted S e n a t o r  
C o n n a l l y ’ s immedia te  r e p l y  t o  Vandenberg on the  S e n a te  f l o o r .  
" I t  seems t o  me i n e v i t a b l e , ’’ s a i d  C o n n a l ly ,  " t h a t  most o f  
t h e s e  i s s u e s  cannot  be s e t t l e d  a t  the  moment bu t  must w a i t  
t h e  d e f i n i t i v e  t r e a t y  o f  p e a c e . "1^4 C on n a l ly  a sked  t h a t
^^^P a p e r s , p. 14$.
l l ^ R e c o r d , 7 9 th  Cong . ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  194$,  Ï C I ,  P a r t  1 ,  168.
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d i s c u s s i o n  on such  m a t t e r s  be w i t h h e l d  u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  
Y a l t a  C o n fe re n c e .
One must t u r n  t o  c o n j e c t u r e  t o  e v a l u a t e  the  p o s s i b l e  
e f f e c t s  had  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  i n s i s t e d  on th e  a d o p t i o n  o f  
t h e  Vandenberg p r o p o s a l .  Would h i s  p l a n  have g u a r a n t e e d  a 
f r e e  Po land?  I t  must  be k e p t  i n  mind, p e r h a p s ,  t h a t  R u ss ia  
viewed much o f  P o la n d  a s  r i g h t f u l l y  h e r s ,  and t h a t  she  had 
a r i g h t  t o  have i t  back .  I f  R o o s e v e l t  had i n s i s t e d  upon a 
b r o a d e r  c o n c e s s i o n  on P o la n d ,  i t  might have weakened t h e  bond 
between t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and R u s s i a .  That t i e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
was b roken  by t h e  c o ld  war.  I t  can be a rg u e d  t h a t  America 
would have  been  b e t t e r  o f f  i n  t h e  lo n g  ru n  to  have c a l l e d  t h e  
S o v i e t  b l u f f  a t  t h a t  t im e .  But t h o s e  who t a k e  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  
must meet t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  such  a c t i o n  could  have had 
a d e v a s t a t i n g  e f f e c t  on th e  w a r .  I n  F e b r u a r y ,  1945,  Germany 
had n o t  s u r r e n d e r e d . , The b a t t l e  i n  th e  P a c i f i c  had b a r e l y  
begun.  The a to m ic  bomb was no t  a r e a l i t y .  R o o s e v e l t  and 
C h u r c h i l l  e i t h e r  had t o  t a k e  R u s s ia  in  good f a i t h ,  o r  
e x e r t  p r e s s u r e s  which R u s s ia  d i d  not have  t o  a c c e p t .  They 
t r i e d  the  l a t t e r .  C h u r c h i l l  l a t e r  e x p la in e d :  "Our h o p e fu l
a s s u m p t io n s  were t o  be f a l s i f i e d .  S t i l l  t h e y  were th e  o n ly  
ones p o s s i b l e  a t  t h e  t im e . " ^ ^ ^  Many h i s t o r i a n s  a g r e e  w i th  
C h u r c h i l l .  "The compromises a g r e e d  upon a t  Y a l t a , "  w r i t e s  
D u l l e s ,  "were  what  made i t  p o s s i b l e  to  c a l l  the  m ee t in g  a t
^^^W inston  S. C h u r c h i l l ,  The Second World War, Vol .  
VI: Triumph and Tragedy (B o s to n :  Houghton M i f f l i n  Company,
1953), 402.
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San F r a n c i s c o . " 1 1 b  R o o s e v e l t  was w i l l i n g  t o  compromise i n  
o r d e r  t o  g i v e  t h e  w or ld  a n o th e r  chance a t  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y .  In  y e a r s  t o  come, Vandenberg ,  t o o ,  p roved  t h a t  
h i s  b e l i e f  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  was s t r o n g  enough t o  
g r a n t  c o n c e s s i o n s .
The A t l a n t i c  C h a r t e r . —With a p p a r e n t  i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,  
Vandenberg c a l l e d  f o r  th e  o b se rvance  o f  the  A t l a n t i c  C h a r t e r  
a t  the  same t im e  he was c a l l i n g  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .
S t i l l  i t  must  be remembered t h a t  the  A t l a n t i c  C h a r t e r  was 
e s s e n t i a l l y  an agreement  between two m a jo r  Anglo-Saxon 
powers.  G rea t  B r i t a i n  and t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  
had p led g e d  th e m s e lv e s  t o  a r e s t o r a t i o n  of th e  s o v e r e i g n  
r i g h t s  of the  in v a d e d  c o u n t r i e s  o f  Europe.  Such a p o l i c y ,  
i f  p u r s u e d ,  would have l e f t  many o t h e r  p e o p le s  out o f  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  At t h e  same t im e ,  Vandenberg t a l k e d  a b o u t  
a  w or ld -w ide  sys tem o f  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  In  c r i t i c i z i n g  
th e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  h i s  r e c e n t  s t a te m e n t  t h a t  the  A t l a n t i c  
C h a r t e r  was s im ply  a g roup  o f  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  Vandenberg 
f a i l e d  to  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  R o o se v e l t  was t r y i n g  t o  make room 
f o r  o t h e r  A l l i e s  to  j o i n  i n  the  system of  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  
V a n d en b e rg 's  s u g g e s t i o n  would have had England and t h e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s  p o l i c i n g  th e  world  whi le  a t  t h e  same t im e  a 
system of  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  was b e in g  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  th e  
same p u rp o se .
^^^Foster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 218.
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Unrestricted national sovereignty.— There is no 
indication that American public opinion disapproved of 
Vandenberg’s inherent assumption that the new organization 
for collective security would rest on unrestricted national 
sovereignty. The Senator proceeded on tnis theory. America 
was to go into tne new organization for "self-interest.” 
Further, she was not going to give up any of her authority 
to achieve this interest. At the same time, this new 
government with no control over the policies of tne 
individual nations except by force was to keep the peace. 
Responsibility for settlement of disputes was to rest upon 
the powers who defeated the Nazis. How this power migl;t 
be used depended upon the willingness of the great powers 
to exercise their responsibility collectively. With each 
nation acting on no "motive otner than self-interest," 
it is difficult to perceive just how the Senator arrived 
at the conclusion that the "self-interests" of these powers 
would not overlap. Obviously, when such conflicts would 
arise, the new organization would be powerless to act siiort 
of war. His mention, in fact, of Russia’s claims in Poland 
showed that the Senator knew these difficulties would unfold. 
Yet, he hoped that the Russians would keep their pledges to 
cooperate in maintaining the peace. If Vandenberg is blamed 
for naivete on this matter, the rest of the free world must 
share the-guilt. Harry Hopkins, for example, one of 
Roosevelt’s chief aids at Yalta, said: "We really believed •
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in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had 
all been praying for and talking about for so many years.
We were absolutely certain that we had won the first great 
victory of the peace— and by 'we' I mean all of us, the 
whole civilized human race."^^^
In summary, Senator Vandenberg dramatically announced 
that American "self-interest" was geared to the peace of the 
world. This analysis of the national interest constituted 
a radical change from his pre-Pearl Harbor position. His 
major goal was still "self-interest." Isolationism as "means," 
however, was dropped for collective security. The speech 
shows that his concept of"self-interest" embraced a strong 
concern for the buffer states of Europe; he had not abandoned 
all ideological hopes for a European peace. In short, he 
completely embraced collective security, but he previewed 
many of the problems that were to come in the postwar world.
The Address on the United Nations Charter 
It may be that Senator Vandenberg's speech on 
January 10 ,  1945, did not constitute the reversal in his 
thinking which so many people thought, but it certainly 
constituted a turning point in his career. On February 13,
1945 the S t a t e  Department  announced t h a t  the  Michigan S e n a to r  
had been named as  a d e l e g a t e  to  t h e  San F r a n c i s c o  C o n fe ren ce .
^^^Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New 
York: Harper &, Bros., 1 9 4 8 ) ,  p .  870.
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From t h a t  d a t e  on u n t i l  i l l n e s s  f o r c e d  h i s  d e p a r t u r e  from 
t h e  S e n a te  i n  1949,  Vandenberg was t o  p l a y  a m a jo r  r o l e  i n  
a l l  s u b s e q u e n t  i m p o r t a n t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s .  This  
p a r t  o f  t h e  s tu d y  i s  d e v o ted  t o  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  
o f  h i s  d i p l o m a t i c  e f f o r t s  on b e h a l f  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y — 
t h e  U n i t e d  N a t io n s  Conference  a t  San F r a n c i s c o  i n  May o f  
1945.
Contex t  o f  the  Speech 
The Y a l t a  C o n f e re n c e . —The t h r e e  w a r - l e a d e r s ,  S t a l i n ,  
C h u r c h i l l ,  and R o o s e v e l t ,  h e l d  a m e e t in g  a t  Y a l t a  i n  F eb ru a ry  
o f  1945 which  paved t h e  way f o r  th e  m ee t ing  a t  San F r a n c i s c o  
t o  w r i t e  th e  U n i t e d  N a t io n s  C h a r t e r .  I n  a g i v e - a n d - t a k e  
a tm osp he re  s e v e r a l  d e c i s i o n s  were made which l a t e r  p roved  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e fe n d .  One of  t h e s e  was P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t ' s  
c o n c e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  Ukra ine  and White  R u s s i a  shou ld  have 
f u l l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  the  G e n era l  Assembly o f  the  new body. 
A no the r  was t h e  ag reem ent  t h a t  R u s s i a  c o u ld  keep  f u l l  c o n t r o l  
o f  P o l i s h  t e r r i t o r y  e a s t  of the  Curzon L in e .  " A l l  t h a t  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o u ld  p e r s u a d e  t h e  R u ss ia n s  t o  concede in  
r e t u r n , "  w r i t e s  P e r k i n s ,  "was a p ledg e  t h a t  a d e m o c ra t ic  
government  would be s e t  up i n  Po land  a t  t h e  end o f  the  w a r . "41% 
I t  was a l s o  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  and R u s s i a  would
44%Dexter P e r k i n s ,  The E v o l u t i o n  o f  F o r e ig n  P o l i c y  
(New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  194&), p .  163.
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each  g e t  t h r e e  v o t e s  i n  t h e  G e n e ra l  Assembly. S t a l i n ,  
s u p p o s e d ly ,  demanded s i x  v o t e s  t o  e q u a l i z e  t h e  s i x  v o te s  
o f  th e  B r i t i s h  Empire a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by the  U n i ted  Kingdom, 
b u t  had s e t t l e d  f o r  t h r e e .
V an denb e rg ' s a p p o in tm e n t . - - R o o s e v e l t ' s i n v i t a t i o n  t o  
Vandenberg t o  a t t e n d  th e  San F r a n c i s c o  C onference  a s  a 
d e l e g a t e  r e a c n e d  him a t  tn e  same t im e  news came from Y a l t a  
o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  on t h e  P o l i s h  i s s u e .  David Lawrence n o ted  
t h e  p re d ic a m e n t  i n t o  wliicii t h i s  pu t  th e  Michigan S e n a t o r .
" I t  was announced t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  had a g re e d  . . . 
t o  th e  e x a c t  o p p o s i t e  r e g a r d i n g  Po land  of  t h a t  which the  
Michigan S e n a t o r  had u r g e d , "  s a i d  Lawrence. "Now . . . 
R o o s e v e l t  has  a sk ed  S e n a to r  Vandenberg . . .  t o  u n d e r w r i t e  
t h e  ve ry  k in d  o f  t h i n g  a g a i n s t  which Î4r. Vandenberg in v e ig n e d  
in  h i s  s p e e c h . "^^9 The S e n a to r  a c c e p t e d ,  however, a f t e r  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  a s s u r e d  him t i . a t  " I  e x p e c t  you f r e e l y  to  p r e s e n t  
y o u r  views t o  your  American c o l l e a g u e s  i n  r e s p e c t  to  a l l  
problems a t  San F r a n c i s c o . "^^0 a c c e p t i n g ,  Vandenberg
q u i c k l y  a s s u r e d  th e  American peop le  t h a t  he had n o t  changed 
h i s  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  P o la n d ,  b u t  t h o u g h t  he could  more 
e f f e c t i v e l y  work f o r  h e r  i n t e r e s t s  a t  the  ^co n fe ren ce .  " I  
may acco m p l i sh  n o t h i n g , "  he s a i d ,  "but  I  s - i a l l  r e l e n t l e s s l y  
try."^^^
^^9papers, p. 147.
^^^Ibid., p. 153. ^^^Ibid., p. 156.
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Vandenberg^s s u g g e s t i o n s . —At the  f i r s t  m e e t in g  o f  
t h e  San F r a n c i s c o  d e l e g a t i o n  Vandenberg su g g e s te d  t h a t  John 
F o s t e r  D u l l e s  be i n v i t e d  t o  th e  c o n fe re n c e  as  a s e n i o r  a d v i s e r .  
A l though  P r e s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  o b j e c t e d  because  o f  D u l l e s ’ 
c l o s e  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i th  Governor  Dewey, th ro u gh  th e  e f f o r t s  
o f  S e n a t o r  Vandenberg and S e c r e t a r y  S t e t t i n i u s ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
1 9 9"came to  s e e  i t  t h e  same way" and named D u l l e s  an a d v i s e r .
Vandenberg a l s o  recommended s e v e r a l  amendments t o  
t h e  Dumbarton Oaks ag reem en t .  Among o t h e r  c h ang es ,  he wanted
t h e  word " j u s t i c e "  i n s e r t e d  i n t o  C hap te r  One of t h e  C h a r t e r .
He a s s e r t e d  t h a t  "permanent  peace  i s  im p o s s ib le  i f  t h e  new 
l e a g u e  i s  a s t r a i t  j a c k e t  w hich  a t tem pt 's  t o  f r e e z e  the  s t a t u s  
Guo. "123 He a l s o  o b j e c t e d  to  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  Dumbarton Oaks 
agreement  which su g g e s te d  t h a t  t h e  "G enera l  Assembly would 
n o t  on i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e  make recommendations on any m a t t e r  
r e l a t i n g  to  t h e  m ain ten an ce  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and 
s e c u r i t y . "  The S e n a to r  a rg u ed  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C ounc i l  
s h o u ld  have t h e  s o l e  power to  a c t  when peace i s  t h r e a t e n e d ,  
t h i s  p r e r o g a t i v e  sh o u ld  n o t  keep  t h e  Genera l  Assembly from 
i n i t i a t i n g  s t u d i e s  and recommending any a c t i o n  t h a t  i t  so
d e s i r e d . 124
^^^John  F o s t e r  D u l l e s ,  War o r  Peace (New York:
The M acm il lan  Company, 1950) ,  p .  126.
l ^ ^ The New York Times, A p r i l  2 , 1945, p. 11.
124ibid.
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The Y a l t a  c o n t r o v e r s y . — At the  f i r s t  m ee t ing  o f  t h e  
d e l e g a t e s  w i th  P r e s i d e n t  R o o se v e l t  f o r  p u rp o ses  o f  be ing  
b r i e f e d  on t h e  Y a l t a  C o n fe re n ce ,  t h e  group l e a r n e d  o f  th e  
G e n e ra l  Assembly v o t i n g  fo rm u la  a g r e e d  upon a t  une B ig -Three  
s e s s i o n .  The P r e s i d e n t ’ s announcement shocked th e  d e l e g a t i o n .  
’’This  w i l l  r a i s e  h e l l , ” w ro te  Vandenberg .  ”Wliy i s  t h i s  news 
b e in g  h e l d  back ,  when p resum ably  t h e  c o u n t r y  was t o l d  a l l  
abou t  t h e  ’Y a l t a  compromise’ on v o t i n g . ” The S e n a t o r ’ s f e a r  
was t h a t  the  c o u n t r y  would o b j e c t  because  B r i t a i n  had s i x ,  
add ing  t h a t  ” i f  i t  were im p o r t a n t  enough t o  c a u s e  S t a l i n  t o  
demand t h r e e ,  we w i l l  be asked  . . . why we s to p p e d  a t  
t h r e e . ” ^2$ He a l s o  th o u g h t  such an agreement  was u n f a i r  
t o  t h e  s m a l l  s t a t e s .  He a g r e e d ,  nowever,  t l i a t  ’’t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
has  made a commitment which h a s  t o  be v a l i d a t e d . ” 12t
I n  t;!6 m idd le  o f  the Y a l t a  c o n t r o v e r s y .  P r e s i d e n t
R o o s e v e l t . d i e d  a t  Warm S p r i n g s ,  G e o rg ia  on A p r i l  12, 1945.
’’Thus a t r u l y  g r e a t  and g a l l a n t  s p i r i t ,  d e s p i t e  a l l  h i s
f l a w s ,  was g a th e r e d  to  h i s  f a t h e r s , ” s a i d  Vandenberg.  ’’The
g r a v e s t  q u e s t i o n  in  e v e ry  American h e a r t  i s  about Truman.
Can he swing th e  jo b ?  D e sp i te  h i s  l i m i t e d  c a p a c i t i e s ,  I
127b e l i e v e  he c a n . ”- The f o l l o w i n g  day ,  Vandenberg n o ted  
i n  h i s  d i a r y  t h a t  w h i le  R o o s e v e l t ’s d e a th  washed ’’t h e  s l a t e
^ P a p e r s ,  p .  1 5 9 .
^ ^ ^ I b i d . ,  p .  1 6 4 .
^ ^ ^ I b i d . ,  p .  165 .
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c l e a n  o f  w h a te v e r  u n d i s c lo s e d  commitments F. D. R. h a s  made 
t o  S t a l i n  o r  C h u r c h i l l , ” t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  may have l o s t  
”t h e  s t r o n g e s t  v o i c e  th ro u g h  which we c o u ld  hope t o  a rg u e  
R u s s i a  o u t  o f  some of th e  m is ta k e s  which  i t  seems d e te rm in e d
t o  make . ” ^28 '
W hile  he had many m is g iv in g s  c o n c e r n in g  th e  Y a l t a  
d e c i s i o n s ,  he was r e a l i s t  enough t o  ad m i t  t h a t  ”we c o n f r o n t  
a  c o n d i t i o n ,  n o t  a t h e o r y . ” T ru e ,  he was unhappy o v e r  t h e  
d e c i s i o n s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  Poland,  but  he a d m i t t e d  th a t  a b an ­
d o n ing  t h e  San F r a n c i s c o  Conference  f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  "would 
s im p ly  l e a v e  R u s s i a  i n  p o s s e s s io n  o f  e v e r y t h i n g  she  w a n ts .
. . . There  would be no hope l e f t  f o r  j u s t i c e . ”^^9 He was
now w i l l i n g  t o  p u t  i n t o  a c t i o n  h i s  J a n u a r y  10, 1945,  s e n t i ­
ments  i n  r e g a r d  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  San F r a n c i s c o  o f f e r e d  
him t h a t  o p p o r t u n i t y .  The a t t i t u d e  w i th  which he a p p roached  
t h e  m ee t in g  i s  b e s t  summarized by V a n d e n b e r g ' s  own comment 
on t h e  S e n a t e  f l o o r  a s  he d e p a r t e d  f o r  t h e  West C o a s t .
I  have no i l l u s i o n s  t h a t  t h e  . . . c o n f e r e n c e  
can c h a r t  t h e  m i l lenn ium .  P l e a s e  do n o t  e x p e c t  
i t  o f  u s .  . . . But I have  f a i t h  t h a t  we may 
p e r f e c t  t h i s  c h a r t e r  of peace  and j u s t i c e  so 
t h a t  r e a s o n a b l e  men of good w i l l  s h a l l  f i n d  i n
i t  so  much good . . . t h a t  a l l  l e s s e r  d o ub ts  and
d i s a g r e e m e n t s  may be r e s o l v e d  i n  i t s  f a v o r . ^30
12&I b i d . . p .  167.
129%bid. ,  p .  156 .
130lbid., p. 1 7 1 .
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Vandenberg^s r o l e  a t  San F r a n c i s c o . —The r o l e  o f  any­
one i n d i v i d u a l  a t  a  c o n f e r e n c e  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s s e s s .  
Vandenberg was a c t i v e  i n  a l l  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  His  own 
v e r s i o n  of  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  p e r h a p s ,  would be a p r o p e r  
e s t i m a t e .  He s a i d :  " I  m od es t ly  c la im  c r e d i t  f o r  t h e s e
f o u r  u t t e r l y  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  f e a t u r e s  of th e  C h a r t e r . ”^31 
His  enu m e ra t io n  r e f e r r e d  to  tiie  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  word ’’j u s t i c e ” 
i n  t h e  p ream ble  of  the U n i ted  N a t io n s  C h a r t e r ,  the p r o v i s i o n  
which e n a b le d  t h e  G e n era l  Assembly t o  recommend t h e  c h an g ing  
o f  pos tw ar  peace  s e t t l e m e n t s ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  the  C h a r t e r  
which a s s u r e d  t h a t  the  Genera l  Assembly cou ld  recommend 
m easu res  o f  p e a c e f u l  a d ju s tm e n t  i n  any s i t u a t i o n  i n  which 
t h a t  body c o n c lu d ed  t h a t  tne peace  o f  the  world would be 
t h r e a t e n e d ,  and f i n a l l y .  A r t i c l e  $1, which made r e g i o n a l  ' 
s e c u r i t y  m easu re s  p o s s i b l e .  S e c r e t a r y  W el le s  summarized 
Vandenberg’ s r o l e  i n  t h e  f o l lo w in g  manner:
The r o l e  p la y e d  by t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  was n e g a t i v e  
save  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a ch ievem en ts  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
. . . t h e  a d m i ra b le  work o f  Commander S t a s s e n  in  
d raw ing  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  ove r  the  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r u s t e e ­
s h i p ,  and i n  t h e  i n v a l u a b l e  s u p p o r t  g iv e n  b y . S e n a t o r  
Vandenberg i n  d e fe n s e  o f  the  r i g h t s  o f  the s m a l l e r
n a t i o n . 132
A s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  Vandenberg’s may have 
been h i s  very p r e s e n c e  a t  the  c o n f e r e n c e .  His membership
3 1 g e v e r ly  Sm ith ,  " R u s s i a ’s P e t  Whipping Boy ,” 
S a t u r d a y  Evening P o s t , CCXIX ( A p r i l  5, 1 9 4 7 ) ,  102.
1 3 2 Sumner W e l le s ,  Where Are We Heading (New York; 
H a rp e r  & B r o s . ,  1 946) ,  p. 41.
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i n  th e  R epu b l ican  p a r t y  h e lp e d  t o  a s s u r e  th e  world t h a t  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  d e l e g a t i o n  spoke w i th  a u t h o r i t y .  His 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was o f  " s p e c i a l  i m p o r t a n c e , "  n o t e s  P r a t t ,  
b e cau se  he was "a  t r u s t e d  R epub l ican  l e a d e r , "  who was "an 
ou tsp ok en  c r i t i c  o f  R o o s e v e l t . "^33 V andenberg 's  a t t e n d a n c e  
a t  t h e  meeting may have th u s  e l i m i n a t e d  doubts  t h a t  Congress  
would r a t i f y  th e  C h a r t e r .
Only a few h ours  a f t e r  s i g n i n g  the  C h a r t e r ,  Vandenberg 
r e t u r n e d  to  th e  S en a te  a lo n g  w i th  S e n a to r  C o n n a l ly .  T h e i r  
j o i n t  r o l e  now was t o  s t e e r  th e  a p p ro v a l  of the C h a r t e r  
th r o u g h  t h e  C ongress .  A f t e r  a few b r i e f  h e a r i n g s ,  t h e  
C h a r t e r  r e a c h e d  th e  S e n a te  f l o o r  where Vandenberg and 
C o n n a l ly  u rged  i t s  a d o p t i o n .  There  a p p a r e n t l y  was no 
s i g n i f i c a n t  o p p o s i t i o n .  With th e  mass media a lm os t  
u nan im ous ly  f a v o r i n g  American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a lon g  w i th  the  
impact  o f  p o l l s  which showed Americans f a v o r in g  the  move by 
wide m a j o r i t i e s , t h e  Sena te  gave qu ick  a p p ro v a l  t o  the  
s t e p .  The f i n a l  v o te  was 39-2 .^35
J u l i u s  W. P r a t t ,  A H i s t o r y  o f  U n i ted  S t a t e s  
F o r e ig n  P o l i c y  (New York: P r e n t i c e  H a l l ,  1 9 5 5 ) ,  P- b 9 9 .
Also s e e . J a m e s  F. B y rn e s ,  S p e a k in r  F ran k ly  (New York:
H arper  & B r o s . , 1947) ,  p.  235.  He r e c a l l e d :  "Because
S e n a t o r  Vandenberg r e p r e s e n t e d  th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  opposed 
t o  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and because  he en joyed  th e  c o n f id e n c e  
o f  t h e  overwhelming m a j o r i t y  o f  h i s  p a r t y ,  h i s  s u p p o r t  enab le :  
us  t o  speak of our f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  as the  American p o l i c y . "
^^^Foster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 219.
135ibid.
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R ep or t  o f  t h e  Speech
V andenberg’s m ajo r  S e n a te  sp e ec h  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  
C h a r t e r  was d e l i v e r e d  on June  29,  1 9 4 5 . The a d d r e s s  was 
p r e s e n t e d  i n  th e  form  o f  an o f f i c i a l  r e p o r t  c o n ce rn in g  h i s  
two-months absence  t o  a t t e n d  th e  San F r a n c i s c o  C on fe re n ce .
In  u r g i n g  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  to  a c c e p t  A m erica ’ s membership in  
t h e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  Vandenberg a t t e m p t e d  to  show: (1)
t h a t  t h e  C h a r t e r  was a " t h i s - o r - n o t h i n g ” p r o p o s a l ;  (2) t h a t  
t h e  C h a r t e r  r e p r e s e n t e d  s e v e r a l  improvements  o v e r  th e  Dumbarton 
Oaks a g re e m e n t ;  (3) t h a t  t h e  f u t u r e  peace  o f  the  w o r ld  depended 
m o s t ly  upon t h e  a c t i o n  of  th e  major  powers and t h a t  t h e  C h a r t e r  
r e c o g n i z e d  t h i s  r e a l i t y ;  and f i n a l l y ,  (4) t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  was a d e q u a te  t o  meet t h e  demands p l a c e d  
on i t .
B e fo re  p ro c e e d in g  t o  h i s  r e a s o n s  f o r  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  
C h a r t e r ,  Vandenberg made a s t r o n g  b i d  f o r  th e  S e n a t e ’ s 
a p p r o v a l  w i th  a d e t a i l e d  r e f e r e n c e  t o  the  h ig h  deg re e  o f  
b i p a r t i s a n s h i p  which had p r e v a i l e d  a t  the  c o n f e r e n c e .  He 
p r a i s e d  S e c r e t a r y  S t e t t i n i u s ,  J r . ,  a s  ”an a b l e  and i n s p i r i n g  
l e a d e r , ” and e x p r e s s e d  deep a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  S e n a to r  C o n n a l ly ,  
who made " i t  c o n s t a n t l y  p o s s i b l e  f o r  each one o f  u s ,  r e p r e ­
s e n t i n g  t h e  m i n o r i t y ,  t o  p l a y  our f u l l  r o l e  i n  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n s . " ^ ^
l^&R e c o rd , 7 9 th  Cong.,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945, XCI, P a r t  
5 ,  6981.
137lbid.
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He made a  s t r o n g  a p p e a l  to h i s  R e p u b l i c a n  f r i e n d s  t o  
s u p p o r t  t h e  m easure  a s  a product o f  b i p a r t i s a n s h i p .  I m p l i c i t l y ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  Vandenberg was g i v i n g  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  t h e r e  need 
be no such  p a r t i s a n  c o n f l i c t  a s  had a r i s e n  over  th e  T r e a ty  
o f  V e r s a i l l e s .  At San F r a n c i s c o ,  t h e  m i n o r i t y  was 
r e p r e s e n t e d .  The S e n a to r  a s s u r e d  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  t h a t  th e  
same b i p a r t i s a n  a p p ro a c h  t h a t  had been used by t h e  Committee 
o f  E ig h t  i n  p l a n s  f o r  Dumbarton Oaks and B r e t t o n  Woods 
was c o n t i n u e d  a t  San F r a n c i s c o .
The S e n a t o r  t h e n  announced h i s  r e a s o n s  f o r  s u p p o r t i n g  
th e  C h a r t e r .  His  p a r t i t i o n  s e r v e d  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  l a y i n g  
b e fo r e  h i s  a u d ie n c e  h i s  own a t t i t u d e s  toward  trie new 
o r g a n i z a t i o n :
I  s h a l l  s u p p o r t  the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t n l s  
C h a r t e r  w i th  a l l  t n e  r e s o u r c e s  a t  my command.
I  s h a l l  do t h i s  i n  the deep c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  p h y s i c a l  and moral  chaos 
i n  many weary  p l a c e s  o f  t h e  e a r t h .  I  s r i a l l  
do i t  b e cau se  t h e r e  must be no d e f a u l t  i n  ou r  
o f t e n  p le d g e d  pu rpose  t o  o u t la w  a g g r e s s i o n  so 
f a r  a s  l i e s  w i t h i n  our human power. I  s n a i l  
do i t  becau se  t n i s  p l a n ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  i n f i r m i t i e s ,  
h o l d s  g r e a t  p rom ise  t h a t  t n e  U n i ted  N a t io n s  may 
c o l l a b o r a t e  f o r  peace  a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  as they  nave 
made common c a u se  f o r  w a r .  I  s h a l l  do i t  oecause  
peace  must no t  be c n ea ted  out  o f  i t s  on ly  
c o l l e c t i v e  ch an c e .
Defense  o f  t h e  C h a r te r  as a " t n i s - o r - n o t h i n m " 
p r o p o s a l . —V a nd en b e rg ’ s f i r s t  main argument in  s u p p o r t  o f  
t h e  C h a r t e r  was a s im p le  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  he p r e f e r r e d  t h i s
^^^Ibid.,
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C h a r t e r  t o  none a t  a l l .  A d e s i r e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  Americans 
t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  a  new world  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  peace was 
t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d .  Aware t h a t  t h i s  b a s i c  a ssu m p t io n  r e s t e d  
in  t h e  minds o f  most Americans ,  Vandenberg viewed h i s  t a s k  
as b e in g  t h a t  of  s im p ly  p ro v in g  t h a t  t h i s  C h a r t e r  was t h e  
on ly  one p o s s i b l e .  For t h i s  p r o o f ,  he t u r n e d  t o  a comparison 
o f  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  one f a c i n g  t h e  c o l o n i e s  in 1789.
He r e f e r r e d  t o  F r a n k l i n ’ s s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  he su p p o r te d  th e  
’’C o n s t i t u t i o n  because  I  e x p ec t  no b e t t e r  and because  I  am 
not  s u r e  i t  i s  n o t  th e  b e s t . ”139 He a l s o  q u o ted  F r a n k l in  
as say ing  t h a t  "when you assemble  a number o f  men . . . 
you i n e v i t a b l y  a ssem ble  w i th  t h o s e  men a l l  t h e i r  p r e j u d i c e s ,  
t h e i r  p a s s i o n s ,  t h e i r  e r r o r s  o f  o p i n i o n s . ” I f  t h i s  were 
t h e  c a se  w i t h  t h e  c o l o n i a l  s t a t e s ,  s a i d  Vandenberg,  ’’now 
much more t r u e  i s  i t  when . . .  50 n a t i o n s ,  . . '. s e p a r a t e d  
from each  o t h e r  by r a c e ,  l a n g u a g e ,  and t r a d i t i o n  . . . and 
d e a l i n g  w i t h ' a  problem which spa n s  t h e  g l o b e .  . . . Tne 
wonder i s  t h a t  we can approve  so  much.” He ended t h i s  
p o i n t  w i th  t h e  obv ious  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  ” I p r e f e r  the  chance  
r a t h e r  t h a n  no chance  a t  a l l . ”!^ ^
One might  i n q u i r e  as  to  why Vandenberg f a i l e d  t o  
employ more l o g i c a l  p r o o f  to  d e v e lo p  h i s  " t h i s - o r - n o t h i n g ” 
a rgum ent .  In  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  he p r o b a b l y  th o u g h t  t h a t
139i b i d .
l ^ ° I b i d . ,  p .  6 9 S 2 .
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Americans were p r e p a r e d  t o  "buy t h e  package"  from San F r a n c i s c o .  
"There  was l i t t l e  p o p u l a r  r e a l i z a t i o n , "  w r i t e s  D u l l e s ,  " o f  
t h e  s t r e s s e s  and s t r a i n s  to  which c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  might  
be s u b j e c t ,  and t h e  s a c r i f i c e s  i t  might  e i ' i t a i l . V a n d e n b e r g  
p r o b a b l y  knew t h i s  and t h u s  had, no f e a r  o f  o f f e r i n g  a " t h i s -  
o r - n o t h i n g ” p i t c h .  I n  the  second p l a c e ,  the  S e n a to r  may 
have r e a l l y  been t r y i n g  t o  l e a d  t h e  p e o p le  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  by 
rem in d in g  them of  t h e  aged maxim o f  government which a l l e g e s  
t h a t  p o l i t i c s ,  i n  the  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  i s  o f t e n  t h e  a r t  o f  
th e  p o s s i b l e .  His p l e a  was t o  th o se  who r e a l i z e d  t h a t  
a b s o l u t e  j u s t i c e  i n  t n e  rea lm of  human a f f a i r s  i s  a myth.
Vandenberg was a d m i t t i n g  t i i a t  An'.erica compromised w i th  
aw aren ess  of r e a l i t y .  But such a c t i o n  i s  n e c e s s a r y  a t  some 
p o i n t .  He was p r e p a r e d  t o  show t h a t  America did. t h a t  
compromising a t  t h e  r i g h t  t im e .
Vandenberg, in  e f f e c t ,  asked  Americans t o  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  a c c e p t in g  t h i s  compromise.
R e j e c t i o n  would be a r e t u r n  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n a r c h y ,  much 
worse  s i n c e  P e a r l  Harbor  because  "World War I I  has  pu t  t h e  
c r u e l  s c i e n c e  of mass murder i n t o  new and s i n i s t e r  p e r s p e c t i v e . "^^2 
F u r th e r m o r e ,  Vandenberg u t t e r e d  wnat ::ost  Americans knew.
R e j e c t i n g  t h i s  C n a r t e r  meant a  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  r e p u l s i v e  t o  
a l l  c i v i l i z e d  men. Tne o r g a n i z a t i o n  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  chance  t o
^ ^ ^ F o s te r  Rhea D u l l e s ,  op. c i t . , p. 219.
^^^Record,  79th  Corn-., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945,  Ï C I ,  P a r t  
5 , 6 9 8 2 .
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a v o id  an armaments r a c e ,  and t h e  whole b u s i n e s s  o f  untram meled  
power p o l i t i c s  and i z s  many d a n g e r s .  Wiuh war s t i l l  go ing  
on i n  th e  P a c i f i c ,  Americans d i d  non wish t o  t h i n k  o f  a n o t h e r  
w a r— e s p e c i a l l y  one t h a t  m igh t  b e g in  where th e  l a s t  one 
ended .  Vandenberg knew, as  d i d  h i s  a u d ie n c e ,  t h a t  t h e  C h a r t e r  
t h e n  b e f o r e  t h e  S e n a te  m ight  be t h e  w o r l d ' s  l a s t  chance .
T hat  i s  p r o b a b ly  why h i s  p r o o f  was s im p ly  a now or n e v e r  
a s s e r t i o n :  "We d a re  not  f a i l  t o  t r y .
Behind h i s  w ords ,  however ,  was th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  
t h e  cy n ic i sm  w i t h  which many r e g a r d e d  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t n e  
San F r a n c i s c o  C o n fe re n ce .  He wondered with  h i s  countrymen 
j u s t  what t h e  S o v i e t  Union was s e e k i n g .  The im ponderab le  
o f  R u s s i a ' s  c la im s  i n  P o la n d ,  n e r  a t t i t u d e  toward f r e e  
d i s c u s s i o n  i n ' t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  h e r  many b l u n t  demands,  
were  b e g i n n 'n g  t o  c r e a t e  a g r e a t  d e a l  of u n c e r t a i n t y .  "You 
may t e l l  me,"  s a i d  Vandenberg ,  " t h a t  some of  th e  s i g n a t o r i e s  
t o  t h i s  C h a r t e r  p r a c t i c e  t n e  p r e c i s e  o p p o s i t e  o f  what t h e y  
p re a c h  even as  they s i g n . " ^ ^ ^  Vandenberg had been a  p a r t  
o f  th e  e x p e r i e n c e d  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  d e a l i n g  with R u s s ia  in  
m.any s i t u a t i o n s .  B u t ,  t h e  S e n a t o r  had an an.swer f o r  t t iose  
who d o u b te d .  I t  p r o b a b ly  echoed  th e  s e n t im e n t s  of  A.merica.
He s a i d :  "I r e p l y  t h a t  the  n e a r e r  r i g h t  yo ; may be i n  any
such  gloomy i n d i c t m e n t ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  i s  t h e  need f o r  the  new 
p a t t e r n  which p ro m ises  a t  l e a s t  t o  s te..: ti^ese e v i l  t i d e s . "^^5
' l^jlbid. 144ibid. 145lbid.
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At t h i s  p o i n t ,  Vandenberg was s t i l l  w i l l i n g  to g iv e  
R u s s i a  the  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  d o u b t .  The o r g a n i z a t i o n  was 
founded  on the a ssu m p t io n  t h a t  t h e  w a r - t im e  a l l i a n c e  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t io n s  would c o n t in u e  t o  work i n  harmony f o r  m u tu a l  
p u r p o s e s .  His sp eech  showed t h a t  he  was aware  t h a t  d o ub ts  
had begun t o  d e v e lo p  i n  many q u a r t e r s .  He s h a r e d  t h o s e  
d o u b t s .  But he was n o t  w i l l i n g  t o  d i s c a r d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  t h e  a l l i a n c e  m ight  c o n t i n u e .  He conceded ,  however,  
t h a t  t h e  new p l a n  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  might  n e v e r  
g e t  beyond th e  t a l k i n g  s t a g e .  The new o r g a n i z a t i o n  might  n o t  
s u c c e e d ,  b u t  i t  was c e r t a i n  t o  f a i l  w i t h o u t  th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
o f  the  U n i ted  S t a t e s .  " I f  t h e  e f f o r t  f a i l s , "  s a i d  Vandenberg ,  
"we can  a t  l e a s t  f a c e  t h e  consequence  w i th  c l e a n  hands .
Defense  o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  C h a r t e r .  — Vandenberg 
n e x t  t u r n e d  to  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  new 
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  He made i t  p l a i n  t h a t  i n  h i s  mind th e  U n i ted  
N a t io n s  p r o j e c t e d  u se  o f  f o r c e  was n o t  t h e  m a jo r  means o f  
p r e s e r v i n g  th e  p e a c e ,  b u t  r a t h e r  he c l e a r l y  looked  upon t h e  
p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  t h e  "pa’c i f i c  s e t t l e m e n t  of d i s p u t e s  b e f o r e  
t h e y  e v e r  r e a c h  th e  f i g h t i n g  s t a g e , "^^7 a s  t h e  most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  means o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace  and 
s e c u r i t y .  The S e n a t o r  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  even  more im p o r t a n t  
th a n  t h i s ,  p e r h a p s ,  was t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n  
would e n a b l e . t h e  s p i r i t u a l  f o r c e s  o f  n a t i o n s  t o  mount a g a i n s t
■ 146ibid. Wibid.
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an a g g r e s s o r .  T h is  "m igh ty  o r a c l e " — n o t  th e  w a r - t im e  a l l i a n c e -  
was where  Vandenberg was p l a c i n g  h i s  main hopes f o r  p e a c e .
The M ich igan  S e n a t o r  n e x t  t u r n e d  t o  a summary o f  t h e  
improvements  which t h e  c o n fe r e n c e  had a t t e m p te d  t o  make ov e r  
th e  Dumbarton Oaks a g re e m e n ts .  His  em phas is  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  
p r i m a r i l y  c o n ce rn e d  t h o s e  p o r t i o n s  i n  which he had p l a y e d  
a m ajo r  r o l e .  For  exam ple ,  he emphasized  t h a t  t h e  " C h a r t e r  
names j u s t i c e  a s  the  pr ime c r i t e r i o n  of p e a c e . H e  was 
e m p has iz in g  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h i s  one w ord .  He s a i d :  "Here
i s  th e  h e a r t ' a n d  c o re  o f  h u m a n i ty ’s hope f o r  . tomorrow."
This  s t a t e m e n t  r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  hope t h a t  j u s t i c e  would be 
c a r r i e d  o u t  s i n c e :  (1) th e  g e n e r a l  a ssem bly  would be i n
a  p o s i t i o n  t o  d i s c u s s  any i s s u e ;  and (2) s i n c e  t h a t  same 
body could  "recommend m easu res  f o r  th e  p e a c e f u l  a d ju s tm e n t  
_of any s i t u a t i o n — r e g a r d l e s s  o f  o r i g i n . "^^9 The i m p l i c a t i o n  
was t h a t  t h e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n  could  r e v i e w  and even m odify  
w a r - t im e  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  made by the  c h i e f  l e a d e r s .
He was p r o b a b l y  t r y i n g  t o  o f f e r  hope t o  t h o s e  who were 
unhappy over t h e  d e c i s i o n  to  p e rm i t  R u s s i a  to  have c o n t r o l  
ove r  P o l i s h  t e r r i t o r y  e a s t  of t h e  Gurzon L in e .  P e r h a p s ,  he 
was j u s t i f y i n g  h i s  own s u p p o r t  of the  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  
f a c e  o f  t h i s  famous Y a l t a  d e c i s i o n .  His p l e a  was t h a t  
Americans sho u ld  g iv e  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a  chance to  undo 
th e  damage.
^48ib id . . p. 6983. 149ibid.
231
R e f u t a t i o n  o f  o b j e c t i o n s . - -T h e  main e s s e n t i a l s  o f  
V andenberg’ s c a s e  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  came when he  
a t t e m p t e d  t o  r e f u t e  t h e  a rgum ents  of t h o s e  who were s k e p t i c a l  
o f  t h e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n .  I n  r e a l i t y  much of  th e  o p p o s i t i o n  
t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l  was a " s t r a w  man" phenomenon. Scan t  o p p o s i t i o n  
was n o t e d  d u r i n g  th e  h e a r i n g s  b e fo re  the  S e na te  F o r e ig n  
R e l a t i o n s  Committee .  M a j o r i t y  o p in io n  was c l e a r l y  on th e  
s i d e  o f  t h e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n . 150 Vandenberg must  have known 
t h i s ,  but  he p r o b a b ly  w an ted  t o  j u s t i f y  h i s  p o s i t i o n .  He 
had h i s  r e s e r v a t i o n s ,  and he  wanted t o  make them known.
F i r s t ,  Vandenberg a t t e m p te d  t o  answer t h o s e  who 
argued  t h a t  "we sh o u ld  know t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  th e  f i n a l  peace  
b e f o r e  we u n d e r t a k e  to  c r e a t e  th e  mechanism t h a t  s h a l l  s u s ­
t a i n  i t . "151  H is  answer was r a t h e r  e v a s i v e .  He a d m i t t e d  t h a t  
t h e  argument had m e r i t  b e f o r e  San F r a n c i s c o .  In  f a c t ,  he 
had once s h a re d  a n x i e t i e s  about  th e  same p roblem , b u t  now 
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  s i t u a t i o n  had changed b ecause  t h e  G en e ra l  
Assembly had been p l a c e d  i n  a p o s i t i o n  to  "recommend m easu re s  
f o r  t h e  p e a c e f u l  a d ju s tm e n t  o f  any s i t u a t i o n ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  
o r i g i n ,  which  i t  deems l i k e l y  t o  im p a i r  t h e  g e n e r a l  w e l f a r e . " 1 5 2  
T h is  was V andenberg ’ s way o f  s a y in g  t h a t  he d i d  n o t  e n d o rs e  
a l l  t h e  Y a l t a  and Dumbarton Oaks d e c i s i o n s ,  but  he cou ld
150poster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 219.




v o t e  f o r  t h e  C h a r t e r ,  b e c a u s e  i t  o f f e r e d  hope o f  c o r r e c t i n g  
t h e s e  a b u s e s .  This  was p r o b a b l y  h i s  answer t o  p rew ar  
i s o l a t i o n i s t s  who were l o o k i n g  t o  Vandenberg f o r  d i r e c t i o n .  
Many w ere ,  p e r h a p s ,  e a g e r  t o  f i n d  such a r a t i o n a l e  f o r  a c t i o n  
on the  C h a r t e r ,  b e c a u se  t h e y  had n o t  f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  some 
who opposed the  League i n  1919 d id  so on the grounds t h a t  
t h e  peace  t r e a t y  sh o u ld  be w r i t t e n  f i r s t .  Few, i n c l u d i n g  
t h e  i s o l a t i o n i s t s ,  had th e  c o u r a g e  i n  1945 t o  deny c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y  a second  chance .
The e s s e n t i a l  o f  th e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n  was t h a t  i t  
would u t i l i z e  a maximum ag reem en t  among t h e  l a r g e  powers 
o f  the  w o r ld ,  and t h a t  t h e s e  powers would i n  sane way g e t  
down t o  t h e  b u s i n e s s  o f  s e t t l i n g  d i s a g r e e m e n ts  s h o r t  o f  
war .  Many c r i t i c s  v o i c e d  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h i s  p l a n .  Most 
s e r i o u s  o f  a l l ,  o p p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  r a i s e d  to  th e  v o t i n g  
p r o c e d u r e  i n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a s  f i n a l l y  ag reed  upon 
a t  Y a l t a .  T h is  was t h e  n e x t  m a jo r  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l  
which  Vandenberg a t t e m p t e d  t o  m e e t .  He a d m i t t e d  t h a t  he 
d i d  n o t  l i k e  t h e  p la n  which i n  e f f e c t  p e r m i t t e d  each o f  t h e  
f i v e  powers t o  e n jo y  a " v e t o "  b u t  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  " I  c a n n o t  
u n d e r s t a n d  th e  c r i t i c  who p e r m i t s  h i s  d i sa p p o in tm e n t  upon 
t h i s  one s c o r e  t o  sweep him i n t o  t o t a l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  
e n t i r e  e n t e r p r i s e .  . . ."133 The S e n a t o r  thus  d e fen ded  
" v e t o "  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s .
133ib id . . p. 6984.
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He a l l e g e d ,  f i r s t ,  t h a t  th e  " v e t o  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
r e f l e c t s  t h e  w o r l d ’ s r e a l i t i e s . "  He t u r n e d  t o  one o f  h i s  
f a v o r i t e  p h r a s e s  t o  e x p l a i n  h i s  p o i n t .  "The t r u t h  o f  t h e  
m a t t e r  i s , "  s a i d  Vandenberg ,  " t h a t  we c o n f r o n t  a c o n d i t i o n ,  
n o t  a t h e o r y . "^54 i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  S e n a t o r  made u s e  o f  
t h e  American a ssu m p t io n  t h a t  the  w a r - t im e  a l l i a n c e  would be 
p r e s e r v e d  t o  keep the  p e a c e .  " B r i t a i n ,  R u s s i a ,  and America 
c o n t r o l  t h e  d o m in a t in g  f o r c e  f a c t o r s  o f  th e  e a r t h , and a r e  
c a l c u l a t e d  t o  t h u s  c o n t in u e  f o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  y e a r s  a h e a d . "^55 
To i g n o r e  t h i s  f a c t ,  a s s e r t e d  the  S e n a t o r ,  would be t o  t u r n  
a s i d e  the  one t h i n g  t h a t  the  w o r ld  was depending  upon t o  
keep  t h e  p e a c e ,  i . e . ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  m ight  which had so 
s u c c e s s f u l l y  d e f e a t e d  t h e  A x is .  He was s im p ly  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  
i f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  was to  u t i l i z e  t h i s  u n a n im i ty  f o r  p e a c e ,  
t h o s e  n a t i o n s  must  be g iv en  t h e  power t o  u se  what t h e y  
a l r e a d y  p o s s e s s e d .  The S e n a to r  p r o b a b l y  echoed th e  s e n t i ­
m ents  o f  t h e  n a t i o n .  A l l  he r e a l l y  s a i d  was t h a t  c e r t a i n  
c o n d i t i o n s  d id  n o t  come up t o  American e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e  
o v e r a l l  g o a l  was t o  t r y  t o  make t h e  a l l i a n c e  a  w orkab le  one.  
C e r t a i n  n a t i o n s  had th e  power,  and t h e y  would u s e  i t  w h e th e r  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  g r a n t e d  i t  o r  n o t .  The v e to  h e lp e d  t o  
a s s u r e  t h a t  S e c u r i t y  C ounc i l  d e c i s i o n s  would b e a r  some r e l a t i o n  
t o  r e a l i t y .  The S e n a t o r  p roposed  t o  t r y  t o  u t i l i z e  t h i s  
s t r e n g t h  on t h e  s i d e  o f  p e ace .
^^^Ibid. ^55xbid.
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Vandenberg s a i d ,  s e c o n d ly ,  t h a t  no a l t e r n a t i v e  
e x i s t e d  t o  t h e  " v e t o "  f o rm u la .  He rem inded  Americans t h a t  
R o o se v e l t  a g re e d  t o  t h i s  p l a n  a t  Y a l t a .  H is  a p p e a l  was t o  
t h e  American r e s p e c t  f o r  a r e c o g n i z e d  p ro m ise .  Said Vandenberg:  
"We Americans have a h a b i t  o f  keep ing  o u r  c o u n t r y ’ s word."^5& 
T h is  was th e  S e n a t o r ’ s answer  t o  t h o s e  who a sk ed  why t h e  
American d e l e g a t i o n  d id  not  assume th e  l e a d e r s h i p  and push  
f o r  a r e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  the. v e t o  fo r m u la .  From many q u a r t e r s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  from s m a l l  pow ers ,  had  come demands fo r  change .  
Vandenberg r e j e c t e d  t h i s  a s  d i d  t h e  o t h e r  American d e l e g a t e s .
He now de fended  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  on t h e  g ro u nd s  t h a t  to  have 
r e p u d i a t e d  the  word o f  an American P r e s i d e n t  "would have  been 
t o  k i l l  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  b e f o r e  i t  g o t  u n d e rw ay ,"  adding  t h a t  
t h i s  " i s  t h e  c h o ic e  which . . . C ongress  and the  c o u n t r y  now 
c o n f r o n t . "157 I t  co u ld  a l s o  be t r u e  t h a t  t h e  S e n a to r  was 
once a g a i n  p o i n t i n g  t o  som eth ing  t h a t  R o o s e v e l t  d e s ig n ed  
which t h e  c o u n t r y  must swallow w h e th e r  i t  l i k e d  i t  o r  n o t .
He was b o th  a sa le sm an  and a p o l i t i c i a n .  Such may have  been  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p o i n t .
I n  a p p ro v in g  t h e  v e to  f o r m u la ,  Vandenberg was f o r c e d  
t o  admit  t h a t  the  concept  of e q u a l i t y  o f  s t a t e s  was d i s c a r d e d  
by the  San F r a n c i s c o  ag re em e n t .  The new o r g a n i z a t i o n  was
156R e c o r d , 7 9 th  Gong. ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  1945,  %CI, P a r t  
5 ,  6984.
157ibid.
235
dominated by the great powers. Witnout being hypocritical, 
Vandenberg wanted to show the small countries that the United 
States respected their sovereignty and independence. For 
that reason, he stressed that the General Assembly, where 
small powers dominate, can "recommend measures for the 
peaceful adjustment of any situation, . . . which it deems 
likely to impair the general welfare."^5^ The San Francisco 
Conference further enhanced this provision by avoiding "an 
extreme interpretation which would have permitted the use of 
the veto against full hearing and discussion of any threats 
to p e a c e . "^59 Although it, perhaps, offered little solace 
to those who thought the small countries had been coerced.
15&Ibid., p. 6983. Also see Pratt, op. cit., p. 700.
He writes: "The original proposals had lodged almost all 
power in the Security Council, which would be dominated by 
the Big Five. . . . Senator Vandenberg, believing that in 
the long run moral force— mobilized world opinion— might 
count more.than material force, led a movement to make the 
General.Assembly ’a town meeting of the world,* by giving 
it unrestricted freedom to debate." He notes "that the 
American delegation achieved this objective at the risk of 
nearly breaking up the Conference."
^^^Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, ICI, Part 5, 
6984. Also see Papers, p. 208. Vandenberg apparently felt 
that the victory over unrestricted debate in the Security 
Council reflected another gain in dealing with the Russians.
He wrote in his diary on June 7, 1945: "I think~everyone
is convinced that the blunt, unconditional message which 
Stettinius sent to Moscow turned the trick. . . .  At any 
rate, we have discovered (I hope) that we can get along 
with Russia if and when we can convince Russia that we 
mean what we say." He added that the victory restored 
"a sinking American prestige at home and abroad; that it 
gives the new Peace League a chance; and that it recommends 
an American Foreign Policy which stands up for our viewpoints, 
our ideals, and our purposes."
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it offered some hope to those who felt that the use of an 
arbitrary veto could defeat the will of the other members.
In speaking of America's fight for free discussion 
in the Security Council, Vandenberg, perhaps, was also saying 
that the United States had not abandoned its interest in 
the small powers. He was telling the world that America had 
run the risk of breaking up the conference in holding out 
for the principle of free speech in the Security Council.
He hoped that the small countries would realize that the 
United States would fight for American principles, one of 
which had always been a belief in the right of self-deter­
mination of all nations. While it is true, he implied, that 
the great powers would have to assume the leading political 
role in making a framework for peace, America would champion 
the rights of small countries in all other activities. In 
short, he was telling the small countries to be thankful 
that America too had a veto; with it, implied Vandenberg, 
she could use that veto to help those who would seek 
liberation.
The Senator's third defense of the veto formula 
might also be regarded as an answer to those small nations 
which attacked the unanimity requirements as a discriminatory 
measure. "The great powers,"said Vandenberg, "must assume 
special and particular r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ."1^0 In other words.
lèOReçord, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part
5 , 6984..
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the unanimity rule not only granted a privilege, but it also 
affirmed that responsibility must go with power. While the 
major powers were to make the main decisions in regard to 
the use of force, this same group had promised to respect 
the sovereign equality of states and to use its influence 
on the side of law and justice. All nations, implied 
Vandenberg, should profit from this arrangement. It put 
power in a position of protecting the equality of nations.
In essence, he was calling on the small powers and their 
supporters to be realists. The great powers would dominate 
the world whether in or out of the new organization. All 
nations are not equal in power and influence. The small 
states recognized this at San Francisco by putting the 
burden of proof on the big powers to keep the peace. 
Vandenberg wanted his countrymen to recognize this fact of 
life.
Vandenberg’s fourth major defense of the veto formula 
represented the sine qua non of the American rationale for 
joining the organization. "Let it never for an instant be 
forgotten that this -veto granted to the five great powers 
includes a veto for our own United S t a t e s . H i s  other 
three arguments in favor of joining the organization with 
the veto provision had been directed to a minority of 
internationalists and peoples in small countries who felt
IGllbid.
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that the organization placed too much power in the hands of 
the great powers; now he speaks to the great majority— those 
"many millions of our citizens" who require it "as the 
indispensable price of our adherence to this treaty." His 
use of emotional evidence indicates that he thought he spoke 
to an agreeing audience. Such statements as "we remain the 
captains of our souls," and "it is the complete answer to 
any rational fears that we may be subordinating our destiny, 
serve to illustrate his attempts to prove his point. He had 
obviously concluded that the "veto" was essential to American 
acceptance, and thus continued his long standing view of 
sovereignty. Many historians agree that the Senator had 
effectively analyzed his audience.
Tandenberg's defense of the Yalta voting formula was 
thus pitched on a "this-or-nothing" theme. He never gave 
the formula complete endorsement, but at the same time, he 
was quick to say that the veto should not constitute a 
rejection of. the Charter. But his insistence that the 
Charter preserved the "sovereignty" of America indicated
l^Zib id .
^ ^^W illiam  R e i t z e l ,  Morton A. K ap lan , and C on stance  
G. C o b lenz , U n i te d  S t a t e s  F o re ig n  P o l i c y ,  1945-1955 (Wash­
i n g to n :  The B rook ings  I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1 9 5 o ) ,  pp . 36 -37 . They
w r i t e :  " I n  a d d i t i o n ,  and j o i n t l y  w i th  th e  o th e r  m a jo r
p o w ers , t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  f i r m l y  a d h e re d  to  th e  co n cep t o f  
a p r i v i l e g e d  p o s i t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  r i g h t  o f  v e t o . "  See 
P r a t t ,  op. c i t . , p . 698. He w r i t e s :  "The p r i c e  o f  s e c u r in g
th e  a d h e re n c e  o f  the  S o v ie t  U nion, and of i n s u r i n g  a f a v o r a b le  
v o te  by  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  S e n a te  was t h u s  a v e to  p r o v i s i o n . "
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that he joined those who could not commit- America to an 
enforcement action against her will. He would not accept, 
and he apparently had concluded that Americans would not 
accept, membership in an organization in which they did not 
have a final say about the use of American resources to keep 
the peace. Any other voting formula could mean that America 
might be outvoted. At this point, he was not convinced that 
his country should give up that privilege. He did want to 
show, however, that the veto would be used by America on the 
side of justice.
Defense of American position in the organization._T-t- 
Vandenberg’s final argument in support of the Charter came 
in a positive assertion that America was not giving up any 
’’essential American sovereignty,” in joining the organization, 
but on the other hand, was "exercising intelligent self- 
interest.” It is, of course, not surprising that Vandenberg 
would have an answer for those who were afraid that the 
United States was giving up her sovereignty. The Senator 
turned to three specific instances to prove his belief that 
all America was doing by joining the organization was 
"exercising intelligent self-interest.
His first example pointed with pride to the fact that 
the organization made provisions for regional arrangements. 
Vandenberg gave special stress to this aspect of the Charter
^^^Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 5,
6984.
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because of its bearing on the Monroe Doctrine. Alarm was 
expressed by some at San Francisco that the new organization 
might void the Act of Chapultepec, signed on March 3, 1945, 
in which the nations of the Western Hemisphere agreed to 
combine military power to defend the American continents 
from aggressors, both local and f o r e i g n . T h e  provisions 
of the act clearly aimed at the preservation of the Monroe 
Doctrine, or the principle of non-intervention in the affairs 
of the West. Senator Vandenberg was an enthusiastic supporter 
of Article 51 which alleged that "nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. . . ."166 
This, he asserted, not only preserved the Monroe Doctrine 
intact, but actually gave it new life in that the Act of 
Chapultepec was said to constitute a regional arrangement 
under Article 51 of ths Charter.
The Senator also emphasized that the new organization 
"exempt all essentially domestic matters from the jurisdiction"!^? 
of the new government. In other words, "national interest" 
was to take preference over peace. He was emphasizing what
Pratt, op. cit., p. 765. "In its most important 
contribution, the Act of Chapultepec declared that until the 
end of the war, any act or threat of aggression against an 
American state would be considered an act or threat against 
all, and would be dealt with by whatever measures proved 
necessary."
^^^Papers. p. 193.
^^^Record. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, ICI, Part 5, 69#5.
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his countrymen already knew. The new organization could not 
force America or any nation to disarm, to remove trade barriers, 
or to stabilize currency without her consent. Each country 
must be willing to submit to those processes or no action 
could be taken. America was to play her cards for international 
cooperation, but she was to decide where, when, and how those 
cards were to be exposed. This policy favored collective 
security, as a principle, but it made little sacrifice of 
self-interest for the greater interest of the rest of the 
world. America was not prepared to go further, and Vandenberg 
felt no compulsion to support the argument with evidence— not 
even explanation. As historians indicate, however, the United 
States did not stand alone in this matter, for most nations 
"rejected any concept of intervention in matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
Jiis final arguments were also mentioned without 
explanation. In one of them he stressed that America preserved 
the right of self-defense, assuring Americans that collective 
defense did not impair this right. In the other, he obviously 
had in mind those people who were concerned about the status 
of certain Pacific Islands in that he made reference to the 
fact that the matter of trusteeships would be settled at later 
conferences with each participating nation having freedom 
of action.
^ ^ % eitze l, Kaplan, and Coblenz, op. c i t . ,  p. 36.
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Conclusion.— Vandenberg’s conclusion constituted a 
restatement of the positions which he had attempted to defend 
in the body of the speech. Although he made no specific 
reference to them, he had in mind two groups. For the 
internationalists who wanted a higher degree of collective 
government, the Senator reiterated that it was "this-or- 
nothing"— the only "plan available for international coopera­
tion"; for the isolationists who feared American participation 
in any type of international organization, Vandenberg reminded 
them of the hope which Americans were placing in this venture, 
and of the protection from loss of sovereignty. His reference 
to a recent statement by General Eisenhower that "the blackness 
of the' grief of those who mourn can be relieved only by the 
faith that this shall not happen again,"^^9 was a reminder 
to the Senate that Americans would not tolerate a rejection 
of the proposal.
Interpretation of the Speech 
The role of the United Nations.— When one ponders the 
inherent weaknesses of an organization predicated on the 
assumption that the unanimity of the war-time powers would 
continue after military victory, it is difficult to see 
how Vandenberg could place much faith in the organization.
The address shows that he had grave doubts about Russia’s
^^^Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part
6, 6985.
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desire for peace. The speech does not really hide the fact 
that Vandenberg was not placing much faith in the ability 
of the Security Council to use force to keep the peace. 
Instead, he placed his hope in the moral force of the United 
Nations— in its ability to focus world attention on an 
aggressor. But he also wanted America to maintain her own 
resources for defense, to encourage regional arrangements 
for defense of the Western Hemisphere, and to take definite 
steps to keep the defeated aggressors under control. He. 
hoped, of course, that the war powers might continue to work 
together in peace as they had in war.
Still Vandenberg’s thinking at this point is somewhat 
inconsistent. .First, he implied that the new organization 
could keep the peace by enforcing moral commitments. Through 
a long process involving negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, judicial settlement, and o t h e r s , offenders 
were bound to be suppressed. In fact; said Vandenberg, "it 
is inconceivable that this routine would not succeed ."^71 
At the same time, he admitted that the organization granted 
a privileged position to the five great powers, each able 
to keep moral commitments by governments from being enforced.
l^OArticle 33 of the Charter provides that each member 
shall first "seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means 
of their own choice."
^^^Record, 79th Gong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 5,
6983.
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Unless the war-time alliance continued, and clearly Vandenberg 
was skeptical, then moral commitments could not be enforced.
The only route left open was to rely on the influence of public 
opinion to act in the place of enforcement. Even the Briand- 
Kellogg Pact proved that declarations of moral purpose can 
be violated. "So long as opinion is nationalistic," says 
Wright, "nations will risk wars in pursuance of nationalistic 
aims even at the expense of international o b l i g a t i o n s . "^^2 
Yet Vandenberg insisted that the greater strengths of the 
United Nations in settling threats to the peace are found 
in those means to be employed before the dispute is given 
to the Security Council. He had thus registered another 
doubt that the unanimity of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council could be relied upon to keep the 
peace.
Vandenberg clearly set forth a lesser role for the 
United Nations in world affairs than many people had hoped 
it would have. He was prepared to see the discontinuation 
of big-power unanimity, but still hoped that the organization 
could influence the course of nations in the search for 
peace. This strength came, thought Vandenberg, through a 
community of nations banded together morally against a 
common enemy. In view of this conclusion, it is difficult 
to understand just why Vandenberg did not stress the importance
^"^^Quincy Wright, "Making the United Nations Work," 
Review of Politics, VIII (October, 1946), 529.
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of universality of membership. It was difficult to.envision 
just how thi s organization was to function as a true 
instrument for peace unless universality was encouraged. 
Recognition of this fact led John Foster Dulles to declare: 
"The United Nations will best serve the cause of peace if 
its assembly is representative of what the world actually 
is, and not merely representative of the parts which we 
like."173
Since Vandenberg had apparently lost faith in the 
ability of the organization to use force in the settlement 
of disputes, one ecu Id question his wisdom of approving of 
an. organization for justice without provisions of securing 
that justice. The League of Nations was of the same design, 
and it failed to keep the peace. In the first place, he 
and his countrymen wanted a chance at collective security; 
this, asserted Vandenberg, was the only one they had.
Americans would not surrender traditional rights, and indeed, 
most of them saw no necessity for it. As historians note:
"At no time did official statements give the public any 
reason to question Soviet cooperation in the postwar era."174 
Secondly, Vandenberg, perhaps, thought that although the 
organization might not prevent those wars provoked by powerful 
nations, it might greatly help in assessing the blame and in
173John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1 9 5 0 ) ,  p. 190.
174jieitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, op. cit., p. S$.
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g a th e r in g  s u p p o r t  o u t s id e  o f  th e  o f f i c i a l  body . T here  was 
a l s o  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i t  m ig h t  h e lp  to  s to p  th o s e  w ars  
n o t  d e l i b e r a t e l y  d e s ig n e d  by a  g r e a t  power. T h i r d l y ,  th e  
speech shows t h a t  he v iew ed  th e  U n ited  N a t io n s  as a c h a n n e l  
f o r  com m unication i n  w hich  in d ep e n d en t  s t a t e s  w i th  d i f f e r e n t  
o b j e c t i v e s  c o u ld  meet t o  compromise p o i n t s  o f  v iew . W ithout 
any p r e t e n s e  t h a t  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  could  s o lv e  a l l  p ro b le m s , 
he  had h igh  r e g a r d  f o r  i t s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a s  a forum where 
d i f f e r e n c e s  cou ld  be a i r e d .  Such were the  o r g a n i z a t i o n ’s 
" p re p o n d e ra n t  a d v a n ta g e s ” w hich i n  V andenberg’ s mind d e se rv e d  
a  ’’f a i t h f u l  t r i a l .
I t  can a l s o  be a rg u e d  a t  t h i s  p o in t  t h a t  Vandenberg 
had d r i f t e d  i n t o  some o f  W ilso n ’ s i d e a l i s m .  How was j u s t i c e  
t o  p r e v a i l  among a  community o f  n a t io n s  i n  which t h e r e  was 
no common p u rp o se ?  I f  t h e r e  was a  common p u rp o se ,  i t  was 
th e  d e s i r e  f o r  p e a c e —n o t  j u s t i c e .  Vandenberg had s ig n e d  
a  document i n  w hich n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  to o k  p r e f e r e n c e  o v e r  
w orld  j u s t i c e  o r  even p e a c e .  He had backed  h im s e l f  i n t o  a 
c o r n e r ,  b u t  n e i t h e r  he n o r  h i s  countrymen co u ld  adm it i t .
He w anted  t o  p r e s e r v e  American s o v e r e ig n ty ,  b u t  a t  th e  same 
t im e  he  so u g h t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o r a l i t y .  Where s o v e re ig n  
n a t i o n s  a r e  c o n c e rn e d ,  " i f  t h e r e  i s  a  c h o ic e  be tw een  m oral 
and immoral m eans, th e  m oral ones can be chosen  o n ly  i f
175&ecord, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945» ICI, 
Part 5, 6983.
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they promise equal success,"176 states Werner Levi. Such 
was the grave consequence of national sovereignty to which 
Vandenberg subscribed. He hoped, without any logical proof 
to substantiate his claim, however, that the fatal results 
ofthis adherence to national sovereignty would give way to 
international justice when it came before the "town meeting 
of the world."177 He knew the truth, however, as he signed 
it at San Francisco. Any Big Five member of the Security 
Council can exercise its veto to keep any matter from being 
investigated. This left the main hope in the power of the 
General Assembly to recommend with the added hope that justice, 
not self-interest, would prevail. Nations on many occasions 
have been known to ignore recommendations concerned with 
justice— including those of the League of Nations.
To be sure, one could argue with Vandenberg’s 
conclusion that the new Charter would help to insure a better 
peace than would a pre-San Francisco agreement. But the 
Senator knew the realities of life. There was hidden 
meaning behind his assertion that "we would desert our own 
ideals if we should permit our desire for the unattainable 
to blind us to the wisdom of embracing the boom which is at 
hand."^7^ He was aware that popular desire for international
176>|-emer Levi, Fundamentals of World Organization 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950), p. 13.
^'^'^Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 5, 6983, 
^ 7 % b id .
248
o r g a n i z a t i o n  was a t  a  peak  d u r in g  th e  h e ig h t  o f  w ar .  He 
o b v io u s ly  th o u g h t  t h a t  th e  w o r ld  m ust adop t th e  new p la n  
b e fo re  th e  h o r r o r s  o f  w ar  had fa d e d  from t h e i r  m em ories .
"lifhen t h e  c r i s i s  i s  o v e r  and th e  t im e  f o r  the  e r a  a r r i v e s , "  
w r i t e s  L e v i ,  " c o n d i t i o n s  a p p e a r  v ery  d i f f e r e n t  from t h o s e  
a n t i c i p a t e d ,  and t h e  p la n  f o r  a  new w orld  a p p e a rs  im p racticab le ."^79 
The S e n a to r ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  was a t  San F r a n c i s c o .  He 
r e c a l l e d  the  s t r u g g l e  o v e r  such seem in g ly  m inor i n c i d e n t s  
as  th e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  word " j u s t i c e "  i n  the  C h a r t e r .  He 
co u ld  e n v i s io n  what c o u ld  happen  t o  the w o r l d 's  hopes f o r  
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i f  i t  had to w a i t  on f i n a l  
agreem ent over such q u e s t io n s  a s  what to  do w ith  Germany 
a f t e r  h e r  d e f e a t .  He w an ted  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
The world hoped for the same thing. The Senator had learned 
that waiting for an organization which assured absolute 
justice would result in a repeat of 1918. To avoid this, 
he compromised principle and accepted a historical reality.
Levi a rg u e s  t h a t  such a c t i o n  i s  n o t  u n u s u a l .  "The new 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  o n ly  n o m in a l ly  a f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  
governm ent p ro m is e s  d u r in g  w a r t im e ,"  he a s s e r t s ,  " a  f u l ­
f i l l m e n t  d i s ig n e d  to  a p p ea se  th e  few s u r v iv in g  ' i d e a l i s t s .  
V andenberg, p e rh a p s ,  was among th o s e  fo r  whom th e  f la m e  had 
n o t  y e t  d i e d .
^'^^Levi, op. c i t . ,  pp. 2 0 1 -02 .
^GOl b i d . ,  p .^ 203 .
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The u n i t e d  f r o n t . — V a n d e n b e r g t a s k  i n  t h i s  sp e e c h  
was to  a v o id  a p a r t i s a n  s p l i t  in  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  S e n a te .
He hoped t h a t  he w ould  n e i t h e r  a l i e n a t e  t h o s e  who w ish ed  t o  
go f a r t h e r  down th e  ro a d  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,  n o r  t h o s e  who 
d id  n o t  w ish  to  go a s  f a r  a s  t h e  C h a r te r  p ro p o se d .  I t  i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  he spoke p e r s u a s i v e l y  t o  b o th  g ro u p s .  Above a l l ,  
he w an ted  t o  avo id  a b i t t e r  d e b a te  w hich  m igh t c r e a t e  d o u b ts  
among Am ericans A l l i e s  a b o u t  A m erica ’ s i n t e r e s t  i n  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y .  To a c c o m p lish  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e ,  he r e l i e d  
c h i e f l y  upon th e  e m o t io n a l  p ro o f  t h a t  " i t  i s  th e  o n ly  p la n  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n , a l o n g w i t h  th e  
i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  th e  Am erican p e o p le  were demanding an 
a t t e m p t  a t  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  The s p e a k e r  had th e  
a d v a n ta g e  o f  one who had  been in  on th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  a s  
w e l l  a s  h i s  g r e a t  " s p e a k e r  c r e d i b i l i t y "  a p p e a l  a s  a member 
o f  th e  o p p o s i t io n  p a r t y .
With t h e  s e n t im e n t  o f  a  n a t i o n  so s t r o n g  in  f a v o r  
o f  th e  C h a r t e r ,  V andenberg cou ld  have e a s i l y  c la im ed  more 
b e n e f i t s  from  the  o r g a n i z a t i o n  th a n  i t  o f f e r e d .  He c o u ld ,  
f o r  exam ple , v e ry  e a s i l y  have e x a g g e ra te d  th e  p o s i t i v e  aim 
o f  th e  v e n tu r e .  W hile he  hoped t h a t  lo n g - te rm  economic 
and s o c i a l  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  would come from th e  U n ited  N a t io n s ,  
he made no such  c la im s .  He hoped , i n s t e a d ,  t h a t  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
w ould  make a c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  peace  by p r o v id in g  in s t r u m e n t s
^^^Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, ICI, Part 5, 6 9 S5 .
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and practices which would enable the peoples of the world 
to realize their collective will to avoid a third world 
war. This was all he promised. He was, in fact, very- 
honest with his audience in implying that signs already 
pointed to the fact that the Grand Alliance of the war 
might fold. He was equally persuasive in his appeal that 
if this should come to pass, there was even greater reason 
to join the organization. The value of the United Nations 
in this case, implied Vandenberg, would be its capacity to 
clarify thinking on matters of international law and to 
stimulate public opinion on the side of justice.- If the 
organization offered nothing more than a moral sense of 
direction, humanity would have won a victory in its search 
for peace based on justice and morality.
The Defense of Collective Security 
This chapter is concerned with the second of the 
phases of American foreign policy being considered in this 
study, the period of war and collective security, 1941 to 
1946. Three of Ar-thur Vandenberg*s speeches are examined 
to represent the changing ideas which reflect America's 
policies in the postwar world, projected peace aims, and 
the nature of the postwar world organization.
Pattern of the Speeches 
The shift of ideas.— When the Japanese attacked 
Pearl Harbor in 1941 , Senator Vandenberg' s  concept of
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American foreign policy embodied one basic interest— the 
security of the United States. Along with other Americans, 
he found this security in two policies. The first was that 
of isolation, the policy of George Washington in his final 
message upon leaving the White House. The second was a 
belief in the principles of the Monroe Doctrine designed 
for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. By 1943» Senator 
Vandenberg had publicly abandoned isolationism for collective 
security. By 1945, he had dramatized that new direction for 
the world, and by June of that year, he had endorsed the 
United Nations Charter as a blueprint to achieve the new 
objective. But his one basic interest for America had 
not changed. He was still, first of all, interested in 
the security of the United States.
Ideas for change.— In supporting the Connally Reso­
lution in 1943, Senator Vandenberg announced to the world 
that isolationism had failed. Pearl Harbor, he said, had 
destroyed his belief that the two great oceans could pro­
tect the country from foreign wars. He also implied that 
America could no longer stand alone in the face of world 
aggression; World War II convinced him that Allies are 
needed to help wage modern war. He proposed, in place of 
isolationism and neutrality, that America join in collective 
efforts for peace.
With war holding popular attention, he refrained from
spelling out the directions that the new policy should take.
252
It was made clear, however, that any attempt at collective 
security must not challenge American sovereignty, and that 
any moves into a postwar organization for peace must be 
subject to the approval of the Congress. He implied, in 
addition, that the base of the new organization would be 
built upon the unanimity of the war-time alliance of 
countries. Rather than run the risk of disrupting the war 
efforts with disagreements over postwar policies, he was 
content to let the matter drop without further elaboration.
By 1945, however, the war in Europe was nearing an 
end. Vandenberg became deeply concerned about the peace 
aims of Americans Allies. In his January 10, 1945, address, 
he made a dramatic profession of faith in collective security 
by advocating that America enter an immediate alliance to 
guarantee that the defeated Axis powers would never again 
assault the world. This proposal was a radical departure 
for a prewar believer in isolationism and a follower of 
"non-entangling" alliances. But he also announced to the 
world that America should not pay for an international 
organization at the expense of peace without justice at 
Yalta or elsewhere.
Vandenberg accepted the United Nations as the best 
possible means for implementing his belief in collective 
security. He was not satisfied with many phases of the 
United Nations agreement, but he was prepared to buy the 
package on a "this-or-nothing" theme. He viewed the General
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Assembly as the strength of the organization. He believed 
that in this "town meeting of the world," the moral force 
of civilization could be brought to bear on any potential 
aggressor. He hoped that the alliance of large powers 
on which the organization was based would hold, but he was 
not over-optimistic. His concern for the small countries 
of the world led him to question the wisdom of granting 
so much power to the Big Five. But he bought the idea 
because in his mind that arrangement fitted the realities 
of the world as they existed in 1945.
Vandenberg^s goal of American security thus continued 
through the collective security period. The main implementation 
for this goal was peace. But his concept of peace had taken 
on a wider base than it had in the period of isolationism.
He was now concerned with peace with justice for all nations. 
Vandenberg had come to believe that a threat to democracy 
anywhere in the world was a threat to freedom everywhere.
This is not to suggest that he had been indifferent to 
tyranny in the thirties. But it is to say that at that time 
he thought that there was very little that America could or 
should do about aggression in other parts of the world. By 
1943, he decided that the only thing to do about it was 
concerted action with other nations. He remained firm in 
his conviction, however, that any collectivist efforts for 
peace must not disrupt American sovereignty, and that 
American participation must be subjected to the wisdom of the 
Congress not only for final approval, but also in formulation.
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Vandenberg* s new concept of America’s role in world 
affairs moved along with public opinion. But he may have 
moved ahead of the public in his suspicions that the members 
of the Grand Alliance might not work as well together in 
peace as in war. In this, he may have grasped the- dangers 
in collective security well ahead of the public while moving 
with them in evaluating its advantages.
Reason for cha.nge.— Vandenberg’s change from isolationism 
to collective security was slow but definite. The change 
cannot be ascribed solely to the fact that Pearl Harbor taught 
him a lesson. An answer can also be found in What is revealed 
in his speeches in the light of the alternatives available 
to him.
First, he could have returned to a policy of 
isolationism after the war. He professed at various times 
both publicly and privately from 1943 to 1945 that "obviously” 
such a course was impossible. His speeches show that the 
Pearl Harbor attack convinced him that "neither time nor 
space any longer promises to shield the victims of treacherous 
a t t a c k . T h e  explanation can be questioned on the grounds 
that the administration had warned the country that the 
attack at Pearl Harbor was possible as early as 1937. His 
speeches show, however, that he was convinced that America
l a z i b i d . . p. 6982.
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could defend herself against any aggressor without the 
assistance of other nations. World War II crushed these 
assumptions.
Neither was Vandenberg oblivious to the determination 
of the American people to win the war and carry that same 
spirit into the organization for peace. Both geographical 
remoteness and neutrality legislation failed to keep America 
out of war. To most Americans, the only road to.follow after 
Pearl Harbor was that of international cooperation. In 
Vandenberg's speaking from 19 4 3  to 1 9 4 5 ,  he hinged many of 
his leading arguments on the fact that Americans would not 
tolerate a return to isolationism. From 1 9 4 3  on, the nature 
of the proofs used in Vandenberg^s speeches showed that he 
anticipated an agreeing audience when he proposed that 
America should take a continuing and permanent interest in 
insuring the maintenance of international peace by cooperating 
in an organization with other nations.
It is, of course, possible that Vandenberg was highly 
influenced in his decision to drop isolationism and support 
collective security by the fact that several Republican 
prewar isolationists met defeat at the polls in 1942 and 
1944.^^3 But it should be kept in mind that Vandenberg
3-^3Ed^ard A. Harris, "Confession Is Good For The Soul," 
New Republic, CÏVI (January 2 0 ,  1 9 4 7 ) ,  3 2 .  Harris said: 
"Vandenberg, it is known, was profoundly disturbed by the 
popular uprising, and a few days after the 1944 election 
closely 're-examined* his whole approach to the question
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was not alone among those who, prior to 1941, had believed 
that American security depended upon a policy of retreat 
from internationalism. It is important to keep in mind 
that twenty-nine other Senators joined Vandenberg in 
voting against the arms embargo repeal in 1939, and as late 
as 1941, thirty-seven Senators still opposed further changes 
in the neutrality act. There were, in fact. Senators so 
opposed to intervention that President Roosevelt "was 
constantly careful to avoid what Tolstoy called 'the 
irrevocable act.'"^^^ Sherwood added; "The truth was 
that as the world situation became more desperately critical, 
. . . isolationist sentiment became even more strident in 
e x p r e s s i o n . "1^5 But by 1943, Congress had passed the 
Fullbright and Connally Resolutions by large majorities.
Polls revealed that a large majority of Americans favored 
this action.
Vandenberg's second alternative was to encourage a 
strong national defense in America and hope for a return 
to balance of power politics to avoid attacks on the Western 
Hemisphere. The idea behind this technique is of course
of One World." Also see. Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally 
(New York: Thomas I. Crowell, 1954), p. 269. He belieyed
that Vandenberg's "reyersal was a sort of 'here is where I 
get on the bandwagon before it turns the comer and leayes 
me behind.'"
1^4Robert E. Sherwood, Rooseyelt and Hopkins: An
Intim ate H istory (New York: Harper & B ro s., 1 9 4 8 ) ,  p. 1 3 2 .
I3$l b id . . pp. 332-83.
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t h a t  no s i n g l e  s t a t e  s h a l l  a t t a i n  a p rep o n d e ran c e  o f  pow er. 
Many A m ericans had lo n g  r e l i e d  upon t h i s  c o n c e p t  a s  a 
d e f e n s iv e  m ea su re ,  h op in g  t h a t  European  n a t i o n s  would  be 
more or l e s s  e q u a l  i n  s t r e n g t h  and would be so busy d e fe n d in g  
th e m se lv e s  from each o th e r  t h a t  th e y  would f o r g e t  th e  W este rn  
H em isphere . America became co n ce rn e d  when Germany c h a l le n g e d  
t h i s  b a la n c e  of povjer i n  1918 and a g a in  i n  1939. V an d en berg ’ s 
p o s tw a r  s p e a k in g  showed t h a t  he was w e l l  aware t h a t  t h i s  
b a la n c e  co u ld  no lo n g e r  e x i s t  even w ith  th e  d e f e a t  o f  Germany. 
H is e x p re s s e d  concern  f o r  th e  a c t i o n s  o f  the  S o v ie t s  i n d i c a t e s  
h i s  knowledge t h a t  R u s s ia  w ould come o u t  o f  th e  war a s  t h e  
s t r o n g e s t  European  power. "The b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  u se  
o f  t h e  b a la n c e  o f  power t e c h n iq u e  no lo n g e r  e x i s t e d , "  s t a t e  
R e i t z e l ,  K aplan and C o b len z .  "The m ost t h a t  t h e  non-Gommunist 
s t a t e s  co u ld  a s p i r e  t o  was to  seek  a m ass iv e  g l o b a l  e q u i l i ­
b rium  o f  p o w e r . T h i s  same r e a s o n in g  le d  Vandenberg t o  
h i s  t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e — t h a t  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y .
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  i n  e l e c t i n g  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y ,  
Vandenberg had in  mind a b a la n c e  o f  power in  a new form . 
P e r h a p s ,  he  e n v is io n e d  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  which p e a c e - lo v in g  
n a t i o n s  co u ld  be a l ig n e d  a g a i n s t  an a g g r e s s o r .  The r h e t o r i c  
o f  t h e  U n i te d  N a tio n s  sp e ec h  shows t h a t  he was a l r e a d y  
b e g in n in g  to doubt th e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  r e t a i n i n g  w a r - t im e
^^^Reitzel, Kaplan and Coblenz, op. cit., p. 329■
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unanimity and thus keeping the peace. He accepted an 
organization based on this principle only because it was 
that or nothing. But he saw in that organization the 
possibility of the balance of power concept maintained to 
some extent by a different method. The new approach did 
not entail a system in which the United States would try 
to encourage two rival camps and then throw its weight in 
one direction or the other in an attempt to dominate world 
politics, but an organization in which the great majority 
of opinion would be aligned against any country that would 
break the peace. For this reason, he told his countrymen 
on June 29, 1945: ”I have signed the Charter with no illusions
regarding its imperfections . . . but with no doubts that it 
proposes an experiment which must be bravely undertaken in 
behalf of peace.
While Vandenberg’s speeches hint that he would have 
preferred an organization founded on a broader base than one 
in which the power was channeled into the hands of the five 
big powers, there is every evidence that he would have 
vigorously opposed any attempt to make the new organization 
for collective security into a world government with the 
ability to pass laws directly affecting the individual. He 
made it quite clear that America must not relinquish any 
"sovereignty,” and that he would oppose any attempt to create
5 , 6982.
l^^Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, ICI, Part
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a "super” state. Even if one admits that the world can not 
have world peace without world government, it would be 
difficult to criticize Senator Vandenberg for not advocating 
it in 1945. At best, one can say that Vandenberg should 
have given some recognition to the fact that a stronger 
organization than the United Nations was needed to preserve 
the peace. Such an organization, however, might have been 
an ultimate objective, but at that moment, the world faced 
complex problems which could not wait for the ideal plan.
If Vandenberg had insisted upon a far-reaching scheme, he 
would have run the risk of final rejection both at home and 
abroad. His own thinking, furthermore, had emerged from 
the shadow of isolationism, but the traditional aspects of 
nationalism were still part of his objectives. He was not 
alone in this respect.
The Changing Pattern of Political Leadership
The role of the party leader.— Once convinced that 
America had a new role to play in world affairs, Vandenberg 
assumed the task of placing his party on record for the new 
order that was in the making. He thought it important that 
the country know that the Republican party would not block 
plans for a postwar organization as it had succeeded in 
doing in I918. Again, he found himself in the role of
lUS^elles, op. cit., p. 46.
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mediator. One element of the party, led by Wendell Willkie, 
proposed postwar organization that hinted at sovereignty 
infringements on member nations. Another camp, led by the 
prewar isolationists, hinted at a return to the position 
of the 1930*s. Vandenberg proposed a middle course as a 
means of bringing these two groups together, hence, his 
support for collective security without a loss of sovereignty. 
Once he accomplished that task at the Mackinac planning 
conference with Republican leaders, he went before the 
Senate with party backing for the new position on collective 
security.
Role of the opposition party.— Vandenberg also put 
the administration on guard that if-it expected Congressional 
approval for postwar plans, then it must work through the 
Republican leadership in planning the new organization. 
Vandenberg made himself available by announcing early 
support for the new concept of collective security. He was 
a logical choice for the administration. He represented 
the isolationist element, but at the same time, had never 
overtly attacked the character and integrity of the admin­
istration as had many of the isolationists. It was thus 
easy to bring him into the planning stages of postwar 
organization. Once in a position of leadership as a member 
of the Committee of Eight and a delegate to the San Francisco 
Conference, he supported positions which he believed his 
party could accept. This, perhaps, explains his constant
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i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  C o n g ress  be k e p t  in fo rm ed  on p l a n s  f o r  t h e  
r o l e  o f  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  a f t e r  th e  w ar. He was s e e k in g  
a b a s i s  o f  t r u s t .
The b i p a r t i s a n  l e a d e r . — By th e  end of th e  p e r i o d ,  
Vandenberg was em erging  a s  t h e  b i p a r t i s a n  l e a d e r .  He had  
begun t o  b ro a d e n  h i s  r o l e  from  t h a t  o f  m e d ia to r  be tw een  
e le m e n ts  w i t h i n  h i s  p a r t y  t o  t h a t  o f  m e d ia to r  be tw een  t h e  
two p a r t i e s .  He made o v e r t  a t t e m p t s  t o  s e c u re  th e  r e s p e c t  
o f  th e  o p p o s i t io n  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  R e p u b l ic a n s .  He v iew ed 
h i s  jo b  i n  te rm s  o f  o f f e r i n g  a  u n i t e d  f r o n t  f o r  America 
and th e  w o r ld .  The t a s k  o f  f i n d i n g  a p o s i t i o n  t h a t  b o th  
p a r t i e s  c o u ld  a g re e  upon became param ount to  him . For t h a t  
r e a s o n ,  he p r e s s e d  R o o se v e l t  f o r  a s t a te m e n t  on A m e r ic a 's  
p la n s  f o r  t h e  p o s tw a r  w o rld  b e f o r e  th e  P r e s i d e n t  went t o  
Y a l ta .  V andenberg  m s  a f r a i d  t h a t  commitments would be made 
t h a t  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e fe n d .  He w anted  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y ,  b u t  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  he d id  n o t  w ish  t o  b e  i n  
th e  p o s i t i o n  of h a v in g  to  a c c e p t  ag reem en ts  t h a t  were n o t  
a p a r t  of h i s  v a lu e  sys tem .
The U n i te d  N a t io n s  s t a te s m a n . —H is r o l e  a t  San 
F ra n c i s c o  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  im p o r t a n t .  As a r e s p e c t e d  
i s o l a t i o n i s t ,  he was i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  t e l l  the  S e n a te  t h a t  
America had no t b e e n  s o ld  down th e  r i v e r ;  c e r t a i n l y ,  few
I
would have s u s p e c t e d  Vandenberg o f  t a k i n g  ex trem e p o s i t i o n s .  
F o r  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s 'w h o  e x p e c te d  m ore, h i s  was t h e  
l o g i c a l  v o ic e  t o  r e p o r t  t h a t  i t  was " t h i s  o r  n o t h i n g . "
262
When he s to o d  i n  th e  S e n a te  and n o t  only a c c e p te d  th e  
C h a r t e r ,  b u t  p la c e d  h ig h  p r a i s e  on th e  Democrat l e a d e r s  
who had h e lp e d  i n  w r i t i n g  t h e  document, he was, i n  h i s  
m ind , t e l l i n g  th e  w o rld  t h a t  t h e r e  were no p a r t i s a n  
d i f f e r e n c e s  on t h i s  p r o j e c t .  He had begun to  r i s e  above 
p a r t y  to  th e  s t a t u r e  o f  th e  t r u e  s ta te sm a n .
CHAPTER V 
THE RHETORIC OF CONTAINMENT POLICIES 
I n t r o d u c t io n
In  th e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n tu r y ,  A le x is  de T o c q u e v i l le  
ob served  t h a t  R u ss ia  and th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  were "marked 
by th e  w i l l  o f  heaven to  sway th e  d e s t i n i e s  o f  h a l f  th e  
g l o b e . H i s  h i s t o r i c  p rophecy  was to  re a c h  f u l l  r e a l i ­
z a t i o n  a c e n tu r y  l a t e r .  I t  came to  p a ss  i n  th e  form  o f  
a " c o ld  w ar" w hich  i r o n i c a l l y  fo l lo w e d  in  th e  wake o f  a 
s ig n e d  p led g e  by th e s e  two g r e a t  powers i n  which th e y  
a g re e d  to  work t o g e t h e r  to  keep  th e  peace a s  th e y  had 
done in  d e f e a t i n g  th e  Axis powers d u r in g  World War I I .  
Mankind^s hope , i n  f a c t ,  o f  a v o d in g  World War I I I  was 
l a r g e l y  b ased  on th e  p la n  a g re e d  upon a t  San F ra n c i s c o  
i n  1945 in  w hich  th e  g r e a t  powers o f  the  w orld  were t o  
c o o p e ra te  i n  the  U n ited  N a t io n s  no t on ly  t o  keep t h e  
p e a c e ,  b u t  to  m a in ta in  j u s t i c e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .
S e n a to r  A r th u r  Vandenberg h e lp e d  t o  w r i t e  th e  San 
F ra n c is c o  docum ent. He f u r t h e r  u rg e d  th e  S e n a te  o f  th e
^Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I 
(2d ed. rev.; New York: A. A. Knopf, 1945), 434.
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United States to ratify it on the rationale that it was 
the world's best hope forpeace. When it became evident 
that the Charter's foundation— the unanimity of the great 
powers— had been shattered by a rift over postwar problems, 
the Michigan Senator was among the first of American states­
men to call for a reinterpretation of Soviet peace aims.
What followed was a slow process by which the United States 
gradually shifted its emphasis away from the United Nations 
as its hope for peace and security and turned, instead, to 
bilateral policies and regional agreements to meet the 
Soviet expansionist policies.
This chapter examines Vandenberg's speeches during 
the period in which his thinking shifted from faith in 
the United Nations as the best protectorate of American 
interest to that of cooperative policies designed to 
contain the Soviet Union. Four of his speeches serve to 
represent his attitudes on America's role in world affairs 
between 1946 and 1949. These four speeches, selected for 
report and interpretation, are as follows:
1. The Address on the First United Nations 
General Assembly Meeting. This speech, often 
entitled "What is Russia Up to Now?" was given 
in the United States Senate on February 17, 1946.
2. The Address on Postwar American Foreign 
Policy. This speech was presented before the 
Cleveland Forum on January 11, 1947. The 
Michigan Senator expressed his attitudes
on various aspects of American foreign policy.
3. The Address on the Marshall Plan. Senator 
Vandenberg presented this speech to the United
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S t a t e s  S e n a te  on March 1 , 1948 , i n  s u p p o r t  o f 
th e  E uropean  R ecovery  Program .
4. The Address on the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. In one of his last major speeches 
before the Senate-, Vandenberg supported the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization on July 6, 
1949.
As in the two preceding chapters, the pattern of 
criticism consists of an examination of the context in 
which each speech was given, followed by a report and an 
interpretation of the speech. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of Vandenberg’s defense of containment, developed 
and expressed between 1946 and 1949.
The Address on the First United Nations 
General Assembly Meeting
The smoke had barely cleared from the dropping of 
the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki when the "cold 
war" broke out around the diplomatic tables. The American 
people had faith in the ability of the United Nations to 
preserve the peace; they counted on the continuation of 
the war-time harmony of the Big Five. Even before the 
completion of the Charter, however, disputes over European 
boundaries and Russia’s attitude toward Poland made it 
evident that unity among the great powers was not certain.- 
Few Americans in government positions through the year of 
1945 openly questioned the Soviet Union’s conduct. On 
February 16, 1946, Senator Vandenberg voiced the opinion 
that it was time for the United States to explore possible
266
new directions for American relations with the Soviet 
U n i o n .2 For a proper understanding of that speech, it 
is first necessary to examine the context of events.
Context of the Speech 
Postwar America.— The United States emerged from 
World War II with a total economic and political power 
exceeding that of any other nation. The country’s mobilized 
military strength was second to none. The country’s war­
time economic capacity defied the Marxian theory that 
capitalism would collapse under the necessity of enormous 
productive demands. . In addition, the United States had 
taken steps through its alignment with numerous political 
organizations to exert political influence on the rest of 
the world.
America faced the postwar years with hopes for 
economic prosperity at home and peace and security in 
their relations with the rest of the world. "Its funda­
mental economic structure," notes Dulles, "appeared to be 
more stable than ever before."3 By 1946, national income 
had risen to its highest peak, and unemployment was at the 
lowest in any peace-time year. Total production was fifty 
percent higher than in any year before World War II. The
^U. S. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d S e s s . ,
1946, IC II, Part 2 , I 692. Hereinafter referred to as Record.
^Foster Rhea Dulles, America’s Rise to World Power, 
IÔ98 to 1954 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954), p. 222.
267
country appeared ready to face any economic demands that 
the future might place upon it; a postwar depression seemed 
to have been averted.
As the war ended, there was every evidence that 
America would give the United Nations experiment its 
wholehearted endorsement. Senate hearings and debate over 
the Charter proved to be only a formality. The Senate 
approved the Charter by a vote of 69 to 2 on July 28, 1945*^ 
The American people placed great faith in the harmonious 
operation of the new political system. The Second World 
War had ended the debate on whether America should isolate 
herself from the rest of the world. The new order called 
for constant cooperation through a world organization.
Few Americans probably realized the responsibilities 
which this new international role involved. The public 
desire for a peaceful world was matched by an equally strong 
desire to demobilize the armed forces, reconvert industry 
to its peace-time role, and settle the problems of inflation 
and housing shortage. The military responded to this frame 
^  of mind by cutting the size of the army from eight million
to two million between the middle of 1945 and July, 1946; 
the navy from three million to one and one-half million; 
and the air force from 218 combat air groups in 1945 to only
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.). The Private Papers 
of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,.
1952), p. 218. Hereinafter referred to as Papers.
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two by 1947 .5 In accepting the United Nations, the American 
people optimistically looked to this agency to keep the 
peace, but there were warnings. Secretary of the Navy 
Forrestal insisted that the "means to wage war must be in 
the hands of those who hate war."^ , But the public continued 
to demand a release from war-time controls. The result 
was that "a real disparity became apparent between the 
intentions of the United States and its capability in 
respect to the military element of national power.
Americans, on the other hand, assumed the new role 
as a world power against a background of specific objectives. 
The American dream of a peaceful world was one in which 
each nation governed itself free from external restraints, 
but at the same time was willing to settle its disputes with 
other nations in a peaceful manner. The machinery of the 
new international organization must be based on a system of 
sovereign states organized for the purpose of promoting peace 
and justice in the world. The new world organization must 
not interfere with a nation's right to regional defense 
including such cherished policies as the Monroe Doctrine.
The country looked to programs which encouraged international
W i l l i a m  R e i t z e l ,  Morton A. K ap lan , and C onstance  G. 
C o b len z ,  U n i te d  S t a t e s  F o re ig n  P o l i c y ,  1945-1955 (W ashing ton , 
D. C. :  The B ro o k in g s  I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1956), p. 49.
^ W alte r  Mi11i s  ( e d . ) ,  F o r r e s t a l  D i a r i e s  (New York:
The V ik in g  P r e s s ,  1951), p. 97.
n
R e itz e l ,  Kaplan, and Coblenz, op. c i t . , p. 56.
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trade, exchange stability, and relief programs that would 
help war-devastated peoples. On the other hand, Americans 
expected each country to choose its own political and 
economic destiny without the interference of other countries. 
While Americans as a whole probably had little knowledge of 
the sacrifices ahead of them to achieve these objectives, 
most subscribed to international programs as means to that 
end.
Shifting attitudes toward the Soviet Union.— It is 
difficult to ascertain the exact time at which the American 
people began to doubt the sincerity of the Soviet Union."
Even with the knowledge that two antagonistic political 
philosophies existed between the governments in Washington 
and Moscow, the assumption was held that the war-time 
alliance would continue after the defeat of the common 
enemy. "A will for peace on the part of every great power," 
states Dulles, "was taken for granted, once the aggressor 
nations were shorn of their strength.Optimism thus 
filled the air as war ended in victory, and the Charter of 
the United Nations was formulated at San Francisco. "It 
was in this hopeful spirit that they [American people] ," 
notes Dulles,"were at long last prepared to reject isola­
tionism and accept the obligations and responsibilities of 
collective security."9
^Foster Rhea D ulles , op. c i t . ,  p. 219.
9lb id . . p. 220.
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Informed opinion including certain administrative 
officials, however, did not share the optimism of the 
public. America's ambassador to Moscow, Averill Harriman, 
told Secretary of the Navy Forrestal before the San Francisco 
Conference opened in April of 1945, that the "outward thrust 
of Communism" might be "as vigorous and dangerous as Fascism 
or N a z i s m . "^0 The Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C.
Grew, noted in the midst of the United Nations meeting that 
"as a war to end war, the war will have been futile . . . 
for the . . . Soviet Union . . . will constitute in the 
future as grave a danger to us as did the A x i s . H i s t o r i a n s  
note, in fact, that many in administration quarters observed 
the Soviet Union throughout the war "with suspicion," and 
that events in the year of 1945 created grave doubts about 
the continued success of great power u n i t y .^2 Even Roosevelt 
at the time of his death had begun to form certain disillu- 
sionments about Soviet objectives.^3 But such sentiments 
were rarely voiced to the public. "The American people," 
says Dulles, "still placed their faith in the new order that 
they believed was in the making.
^*^Millis, op. cit., p. 47.
^^Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era, II (2 vols.;
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 1445.
^^Reitzel, Kaplan and Coblenz, op. ci t., p. 04.
Julius ¥. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign 
Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), p. 710.
14Fos.ter Rhea D u lles , op. c i t . ,  p. 220.
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The shattering of American hopes for a peaceful 
world was a gradual process. Optimism still surrounded 
the meetings of the Big Three at the Potsdam Conference 
in the summer of 1 9 4 5 . The American people were so 
absorbed, in fact, with the problems of demobilization 
that many failed to detect the "rifts” which unfolded at 
the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London 
from September to October, 1945, and in Moscow in December 
of 1945, and the first meeting of the General Assembly in 
London in January and February of 1946.
Yandenberg^s reaction to the Soviet threat.— Senator 
Yandenberg's experiences with the Russians at San Francisco 
convinced him that the road ahead was a rugged one. He 
became increasingly concerned over Russia’s attitude toward 
Poland. In a letter to Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of 
State, in July, 1945, he expressed concern that the Yalta 
agreement for "free elections" in Poland might be ignored 
by Russia, thus denying Poland "the final opportunity of 
untrammelled self-determination."^^
The Senator also became convinced that the United 
States must not immediately share its atomic secrets with 
its war Allies. He concluded that he favored the sharing 
of atomic secrets with other countries, but he was a firm
l^ lb id . .  p. 223.
^^Record. 79th Gong., 1st S e s s . ,  1945, ZCI, Part 6,
7743.
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believer that such a policy must be preceded by a world-wide 
inspection and control system.^? A squabble developed in 
November of 1945 between Yandenberg and Secretary of State 
Byrnes when Congress was informed of an agreement which the 
administration had reached with Great Britain and Canada in 
regard to the use of atomic energy.Yandenberg objected 
to the by-passing of Congress on the matter. The explosion 
really hit in December vhen a message reached Washington 
that Byrnes, Prime Minister Bevin and Prime Minister Molotov 
had reached an agreement for a proposed United Nations Atomic 
Energy Control Commission.^9
The communique implied that information would first 
be shared before adequate safeguards and inspection systems 
had been provided to protect against those who violated the 
agreements. In protest, Yandenberg threatened to resign as 
a delegate to the first meeting of the General Assembly.
But he changed his mind after the President assured him 
that "each stage of disclosure would be accompanied by 
adequate arrangements for security,"20 and after Byrnes 
stated that any final decision reached on atomic energy 




2Qlbid.. p. 234. ^^Ibid.. p. 235.
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The London meeting,— The Senator's growing distrust 
of the Russians was increased by events at the first session 
of the General Assembly to which Yandenberg was a delegate 
in January, 1945. His official assignment was to represent 
the United States on the Assembly’s Administrative and 
Budgetary Committee.^2 But he was included in American 
discussions regarding Russia’s increasingly obstructive 
policies over Poland, Iran, Hungary and other liberated 
countries in addition to her attitudes toward plans for 
disarmament and control of .atomic energy.
It is not necessary here to review the many contro­
versies which developed over these issues. Historians have 
noted the p rob lem s.^3 . It will suffice to point out that 
Senator Yandenberg was among the American officials to whom 
it became obvious that the Soviet Union was more interested 
in selfish gain than in promoting the cause of world peace. 
He was further convinced that the immediate outcome of the 
rift seemed to show an advantage for the Soviet Union.
While the American delegates pursued the agreements made at 
Yalta, the Soviet Union used every opportunity to gain 
political advantages for itself. Yandenberg decided that
22 I b id . , p. 23#.
23poster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 229. He notes: 
"The hoped-for cordiality in Soviet-American relations, as 
the key to international cooperation, had given away to a 
grim contest that was at first centered on German policy, 
and then spread gradually to other parts of the world."
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appeasement must end.^^ In his mind, the time had come for 
America to "get tough" vftth Russia.
Report of the Speech
Purposes of the speech.— The Michigan Senator made 
public his new attitude toward the Soviet Union in an 
address before the United States Senate in February of 1946.^5 
The speech was given as a report of his trip to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations Organization in London. It 
was in essence a summary of Yandenberg’s impressions of the 
meeting followed by an expression of what he thought America’s 
attitude toward Russia should be in foreign affairs.
Both before and after Pearl Harbor, Senator Yandenberg’s 
basic interest for his country was characterized by the con­
cept of security. He looked for this security before 
December 7, 1941, in Western Hemisphere defense. As early 
as 1943, he had broadened his aim to international collective 
security. His speaking in support of the United Nations 
Charter revealed that he hoped that organization would 
provide the type of collective security which he thought 
his country needed. He expressed the same hope in the speech 
considered here.
This speech, however, registered Yandenberg’s concern 
about various actions taken by Russia. The attitudes of the
.24papers, p. 245.
^^R ecord , 7 9 th  C o n g ., 2d S e s s . ,  1946, ÏCII, P a r t  2 ,  1692.
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Russians in regard to the smaller powers continued to be 
of great concern to him. He had questioned her behavior 
in this regard on a limited scale in his famous January 10, 
1945, address. He excused it then on the grounds that 
Russia feared a rearmed Germany. The Russians had promised 
to leave Manchuria but were still there, and that excuse 
had been removed. Further, they refused to get out of Iran, 
thus breaking a Big Three agreement for evacuation; they 
rejected all attempts to unify Germany; they refused to 
withdraw from Austria; and they continued to dominate Poland 
and other neighboring countries. Yandenberg sought an answer 
to this perplexing problem as he asked, "What is Russia up 
to now?"
The Senator's speech divides into two main parts.
The first section deals with his analysis of the United 
Nations meeting including its credits and its debits. The 
second section treats the tough problem of Soviet-American 
relations, followed by the Senator's recommendations on how 
best to meet the new threat to American security.
Introduction.— Yandenberg introduced the speech by 
praising the work of Senator Connally at the conference.
It was significant to note, however, that no compliments 
were showered on the leadership of Secretary Byrnes. This 
was in direct contrast to his report following the San 
Francisco Conference. In that instance, he praised the 
work of all American representatives. For the discerning
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listener, this failure to mention Byrnes may have been an 
indication that a criticism of the administration's foreign 
policy was in the offing.
The positive achievements of the first meeting.— The 
Senator first turned to the task of reporting the positive 
accomplishments of the meeting. He obviously hoped to ward 
off the slowly encroaching American attitude that the 
United Nations was not capable of meeting the great tasks 
which it had assumed. ”I can share your anxieties over some 
of the disturbing trends," admitted Yandenberg, "but I can­
not— and I do not— share the melancholy pessimism. . . ."26 
The speaker proceeded in his efforts to restore faith in 
those for whom San Francisco had become a disappointment.
In the first place, he argued that the.United Nations 
"must be made to succeed if we are to avoid unspeakable 
catastrophe in this atomic age," adding that if this organi­
zation has problems "any more ambitious project would 
obviously multiply these o b s t a c l e s . F o r  those who would 
despair of ultimate cooperation, he turned to a reminder of
the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki., He was, in effect,
•*
warning his countrymen that these technological developments 
not only made world organization desirable but also mandatory. 
For those who were ready to abandon the.United Nations, he
2&ib id .
2?Ib id . , p. 1693.
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p r e s e n te d  th e  b l u n t  r e a l i t y  t h a t  th e  a to n i c  bomb was i n  th e  
w o rld  t o  s t a y .  The c h o ic e  was c l e a r .  E i t h e r  th e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  m ust assume t h e  t a s k  o f  w ork ing  th ro u g h  th e  o n ly  
e x i s t i n g  in s t r u m e n t  a t  hand , o r  f a c e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
u l t i m a t e  a n n i h i l a t i o n  o f  th e  w o r ld ’ s  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  H is 
f a i l u r e  t o  p r e s e n t  e x te n s iv e  e l a b o r a t i o n  on t h i s  p o i n t  m igh t 
i n d i c a t e  h i s  a w aren ess  t h a t  Am ericans were t i r e d  o f  war and 
w ere  s t i l l  o p t i m i s t i c a l l y  hop ing  t h a t  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  
would p r e v e n t  W orld War I I I .
T h is  p o in t  c a r r i e d  a second i m p l i c i t  w a rn in g  t o  
A m ericans . The S e n a to r  was t e l l i n g  h i s  countrym en t h a t  th e y  
m ust l e a r n  t o  l i v e  w i th  people  whom th e y  do no t e s p e c i a l l y  
l i k e .  Aware t h a t  th e  w a r - t im e  image o f  t h e  S o v ie t  Union as  
a  h e r o i c  n a t i o n  f i g h t i n g  f o r  peace  was fa d in g  i n  th e  l i g h t  
o f  w orld  r e a l i t i e s ,  t h e  M ichigan S e n a to r  hoped to  w ard o f f  
th e  oncoming c o n c e p t  o f  R u ss ia  as a power w i th  whom war was 
i n e v i t a b l e .  He d id  n o t  deny t h a t  t h e r e  were i d e o l o g i c a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  th e  two p w e r s .  But he d id  c h a l le n g e  
t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  w o r ld  was n o t  b i g  enough f o r  p e o p le  w i th  
d i f f e r e n t  v iew s and governm en ts  w ith  v a r y in g  economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  sy s te m s .  A knowledge o f  t h o s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  made 
i t  im p e r a t iv e  t h a t  the  U n ited  S t a t e s  a v a i l  i t s e l f  o f  th e  
C h a r t e r  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  make th e  n e c e s s a r y  a d ju s tm e n t s  f o r  
p e ac e .
The S e n a to r  th e n  d i r e c t e d  a t t e n t i o n  t o  th e  a c c o m p l ish ­
m ents o f  th e  G e n e ra l  Assembly a t  i t s  f i r s t  m e e t in g .  He f i r s t
27Ü
noted certain organizational decisions, including an agree­
ment on a permanent site and a plan for financing the organi­
zation. "On January 1 0 ,  we had a scrap of paper," said the 
Senator. "In 37 days we gave it life." He recalled for his 
audience the disagreements which even those decisions 
provoked, but his subtle reminder to his countrymen was that 
America was not afraid of differing points of view. "There 
was a healthy riva l r y , s a i d  Yandenberg.
Yandenberg’s enumeration of the actions of the 
Assembly makes it obvious that the Senator thought it offered 
the best hope for maintenance of international peace. He 
called attention to the fact that the Assembly had initiated 
studies to find the best means of international control of 
atomic energy, had offered a resolution encouraging self- 
government for all peoples, had encouraged a /ree press at 
all General Assembly sessions, and had refused to sanction 
the involuntary repatriation of war refugees. While admit­
ting that "action must follow words," the- Senator made it 
clear, however, that even such resolutions were steps toward 
peace. He feared that America might not notice such contri­
butions toward peace in its concern over the disagreements 
in the Security Council. Such moves by the General Assembly, 
he thought, organized "the conscience of the world against 
any.aggressor who defies these precepts."^9
ZGlbid. 29lbid.
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The n e x t  phase  o f  Y a n d e n b e r g r e p o r t  on th e  London 
m ee tin g  was u n d o u b te d ly  p a i n f u l .  F u l ly  aware of th e  w o r ld ­
wide a t t e n t i o n  t h a t  the  S e c u r i t y  C ou nc il  had been a t t r a c t i n g ,  
he q u ic k ly  a d m i t te d  t h a t  t h e  C o u n c il  had f a i l e d  t o  t a k e  
a c t i o n  on the  m a jo r  c o n t r o v e r s i e s  b ro u g h t b e fo re  i t .  These 
in v o lv e d  the  q u e s t io n  of p r o t e s t  o v e r  the  p re se n c e  o f  S o v ie t  
t r o o p s  i n  I r a n ,  and B r i t i s h  t r o o p s  i n  G reece , I n d o n e s ia ,  
Lebanon and S y r i a .
The f a c t  t h a t  th e  C o u n c il  l e f t  th e  c o n t r o v e r s i e s  
" t o  f u r t h e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  betw een th e  n a t i o n s  i n  d i r e c t  con­
c e r n , was o f  no a la rm  to  th e  S e n a to r .  The s i g n i f i c a n t  
a s p e c t  o f  th e  problem  was t h a t  each  m easure  had a " f u l l  
h e a r i n g . "  I t  s h o u ld  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  from th e  moment o f  
i t s  i n c e p t i o n .  S e n a to r  Yandenberg had r e g a rd e d  th e  "open 
h e a r in g "  a s p e c t  o f  the  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a s  i t s  g r e a t e s t  p o t e n t i a l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  to w a rd  w orld  p e a c e .  He used  i t  now to  d e fe n d  
th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  C o u n c il  m e e tin g .  He g e a re d  h i s  argum ent 
t o  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  v a lu e s  w hich  Am ericans p la c e d  on th e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  c o n fe re n c e  t a b l e .  There was a l s o  an a p p e a l  
to  th e  American b e l i e f  t h a t  each c o n tr o v e r s y  had a r i g h t  t o  
i t s  day in  c o u r t .  "H ere , words which would have been f i g h t i n g  
words i n  o th e r  d a y s , "  s a id  t h e  S e n a to r ,  "were th e  s u b s t i t u t e s  
f o r  guns and sw o rd s .  . . .  I t  was open d ip lom acy  open ly  
a r r i v e d  a t . "  He a s s e r t e d :
30ib id ,
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But h e re  t h e  c o n t e s t a n t s  were n o t  m ee ting  on a  
b a t t l e f i e l d .  They were m ee tin g  a t  th e  c o u n c i l  
t a b l e ,  i n  t h e  w h i te  l i g h t  o f  f u l l  p u b l i c i t y ,  i n  
t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e i r  p e e r s ,  u n d e r  s e a r c h in g  eyes  
o f  a w a tc h in g  w o rld  and  u n d e r  th e  im pu lse  o f  a  
solem n p led g e  t o  keep t h e  p e ac e .  . . . Here t h e  
f r a n k e s t  im a g in a b le  d i s c u s s i o n s  w ere  t a k i n g  p l a c e .
. . .. Here th e  c o n t e s t a n t s  shook hands a t  th e  
t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  th e  j o u s t s .  . . .  I t  was an  epoch 
i n  t h e  hopes o f  h u m ^ k in d .  L e t  u s  p u t  t h a t  on 
t h e  c r e d i t  l e d g e r .
The S e n a to r  a g a in  r e s o r t e d  t o  " t u r n in g  th e  t a b l e s "  
a g a i n s t  th o s e  who lo o k e d  upon th e  C o u n c i l ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  a c t  
a s  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  in a d e q u a c y  t o  cope w i th  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
What was im p o r t a n t ,  a s s e r t e d  the  S e n a to r ,  was n o t  t h a t  each 
n a t i o n  i n  th e  c o n t r o v e r s y  be s u b je c t e d  to  s a n c t i o n s ,  b u t  
t h a t  th e  C o u n c il  a i r  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  b e f o r e  th e  w o r ld .  In  
t h i s  m anner, im p l ie d  Y andenberg , th e  d e m o c ra t ic  p ro c e s s  had 
b e en  adv an ced . What was s i g n i f i c a n t  was t h a t  th e  C ounc il  
s e t  i n  m otion  a l l  o f  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  s h o r t  o f  d i r e c t  a c t i o n .  
Each n a t i o n ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  s h a re d  i n  th e  p r o c e s s  and " th e s e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i l l  p ro ce ed  i n  the  p re s e n c e  o f th e  n e c e s s i t y  
f o r  an u l t i m a t e  a c c o u n t in g  n o t  o n ly  t o  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o unc il  
b u t  a l s o  t o  t h e  c r i t i c a l  o p in io n s  o f  mankind."32 With p r id e  
he t h e n  p o in te d  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  R u s s ia  was r e n e g o t i a t i n g  
w i t h  I r a n  over  the  p r e s e n c e  o f  R u ss ia n  t r o o p s  on th e  l e t t e r ' s  
t e r r i t o r y .  He hoped t h i s  would r e l a x  th e  grow ing co n ce rn  
i n  A m erica  o v e r  the  p r e s s u r e  which th e  S o v ie t  Union had been
31lbid.. pp. 1693-94.
32lbid. . p. 1694.
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b r i n g i n g  t o  b e a r  on I r a n .  He p u t  t h i s  accom plishm en t on 
t h e  " c r e d i t  l e d g e r . "
The failures of the first meeting.— Vandenberg thus 
used the first division of his speech to assure the world 
that the United States still looked to the United Nations 
as the best hope for peace. He was now ready to recognize 
what he considered the greatest stumbling block to the 
attainment of that goal— the expansionist activities of the 
Soviet Union. For the transition between the two divisions, 
he turned to an incident in the Security Council which showed 
both the value of the United Nations and its greatest limitation.
One of the early appeals to the Security Council came 
from Lebanon and Syria, who called for the withdrawal of 
French and British troops from their borders. Vandenberg 
related in detail how both Britain and France agreed to 
honor this request, the fact that the American delegation 
offered a resolution "asserting the Council’s belief that 
there should be no unwanted troops on foreign soil in peace­
time, and remanding the case to the parties directly con­
cerned for direct negotiation and settlement,"33 and finally
how t h e  S o v ie t  Union moved to  b lo c k  th e  a c t i o n  by o f f e r i n g
o f f e n s i v e  amendments to  B r i t a i n  and F ra n c e .  He s a i d :
. . '. V ish in sk y  in t e r v e n e d .  He w anted  no such  easy  
' 'p e a c e .  He was n o t  s a t i s f i e d ,  he s a i d ,  th u s  to  l e t  
the  m a t t e r  r e s t .  Long and b i t t e r l y  he i n d i c t e d  th e
33%bid.
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a c t i o n  o f  F ra n ce  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  Lebanon and S y r i a .  
I n s t e a d  of b e in g  c lo s e d ,  th e  i n c i d e n t  b la z e d  i n t o  
two more days o f  i n t e n s e  and f u t i l e  d e b a te .  He 
o f f e r e d  amendments t o  t h e  American r e s o l u t i o n  which 
b o th  F ran ce  and B r i t a i n — and most o f  the  c o u n c i l — 
i n t e r p r e t e d  as s t i n g i n g  and un w arran ted  rebukes.34
Vandenberg e x p la in e d  t h a t  R u s s ia ’ s amendment l o s t ,  
f o l lo w e d  by a v o te  i n  v h ich  th e  American p ro p o s a l  g a in e d  
th e  r e q u i r e d  seven  a f f i r m a t i v e  v o te s .  But t h e r e  was a c a t c h ,  
R u s s i a ’ s n e g a t iv e  v o te  v e to e d  th e  p ro p o s a l .  But in  th e  
S e n a t o r ’ s mind, r i g h t  t r iu m p h e d  b ecause  b o th  England and 
F ran ce  announced t h a t  t h e y  would h o n o r ' th e  te rm s  o f  the  
r e s o l u t i o n .
The M ichigan  S e n a to r  was both  p le a s e d  and d e je c t e d  
by t h i s  i n c i d e n t .  ” I  c o n f e s s , ” s a id  t h e  S e n a to r ,  ’’t h a t  I  
was proud of W este rn  democracy t h a t  n i g h t . ” He c a l l e d  i t  
t h e  ’’tr iu m p h  o f  an i d e a l , "35 f o r  Lebanon and S y r ia  had come 
b e fo r e  th e  g r e a t  powers o f th e  w orld  w i th  t h e i r  case  and 
won a v i c t o r y .  Such p ro c e e d in g s  s u b s t a n t i a t e d  V andenberg’ s 
f a i t h  i n  the  f u t u r e  o f  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s .  But th e  s t o r y  
had a d a rk  s i d e .  Why had the  S o v ie t  d e le g a t e  who was 
supposed  t o  be s u p p o r t in g  g r e a t  power u n i ty  seemed ’’l e s s  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  peace  a t  t h i s  p o in t  t h a t  he was in  f r i c t i o n ? "  
The S e n a to r  u se d  t h i s  e p is o d e  a s  a prime example o f  h i s  
m ajo r q u e s t io n ,  "What i s  R u s s ia  up to  now?" T h is  q u e s t io n ,  
im p l ie d  V andenberg , i s  no t  academ ic , b u t  " i t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,
3 4 i b i d .  3 5 i b i d .
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t h e  supreme conundrum o f  ou r  t i m e . "  An en u m era tio n  
fo l lo w e d :
We ask  i t  in  M anchuria . We ask  i t  in  E a s te r n  
Europe and th e  D a r d a n e l l e s .  We a sk  i t  i n  I t a l y .
. . .  We a sk  i t  i n  I r a n .  We a sk  i t  i n  T r i p o l i t a n i a .
___ We ask  i t  i n  the  B a l t i c  and  th e  B a lk a n s .  We a s k  i t  
i n  P o lan d . We a s k  i t  i n  Canada. We ask  i t  i n  J a p a n .
We ask  i t  som etim es even in  c o n n e c t io n  w ith  e v e n t s  i n  
o u r  own U n ited  S t a t e s .  "What i s  R u ss ia  up to  now?"3o
Yandenberg*s recom m endations t o  meet th e  t h r e a t . — The 
S e n a to r  had f o r c e f u l l y  l a i d  t h e  i s s u e  b e fo re  th e  American 
p e o p le .  The t im e  had come, a c c o rd in g  to  V andenberg , to  
f i n d  an answ er t o  t h i s  b a f f l i n g  q u e s t io n .  He d id  n o t  c la im  
t o  have the  answ er, b u t  he s u g g e s te d  th e  p a th  down which 
America must t r a v e l  i n  o r d e r  t o  meet t h e  i s s u e .
V a n d e n b e rg , ' f i r s t ,  r e c o g n iz e d  th e  i d e o l o g i c a l  d i f f e r ­
ences  betw een the  two pow ers . He was o b v io u s ly  aw are t h a t  
some peop le  had  r e a c h e d  the  p o in t  where th ey  th o u g h t  t h e s e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  made i t  im p o s s ib le  f o r  th e  two c o u n t r i e s  to  work 
t o g e t h e r .  T h is  p o s i t i o n  was r e j e c t e d  by the  S e n a to r .  He 
h e ld  t o  th e  hope t h a t  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s  s t i l l  o f f e r e d  th e  
b e s t  hope f o r  p e ac e .  The i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  c o n f l i c t  t h e o r y  
was n o t  a c c e p te d .
N e i th e r  would the  S e n a to r  a g re e  t h a t  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  
must d r a s t i c a l l y  a l t e r  h e r  p o s tw a r  o b j e c t i v e s  in  o r d e r  to  
d e a l  w i th  th e  S o v ie t  Union. What was r e a l l y  n e ed e d , a s s e r t e d  
V andenberg , was f c r  America t o  t a k e  a f i rm  s ta n d  i n  a l l  h e r
3°Ibid.
284
d e a l in g s  w i th  R u s s ia .  " I  a s s e r t  my own b e l i e f , "  s a id  
V andenberg , " t h a t  we can  l i v e  t o g e t h e r  in  r e a s o n a b le  harmony 
i f  t h e  U n ited  S t a t e s  sp e ak s  a s  p l a i n l y  upon a l l  o c c a s io n s  
a s  R u ss ia  d o e s ." ^ ^  He o f f e r e d ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  a f i rm : .e s s  w ith  
p a t i e n c e  p o l i c y .  The c h i e f  p rob lem  seemed t o  l i e ,  he t h o u g h t ,  
i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  A m ericans w ere a f r a i d  to  " g e t  to u g h "  w ith  
R u s s ia  o u t  o f  f e a r  t h a t  th e y  w u l d  endanger t h e  p eace . Such 
" v a c i l l a t i o n "  s a i d  V andenberg  would b reed  i n e v i t a b l e  c o n f l i c t .
While he a d v o ca te d  a " g e t - to u g h "  p o l i c y ,  Vandenberg 
o b v io u s ly  d id  n o t  want to  le a v e  th e  im p re ss io n  th_at he was 
f o r  c r e a t i n g  an a n t i - S o v i e t  b lo c .  He w anted t h e  American 
p e o p le  t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  he b e l i e v e d  th e r e  i s  room i n  th e  
w orld  f o r  both  t h e  S o v ie t  Union and th e  U n ited  S t a t e s .  So 
d e te rm in e d ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  he must n o t  l e a v e  t h e  im p re s s io n  
t h a t  he was p ro p o s in g  t o  s h u t  th e  door on n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  t h e  
S e n a to r  r e p e a t e d  h i s  J a n u a r y  10, 1945, p rom ise  to  h e lp  
c r e a t e  a t r e a t y  o f  m u tu a l  d e fe n s e  t o  ward o f f  p o s s ib l e  f u t u r e  
A xis  a g g r e s s io n .  He t r i e d  t o  a v o id  g iv in g  th e  S o v ie ts  
f u r t h e r  ground to  i n t e n s i f y  t h e i r  a g g re s s iv e  p u r s u i t s .  He 
d i d  w arn , n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h a t  R u ss ia  would c o o p e ra te  in  th e  
U n ite d  N a t io n s  o n ly  i f  Am erica came f o r t h  as a g g r e s s iv e l y  
f o r  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  w hich  she n e g o t i a t e d ,  as  d id  th e  
S o v ie t  Unio . .
3 7 lb id .,  p. 1695.
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C lo s e ly  a k in  t o  t h e  w a rn in g  t h a t  Am erica must s e t  a  
l i m i t  on "com prom ise" was t h e  c a l l  he made f o r  A m ericans t o  
r e t u r n  t o  th e  "m ora l l e a d e r s h i p  w h ich  we have  to o  f r e q u e n t l y  
a l lo w e d  t o  l a p s e , "  add in g  t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  m ust " a c t  
i n  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r  f o r  l i b e r t y  and j u s t i c e ,  and 
no t t o  l a p s e ,  a s  I  f e a r  we may have  done on some o c c a s io n s .
The S e n a to r  d id  n o t  b o t h e r  t o  s p e c i f y  th e  i n c i d e n t s .  He 
cou ld  have  been  r e f e r r i n g  to  c e r t a i n  d e c i s i o n s  made a t  Y a l t a ,  
o r  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  had  n o t  made a lo u d  
p r o t e s t  o v e r  R u s s i a ' s  u n i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n  in  I r a n ,  M anchuria  
and E a s t e r n  E u ro p e . I t  i s  u n l i k e l y  he was r e f e r r i n g  to  t h e  
f a i l u r e  t o  j o i n  i n  a " q u a r a n t in e "  o f E uropean  a g g r e s s o r s  i n  
th e  l a t e  19.30' s .  H is e x p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e ,  how ever, i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  he  p ro b a b ly  had in  mind a l l  t h e  r e c e n t  S o v ie t  o b s t r u c t i v e  
p o l i c i e s  t o  w hich America had n o t  g iv e n  u n r e l e n t i n g  o p p o s i t io n .  
In  any e v e n t ,  he w anted  America t o  c o n t in u e  h e r  lo n g  h i s t o r y  -  
o f  s p e a k in g  up  f o r  th e  advancem ent o f c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s ,  b e l i e f  
i n  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t s ,  and r e s p e c t  f o r  law  and j u s t i c e .  I t  i s  
p o s s ib l e  t h a t  he meant t o  i n f e r  t h a t  i f  America d i d n ' t  speak 
up f o r  t h e s e  i d e a l s  a t  th e  c o n fe re n c e  t a b l e ,  t h e  t im e  would 
soon come when sh e  would have t o  f i g h t  f o r  them i n  World War 
I I I .  For th e  moment, a t  l e a s t ,  he  was c o n te n t  t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  
America must th row  h e r  i n f lu e n c e  on th e  s id e  o f  decency  and 
hum an ity .
3% bid.
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As n o te d  i n  h i s  sp e ec h  i n  d e fe n se  o f  th e  C h a r t e r ,  he 
seemed to  t h in k  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t  s t r e n g t h  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s  
a s  an in s t r u m e n t  i n  k e e p in g  th e  peace l a y  i n  i t s  m ora l i n f l u ­
ence  r a t h e r  th a n  i n  the  u n i t y  o f  the  B ig -F iv e  war pow ers . He 
w an ted  t h e  w o rld  t o  know t h a t  America c o u ld  n o t  s a n c t i o n  
a c t i o n s  opposed t o  A m e r ic a 's  d e c l a r a t i o n s  o f  m ora l  p u rp o se .
He was th u s  c o n ce rn e d  t h a t  " i n  t h i s  f i r s t  m e e tin g  o f  t h e  
U n ite d  N a t io n s  I  m is se d  t h e  u p l i f t i n g  and s u s t a i n i n g  z e a l  
f o r  a  g r e a t ,  c r u s a d in g ,  m oral cause  w hich  seemed t o  imbue 
t h e  e a r l i e r  C h a r te r  s e s s i o n s  a t  San F r a n c i s c o . H e  was 
s e r v i n g  n o t i c e  t h a t  Am erica had no t f o r g o t t e n  th e  fu n d am en ta l  
p r i n c i p l e s  e sp o u sed  t h e r e .
H is  p l e a  f o r  a  r e t u r n  t o  m o r a l i t y  was a l s o  embedded
-
i n  h i s  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  he found  a  ten d e n cy  a t  th e  London 
m ee tin g  among some n a t i o n s  " t o  u se  the  U n i te d  N a t io n s  a s  a 
s e l f - s e r v i n g  t r i b u n e  r a t h e r  th a n  a s  a t r i b u n a l . N a m e s  
w ere n o t  c a l l e d ,  b u t  i t  was o bv ious  t h a t  he was t h i n k i n g  
p r i m a r i l y  o f  the  S o v ie t  U nion. T h is  was h i s  own im p l ie d  
answ er t o  th e  q u e s t i o n ,  "What i s  R u ss ia  up t o  now?" H is 
example o f  th e  c a s e  in v o lv in g  Lebanon and S y r i a  c l e a r l y  
i n d i c a t e d  t h e  S o v ie t  t e c h n iq u e s  o f  c r e a t i n g  d i s s e n t i o n  by 
a rg u in g  i s s u e s  n o t  p e r t i n e n t  w i th  the hope o f  c a u s in g  a 




S o v ie ts ^  p u rp ose  was to  advance t h e  communist w o r ld  c o n q u e s t .  
But he was c o n te n t  t o  l e t  h i s  a u d ie n c e  draw t h e i r  own con­
c l u s i o n s .  He d id  c a l l ,  how ever, f o r  a  f i rm  hand i n  d e a l in g  
w i th  th e  R u ss ia n s  which would n o t  s a c r i f i c e  m o r a l i t y  f o r  
u n a n im i ty .
C o n c lu s io n . — "We need  b u t  one r u l e , "  s a i d  th e  S e n a to r .  
"What i s  r i g h t ?  Where i s  J u s t i c e ?  T here  l e t  Am erica t a k e  
h e r  s t a n d . "41 T h at " s ta n d "  meant a s t r o n g  a s s e r t i o n  o f  
American i d e a l s .  The speech t h u s  ended on th e  same n o te  
w i th  w hich i t  beg an . He s im p ly  r e p e a t e d  h i s  p l e a  f o r  a 
c o n t in u e d  t r u s t  i n  the  U n i te d  N a t io n s .  T h is  new " f r a n k n e s s , "  
he c o n te n d ed , i n  American n e g o t i a t i o n s  "does  n o t  d e t r a c t  f o r  
an i n s t a n t  from t h e  n o ta b ly  l o y a l  and r i c h l y  h e l p f u l  r e c o r d  
w hich  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  has made t o  the  fo u n d a t io n s  o f  t h e  
U n i te d  N a t io n s . "  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  the  many 
prob lem s i n  A m erican -S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s ,  he i n s i s t e d  " t h a t  th e  
c r e d i t s  u t t e r l y  p re p o n d e ra te  w i th  a h eav y , a  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  a 
wholesome and an e n c o u ra g in g  b a l a n c e . "4%
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  Speech
The e s se n c e  o f  V andenberg^s r e p o r t  on t h e  G e n e ra l  
Assembly m ee ting  was s im p ly  t h a t  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  made p r o g r e s s  




Vandenberg c la im ed  so  much f o r  a c o n fe re n c e  w hich  d id  l i t t l e  
more th a n  p a ss  r e s o l u t i o n s .  I t  i s  e asy  to  see  t h a t  a  v o te  
o f  c o n f id e n c e  d id  n o t  a l l e v i a t e  th e  hun g e r  o f  m i l l i o n s  o f  
p e o p le s ,  and n e i t h e r  d id  an e x p re s s io n  o f  sympathy f o r  war 
r e f u g e e s  b r in g  them  any c l o s e r  t o  freedom . V andenberg , i n  
f a c t ,  may have evaded th e  r e a l  i s s u e  on th e s e  m a t t e r s  by 
f a i l i n g  to  d i s c l o s e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Big F iv e  d isa g re e m e n t  on 
p r a c t i c a l l y  ev ery  f a c e t  o f  t h e s e  problem s made any r e a l  
p r o g r e s s  tow ard  s o l u t i o n s  an  i m p o s s i b i l i t y .  To have exposed  
th e  many d is a g re e m e n ts  u n n e c e s s a r i l y ,  however, would have 
d e f e a t e d  h i s  o b j e c t i v e  o f  b u i ld in g  c o n f id e n c e  i n  th e  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n .  I t  can be a rg u e d  t h a t  i t  would have been b e t t e r  f o r  
th e  S e n a to r  to  have made a f r a n k  and c a n d id  e x a m in a t io n  o f  
t h e  l i m i t s  and c a p a c i t i e s  o f  th e  United. N a t io n s .  F o r such  
a c h o re ,  th e  S e n a to r  was w e l l  q u a l i f i e d .  But such  f r a n k n e s s  
i n  h i s  speech  m ight have s im p ly  ea rn ed  him th e  l a b e l  o f  
" i s o l a t i o n i s t "  a g a in  and g r e a t l y  have weakened h i s  f u t u r e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  w o rld  p e ac e .
The " g e t - t o u g h "  p o l i c y . — Again w i th  h in d s i g h t  o f  
s e v e r a l  y e a r s  to  d i r e c t  o n e ’ s t h i n k i n g ,  h a r d ly  anyone would 
q u a r r e l  w ith  V andenb erg ’ s t h e s i s  th a t  America i n  1946 sh o u ld  
be f i r m  in  h e r  d e a l in g s  w i th  t h e  Communists. T here  w as , o f . 
c o u r s e ,  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n  in  t h i s  argum ent t h a t  th e  S o v ie t  
U n ion ’s b e h a v io r  was n o t  a c c o rd in g  to  American s t a n d a r d s ,  
and he c a l l e d  f o r  a f i r m  s ta n d  to  b r in g  h e r  t o  a more f a v o r a b le  
p o s i t i o n .  What he p r e s e n te d  was a m idd le  c o u rse  be tw een  th o s e
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•who would f o r c e  a com ple te  showdown w i th  R u ss ia  on th e  
g round s  t h a t  she was se e k in g  w o r ld  d o m in a t io n ,  and th o s e  
who would p la y  a " s o f t "  r o l e  on t h e  t h e o r y  t h a t  R u s s i a ’ s 
a c t i o n s  were a r e s u l t  o f  th e  f e a r s  she  p o s s e s s e d  over t h e  
atom bomb i n  American h a n d s .  An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  V andenberg’ s 
sp eech  shows t h a t  he th o u g h t  each  such  d i s p u t e  sh o u ld  be met 
on i t s  own m e r i t .
F o re ig n  p o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s . — The speech  a l s o  r e v e a l e d  
s e v e r a l  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  I n  th e  f i r s t  
p l a c e ,  i t  was an i n d i r e c t  c r i t i c i s m  o f  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s 
p o l ic y  to w ard  th e  R u s s ia n s .  He was c a l l i n g  on S e c r e t a r y  
B yrnes to r e c o g n iz e  th e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  l i f e ;  Am erica cou ld  
n o t  c o n t in u e  g iv in g  a f a v o r a b l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t o  S o v ie t  
a c t i o n s  a s  had  been  t h e  case  d u r in g  World War I I .  W hile he 
d id  n o t  become s p e c i f i c ,  i t  was o b v io u s  t h a t  he had  in  mind 
such  S o v ie t  a c t s  as  th e  b rok en  Y a l ta  p rom ise  n o t  t o  i n t e r f e r e  
wi'th f r e e  e l e c t i o n s  in  P o la n d ,  H ungary , B u l g a r i a ,  and Rumania. 
He th o u g h t  t h a t  i t  was t im e  f o r  th e  S t a t e  D epartm ent to  
r e c o g n iz e  such  a c t s  a s  d e f i n i t e  e x p a n io n i s t  p o l i c i e s  by th e  
S o v ie t  Union. He w anted  the  U n i te d  S t a t e s  to  l i f t  i t s  v o ic e  
a g a i n s t  R u ss ia  i n  any a c t i o n  i n  which i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g reem en ts  
h a d .b e e n  b r o k e n .  He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  sh o u ld  
s u s t a i n  " i t s  own p u rp o se s  and i t s  i d e a l s  upon a l l  o c c a s io n s  
a s  R u ss ia  do e s . "4-3
43ib id .
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A second  im p l i c a t io n ,  was a  d i r e c t  w arn in g  t o  th e  
American p eo p le  t h a t  t h e r e  must be a l i n e  beyond w hich  th e  
U n i te d  S t a t e s  would no t go i n  compromising w ith  t h e  R u ss ia n s .  
F u l l y  aw are t h a t  " th e  American p u b l ic  was no t y e t — in  1945- 
46— v e ry  much a ro u s e d " ^ ^  o v e r  th e  A m erican -S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s ,  
th e  S e n a to r  hoped t o  awaken th e  c o u n try  to  t h i s  new t h r e a t .
He gave a s t r o n g  w arn ing  t h a t  A m erican-freedom  and  s e c u r i t y  
were b e in g  j e o p a r d iz e d  by  a new appeasem en t. The s o l u t i o n  
he o f f e r e d  t o  th e  p rob lem  was no t s im p ly  t o  q u i t  d e a l in g  ■ 
w i th  th e  R u s s ia n s ,  b u t  i n s t e a d ,  he i n d i r e c t l y  c a l l e d  upon 
America t o  t e l l  t h e  w o rld  what she s to o d  f o r  and implement 
t h a t  announcement w i th  a c t i o n .  He th o u g h t  t h a t  American 
f r a n k n e s s  would "win S o v ie t  r e s p e c t  and S o v ie t  t r u s t . "^5 
The w ords " g e t  to u g h "  were n e v e r  used  i n  th e  sp e e c h ,  bu t  
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  was c l e a r .
He a d m i t te d  t h a t  d u r in g  th e  war Am erica c o u ld  a f f o r d ,  
p e rh a p s ,  t o  g iv e  i n  to  S o v ie t  demands, b u t  added t h a t  "we 
can n o t  c r o s s  i t  ( t h e  l i n e )  a g a i n . H e  d id  no t e l a b o r a t e .
He c o u ld  have i l l u s t r a t e d  R u ss ian s  i m p e r i a l i s t i c  i n t e n t i o n s  
by p o i n t i n g  t o  th e .m an y  b roken  p rom ises  w hich were made a t  
Y a l t a  and Potsdam . He co u ld  have c i t e d  numerous exam ples 
t h a t  would have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  R uss ia  was on a m is s io n  o f
^ ^ F o s te r  Rhea D u l l e s ,  op. c i t . . p .  227.
^^R eco rd , 7 9 th  C ong ., 2d S e s s . ,  1946 , Ï C I I ,  P a r t  2 ,  1695, 
4^Ibid.
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w o rld  c o n q u e s t .  He c o u ld  have p o in te d  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  
L eb an o n -S y r ia  s i t u a t i o n  a s  an example o f  R u s s ia n s  r e f u s a l  
t o  s e t t l e  e x c e p t  on h e r  t e r m s .  He co u ld  have s a i d ,  i n  f a c t ,  
t h a t  d e m o c ra t ic  compromise works o n ly  when th e  n a t i o n s  in v o lv e d  
a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  u se  i t  f o r  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  a l l  n a t i o n s ,  b u t  
n o t  when one o r  more o f  them s e i z e  i t  a s  a  d e v ic e  t o  a c h ie v e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  a m b i t io n  f o r  th e m s e lv e s .  He c o u ld  
have s a id  a l l  t h i s  and m ore. But h i s  pu rp ose  was t o  s a lv a g e  
t h e  i d e a l s  o f  t h e  U n ited  N a tio n s  i f  a t  a l l  p o s s i b l e .  Few 
cou ld  q u a r r e l  w i t h  h i s  r e s t r a i n t .  He s im p ly  a sked  t h a t  
America be a s  a g g r e s s iv e  i n  p u r s u i t  o f  h e r  g o a l s  a s  was th e  
S o v ie t  Union.
Looking b a c k ,  i t  was c e r t a i n l y  to  V andenberg^s c r e d i t  
t h a t  he was w i l l i n g  to  s t a n d  b e f o r e  h i s  countrym en i n  1946 
and ask  them t o  f a c e  the . r e a l i t i e s  o f  l i f e .  T h is  i s  s u b s ta n ­
t i a l l y  what he d id  i n  th e  sp eech  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  W hile 
he v o ic e d  what men in  an o f f i c i a l  governm en ta l  c a p a c i ty  had 
n o t  been w i l l i n g  t o  do, t h e r e  was n o th in g  r a d i c a l  about h i s  
p r o p o s a l .  T here  was no i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  Yandenberg th o u g h t  
America sh o u ld  b y -p a s s  t h e  U n ited  N a t io n s  i n  d e a l in g  w i th  
th e  R u s s ia n s .  N e i th e r  was t h e r e  any m en tio n  o f  ch ang ing  th e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  U n ited  N a tio n s  in c lu d in g  t h e  v e to  power.
T here was, o f  c o u r s e ,  no c r i t i c i s m  o f  the  S o v ie t  Union f o r  
sp e a k in g  h e r  mind i n  the  U n ited  N a t io n s  m e e t in g s .  T here  
was s im p ly  an a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  America must 
make h e r  p o l i c i e s  c o n c r e te  w h ile  a t  the  same tim e d raw ing
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upon h e r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  compromise w i t h in  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  
m o r a l i t y .  The S e n a to r  hoped t h a t  th e  American p eo p le  
would buy  a  p r o p o s a l  w h ich  prom ised  t o  seek  American 
s e c u r i t y  w i t h in  th e  fram ework o f  the  U n i te d  N a t io n s  w h i le  
a t  th e  same t im e  Am erican d ip lo m a ts  s to o d  up f o r  Am erican 
i d e a l s .  He a sk e d  f o r  no m ore.
I t  m ust be a d m i t te d  t h a t  even a m id d le  g round p o s i ­
t i o n  a s  p ro p o se d  by Yandenberg was an improvement o v e r  t h e  
n a iv e t e  w i th  w hich  Am erican o f f i c i a l s  n e g o t i a t e d  w i th  t h e  
R u ss ia n s  a t  t h e  end o f  World War I I .  The w eakness o f  h i s  
p r o p o s a l ,  how ever, was i n  h i s  obv ious f a i l u r e  to  en cou rage  
t h e  Am erican p e o p le  t o  back up t h i s  new p o l i c y  w i th  a d e q u a te  
d e fe n se  m e a su re s .  He f a i l e d  to  e x p la in  how an a g g r e s s iv e  
a t t i t u d e  by  Am erica was g o in g  t o  im press  the  R u ss ia n s  when 
d e m o b i l i z a t i o n  was f a s t  d i s s i p a t i n g  American power. The 
S e n a to r ,  i n  f a c t ,  made no o v e r t  e f f o r t  t o  stem th e  t i d e .
N e i th e r  d id  he e x p l a i n  how m oral commitments would be 
r e s p e c t e d  w i th o u t  th e  power t o  e n fo rc e  them .
Y andenberg , p e r h a p s ,  moved ahead o f  th e  p e o p le  i n  
c a l l i n g  on A m ericans t o  h a l t  t h e  e x p a n s io n i s t  demands o f  
t h e  Communists. But i t  was a l s o  n e c e s s a ry  to  warn A m ericans 
t h a t  f a c i n g  up t o  t h e  demands o f  th e  h o u r  meant a  new con ­
c e p t io n  o f  t h e i r  w o r ld  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ;  i . e . ,  a r e c o g n i t i o n  
t h a t  a w orkab le  c o o p e r a t i v e  e f f o r t  i n  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s  and 
t h e  f u l l  a s su m p tio n  o f  American m oral a t t i t u d e s  to w a rd  t h e  
n a t i o n s  o f th e  w o r ld  demanded a  s t r o n g  American m i l i t a r y  f o r c e .
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I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  im agine  t h a t  th e  S e n a to r  th o u g h t  t h e  
s a f e t y  o f  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  c o u ld  be in s u r e d  i n  t h e  f a c e  
o f  a " g e t - to u g h "  p o l i c y  when t h e  c u r r e n t  r a t e  o f  d e m o b i l iz a ­
t i o n  was f a s t  d e s t r o y in g  an a d e q u a te  m i l i t a r y  d e f e n s e .  W ith 
t h i s  r e a l i z a t i o n ,  i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  he owed i t  t o  h i s  
a u d ie n c e  to  em phasize  t h a t  th e  w o r ld  must be co n v in c ed  o f  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  i f  Am erica was 
to  have a  sound r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  w o r ld .
He, p e rh a p s ,  f e l l  i n t o  l i n e  w i th  o t h e r s  o f  h i s  t im e .  H is ­
t o r i a n s  n o te :  "The g r e a t e r  number o f  th o s e  who a d v o c a te d
t h e  " to u g h e s t"  l i n e  showed no e a g e rn e s s  t o  pay t h e  m one ta ry  
and human c o s t s  o f  f o l lo w in g  t h e i r  own a d v i c e , "  w h i le  
em p hasiz ing  t h a t  " th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  was w i th o u t  th e  m i l i t a r y  
c a p a c i ty  t o  p u rsu e  a  b o ld  d ip lo m a t i c  c o u rs e .
N e i th e r  d id  V andenberg^s a n a l y s i s  come to  g r i p s  w i th  
t h e  whole p rob lem . Even i f  one a d m its  t h a t  a  " t o u ^  p o l i c y "  
a t  d ip lo m a t ic  t a b l e s  was d e s i r a b l e ,  and i t  w as , V andenberg 
sh o u ld  have r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  th e  r e a l  problem  was o u t s i d e  t h e  
c o u n c i l  room i n  key a r e a s  i n  Europe and A s ia .  He p o in te d  
t o  th o s e  when he m en tioned  Y u g o s la v ia  and M anchu ria .  But 
he im p l ie d  t h a t  a f r a n k e r  p o l i c y  would s o lv e  th e  p rob lem .
The au d ie n ce  was n ev er  t o l d  j u s t  how t h i s  new d ip lom acy  
would d e a l  w i th  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and economic t e c h n iq u e s  which 
t h e  S o v ie t s  w ere  u s in g  t o  i n f i l t r a t e  many c o u n t r i e s .  Did
^^Reitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, op. c i t . ,  p. 92.
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h i s  " g e t - to u g h "  p o l i c y  mean t h a t  he was re a d y  f o r  America 
t o  meet t h e  economic c h a l le n g e  t h a t  Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n  
had  p r e s e n te d ?  I f  s o ,  t h i s  should  have been  made e x p l i c i t .
I n  t h i s  sp e e c h ,  th e  S e n a to r  c a l l e d  f o r  a new approach  
t o  American d e a l in g s  w ith  t h e  Communists a t  the  c o n fe re n c e  
t a b l e .  H is  p o l i c y  f e l l  s h o r t  o f  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  th e  " c o ld  
w ar"  i n  t h a t  he d id  n o t  p ro p o se  a d r a s t i c  change i n  s a f e ­
g u a rd in g  American s e c u r i t y  o u t s i d e  th e  c o u n c i l  chambers o f  
t h e  U n ite d  N a t io n s .  But he p o in te d  to  a  new d i r e c t i o n  in  
c a l l i n g  f o r  an end t o  American t o l e r a t i o n  o f  R u ss ian  ex p ansion .
The A ddress  on P o s tw ar  American F o re ig n  P o l i c y  
The R e p u b lic a n  P a r ty  c a p tu r e d  c o n t r o l  o f  b o th  houses  
o f  C ongress  i n  t h e  1946 e l e c t i o n .  S e n a to r  V andenberg , l e a d ­
in g  R e p u b lica n  a d v o c a te  o f  t h e  n o n p a r t i s a n  c o n cep t  i n  f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s  and new chairm an  o f  the  S e n a te  F o re ig n  R e la t io n s  
C om m ittee , u se d  t h e  o c c a s io n  o f  an  a d d re s s  b e fo r e  th e  C lev e ­
l a n d  Forum on J a n u a ry  11, 1947^^ t o  d i s p e l l  any f e a r s  t h a t  
t h e  R e p u b lic a n s  would a t t e m p t  any s e r i o u s  changes i n  f o r e ig n  
p o l i c y .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  o f  t h i s  pronouncement on f o r e ig n  
p o l i c y  can b e s t  be g ra s p e d  by exam in ing  th e  c o n te x t  o f  w orld  
e v e n t s  i n  w hich  t h e  speech  was d e l i v e r e d .
The C o n tex t o f  th e  Speech
^ % h e  t e x t  o f  th e  a d d re s s  i s  r e p r i n t e d  in  t h e  U. S. 
C o n g re s s io n a l  R e co rd . SOth C ong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1947, I C I I I ,  
P a r t  1 ,  pp . 272-44 .
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Reactions to Yandenberg^s 1946 "firmness with 
patience" policy.— The American press rushed to support the 
"get tough" with the Russians policy which the Senator advo­
cated in his February 27, 1946, address. The Detroit Free 
Press, for example, noted that the speech "left you with a 
sense of hi story going on here now." The Omaha World-Herald 
looked upon the speech as the "voice that America has been 
longing to hear."49 Arthur Krock of The New York Times 
viewed the address as a serious condemnation of the admin­
istration's foreign policy and insisted that the speech was 
"much milder than its implications."5^ Time magazine went 
even further in saying that the speech was "a challenge"51 
to Secretary of State Byrnes to adopt a firmer tone in ' 
American-Soviet relations.
Secretary Byrnes accepted Vandenberg's challenge in 
an address before the Overseas Press Club of New York City 
on February 2S, 1946. "If we are going to be a great power," 
said Byrnes, "we must act as a great power, not only in order 
to insure our own security but in order to preserve the peace 
of the world." The Secretary reflected the "get-tough" 
spirit when he asserted that while the United States "had 
approved many adjustments in" Russia's favor, in the future
^^Papers, p. 250.
^^The New York Times, March 1, 1946, p. 20.
^^"National Affairs," Time, ILVII (March 11, 1946)> 19.
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the United States "intends to defend the Charter,” because 
such action is in "the interest of world peace and in the 
interest of our common and traditional f r i e n d s h i p . ”5%
Byrnes also emphasized as Vandenberg had on the pre­
ceding day that the United States must continue to work 
through the United Nations for peace. But the Secretary 
went beyond Vandenberg in noting that more than a change 
in attitude toward Russia at the diplomatic table was 
necessary to keep the peace. He stressed that "we cannot 
allow our military establishment to be reduced below the 
point required to maintain a position commensurate with our
responsibilities."53
The new policy in operation.— The firmer tone advo­
cated by Vandenberg and Byrnes was reflected for the remain­
der of 1946 in American negotiations with the Russians.. The 
new attitude did not completely adhere to the position Sir 
Winston Churchill advanced at Fulton, Missouri in March of 
1946. He asserted that the United States and Great Britain 
should join in an anti-Soviet alliance for survival. While 
clinging to the hope that great power unity could be preserved, 
the new middle position of American diplomats simply tried 
to preserve long-term American goals.
52The New York Times. March 1, 1946, p. 10.
5 3 i b i d .
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The first application of the new policy was at the 
Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris, April, 1946. 
Senators Connally and Vandenberg accompanied Byrnes. The 
purpose was to negotiate peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Italy. The firmness policy was especially 
applied when discussions began on the Italian peace treaty. 
Russia insisted that Yugoslavia should get Trieste, but the 
Western nations argued for the establishment of a trusteeship. 
Vandenberg gave a flat "No" reply when asked by Byrnes if he 
were prepared to trade Trieste for progress on other p r o b l e m s . 54 
The conference reached a stalemate and recessed until June 15, 
1946.
When the Foreign Ministers* Conference resumed in 
June, Vandenberg was again in attendance. He agreed with 
Connally and Byrnes that America should seek an early show­
down with ^ssia. After several days of delaying action, 
the Russians sprang several agreements on the Western powers.
The conference agreed on an internationalization plan for 
Trieste. Vandenberg prepared a "free territory" draft which 
Russia finally accepted.
Vandenberg*s report to the Senate reflected the phil­
osophy of the new firmness attitude in operation. While 
admitting that the United States did not have things all its 
way at Paris, he insisted that American ideals were never
^^Tapers, p. 2 5 2 .
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sacrificed. The compromising spirit is noted in the.remark: 
"Trieste should have gone to Italy," but at the same time, 
there must be no "breakdown in peace."55 He also displayed 
a new confidence in Secretary Byrnes. "I do not know how 
any representatives of America could have been more faithful 
to the human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .”56
The new firmness policy was also carried into the 
Paris Peace Conference in July, 1946. Vandenberg and.Connally 
went to the meeting in response to Byrnes’ plea that they 
were needed to help "defend the United States against the 
criticism now being directed against us by the satellites 
as well as the Soviet U n i o n ."^7 The German treaty was the 
major issue of the conference. Byrnes suggested a four-power 
treaty similar to the one proposed by Vandenberg on January 10, 
1945, as a move to calm Russian fears that the United States 
was returning to a policy of i s o l a t i o n . 5& When Russia 
rejected the proposal, the administration issued a statement 
on the German situation designed to clarify the American 
position. Accompanied by Vandenberg and Connally, the Sec­
retary went to Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, to make the
^^Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 7,
9062.
^^Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, XCII, Part S,
10534.
^7james Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper
& Bros., 1946), p. 140.
58ibid.. p. 171.
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pronouncement that the United'States would occupy Germany 
as long as was needed to keep her from becoming "a pawn or 
a partner in the military struggle for power between the 
East and the West.”59
A minority in the United States thought Byrnes was 
going too far in replying to the Russians. Secretary of 
Commerce Wallace charged that Byrnes’ ”get tough with 
Russia” policy was leading America into World War III. He 
contended that ”the tougher we get, the tourer the Russians 
will get.” 0̂. Speaking before an audience at Madison Square 
Garden in New York, he said: ”We must not let the reactionary
leadership of the Republican party ... . and the British 
balance of power manipulations determine whether and when 
the United States gets into war."^^
Wallace’s remarks confused diplomats at the Paris 
Peace C o n f e r e n c e . ^2 Would the United States be expected to 
follow the ”get-tough” policy of Byrnes, Vandenberg, and 
Connally, or the ”go-easy” policy of Wallace? Reports reached 
Paris that Truman had approved the Wallace speech in advance
59lbid.. p. 139.
^Qlhe New York Times, September 13, 1946, p. 1.
An
Ibid., September 13, 1945, p. 4.
&2john C. Campbell (ed.), The United States In World 
Affairs, 1945-1946 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, for
the Council on Foreign Relations), p. 448.
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of its presentation.^3 Vandenberg retorted: "We can only
cooperate with one Secretary of State at a time."&4 Byrnes 
wired Turman: "The world today is in doubt not only as to
American foreign policy, but as to your foreign policy," 
insisting "the administration itself is divided. . . .  It 
cannot hope to convince the world that the American people 
have a foreign policy."^5 Truman called for Wallace's 
resignation. The press reaction indicated that the public 
stood firmly behind Byrnes' p o l i c y . T h e  Vandenberg 
"firmness with patience" policy passed its first major 
challenge on the home front.
The 1946 election.— Vandenberg decided that his 
campaign for re-election to the Senate in 1946 must not 
interfere with his diplomatic work. "I am not going to 
let my work for peace get bogged down into politics," he 
said. "Politics are important; but peace is indispensable."&7 
Instead of returning to Michigan to campaign, therefore, 
Vandenberg accepted the administration's invitation to • 
participate in the second meeting of the General Assembly 
in New York City on October 23, 1946.
^3papers. p. 300. Truman had not read the speech, but 
had only heard portions which Wallace had read to him.
64ibid.. p. 3 0 1.
^^Bymes, op. cit., p. 24I.
67t
^^The New York Times, September 21, 1946, p. 14-
Papers, p. 304.
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Vandenberg set the tone for the elections. Politics 
stopped at the "water’s edge." The returns sent the Repub­
licans to Washington with landslide majorities in both houses 
of Congress. Senator Vandenberg shared in the victory with 
a vote majority of $67,674.^^ Some thought the Republican 
victory marked the end of bipartisan policy. Senator John 
Fullbright even called on President Truman to appoint "a 
Republican Secretary of State and then resign the Presidency 
to be succeeded by that a p p o i n t e e . B u t  Senator Vandenberg 
assured the country on December 18, 1946, that he would 
"cooperate in maintaining the united American foreign policy 
. . .  in respect to the peace settlements in Europe, and in 
establishing collective security and justice through the 
United Nations." Such a policy, said Vandenberg, was "vital 
to our own national interest.
Vandenberg’s new role.— Vandenberg emerged as one of 
the outstanding personalities of the Eightieth Congress.
He served not only as Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations but also President Pro-Tempore of the 
Senate. His influence was felt early in the session when 
he rushed through the nomination of General George C. Marshall 




^^The New York Times, November 7, 1946, p. 1.
Ibid. . December 18, 1946, p. 3*
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criticism of Marshall's work in China in 1945, Vandenberg 
secured the approval of the Foreign Relations Committee 
on the same day in which hearings were held.
He also moved early in the session to outline the 
foreign policy the world could expect from the new Republican 
Congress. He found the occasion at the January 11, 1947,
21st Annual Cleveland Council on World Affairs. Both 
Vandenberg and Byrnes addressed the closing session to an 
estimated audience of 12,000 spectators. Byrnes used the 
occasion to deliver his final foreign policy address as ■ 
Secretary of State. "From the same platform Senator Arthur 
H. Vandenberg," said Time, "redefined U. S. foreign policy 
for the first time since becoming head of the U.-S. Senate's 
Foreign Relations Committee.
Report of the Speech 
Vandenberg's Cleveland Forum address was delivered 
in the atmosphere of a world becoming increasingly aware 
of the '"cold war."" His major purpose was to establish the 
fact that America would not retreat from her "firmness with 
patience" role in the struggle. The speech differs from 
the Senator's other addresses in that he sought to advance 
no specific proposal. Vandenberg had in mind the whole 
world for his audience. He made it plain, of course, that
^^"Report from the World," Time, XLIX (January 20,
1947), pp. 53-54
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he could not speak for the Senate. He further admitted 
that major party decisions are made by the President. He 
simply wanted to set forth the long-range goals for which 
the Republican leadership in the Senate would strive.
The speech divides into five parts. Each division 
is an expression of Vandenberg^s attitude on selected phases 
of American foreign policy. In the first part, he pledged 
continued support for the bipartisan concept in foreign 
affairs. His objective was to define the concept along with 
an analysis of its use and abuse. He next assured the world 
that America would continue to support the concept of collective 
security. In the third part he revealed his attitudes toward 
the United Nations and its problems including the abuse of 
the veto provision in the Security Council, fiscal failures 
of the organization, and the breakdown of plans for disarma­
ment. He used the fourth division to discuss Americans role 
in the economic aspects of the world's peace. The fifth 
part, labelled "a few swift o v e r t o n e s , consisted of a 
brief mention of the need for peace treaties, a program for 
Latin America, and problems in the Far East.
Introduction.— The introduction was apparently designed 
to stress both Anærican faith in collective security and 
American bipartisanship in foreign affairs. He compared the
1 , 2 73 .
^̂ Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, ÏCIII, Part
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meeting in Cleveland with the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. The "town meeting of the air," he asserted, gives 
the world hope that "reason is calculated to outweight 
force."73 His praise for retiring Secretary of State Byrnes 
and his successor, George Marshall, was evidence that he had 
no quarrel with the administration's foreign policy, Byrnes, 
he insisted, "has relentlessly defended American ideals in 
crises," while noting that Marshall "has always enjoyed the 
total confidence of Congress and of all his military and 
civilian colleagues at home and a b r o a d . "74 Then he moved 
to his thesis sentence. "Tonight, according to your program, 
the United States replies to the w o r l d . " 7 5
Bipartisan foreign policy.— The ^enator first assured 
the world that he would continue to support a bipartisan 
foreign policy. "Partisan politics, for most of us," said 
Vandenberg, "stopped at the water's edge. I hope they stay 
stopped— for the sake of America— regardless of what party 
is in power." He emphasized that he had in mind a "permanent 
American foreign policy, in basic essentials, which serves 
all America and deserves the approval of all American-minded 
parties at all times." The goal of this policy, he said, 





of a substantially united front." He was happy to report 
that "despite some distressing domestic interludes, it has 
b o m  rich fruits.
While conceding that the President is the final judge 
on foreign policy, he hinted that the White House could 
expect criticism for any action not arrived at by bipartisan 
means. He criticized foreign policy decisions only in areas 
in which cooperative consultation with the opposition party 
had not been the case. When he referred to problems facing 
the country in regard to collective security and peace 
treaties, he was careful to leave the impression that the 
country faced these problems with solidarity^ ‘Having par­
ticipated, for example, in the negotiations at the Paris 
Peace Conference he was aware that many aspects of the 
agreements were unsatisfactory. But he supported the 
administration in__defendijig them. "These five treaties are 
far from satisfactory in many aspects," he said. "But they 
bear no remote resemblance to the greater dissatisfactions 
which we have prevented.Collaboration with the opposition 
appeared to be the price that the President must pay for 
unity in foreign affairs. Vandenberg freely admitted, of 
course, that the President had the right to decide whether 




He also served notice on the administration that he 
was unhappy over the fact that the United States did not 
have a unified policy towards Latin America, Far East, and 
Middle East. In each instance, there had been no extensive 
bipartisan efforts. Plainly, Vandenberg was unhappy because 
he had not been consulted on these matters as he had been 
on the development of the United Nations and the European 
peace treaties. He was critical of the delay in calling 
the Latin American Conference for purposes of negotiating 
a Western Hemispheric defense pact under the Act of 
Chapultepec. His criticism extended to the China policy 
where he implied that America should stop trying to unify 
the country. This outspoken criticism of administration 
policy clearly indicates that he regarded a bipartisan 
approach as one in which statesmen could disagree. It is 
clear, however, that he expected consultation between the 
two major parties as foreign policy issues arose.
Collective security.'— Having firmly established his 
hope that a bipartisan foreign policy would continue in the 
American government, the Senator next assured the world that 
America would continue to support collective security. ”I 
assume the world chiefly wants to know," said the Senator, 
"whether America will persist in its attitude toward collective 
peace and security." His answer was very explicit. America 
would "do everything within its power to sustain organized 
international defense against aggression . . . through
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international c o o p e r a t io n ." ? #  Apparently aware that some
might fear a return to isolationism now that the Republicans
were back in control of Congress, he gave assurance that the
world need have no worry. "Pearl Harbor ended that debate,"
he said. "We learned that the oceans are no longer moats
around our ramparts."?9 Replying to those abroad who were
in doubt about America’s future role and to any possible
isolationist tendencies that might spring up in the new
Congress, he added:
. . . then we contributed the crowning proof our­
selves. In the climax of this tragedy we ourselves 
devised the atom bomb— an appalling tribute to our 
illimitable genius— an equally appalling prophecy 
of civilization’s suicide. . . . This produced the 
inevitable conviction that the jungle code of war 
must be repealed for k e e p s .
The United Nations.— Having assured the world that 
America would not retreat from its belief in collective 
security, the Michigan Senator emphasized that the United 
States still looked to the United Nations as the basis of 
that concept in operation. "We have embraced the United 
Nations as the heart and core of united, unpartisan American 
foreign policy," insisted the Senator, adding that "we shall 
be faithful to the letter and the spirit of these obligations.
Vandenberg probably had more in mind at thi s point 
than simply to reassert America’s intentions to remain in
f^ib id . , p. 272. • '̂ Îb id .
GOlbid. ^^Ibid . , p. 273.
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the United Nations. He may have been trying to restore 
faith in the organization. The world had just witnessed 
a breakdown in the unanimity of the Big-Five powers. The 
peoples of the world were just becoming aware of the split 
of the world into two power groupings, each with irrecon­
cilable philosophies and basically different concepts of 
the political state. The struggle was made evident as the 
contest over Germany unfolded. The Senator promised that 
America would not abandon the organization. "This will be 
true," he said, "no matter what administration sits in 
Washington. . .
But his reply to the world also included the admission 
that all was not well with the new organization. As examples 
of the hazards facing the United Nations, he pointed to the 
frequent use of the veto, the fiscal failures, and the lack 
of progress toward effective disarmament. He admitted that 
the much hoped for Soviet-American unanimity had given away 
to a fight that was slowly encompassing the globe. The very 
fact that the war allies had failed by concerted action to 
keep the peace would seem to indicate that the time had 
come for the United States to create the desired postwar 
conditions through other methods. He made no such admission. 
Instead, he proposed means of furthering the objectives of 
the Charter in the light of existing world conditions.
d^Ibid.
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Vandenberg's plan for improvement appears superficial.
He recognized the veto as a major weakness of the organization. 
To overcome this, he called for voluntary restraint in the 
use of this weapon. He implied that the basic weakness in 
the organization was not a fundamental structural fault but 
was, instead, in the spirit of the members who "make use of 
the veto as a stultifying checkmate." He was apparently 
cognizant of opinion in many quarters that abolition of the 
veto would transform the United Nations into a workable 
instrument for peace. Aware that such action was futile, 
he hoped for a miracle that would change the attitude of 
member nations. "We must not be impatient," he insisted.
"It took five years to take the world a part. It would not 
be surprising if it took at least that long to put it together 
again."^3
Neither did Vandenberg offer a solution to the stale­
mate over disarmament. He made it clear that America would 
disarm, first, when other nations were prepared to follow 
through on an adequate renunciation of weapons, and second, 
when the United Nations demonstrated that it had the capacity 
to keep the peace. "It is our dearest dream," he asserted,
"but we shall not dream ourselves into a nig h t m a r e . A b o v e  
all, he wanted the world to know that America would not be 
fooled by the mere promises of other nations that they would
^^Ibid . ^^Ibid,
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d isa rm . He a s s e r t e d ;
. . .  we s h a l l  n o t  d isa rm  a lo n e .  We s h a l l  n o t  t r u s t  
to  th e  p e r s u a s io n  of our exam ple . We t r i e d  t h a t  once 
b e f o r e .  We s h a l l  t a k e  no sw e e tn e ss  and l i g h t  f o r  
g r a n te d  i n  a w o r ld  i n  which t h e r e  i s  t o o  much i r o n  
c u r t a i n .  We s h a l l  n o t  t r u s t  a lo n e  t o  f i c k l e  w ords.
Too many words a t  Y a l ta  and Potsdam have  been  d i s t o r t e d  
o u t  o f  a l l  p r e t e n s e  o f  i n t e g r i t y .  We s h a l l  no t  ig n o re  
r e a l i t y . .  . . .85
The S e n a t o r ' s  p o s i t i o n  was sim ply  t h a t  th e  U n ited  
S t a t e s  would c o n t in u e  t o  work w ith  th e  U nited  N a tio n s  f o r  
p e a c e .  The c o u n try  would p la c e  i t s  m ajor r e l i a n c e ,  how­
e v e r ,  n o t  i n  t h i s  c o o p e r a t i v e  u n d e r t a k in g ,  b u t  i n  i t s  own 
s t r e n g t h .  . "We do n o t  i n t e n d  t o  be a t  anybody’ s mercy; n o r  
do we in^.endr' t o  e m a sc u la te  o u r  a u t h o r i t y  w ith  th o s e  who 
may'”s t i l l  t h in k  in  te rm s  o f  f o r c e .  The c o r n e r s to n e  o f  
A m erica ’ s s e c u r i t y  w ould c o n t in u e  to  be h e r  own system  o f  
d e fe n s e .  N o tin g  t h a t  America had a monopoly upon th e  
" s i n i s t e r  s e c r e t "  o f  t h e  a tom ic  bomb fo r  some y e a r s  to  come, 
th e  S e n a to r  r e p l i e d  t h a t  t h e  U n ited  S t a t e s  co u ld  develop  
f o r  i t s e l f  d e f e n s iv e  power of a d e q u a te  scop e . He made i t  
c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  America was w i l l i n g  t o  j o i n  i n  e f f e c t i v e  
a tom ic  en e rg y  c o n t r o l s ,  b u t  he gave th e  p r i c e  o f  such coop­
e r a t i o n .  I t  was s im p ly  "an e f f e c t i v e  system  o f  con tinuous 
i n s p e c t i o n  and c o n t r o l  w hich  makes c e r t a i n  t h a t  no i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  b r ig a n d  s h a l l  h e r e a f t e r  b r e a k  f a i t h  w i th  u s  and w i th  
t h e  w o r l d . "^7 N o t ice  was th u s  s e rv e d  on R u ss ia  t h a t  a s  lo n g
85lbid. 36ib id . ^Vibid.
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a s  she u n r e l e n t i n g l y  opposed e f f e c t i v e  in s t ru m e n ts  o f  
armament c o n t r o l s ,  t h e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  would r e s i s t  w i th  
d e t e r r e n t  pow er.
Economic a i d . —The S e n a t o r ’ s f o u r t h  announcement to  
t h e  w orld  c o n ce rn e d  A m erica ’ s c o n t r i b u t i o n s  tow ard  economic 
a i d  f o r  p e a c e .  I t  was n o t s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  he s u p p o r te d  
U n ited  S t a t e s  a id  th ro u g h  t h e  U n i te d  N a tio n s  R e l i e f  and 
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n  A d m in is t r a t io n  d e s ig n e d  to  meet th e  u r g e n t  
problem  o f  d i r e c t  r e l i e f  f o r  s t r i c k e n  p o s tw a r  a r e a s .  He 
w arned , how ever, t h a t  America would no t su p p o r t  the  program  
a lo n e .  " I  am s u re  t h a t  C ongress  w i l l  make a l i b e r a l  r e l i e f  
p ro g ra m ,” he s a i d ,  ’’even though  we n e v e r  a g a in  c o n t r i b u t e  
72 p e rc e n t  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  fund  . . . which can be con­
t r o l l e d  and e x p l o i t e d  by o t h e r s . A m e r i c a  had f i r m l y  
com m itted h e r s e l f  to  t h i s  c o u rse  o f  a c t i o n .  But Vandenberg 
r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  t h e  economic problem s in v o lv e d  more t h a n  
r e l i e f .  He a s s e r t e d  t h a t  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  shou ld  " c o n t in u e  
t h e  d e v ic e  of r e c i p r o c a l  t r a d e  a g re e m e n ts ,  i n  one form  o r  
a n o th e r ,  t o  r e l e a s e  and expand m u tua l t r a d e . ” ^9 T h is  p o s i t i o n  
was t h e  e x a c t  o p p o s i te  o f  the  one a d v o c a te d  by th e  S e n a to r  
d u r in g  the  1 9 3 0 ’ s .  His a t t i t u d e  shows the in f lu e n c e  o f  h i s  
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t i c  t h in k i n g  on h i s  whole o u t lo o k  tow ard  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  He had a p p a r e n t l y  come to  b e l i e v e  th .-.t 
A m erica ’ s p r o s p e r i t y  as  w e l l  a s  th e  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  th e  r e s t
G^ibid. ^9ibid.
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o f  t h e  w o rld  co u ld  b e s t  be s e rv e d  by th e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  
some of th e  a r t i f i c i a l  b a r r i e r s  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .
V andenberg^s new p o s i t i o n  on t r a d e  sh o u ld  not be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  mean t h a t  he had become a " f r e e  t r a d e r . "
He r e c o g n iz e d  th e  f a c t s  o f  l i f e .  America would have t o  
buy w here she s o ld  goods, o r  she would soon f i n d  th o s e  
m ark e ts  c lo s e d  t o  h e r .  T h is  c a l l e d  f o r  a  w i l l i n g n e s s  on 
t h e  p a r t  o f  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  to  r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  t a r i f f  c o n c e s s io n s  would be n e c e s s a r y .  He d id  n o t  b l u r t  
o u t  t h i s  s im p le  t r u t h .  I t  co u ld  mean t h a t  he  was no t p e r -  ■ 
s o n a l l y  re a d y  f o r  d r a s t i c  t a r i f f  r e v i s i o n s .  I t  c o u ld  a l s o  
mean t h a t  he was t r y i n g  t o  av o id  r a i s i n g  C o n g re s s io n a l  
o b j e c t i o n s  a t  t h i s  e a r l y  h o u r  i n  th e  new s e s s i o n .
O ther p ro b le m s . —The S e n a to r  l a b e l e d  t h i s  d i v i s i o n  
o f  h i s  speech  "a  few s w i f t  o v e r t o n e s . "  He gave b r i e f  m en tio n  
t o  a number o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  prob lem s b u t  made l i t t l e  e f f o r t  
t o  d i s c u s s  them . He s a i d  he r e g a rd e d  th e  f a i l u r e  to  re a c h  
peace  t r e a t i e s  w i th  A u s t r i a  and Germany a s  t h e  " h e a r t  o f  t h e  
E uropean p r o b l e m . "9^ He showed p a r t i c u l a r  c o n ce rn  f o r  th e  
f a t e  o f  Germany. He s im p ly  r e i t e r a t e d  th e  p o s i t i o n  which 
S e c r e t a r y  B yrnes had e x p re s s e d  i n  t h e  sp eech  a t  S t u t t g a r t .
He c h a rg ed  th e  R u ss ia n s  w ith  v i o l a t i o n  o f  th e  Potsdam a g r e e ­
ment which had prom ised  t h a t  th e  German o c c u p a t io n  zones  
w ould f u n c t i o n  a s  an economic u n i t .  "We in te n d  to  rem ain  in
90lbid.
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o c c u p a t i o n , ” s a i d  t h e  S e n a to r ,  " u n t i l  t h i s  jo b  i s  d o n e . ” 91  
He made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  p u rp o se  o f  o c c u p a t io n  was n o t  
m o t iv a te d  by a  d e s i r e  t o  c o n t r o l  th e  German p e o p le ,  b u t  f o r  
th e  p u rp o se  o f  i n s u r i n g  a  f r e e  Germany.
The S e n a to r  was r e a l i s t i c  i n  h i s  a p p r a i s a l  o f  t h e  
German s i t u a t i o n .  Germany was a  symbol o f  a d e e p e r  c o n f l i c t .  
The i m p l i c a t i o n  was c l e a r  t h a t  b o th  R u ss ia  and th e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  were c o n c e rn e d  w i th  th e  b a la n c e  o f  power t h a t  a  new 
Germany w ould c r e a t e .  Vandenberg gave no h i n t  a s  t o  t h e  way 
ou t o f  t h i s  s t a l e m a t e .  This was t h e  b e g in n in g  o f  A m erica ’s 
p o l i c y  o f  c o n ta in m e n t .  He r e c o g n iz e d  th e  p r o l o n g a t io n  o f  
th e  c o n f l i c t .  The n e x t  move was up t o  the  S o v ie t  U nion. 
America w ould w a i t  and r e a c t .  The S e n a to r  o f f e r e d  no p ro o f  
f o r  th e  so u n d n e ss  o f  t h i s  p o s i t i o n .  He s im p ly  a s s e r t e d  i t  
w i th  t h e  c o n f id e n c e  o f  one who th o u g h t  he spoke to  an a g re e ­
in g  a u d ie n c e .
H is  n e x t  " s w i f t  o v e r to n e ” was a b r i e f  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  
i t  was t im e  f o r  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  t o  c a l l  a  c o n fe re n c e  o f  
th e  L a t i n  A m erican N a t io n s  t o  work on a  r e g i o n a l  a rran g em en t 
f o r  s e c u r i t y  i n  t h e  W estern  H em isphere . N o tin g  t h a t  t h e  
S t a t e  D epartm ent p rom ised  t h i s  i n  1945 , he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  i t  
was needed  t o  " r e s t o r e  th e  warmth o f  th e  new w orld  u n i t y . "92
91lbid.
92ibid. . p. 274.
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F i n a l l y ,  t h e  S e n a to r  s h i f t e d  h i s  i n t e r e s t  t o  th e  
F a r  E a s t .  He s a i d  t h a t  i t  was tim e f o r  America t o  en cou rage  
t h e  reg im e of C hiang K a i-s h e k .  A lthough he i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  
h i s  s u g g e s t io n  was m o t iv a te d  o u t  of r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  N a t io n ­
a l i s t s ,  i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  w i th  t h i s  move he hoped to  keep  
China o u t  o f  th e  S o v ie t  o r b i t .  While th e  S e n a to r  f a i l e d  t o  
s p e c i f y  t h e  ty p e  o f  encouragem ent he h a d  in  m ind, i t  was 
ob v io u s  t h a t  h e  was t h i n k i n g  o f  f i n a n c i a l  h e l p .  T hat 
m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  was n o t  in v o lv e d  i s  e v id e n ce d  by h i s  
a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  " o u r  m a r in e s ,  hav ing  f i n i s h e d  t h e i r  t a s k ,  
a r e  coming hom e.” ^^ W hether he would have g iv e n  Chiang 
g i g a n t i c  su p p o r t  i s  n o t  c e r t a i n ,  but h i s  a p p a r e n t  f a i t h  in  
t h a t  reg im e would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  he had  no c l e a r  c o n c e p t io n  
a t  t h i s  t im e  o f  t h e  im pending c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  
f o r c e s .
C o n c lu s io n . — The speech  ended w i th  a  t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  
U n i te d  N a t io n s .  "The U n ited  N a t io n s , "  s a i d  th e  S e n a to r ,
"h as  r a i s e d  th e  s t a n d a r d  t o  w hich  men o f  good w i l l  . . . 
can  r e p a i r . "  In  s p i t e  o f  h i s  f r e q u e n t  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  American 
d e v ic e s  t o  b u i ld  i t s  own n a t i o n a l  power, he t r i e d  t o  save  
t h e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  " F i f t y - f i v e  n a t i o n s  
a r e  com m itted t o  solemn co v en an t  to  h e l p  eac h  o t h e r  keep  th e  
p eace  . . . and  i t  h a s  a l r e a d y  sped u s  on t h i s  G o d -b le s se d
QA
way. America w i l l  do h e r  f u l l  p a r t . ”
93Ibid. 94ibid.
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I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  Speech 
The new R ep u b lican  l e a d e r s h i p »— S e n a to r  V an d en b e rg 's  
sp e ec h  b e f o r e  th e  C leve land  Forum f u r n i s h e d  few , i f  any , 
new id e a s  f o r  th e  conduct o f  American f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s .
But he may have perfo rm ed  a  more im p o r ta n t  f u n c t i o n .  What 
was n eed ed , p e rh a p s ,  was a v o ic e  t h a t  c o u ld  t e l l  the  w orld  
e x a c t l y  w hat i t  co u ld  ex p ec t  from  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  of th e  new 
R e p u b lica n  C o n g ress .
V a n d en b e rg 's  speech  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  n a t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t  was in v o lv e d  i n  th e  s t r u g g l e  o f  n a t i o n s .  The w orld  
c o u ld  e x p e c t  no w ith d raw a l  by A m erica. u r th e r m o r e .  Repub­
l i c a n s  and Democrats a l i k e  were u n i t e d  b e h in d  th e  con cep t 
o f  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y ,  a d e s i r e  t o  see  th e  U n ite d  N a t io n s  
w ork , and a w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  sm a l l  n a t i o n s .  The Communist n a t i o n s  were p u t  on g u a rd  
t h a t  America would n o t  ap p ease  t h o s e  who a t te m p te d  th e  
c o n q u e s t  o f  o t h e r s .  America was u n i t e d  i n  i t s  d e te r m in a t io n  
t o  f a c e  t h e  S o v ie t  c h a l le n g e  w i th  a f i rm n e s s  t h a t  d id  no t 
p u rc h a se  " u n i t y  a t  any p r i c e . "95
The M ichigan  S e n a to r ,  p e r h a p s ,  was th e  one man b e s t  
q u a l i f i e d  t o  p r e s e n t  t h i s  m essage t o  t h e  w o r ld .  He was n o t  
o n ly  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l ic y  l e a d e r  o f  h i s  own p a r t y ,  but s in c e  
1945 , he had e a rn e d  a p o s i t i o n  o f  t r u s t  and s t r e n g t h  w i th in
95%bid., p. 272.
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t h e  c i r c l e s  o f  th e  o p p o s i t io n .  His was an e f f e c t i v e  v o ic e  
t o  l e t  i t  be known t h a t  t h e  f u l l  fo rc e  o f  America would be 
u se d  t o  head  o f f  any a t t e m p t  t o  d i s r u p t  th e  m a jo r  p o l i c i e s  
o f  U n ited  S t a t e s  d ip lom acy  a b ro a d .  He f u r t h e r  s p e l l e d  ou t 
h i s  c o n ce p t  o f  the  t e n e t s  o f  American p o l i c y  so t h a t  A l l i e s  
and fo e s  a l i k e  co u ld  see  th e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  o f  h i s  v iew s t o  
th o s e  of th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  I t  i s  t o  h i s  c r e d i t  t h a t  he 
was w i l l i n g  to  n o te  i n s t a n c e s  i n  which h i s  c o n c e p ts  d i f f e r e d  
from th e  S t a t e  Departm ent a p p ro ach .
The g r e a t  weakness o f  t h e  S e n a t o r 's  add h ess  was h i s  
f a i l u r e  t o  o f f e r  a n y th in g  s p e c i f i c  to  d e a l  w i th  th e  prob lem s 
t h a t  he so v i v i d l y  p o r t r a y e d .  He pa raded  th e  t r o u b l e  s p o ts  
o f  th e  w o rld  b e fo re  h i s  a u d ie n c e  i n c lu d in g  th e  s t a l e m a t e s  
o v e r  th e  peace  t r e a t i e s ,  a to m ic  e n e rg y ,  d isa rm am en t,  t h e  
C hina s i t u a t i o n ,  and f a i l u r e s  i n  the  U n ited  N a t io n s .  His 
o n ly  s o l u t i o n  was s im p ly  t h a t  America would f a c e  each problem 
w i th  a  u n i t e d  f r o n t — firm  in  h e r  d e te r m in a t io n  t o  m a in ta in  
i d e a l s  o f  freedom  and human r i g h t s .  In  one i n s t a n c e ,  a t  
l e a s t ,  in  th e  case  o f  C h in a ,  he added t o  th e  a m b ig u i ty  o f  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  by i n f e r r i n g  t h a t  America sh o u ld  ad o p t  a  
p o l i c y  t h a t  n e i t h e r  he n o r  h i s  c o u n try  was w i l l i n g  t o  back 
up  w ith  th e  s a c r i f i c e s  t h a t  would be in v o lv e d .  Vandenberg 
spoke i n  t h e  m id s t  o f  numerous a p p e a ls  from E uropean c o u n t r i e s  
f o r  h e lp  t o  save  them from  t h e  Communists. Y e t ,  he f a i l e d  
t o  d e m o n s tra te  how a " g e t - t o u g h ” p o l ic y  w ould  h e lp  t h e s e  
p e o p le .
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I t  can  be a rg u e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  t h e  
t im e  o r  th e  p l a c e  f o r  Vandenberg t o  advance s p e c i f i c  l i n e s  
o f  a c t i o n ;  t h a t  h i s  pu rpose  was n o t  to  o f f e r  a  s p e c i f i c  
p ro p o s a l  b u t  t o  make a p o s i t i o n  c l e a r  and e v i d e n t .  Y e t ,  
t h e  most e n c o u ra g in g  message he p ro b a b ly  cou ld  have o f f e r e d  
t o  th e  h a r a s s e d  p e o p le s  o f  Europe and A sia  would have been  
a s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  th e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  America were g o in g  to  be 
u se d  to  r e l i e v e  t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n  t h a t  was s t i f l i n g  them . 
Vandenberg met t h e  Communist c h a l le n g e  i n  t h i s  a d d r e s s ;  i f  
he f a i l e d ,  i t  was i n  s t i p u l a t i n g  s o l u t i o n s .
D e f i n i t i o n  o f  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y . - - H i s  co n cep t  
o f  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l ic y  m eant t h a t  p o l i c y  f o rm a t io n  was 
made by both  p a r t i e s  b e fo re  m ajo r  d e c i s i o n s  were a d o p te d .
He a d m it te d  t h a t  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  g r a n t s  t h a t  power 
e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  b u t  he  made i t  p l a i n  t h a t  
w i th o u t  t h e  a p p ro v a l  o f  the  C ong ress  such  a p o l i c y  would 
n o t  have a u t h o r i t y  a b ro a d .  He had c a l l e d  f o r  t h i s  c o o p e r a ­
t i v e  v e n tu r e  be tw een  th e  two p a r t i e s  soon a f t e r  P e a r l  H arbor. 
He re g a rd e d  i t  a s  th e  s in e  qua non o f  an e f f e c t i v e  f o r e i g n  
p o l ic y .9 G
S e n a to r  Vandenberg c o n t in u e d  to  r e g a r d  t h i s  a s p e c t  
o f  b i p a r t i s a n s h i p  a s  a b a s i c  re q u ire m e n t  th ro u g h o u t  h i s  
l a s t  t e im  i n  o f f i c e .  L a te  i n  194S, he d e fe n d ed  h i s  view  
o f  b i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i n  a n a t io n w id e  a d d r e s s .  See 
A r th u r  H. V andenberg , " B i p a r t i s a n  F o re ig n  P o l i c y , "  V i t a l  
S p e e c h e s ,  XV, No. 1 (O c to b e r  15, 1948), p .  13. He s a i d :  
" B i p a r t i s a n  f o r e i g n  p o l ic y  a p p l i e s  o n ly  where c o o p e r a t iv e  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  and m u tu a l  d e c i s i o n  e x i s t s  from  s t a r t  t o  f i n i s h .  
H i s t o r i c a l l y  t h i s  h a s  n o t  been t h e  c a se  i n  C h in a ,  P a l e s t i n e  
o r  J a p a n ,  . . . "
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Vandenberg a l s o  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
sh o u ld  p ro v id e  th e  c h a n n e ls  t o  make com m unication between 
t h e  two b ran c h es  o f  governm ent a  r e a l i t y .  He r e f e r r e d  t o  
h im s e l f  as  a " j u n i o r  p a r t n e r , ” 97 th u s  making i t  a p p a re n t  
t h a t  i n  h i s  mind the  S t a t e  D epartm ent was th e .  agency to  
make th e  n e c e s s a ry  c o n t a c t s  be tw een  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and 
t h e  S e n a te .  He a l s o  l e t  th e  W hite House know t h a t  h i s  
o f f i c e  a s  S e n a te  F o re ig n  R e la t i o n s  Committee Chairman cou ld  
be u sed  as a c h an n e l  o f  com m unication betw een  t h e  two m ajor 
p a r t i e s .  The p r i n c i p l e  o f  b i p a r t i s a n s h i p  need  n o t wane 
j u s t  b ecau se  t h e  R e p u b lic a n s  were now i n  c o n t r o l  o f  C ongress .
Even i f  one a d m its  t h a t  V a n d e n b e rg 's  method o f  f o r e ig n  
p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n  making p o s s e s s e d  more a s s e t s  th a n  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  
i t  would s t i l l  a p p e a r  t h a t  he sh o u ld  a t  l e a s t  have o v e r t l y  
r e c o g n iz e d  th e  p o s s i b l e  i l l  e f f e c t s  o f  b i p a r t i s a n  c o l l a b ­
o r a t i o n  in  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  a lw ays th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  th e  P r e s i d e n t  w i l l  a c c e p t  p o l i c i e s  which 
he might t h in k  unw ise  i n  o r d e r  t o  a c h ie v e  u n i t y .  T h is  
r a i s e s  t h e  whole q u e s t io n  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of Congress 
t o  th e  e x e c u t iv e  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  I t  i s  beyond th e  
scope  of t h i s  s tu d y  to  su p p ly  a d e f i n i t i v e  answer.9& I t
97Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCII, Part
1, 272.
9 ^ C e c i l  V. C rabb, J r . ,  B i p a r t i s a n  F o re ig n  P o l i c y . 
Myth o r  R e a l i t y  (E v an sto n : Row, P e t e r s o n  and Company,
1 9 5 7 ) ,  p .  2 2 4 .^
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w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  Vandenberg owed i t  t o  h i s  
a u d ie n c e  to  r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  th e  P r e s i d e n t  m igh t p o s s ib l y  
s a c r i f i c e  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  in  o rd e r  t o  a p p ea se  members of 
t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t y .
N e i th e r  d id  Vandenberg a p p e a r  b o th e re d  by th e  p o s s i ­
b i l i t y  t h a t  an o ve rem p h as is  on b i p a r t i s a n s h i p  i n  f o r e ig n  
a f f a i r s  m ight mean l e s s  open d i s c u s s i o n  and d e b a t e .  A 
u n i t e d  f r o n t  m ig h t  n o t  alw ays be w orth  th e  p r i c e .  A r th u r  
Krock n o te d  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  Vandenberg was l e a d e r  of t h e  
S e n a te  t h a t  members of h i s  p a r t y  were fo r c e d  " t o  c o n s id e r  
t a x  i n c r e a s e s  in  which th e y  do not b e l ie v e " ^ ^  in  o rd e r  to  
p r e s e r v e  th e  b i p a r t i s a n  p r i n c i p l e .  Even Vandenberg a d m it te d  
t h a t  " i t  may s h o r t e n  f r e e  d e b a te .  . . .  A unanim ous b i p a r ­
t i s a n  Committee r e p o r t  c r e a t e s  an im pe tus  which d i s c o u r a g e s  
p a r t i s a n  a t t a c k . "100 E i H s  A m a l l  m en tio n ed  th e  e f f e c t  on 
t h e  e x e c u t iv e .  "A ccep tance  o f r e a c t i o n a r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  th e  making o f  f o r e i g n  p o l ic y  and th e  rem oval o f  f o r e ig n  
p o l i c y  im p ro p e r ly  from th e  sph e re  o f  p u b l i c  d i s c u s s i o n  . . . 
was f o r c e d  on P r e s i d e n t  Truman by w e l l-m e a n in g  a d v i s e r s  i n  
b o th  p a r t i e s . "101 The absence  o f  p u b l i c  d e b a te  m igh t a f f e c t  
t h e  v a lu e  o f  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n .
^^The New York T im es, November 11 , 1949, p .  21. 
lOOp a p e r s , p .  550.
IO Ie I I I s G. A r n a l l ,  "The Democrats Can W in ,"  A t l a n t i c  
M o n th ly , CLXXXII (O c to b e r ,  1948), 37.
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F i n a l l y ,  Vandenberg seemed to  assume t h a t  i f  p a r t i ­
s a n sh ip  were k e p t  out o f  t h e  d e c is io n -m a k in g ,  th e  governm ent 
would be more l i k e l y  to  fo l lo w  the  p a th  w hich  b e s t  l e d  t o  
American s e c u r i t y .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  e x c e s se s  i n  p a r t i s a n s h i p  
have c ro s s e d  th e  American s c e n e .  Such was th e  c a se  in  1918 
when a p a r t y  f i g h t  k e p t  th e  co u n try  out o f  the  League o f  
N a t io n s .  But t h i s  one example does n o t p rove  t h a t  i t  i s  
wrong t o  have o p p o s i t io n  in  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  N e i th e r  d o es  
i t  d i s p ro v e  th e  th e o ry  t h a t  sounder d e c i s io n s  a r e  r e a c h e d  
where an o p p o s i t io n  e x i s t s .  Vandenberg s im p ly  assumed t h a t  
i t  was d e s i r a b l e  to  avoid  s u b s t a n t i a l  d isa g ree m e n t  betw een  
th e  m a jo r  p a r t i e s  over f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  such  a p o l i c y  might l e a v e  th e  im p re s s io n  t h a t  a l l  a re  
i n  agreem ent when d i f f e r e n c e s  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t  a p p a r e n t l y  
d id  n o t  b o th e r  him.
F or a l l  of t h i s ,  i t  must be a d m it te d  t h a t  th e  
S e n a t o r ' s  s t r o n g  b e l i e f  t h a t  American s ta te s m e n  sh o u ld  n o t  
a t te m p t  t o  make p o l i t i c a l  g a in  out of f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  
was n o b le  in  p u rp o s e . The same, p e rh a p s ,  could  be hoped f o r  
when p o l i t i c i a n s  d e a l  w i th  any v i t a l  i s s u e  in  American l i f e .
A m e r ic a 's  r o l e . — Vandenberg a l s o  em phasized  t h a t  
America would be the  p r o t e c t o r  o f  th e  f r e e  w o rld  b u t  would 
n e v e r  be an  a g g r e s s o r .  But he f a i l e d  to  d i s c u s s  th e  m i l i ­
t a r y  s t r e n g t h  r e q u i r e d  t o  m a in ta in  such a p o s i t i o n .  The 
U n ited  S t a t e s  r a t e  o f  d e m o b i l i z a t io n  d id  n o t  i n s u r e  th e  
s a f e t y  o f  t h e  W estern  H em isphere . As a member o f  th e  S e n a te
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F o re ig n  R e la t io n s  Com m ittee, he u n d o u b ted ly  was aware o f  
t h i s  r e a l i t y .  But he had to  have the  s u p p o r t  o f a Repub­
l i c a n  S e n a te  t h a t  had p rom ised  to  cu t  t a x e s  and red u c e  th e  
n a t i o n a l  d e b t .  He p ro b a b ly  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  th e  t im e  
to  s p r in g  a p r o p o s a l  on the  Congress w hich  c a l l e d  fo r  
i n c r e a s e d  m i l i t a r y  sp e n d in g .
F a i l u r e  t o  s t r e s s  a s t r o n g  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  p la c e d  
him i n  a  dilemma over the  means of a c h ie v in g  d isa rm am ent.
He i n s i s t e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  a way must be e s t a b l i s h e d  to  
p r e v e n t  a b re a c h  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e ac e .  R u ss ia  had r e ­
j e c t e d  a l l  U n ited  N a tio n s  s u g g e s t io n s  f o r  a c o n t r o l s  sys tem . 
H is  hope was o b v io u s ly  t h a t  American s t r e n g t h  would f o r c e  
R u ss ia  i n t o  a c c e p t in g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l s  a s  a means o f  
s u r v i v a l .  But a t  t h e  same t im e ,  he d e v o ted  l i t t l e  e f f o r t  
t o  the  t a s k  o f  awakening th e  p u b l ic  from a p a th y  tow ard  
m i l i t a r y  o b l i g a t i o n s .
The t r a d e  i s s u e . —V andenberg’ s p o s i t i o n  on th e  t r a d e  
i s s u e  came a t  a  c r u c i a l  h ou r  in  the  n a t i o n ' s  h i s t o r y .  The 
R e p u b lic a n  l e a d e r s h i p  had lo n g  been  opposed to  th e  r e c i p r o ­
c a l  t r a d e  a g re e m e n ts .  He s e rv e d  n o t i c e  t h a t  th e  a d m in is ­
t r a t i o n ' s  e f f o r t s  t o  redu ce  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  must c o n t in u e .  He 
l e f t  unan sw ered , how ever, t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  j u s t  how f a r  he 
would go i n  lo w e r in g  American t a r i f f  w a l l s .  The S e n a to r  
p ro b a b ly  hoped f o r  an  im p o rt  b a la n c e  so  t h a t  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  
c o u ld  pay t h e i r  d e b ts  and c o n t in u e  to  p u rch a se  from th e  U n ited
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S t a t e s .  But he made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  a " s a n e , h e a l t h y ,  m u tua l  
t r a d e  e x p an s io n  i s  b e s t  f o r  a l l  c o n c e r n e d ."^02
The S e n a to r ,  p e rh a p s ,  was a l s o  lo o k in g  t o  an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  sys tem  r e l a t i v e l y  f r e e  o f  uneconomic r e s t r i c ­
t i o n s  t o  h e lp  ward o f f  i n c r e a s i n g  communist i n f lu e n c e  in  
c o u n t r i e s  where economic u n r e s t  was a b re e d in g  ground f o r  
R u ss ian  i n f i l t r a t i o n .  "Peace and econom ics a re  i n s e p a r a b ly  
k i n , "^03 he s a i d .  He f u r t h e r  a d m i t te d  t h a t  th e  dem o crac ie s  
o f  th e  w o rld  could  n o t  f i n d  an e n d u rin g  s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  peace  u n t i l  each c o u n try * s  s t a n d a r d  of l i v i n g  
u t i l i z e d  th e  maximum p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  o th e r  n a t i o n s .  America 
i s  no t  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  because  " o u r  v a s t l y  expanded n a t i o n a l  
economy and employment r e q u i r e " 1 0 4  maximum t r a d e  w i th  o t h e r s .  
But he a l s o  hoped t h a t  m utua l t r a d e  program s would h e lp  g e t  
p e a c e - t im e  p ro d u c t io n  go ing  a g a in  i n  f o r e ig n  l a n d s .  He 
f a i l e d ,  how ever, t o  p o in t  ou t  w here Europe was go ing  to  
g e t  th e  c a p i t a l  t o  buy American goods. A method was needed 
t o  r e l i e v e  th e  s c a r c i t y  Of d o l l a r s .  I f  th e  M ichigan  S e n a to r  
had d e v is e d  a means o f  a c c o m p lish in g  t h i s  need in  J a n u a ry  o f  
1947 , he w i th h e ld  i t  i n  h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n s  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  t o  
th e  w o r ld .




The German s i t u a t i o n . —One f i n d s  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
c r i t i c i z e  t h e  S e n a to r  f o r  h i s  u n w i l l in g n e s s  t o  touch  o f f  
a p o s s ib l e  armed c o n f l i c t  by a d v o c a t in g  a p o l ic y  t o  f o r c e  
R u s s ia  o u t  o f  Germany. But h i s  i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  n o th in g  
co u ld  be done t o  r e l i e v e  th e  economic p l i g h t  o f  West 
Germany u n t i l  t h e  c o u n try  was u n i f i e d  i s  open to  q u e s t io n .
He s t r e s s e d  t h a t  " th e  b u s in e s s  o f  renew ed, d e c e n t r a l i z e d  
p o l i t i c a l  autonomy . . . makes en co u rag in g  p r o g re s s  i n  th e  
American z o n e ."^ 0 5  What he f a i l e d  t o  adm it ,  how ever, was 
t h a t  an American economic p o l i c y  i n  West Germany was v i r t u a l l y  
n o n - e x i s t e n t .  The blame f o r  t h i s  c o u ld  no t  b e  p la c e d  
e n t i r e l y  on t h e  m u l t i p l e  zone sy s tem . America was i n  a 
p o s i t i o n  to  o f f e r  a  r e l i e f  p rogram . A d e s p e r a te  Germany 
was to  be p o l i c e d  by an o c c u p a t io n  army, b u t  Vandenberg 
gave no h i n t  t h a t  th e  American p o s i t i o n  could  be enhanced 
by making th e  t e r r i t o r y  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  Such a  p ro p o s a l  
would n o t  have  been o r i g i n a l ;  o c c u p a t io n  a u t h o r i t i e s  had 
c a l l e d  f o r  su c h  h e lp .  A lthough Vandenberg seemed t o  se n se  
t h e  u rg en cy  o f  r e l i e f ,  he co n c luded  t h e  p o in t  w ith o u t any  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  A m erica’ s economic r o l e  i n  t h a t  a r e a .
I t  was p o s s i b l e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  Vandenberg th o u g h t  
i t  unw ise  t o  c a l l  f o r  e x te n s iv e  economic a id  t o  Germany 
u n t i l  f u r t h e r  groundwork had  been  l a i d .  This d id  n o t  ex cu se  
h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  p o in t  ou t t h a t  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  p o s s i b i l i t y
10$Ibid.
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o f  d e v e lo p in g  dem ocracy in  a  c o u n try  i n  which most o f  t h e  
peop le  were l i v i n g  on a low s u b s i s t e n c e  l e v e l ;  and more 
im p o r ta n t ,  to  r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  America cou ld  do som eth ing  
a b o u t  t h i s  d e p lo r a b le  c o n d i t io n  i n  th e  W estern  s e c t o r  w i th  
o r  w i th o u t  a u n i f i e d  Germany. The S e n a to r ,  i n  s h o r t ,  s im p ly  
f a i l e d  t o  d i s p l a y  an im a g in a t iv e  g ra s p  o f  the  t o t a l  p i c t u r e  
i n  Germany.
The China s i t u a t i o n . — His b r i e f  r e f e r e n c e  t o  th e  
cau se  o f  th e  C hinese  N a t i o n a l i s t s  showed no a p p a re n t  g ra s p  
o f  t h e  im pending doom f o r  K a i - s h e k 's  f o r c e s .  H is c a l l  f o r  
h e lp  fo r  th e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  cou ld  have meant l i t t l e  more t h a n  
m ora l  s u p p o r t .  He w ro te  i n  h i s  d i a r y  on F ebruary  10, 1947, 
t h a t  he d id  not c o n s id e r  t h e  w ith d raw a l  o f  American t r o o p s  
a s  an  abandonment o f  t h e  "C hinese  t o  th e  Com m unists ,"  ad d in g  
t h a t  what th e  C h inese  N a t i o n a l i s t s  government needed was 
A m e ric a 's  good w i l l .  He co n c lu d ed , how ever, t h a t  " I  have 
no i l l u s i o n s  ab o u t  C h in a 's  f u t u r e  u n d e r  any p r o s p e c tu s .  I t  
i s  th e  g r e a t e s t  s p e c u l a t i o n  o f  th e  a g e s . "1^6 This s ta te m e n t  
seems t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  on J a n u a ry  11, 1947, he s im p ly  w anted  
th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  governm ent to  s to p  e n c o u ra g in g  a u n i t e d  
C h ina , and i n s t e a d ,  pay l i p - s e r v i c e  to  the  N a t i o n a l i s t  c a u s e .
In  s h o r t ,  Vandenberg took  a m iddle  ground w hich  p le d g e d  
th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  to  su p p o r t  th e  U n ited  N a t io n s  w h i le  a t  th e  
same t im e  making i t  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  w ould  do
106p a p e rs , p. 523.
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what must be done to contain the Communists. What was 
missing was a clear statement of a strategic concept of 
ways and means for America to maintain the reality of 
national power. His speech showed no clear grasp of the 
role America must play in the economic fight for contain­
ment; this was yet to come.
The A ddress  on th e  M a rsh a l l  P la n  
A co n sen su s  was r e a c h e d  i n  1947 t h a t  S o v ie t  e x p an s io n  
must be s to p p e d .  The f i r s t  move was th e  Truman D o c t r i n e ,  
a p ro p o s a l  w hich  e x te n d e d  econom ic a i d  to  th e  d e v a s t a t e d  
s t a t e s  of G reece and T urkey . The n e x t  s t e p  was th e  i n i t i a t i o n  
o f  the  E uropean R ecovery  P rogram , o f te n  c a l l e d  th e  M a rs h a l l  
P la n ,  w hich was begun in  194# in  an e f f o r t  a t  lo n g - r a n g e  
economic p la n n in g  f o r  W este rn  E urope . S e n a to r  Vandenberg 
a s  l e a d e r  o f  th e  F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s  Committee o f  t h e  S e n a te  
was i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n  g a in in g  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e s e  two p rogram s.
In the speech under consideration, he argued for the passage 
of the Marshall Plan. His speech in support of this measure 
can best be understood by an examination of the historical 
events which accompanied the speech and the ensuing legis­
lative debate of which his speech was a significant phase.
The C o n te x t  o f  t h e  Speech 
The end o f  th e  a l l i a n c e . — By e a r l y  1947, American 
o f f i c i a l s  were r e a d y  to  a d m it  t h a t  th e  w orld  community 
e n v is io n e d  i n  t h e  f o r m a t io n  o f  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s  had n o t
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emerged from the war-time alliance. Secretary of State
Marshall took a proposed treaty for German disarmament to
a conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March, hoping
as a result to end the stalemate. The offer was rejected.
The West could not accept either the Soviet claim for%
.partial control of the industrial sections of the Rhur or 
her demand for reparations amounting to ten billion dollars.
The West also refused to accept the Soviet proposal for a 
strong central government for Germany. The conference ended 
in deadlock. "It ended whatever hope may still have survived," 
notes Pratt, "of friendly cooperation between the Communist 
and the non-Communist w o r l d s . "^07
After the Moscow Conference the administration sub­
scribed to the viewpoint of George F. Kennan, who urged 
that the United States "regard the Soviet Union as a rival, 
not a partner, in the political arena." The Soviet Union 
was to be stopped at its present boundaries through a policy 
of containment. The United States would subscribe to 
policies "designed to confront the Russians with unalterable 
counter-force at every point when they show signs of encroach­
ing upon the interests of a peaceful and stable w o r l d . "10#
The American people backed the new policy which affirmed that 
the Kremlin's conduct had demonstrated that there was no
^07pratt, op. c it .,  p. 719.
1 m a
George F# Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951J, p. 126.
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"conmiunity of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which 
are regarded as c a p i t a l i s m . "^09 The war-time vision of "one 
world" changed to a concept of a world divided into two 
power groupings, each with irreconcilable philosophies.
The European economic situation constituted further 
awareness of the Soviet-American'split. Unlike America, 
which emerged from the war with the greatest prosperity peak 
in its history, European countries faced poverty in the form 
of shortages of raw materials, a shortage of dollars, and a 
steadily declining production. Under these conditions, these 
countries faced the threat of ever increasing Communist infil­
tration. As a prostrate people, they turned to America for 
help. The United States, in an effort to utilize its own 
power, braced itself to aid these people as a means of con­
taining the Communist.
The Truman Doctrine.— The British government’s announce­
ment that its military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey 
would end in March of 1947 provided the incentive for American 
action. It was clear that with British withdrawal from these 
areas, Soviet influence could spread all the way to the 
Eastern Mediterranean. This could mean many more converts 
to the Communist cause in countries which could not meet the 
economic needs of their people. The United States decided 
to accept the challenge. On March 12, 1947, President Truman
109ibid. , p. 115.
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a sk e d  C ongress  f o r  f o u r  b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  i n  d i r e c t  a id  t o  
t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s .  " I t  must be the  p o l i c y , "  s a i d  Truman,
" o f  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  t o  su p p o r t  f r e e  p e o p le s  who a re  
r e s i s t i n g  a t te m p te d  s u b ju g a t io n  by armed m i n o r i t i e s  o r  by 
o u t s i d e  p r e s s u r e s . "^^0 The P r e s id e n t  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  
he was t h i n k i n g  p r i m a r i l y  o f  economic s u p p o r t .
S e n a to r  Vandenberg su p p o r te d  th e  Truman D o c t r in e .
He a rg u e d  b e f o r e  C ongress t h a t  C o n g re s s io n a l  f a i l u r e  t o  
s u p p o r t  t h e  r e q u e s t  would " g iv e  the  g re e n  l i g h t  to  a g g r e s s io n  
e v e r y w h e r e . B u t  th e  S e n a to r  made a l a s t  m inu te  e f f o r t  
t o  i n s t a l l  a  d e v ic e  aimed a t  sav ing  th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y .  The P r e s id e n t  l e f t  th e  im p re s s io n  t h a t  the  Truman 
D o c t r in e  would have to  be e n t i r e l y  o u t s id e  th e  scope o f  th e  
U n i te d  N a t io n s  inasmuch a s  t h a t  body was " n o t  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  
to  e x te n d  h e lp  o f  t h e  k ind  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d . V a n d e n b e r g  
i n s i s t e d ,  how ever, on th e  i n s e r t i o n  o f  a p ream ble  to  th e  b i l l  
w h ich  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  U n ited  Nattions c o u ld  t e rm in a te  
such  a i d  when t h a t  body was in  a p o s i t i o n  to  t a k e  up the  
t a s k .  He b e l i e v e d  t h i s  amendment b ro u g h t  t h e  a c t  w i th in  the  
fram ew ork o f  th e  U n ited  N a t io n s .
U. S . C o n g re ss ,  S e n a te ,  Committee on F o re ig n  
R e l a t i o n s ,  A Decade of American Forei& n P o l i c y ,  B as ic  
D ocum ents, 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 9 , Document No. 1 2 3 i 8 1 s t  C ong ., 1 s t  
S e s s . ,  I 95O, p . 1256.
^^^R ecord , SOth C ong ., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1947, X C III ,  
P a r t  3 ,  319T .
11 ? ^A Decade o f  American F o re ig n  P o l i c y , p .  1254.
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With Vandenberg*s guidance, the Republican controlled 
Congress passed its first test in bipartisan foreign policy.
In spite of grave doubt on the part of many Americans as to 
the soundness of the move, the bill passed the House by a 
vote of 2Ô7 - 107 and the Senate by a vote of 67 - 23.^^^ 
Vandenberg*s concept of the measure probably captured the 
sentiment of most of its supporters. He stressed that it 
was a question of choosing between "risks," and in his mind, 
approving the bill was less dangerous because it "indicates 
the United States will not be pushed around." On the other 
hand, he cautioned that "failure to act would give aggression 
the tgreen light,’" while the "rest of the world, including 
America, gets the red."^^^
The Marshall Plan.— The Truman Doctrine proved to be 
the first step in improving the rapidly deteriorating 
economic conditions of Europe. It represented the country’s 
first effort to stop the spread of communism with contain­
ment policies. But it was soon realized that this did 
nothing for other European countries whose war-torn economies 
made them particularly susceptible to political extremism. 
Secretary Marshall on June 5, 1947, promised European countries 
that if they would jointly plan a program of economic recovery 
American aid would probably be forthcoming. "The initiative,"
^13poster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 232. 
ll^Record, SOth Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCII, Part
3 , 319s .
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he said, "should come from E u r o p e ."^5 While he insisted 
that "our policy is not directed against any country or 
doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and 
chaos,"^16 the Soviet Union looked upon the proposal as 
a move against her and refused along with several satellites 
to accept the offer. Fourteen nations, however, joined in 
the effort and by the fall of 1947 had submitted their aid 
requests to the United States. President Truman submitted 
the assistance requests to Congress in December, 1947, with 
the appeal that the move was "essential to the maintenance 
of the civilization in which the American way of life is 
rooted."117
EarljTTLn January of 1948, U. S. News predicted that 
the kind of bill Congress approved in connection with the 
President's European Recovery request "depends largely upon 
Senator Vandenberg."11& He faced the task of getting the 
bill through a Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress that 
had promised to reduce taxes and balance the budget. Acheson, 
said Vandenberg, also had to overcome his own fears and those 
of other Republicans that the measure would not be used by
ll^The New York Times, June 6, 1947, p. 2.
^ ^ ^ I b i d .
117a Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 12#$.
ll^"Senator Vandenberg as Chief Strategist for the 
Marshall Plan," U. S. News, HIV (January 16, 194#), p. 6$.
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the administration to "decide the approaching election of 
1948. This meant that he had to find areas of compromise 
between the State Department and Congress, The former wanted 
the measure administered by their own officials while many 
Senators thought that it should be handled by a congressional 
agency. To solve the problem, Vandenberg called in the 
Brookings Institution of Washington to make a private study. 
When this group recommended a separate agency designed to 
work with but independent of the State Department, he got 
the administration to accept the p r o p o s a l . Congress was 
promised a "watchdog" committee to observe the administration 
of the program.
Vandenberg also managed to satisfy those who were 
worried about the cost of the program. He cut the term of 
the appropriation, for example, without seriously damaging 
the proposal. With skillful handling of the measure, the 
Senator was able to conciliate the "discordant factions so 
skillfully that they thought they were w inning."^21 Senator 
Taft, for example, voiced objection to the proposal when it 
was first announced. But eventually Vandenberg persuaded 
him that the measure was essential to relieve the European
llÇpean Acheson, "Journey Into Our Times," American 
Heritage. II (February, I960), p. 47.
l^Qpapers. p. 3&&.
- -  -  121  ____"Vandenberg Compromise," Newsweek, J U l (February 23,
1943), p. 2 3 .
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s itu a t io n .122 The result was a final passage of the measure
by a vote of 69 to 17. The New York Times noted that Senator
Vandenberg was in ”complete control" of the bill as it was 
debated on the floors of C o n g r e s s . 1^3
Report of the Speech 
Senator Vandenberg reported the bill out of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee by unanimous vote on March 1, 
194#. In a long address, he presented the case for the pro­
posal. He turned primarily to logical proof to develop his 
thesis that America must try to save the peoples of Europe
from aggression or infiltration with a policy of containment.
A program of economic assistance was to be used to enable 
the freedom-loving states of Europe to mobilize their capa­
cities in behalf of United States* objectives. As the speech 
unfolds, it becomes clear that the Senator had moved from a 
"firmness with patience" position on the Soviet problem to 
the concept of containment by overt acts.
■ ^ The speech divides clearly into three part,s. The 
Senator first argued the case for aid to Europe. In the 
second part, he answered major objections to the proposal.
^22papers, p. 3#0.
^^^The New York Times, March 14, 194#, p. 1. Also 
see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and 
Hope (Garden City: Doutleday and Company, 1956), p. 172.
He recalled: "Without the . . .’brilliant, intelligent
leadership of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, . . . the Marshall 
Plan, NATO, and other projects would have been hampered, if 
not blocked completely by the selfish Republican majority."
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His third division, labeled ”a few desultory c o m m e n t s ,"^24 
attempted to deal with the problems of administering the 
program, along with a message for the various parties 
concerned with the bill.
Introduction.— In an obvious attempt to demonstrate 
bipartisan support for the measure, Vandenberg introduced 
the bill as a unanimous choice of the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions Committee. He called for its passage "in the name of 
peace, stability, and freedom."^25 His announced thesis put 
the burden of proof primarily on those who objected to the 
bill.
The greatest nation on earth either justifies or 
surrenders its leadership. We must choose. There 
are no blueprints to guarantee the results. We are 
entirely surrounded by calculated risks. I pro­
foundly believe that the pending program is the best 
of these risks. I have no quarrel with those who 
• disagree, because we are deling with imponderables.
But I am bound to say to those who disagree that they 
have not escaped to safety by rejecting or subverting 
this plan. They have simply fled to other risks, and 
I fear far greater ones. For myself, I can only say 
that I prefer my choice of responsibilities.126
Reasons for supporting the bill.— Vandenberg argued, 
first, that the Marshall Plan must be passed in order to 
save Europe from Communist infiltration. The argument was 
not stated explicitly, but can be deduced from his quotation





from the bill that it was "the policy of the United States 
to sustain . . . free institutions and genuine independence 
through assistance. . . ."^^7 The threat to Europe was 
pictured in the form of Communist advancements in countries 
where frustration, disorder, and want had followed in the 
wake of World War II. The American people, he implied, 
could not afford to let this continue. The United States 
must provide the means to help Europe secure the stability 
so vital in keeping the people from turning to the Communist 
phiosophy. Without mentioning Russia as the offender, he 
turned for his prime example to a recent event. ."Czechoslovakia 
where any semblance of democracy has just been gutted by sub­
versive conquest, underscores this solemn thesis."128
The Senator made no, prolonged attempt to prove that 
Europe was in serious economic trouble. The crisis, he said, 
was a "significant narrative which speaks for itself,"129 
He attempted to deal with the problem with a brief assertion 
that Europe was in "utter prostration . . . amid the ashes 
of its victory; the resultant tragedy of far-flung human 
want and suffering." It was clear Vandenberg believed the 
American people were fully aware that World War II left 
Europe physically devastated and her economy virtually 




on ly  a re m in d e r  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e .  " I t  i s  en ough ,"  he s a i d ,  
" f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  t h a t  the  t r a g e d i e s  o c c u r r e d ,  
and t h a t  t h e y  s t i l l  t h r e a t e n  th e  p e a c e ,  s t a b i l i t y ,  and 
s e c u r i t y  o f  t h i s  whole e a r t h ,  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  a g a in
e m p h a t ic a l ly  i n c l u d e d . "^^0
N e i th e r  d id  the  S e n a to r  f e e l  com pelled  to  o f f e r  
e x te n s iv e  p ro o f  t h a t  Europe would  f a l l  to  the  Communists 
u n l e s s  e f f o r t s  w ere 'm ade t o  p r e v e n t  w id e sp re a d  s t a r v a t i o n  
and economic c o l l a p s e .  He a l l u d e d  to  th e  c u r r e n t  s t r u g g l e  
in  F in la n d  a s  an  example of t h e  Communist d e te r m in a t io n  to  
e x p l o i t  economic and p o l i t i c a l  d i s l o c a t i o n s  a s  a means o f  
advanc ing  Communism. In v o lv e d  i n  the  c o n f l i c t ,  he c la im e d ,  
were 2 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  p e o p le  o f  " t h e  s to c k  which has l a r g e l y  made 
A m erica ,"  who w ere " s t r u g g l i n g  a g a i n s t  g r e a t  and ominous 
odds, to  r e g a i n  t h e i r  f e e t . "  A g a in s t  t h i s  b ack g ro und , he 
a rgued  f o r  Am erican a i d  t o  h e lp  t h e s e  p e o p le  r e c o v e r .  "The 
i r o n  c u r t a i n , "  he i n s i s t e d ,  "m ust no t come to  t h e  r im s  o f  
th e  A t l a n t i c  C h a r t e r  e i t h e r  by  a g g r e s s io n  or by d e f a u l t . "^31 
He p ro ceed ed  on t h e  a ssu m p tio n  t h a t  in  194Ô th e  American 
p eo p le  had come to  r e g a r d  t h i s  s ta te m e n t  a s  a f a c t  o f  l i f e .
A lthough Vandenberg s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  b i l l  " p ro p o se s  
t o  h e lp  o u r  f r i e n d s  t o  h e lp  t h e m s e lv e s , "  he a d m i t te d  t h a t ,  
" th e  q u e s t  can mean as much t o  u s  as  i t  does t a  th e m ."  I t
1 3 0 l b i d . .  p .  1 9 1 6 .
^ 3 1 i h i d . . ■  p .  1 9 1 5 .
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became c l e a r  t h a t  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  r a t h e r  th a n  c h a r i t y  was 
t h e  m ajo r m o t iv a t i o n .  W hile  he t r i e d  to  g iv e  i t  a humani­
t a r i a n  f l a v o r ,  he made i t  obv ious  t h a t  America had p o l i t i c a l  
m o t iv e s .  For th o s e  who m igh t v i e w ’i t  a s  a n o th e r  h a n d -o u t  
t o  E u ro p e , he l e t  i t  be known t h a t  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  the  
U n ited  S t a t e s  was th e  prim e o b j e c t i v e .  The M a rs h a l l  P la n ,  
s t r e s s e d  th e  S e n a to r ,  " r e c o g n iz e s  the  grim  t r u t h —w hether 
we l i k e  i t  o r  n o t — t h a t  American s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  n a t i o n a l  
economy, and n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  a r e  i n s e p a r a b ly  l in k e d "  w ith  
th e  m easu re , adding t h a t  " t h i s  v a s t  f r i e n d l y  segment of th e  
e a r t h  m ust no t c o l l a p s e . T h e  p rem ise  o f  h i s  b e l i e f  was 
t h a t  t h e  Communist sys tem  would n o t  p r e v a i l  i n  a w orld  t h a t  
was f r e e  and p ro s p e ro u s .  In  e s s e n c e ,  th e  S e n a to r ’ s argument 
t h a t  t h e  b i l l  sh o u ld  be p a sse d  t o  a id  Europe was a n o th e r  
way o f  s a y in g  i t  sh o u ld  be p a sse d  to  p r o t e c t  the p o l i t i c a l  
s e c u r i t y  o f th e  American p e o p le .
Vandenberg a l s o  a rg u e d  t h a t  economic a id  to  Europe 
would have a f a v o r a b l e  im pact on the  American economy. He 
s t r e s s e d  the im p o rtan ce  o f  W este rn  Europe to  econom ics a t  
home. A p p ea lin g  to s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  g ro u p s ,  he s a i d :
These a r e  26 p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  th e  l i t e r a t e s  o f  the  
e a r t h .  B efo re  t h e  war t h e y  o p e ra te d  68 p e r c e n t  o f  
a l l  th e  s h ip s  t h a t  s a i l e d  t h e  s e a .  They grew 27 
p e r c e n t  o f a l l  t h e  w o r ld ’ s c e r e a l s .  They produced  
37 p e r c e n t  o f  th e  w o r ld ’ s s t e e l .  They s o ld  24 p e rc e n t  
o f  th e  w o r ld ’s e x p o r t s  and bought 39 p e rc e n t  o f  th e  
w o r l d ’ s im p o r t s .  The w o r ld — America e m p h a t i c a l ly  
in c lu d e d — needs them as bo th  o ro d u c e rs  and consum ers.
132ibid . 133ibid.
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I t  was n o t d i f f i c u l t  f o r  Am ericans t o  g r a s p  th e  
im p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  European econom ies c o u ld  n o t  im p o r t  
m ach inery  and equipm ent u n t i l  t h e y  were a b le  t o  a c q u i r e  
th e  needed  f u n d s .  N e i th e r  was i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them t o  
see  t h a t  i f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  sh ou ld  sw ing i n t o  th e  S o v ie t  
o r b i t ,  America m igh t l o s e  many o f  t h e s e  m a rk e ts  f o r e v e r .
Under th e  M a rs h a l l  P la n ,  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  w ould p ro v id e  
th e  m arg in  o f  c a p i t a l  t o  in a u g u r a te  th e  needed g row th  p r o c e s s .  
The a p p e a l  was d i r e c t e d  to  th o s e  who lo o k ed  to  Europe a s  an 
o u t l e t  f o r  s u r p l u s e s  o f  American goods i n  the  y e a r s  t o  come. 
American a id  was to  h e lp  b reak  a v i c i o u s  c i r c l e .
V a n d e n b e r g c o n c l u d i n g  argum ent i n  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  
p ro p o s a l  was a l s o  g e a re d  t o  th e  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  
American p e o p le .  He a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  U n ited  S t a t e s  had 
no e f f e c t i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  th e  M a rs h a l l  P la n .  He n o ted  
t h a t  i f  America r e j e c t e d  th e  p ro p o s a l  e i t h e r  sh e  had t o  
w ithd raw  a l l  a id  o r  c o n t in u e  th e  p o s tw a r  r e l i e f  m ea su re s .  
N e i th e r  s t e p ,  he a rg u e d ,  would p rov e  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  America.
Speak in g  t o  t h e  i s o l a t i o n i s t  e le m e n t ,  he  a d m i t te d  
t h a t  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  c o u ld  w ithd raw  a l l  s u p p o r t .  Such 
"dream s of i s o l a t e d  and p ro sp e ro u s  p e a c e ,"  he a rg u e d ,  were 
l u x u r i e s  which Am ericans could  n o t  a f f o r d  i n  a  " f o r e s h o r t e n e d ,  
a tom ic  w o r l d . T h e  sp e a k e r  r e l i e d  upon h i s  c o u n try m e n 's  
aw areness  o f  th e  g r a v i t y  o f  the  s i t u a t i o n  i n  Europe a s  a
134ibid.
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m o tiv a t io n  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e .  "This a c t  may- 
w e l l  become a welcome beacon  i n  the  w o r ld ’ s dark  n i g h t .
I f  i t  i s  to  be l i g h t e d  a t  a l l ,  i t  had b e t t e r  be l i g h t e d  
b e fo re  i t  i s  to o  l a t e . "  He adm onished: "We must ta k e
th in g s  a s  t h e y  a r e . " ^ ^ ^  The " o t h e r  r i s k "  was a w o rld  
e c o n o m ic a l ly  and i d e o l o g i c a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by the R u s s ia n s .  
The S e n a to r  a d m i t te d  he c o u ld  n o t  p rove  th e  European 
Recovery Program would p r e v e n t  such  a t r a g e d y .  But he 
b e l i e v e d  l o g i c  would s u p p o r t  h i s  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  i t  was 
b e t t e r  t o  do som eth ing  th a n  i t  was to  a t t e m p t  a w i th d ra w a l  
from a s t r u g g l e  t h a t  c o u ld  n o t  be e sc a p e d .  In  h i s  f a v o r  
was th e  a u d ie n c e ’ s aw areness  o f  Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n  i n  
I r a n ,  W este rn  E uro pe , th e  Near E a s t ,  and China which 
c o n s t i t u t e d  overw helm ing e v id e n c e  t h a t  R u ss ia  would n o t  
h e s i t a t e  t o  t a k e  what Am erica r e j e c t e d .
The o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  th e  M a rs h a l l  P la n ,  
s a id  V andenberg , was a c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  the  p iecem ea l  a id  
which t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  had co n d u c ted  s in c e  th e  c lo s e  o f  
t h e  w ar. He n o te d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  had 
sp e n t  b i l l i o n s  on f o r e i g n  r e l i e f  t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  te rm s  o f  
b a s ic  economic improvement had p roved  to  be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
T ru e , t h e  numerous a i d  program s w hich had been  f e d  i n t o  
f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  had r e l i e v e d  much human d e s t i t u t i o n  
r e s u l t i n g  from  th e  w ar. The p r o c e s s ,  how ever, had n o t
135lbid .
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r e s t o r e d  th e  m a rk e ts  and so u rc es  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  which t h e  
w ar d e s t r o y e d .  F u r th e rm o re ,  a rg u ed  V andenberg, "Europe 
c o u ld  n o t  w a i t  lo n g e r  f o r  r e a l  e m a n c ip a t io n ,"  and th e  
U n i te d  S t a t e s  co u ld  no lo n g e r  " a f f o r d  t o  u n d e rw r i t e  f u t i l i t y . "^36 
The S e n a to r  o f f e r e d  t h e  M a rs h a l l  P la n  a s  th e  o n ly  r e a l  a l t e r ­
n a t i v e .  The new p ro p o s a l  was c o n d i t i o n a l  upon W estern  
E urope*s h e lp in g  i t s e l f  th ro u g h  a  u n i f i e d  p la n  o f  American 
a i d  r a t h e r  th a n  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  r e l i e f  m ea su re s .
R e f u t a t i o n  o f  m a jo r  o b j e c t i o n s . — With th e  case  f o r  
t h e  p ro p o s a l  b e f o r e  h i s  a u d ie n c e ,  th e  S e n a to r  tu r n e d  t o  a 
r e f u t a t i o n  o f  th e  m a jo r  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n .  He 
f i r s t  d i r e c t e d  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  A m ericans who lo o k ed  upon 
th e  i d e a  a s  an i d e o l o g i c a l  war upon th e  S o v ie t  Union.
C r i t i c s  had a t t a c k e d  th e  b i l l  on th e  g ro u n d s  t h a t  i t  aban­
doned any hope o f  r e c o n c i l i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  w i th  R u s s ia .
T h is  f o r c e d  th e  S e n a to r  t o  w alk  a  t i g h t  ro p e .  F u l l y  aware 
t h a t  t h e  b i l l ' s  s u p p o r t e r s  w ere  r e l y i n g  upon the  American 
p e o p le  t o  see  th e  move as  a s t r a t e g i c  c o n c e p t  i n  c o n f r o n t in g  
t h e  S o v ie t  U nion, t h e  S e n a to r  advanced  th e  argum ent t h a t  
t h e  m easure  was needed  t o  save  Europe from  Communist i n f i l ­
t r a t i o n .  At th e  same t im e ,  he wanted t o  a s s u r e  h i s  c o u n try ­
men t h a t  t h i s  b i l l  d id  n o t  c lo s e  th e  d o o r  t o  E as t-W est 
c o o p e r a t i o n .  He rem inded  th e  w orld  t h a t  th e  a id  was a p p l i ­
c a b le  t o  a l l  E uropean c o u n t r i e s ,  t h u s  th e  door was l e f t  open
13&Ib id . , p._ 1916.
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f o r  th e  S o v ie t  Union. "T here  i s  n o th in g  i n  t h i s  p l a n , "  
s a i d  V andenberg , "which t h r e a t e n s  th e  S o v ie t  p o l i c e  em pire  
w i th  any s o r t  o f  consequence  w hich she d oes  n o t  h e r s e l f  
choose v o l u n t a r i l y  t o  i n v i t e ,  . . . E a s te r n  Europe was 
i n v i t e d  i n . "  F o r  America to  w ithd raw  th e  a i d  s im ply  
becau se  the  S o v ie t  s a t e l l i t e s  r e j e c t e d  t h e  i n v i t a t i o n  
would be ap peasem en t.  On th e  o t h e r  hand , s t r e s s e d  
V andenberg, E as t-W es t  t e n s i o n  "can be r e l e a s e d  whenever 
t h e r e  i s  m u tu a l  E as t-W est r e s p e c t  f o r  the  r i g h t s  o f  f r e e  
p e o p le  t o  o r d e r  t h e i r  own l i v e s . "^37 .
N e i th e r  d id  t h e  S e n a to r  want t o  harm th e  ad m in is­
t r a t i o n ' s  a t t e m p t s  t o  a s s u r e r  Europe t h a t  th e  measure was 
more th a n  a s t r a t e g y  t o  r e t a r d  th e  growth o f  Communism.
F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  Vandenberg s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  b i l l  was 
d e s ig n e d  to  make Europe c a p a b le  o f  s u p p o r t in g  i t s e l f  by 
h e r  own e f f o r t s .  The g r e a t  v i r t u e  o f  th e  program  was i t s  
em phasis  upon c o o p e r a t io n ,  which r e q u i r e d  the  peop le  o f  
Europe t o  a s s e s s  t h e i r  o v e r - a l l  n eed s  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f t h e i r  
p la n s  t o  make maximum e f f o r t s  t o  meet t h e i r  own prob lem s.
American a id  was th e n  t o  be u s e d  t o  f i l l  i n  th e  gap , n o t  a s  
a  " r e l i e f "  m easu re  b u t  a s  a s t e p  i n  h e lp in g  Europe make 
perm anent r e c o v e r y .  The S e n a to r  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  s i x t e e n  
European  g overnm en ts  had  c o n f e r r e d  and su b m i t te d  r e q u e s t s .
"We d id  n o t  d i c t a t e  t h e i r  t i c k e t .  They w ro te  i t  f o r  th e m s e lv e s . "
137lbid .
341
E u ro p e ’ s prompt and e n t h u s i a s t i c  r e p l y  o f f e r e d  e v id e n c e  
t h a t  th e s e  c o u n t r i e s  lo o k ed  upon th e  move a s  ’’t h e  b e s t  
chance f o r  s t a b l e  peace and f o r  p e a c e fu l  s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  
th e r e  i s  on th e  e a r t h  to d a y .
A nother m ajo r o b j e c t i o n  to  t h e  p ro p o s a l  was t h a t  
th e  b i l l  m igh t provoke a w ar w i th  R u s s ia .  Vandenberg 
a d m it te d  R u s s ia  had a t t a c k e d  th e  b i l l  a s  an a n t i - S o v i e t  
move. But he a rg u ed  the  U n i te d  S t a t e s  must p ro c e e d  w ith  
t h e  program  no m a t te r  how t h e  S o v ie t  Union r e a c t e d  to  i t .
He s t r e s s e d / t h a t  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  was to  r i s k  f u r t h e r  
S o v ie t  e x p a n s io n  i n  a r e a s  v i t a l  t o  th e  d e fe n s e  o f  the  
f r e e  w o r ld .  For Am erica, s a i d  Vandenberg, to  p e rm it  
R u ss ian  i n t r a n s i g e n c e  to  d r i v e  h e r  i n t o  a sudden r e v e r s a l  
on th e  i s s u e  would be appeasem ent of th e  k in d  b e f o r e  World 
War I I .  He g e a re d  h i s  p r o p o s a l  to  th e  v i v i d  memories o f  
a n o th e r  e r a .  ’’But peace and appeasem ent a r e  not on sp eak ­
in g  t e r m s , ” s a i d  th e  S e n a to r ,  ’’and th e y  have n p t  been s in c e  
Munich, a f t e r  World War I ,  and Y a lta  in  World"War I I . ” ^^9
When Vandenberg tu r n e d  t o  th e  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  th e  
program was to o  c o s t l y  f o r  A m erica, he f a c e d  h i s  most 
d i f f i c u l t  p rob lem . He n o t  o n ly  c o n f ro n te d  th o s e  who viewed 
th e  move a s  a s t e p  tow ard  o th e r  e x p en s iv e  f o r e i g n  a i d  p l a n s ,  
b u t  a l s o  members o f  h i s  own p a r t y  who had p ro m ised  i n  t h e  
C o n g re s s io n a l  campaign o f  1946 to  red u ce  t a x e s .  He
^^^Ibid. - ^^^Ibid.
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had  t o  d e a l  w i th  th e  dilemma w hich  fa c e d  th e  R e p u b lic a n  
P a r t y .  How c o u ld  th e  m a j o r i t y  p a r t y  approve  th e  a i d  
program  and a t  th e  same t im e  pi-ovide a  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  of 
r e d u c e d  spen d ing ?
Vandenberg t u r n e d  t o  l o g i c a l  p ro o f  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  
h i s  c la im  t h a t  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  c o u ld  a f f o r d  th e  p r o j e c t  
w i th o u t  a  n e g a t iv e  im p a c t  on th e  d om estic  economy. He 
c i t e d  th e  r e p o r t s  o f  th e  Committee on N a t io n a l  R esources 
and F o re ig n  A id, th e  Committee on F o re ig n  A id , and th e  
C o u n c il  o f  Economic A d v ise rs  t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  America 
co u ld  s a f e l y  s u p p o r t  su c h  a  p rogram . " A l l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
a g r e e , "  s a i d  V andenberg , " t h a t  t h e  p la n  can  be managed to  
a v o id  s e r i o u s  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i th  o u r  d o m e s tic  econom y."440 
He s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  p r o p o s a l  r e f l e c t e d  r i g o r o u s  s c r e e n in g  
o f  European  needs  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t i e s .  He drew 
h e a v i l y  upon t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  th e  co m m ittees  w hich  i n s i s t e d  
t h a t  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  cou ld  s u p p o r t  such  a program  both  
i n  te rm s  o f  p h y s i c a l  r e s o u r c e s  and i n  te rm s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
c a p a c i t y .  He was q u ic k  t o  a d m i t ,  hbwever, t h a t  th e  program 
would in v o lv e  some s a c r i f i c e  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  American 
p e o p le .  But f o r  th o s e  who f e a r e d  t h i s  c o n se q u e n c e ,  th e  
S e n a to r  n o te d  t h a t  t h e  p ro b a b le  p r i c e  o f any  o th e r  a l t e r ­
n a t i v e  would mean t h a t  much o f  Europe would be d r i v e n  to  
t h e  Communist camp.
________X__________________________
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I n  d e v e lo p in g  h i s  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  th e  American 
p e o p le  c o u ld  a f f o r d  th e  p r o j e c t ,  Vandenberg c o n t in u e d  t o  
s t r e s s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  co u ld  n o t  
be m easu red  s o l e l y  i n  economic t e r m s .  He made i t  p l a i n  t h a t  
th e  r e a l  i s s u e  was p o l i t i c a l .  As he view ed i t ,  i t  was 
l a r g e l y  a  m a t t e r  o f  s t r a t e g i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  He w arned 
th o s e  who opposed t h e  m easure  b e ca u se  o f  th e  c o s t s  t h a t  
"we c a n n o t  a f f o r d  n o t  t o  take  th e  p r e f e r a b l e  chan ce .
The S e n a to r  a l s o  had t o  m eet t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h i s  
p ro p o se d  program  was s im p ly  a n o th e r  " h a n d -o u t"  t o  E urope.
He s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  p la n  demanded c o o p e r a t io n  betw een  
W este rn  Europe and  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .  He n o te d  th e  p la n  
r e q u i r e d  W estern  Europe t o  a s s e s s  i t s  o v e r - a l l  needs  and 
come t o  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  w i th  i t s  c a l c u l a t i o n s . ' C o u n t r ie s  
would r e c e i v e  a id  o n ly  i f  t h e y  d e m o n s tra te d  a s t r o n g  e f f o r t  
t o  r e a c h  p r o d u c t io n  g o a l s .  I n  t h i s  m anner, i t  was hoped 
t h a t  t h e  European economy would r e c o v e r  and Am ericans would 
n o t  be  f o r c e d  t o  c o n t in u e  l a r g e  o u t l a y s  f o r  f o r e i g n  a s s i s t a n c e .
F i n a l l y ,  Vandenberg f a c e d  th e  o p p o s i t io n  o f  R ep u b lican  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  o v e r  th e  n e g l e c t  o f  b i p a r t i s a n  e f f o r t s  i n  
p la n n in g  th e  program . For th e  M ich igan  S e n a to r ,  th e  c h o ic e  
was c l e a r .  He p u t  t h e  i s s u e  to  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  r a t h e r  d i r e c t l y .  
E i t h e r  th e y  a c c e p te d  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  p r o p o s a l ,  o r  e l s e  
th e y  w ould r u n  th e  r i s k  o f  p e r m i t t i n g  th e  Communists t o
■l^libid.
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i n f i l t r a t e  W este rn  E urope . "T here  i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  p r i c e , "  
s a i d  V andenberg. "The ab sen ce  o f  some r e a s o n a b le  p ro s p e c t  
f o r  th e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  W este rn  Europe w i l l  . . . u r g e n t l y  
demand b i l l i o n s  more f o r  n a t i o n a l  d e fe n s e  . . . t h e  a l t e r ­
n a t i v e  p r i c e  i n  a  Com m unist-dom inated w o r l d . "^42 The choice  
was betw een  c o o p e r a t io n  o r  th e  ' p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  d i s a s t e r .
F i n a l  a p p e a l s . —The S e n a to r  d e v is e d  a s p e c i a l  l a b e l  
f o r  th e  t h i r d  d i v i s i o n  of h i s  sp e e c h ,  c a l l e d  a "few d e s u l ­
t o r y  comments. He g rouped  t o g e t h e r  a  c o l l e c t i o n  o f
s e v e r a l  re m in d e rs  d i r e c t e d  t o  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  th e  
f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  r e c e i v i n g  a i d ,  and th e  Congress o f  th e  
U n ited  S t a t e s .
One such rem in d e r  was d i r e c t e d  t o  th e  P r e s id e n t .
"The c h o ic e  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  and h i s  a s s o c i a t e s , "  s a id  
V andenberg , " i s  one o f  th e  most so lem n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t h a t  
e v e r  c o n f ro n te d  a  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .
I m p l i c i t  i n  t h i s  s ta te m e n t  was a w a rn in g  f o r  P r e s id e n t  
Truman t h a t  h i s  s e l e c t i o n  o f  an a d m i n i s t r a t o r  would haVe 
t o  m eet V andenberg^s a p p ro v a l .  I t  a l s o  c a l l e d  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
t h e  dilemma i n  w hich  th e  m easure  was p l a c in g  th e  P r e s i d e n t .  
He m ust f i n d  a c a p a b le  b u s in e s s  e x e c u t i v e  who a l s o  th o u g h t 
a s  a  d ip lo m a t .  Vandenberg se n se d  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  such a
^ ^ Ib id .
l^^Ib id . .  p ., 1920. ^^ I b i d .
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c h o re .  He n o te d  on Jan u ary  2 , 194Ô, t h a t  th e  " b u s in e s s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  ERP h a s  t o  be  a s u c c e s s f u l  l i a i s o n  w i th  
t h e  S e c re ta r y  o f  S t a t e  and th e  P r e s id e n t  w h e rev e r  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  i n v o l v e d . "^^5
The f i n a l  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  program was a l s o  s a i d  t o  
l i e  upon t h e  s h o u ld e r s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  in v o lv e d .  "Our 
c o l l a r s  can n o t  s u b s t i t u t e , "  s a i d  V andenberg, " f o r  t h e i r  
own w i l l  t o  make common cause  fo r  the m u tu a l  d e fe n s e  o f  
t h e i r  own w e l f a r e . T h i s  a s s e r t i o n  c a l l e d  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
th e  r i s k  i m p l i c i t  i n  th e  program . U n less  Europe was p r e ­
p a red  t o  become an  in d ep e n d en t  economy, th e  te m p o ra ry  h e lp  
from America would f a i l .  W hile Americans would n o t  a t t e m p t  
t o  " d i c t a t e  the  f o r m u l a " 4 4 7  f o r  r e c o v e ry ,  th e  C ongress 
would e x p e c t  to  see  a s tro ng -  e f f o r t  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  a t t a i n  the  c o o p e r a t io n ,  p r o d u c t io n ,  and 
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  a g re e d  upon a t  t h e  P a r i s  m e e t in g .  The lo n g -  
ran ge  v a lu e  of th e  M a rsh a l l  P la n ,  im p lie d  th e  S e n a to r ,  
depended upon th o s e  commitments becoming a r e a l i t y .
The M ichigan S e n a t o r ’ s f i n a l  " d e s u l t o r y  comment" was 
d i r e c t e d  tow ard  th e  S e n a te .  He rem inded th e  S e n a te ,  f i r s t ,  
t h a t  the  b i l l  had t h e  su p p o r t  o f  th e  Am erican p e o p le .  "The 
a c t  has  th e  am azing u n i f i e d  s u p p o r t , "  s a i d  V andenberg , " o f
7
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l^&R e co rd , SOth C o n g . , 2d S e s s . ,  1948, XCIV, P a r t  
2 , 1920 .
147ibid.
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p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  spokesmen in  o u r  own l a n d  fo r  o rg a n iz e d  
l a b o r ,  c a p i t a l ,  a g r i c u l t u r e  and i n d u s t r y ,  women^s o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n s ,  American jo u r n a l i s m  . . . and th e  c h u rc h .
Not w r i t t e n  i n t o  t h i s  p ie c e  o f  e v id e n c e  was th e  i m p l i c i t  
w a rn in g  to  Congressmen t h a t  th e y  must v iew  t h i s  program  i n  
te rm s  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  F a i l u r e  to  h e lp  Europe c o u ld  
mean more s t a r v a t i o n ,  more d e s o l a t i o n ,  and more c h a o s .  T h is  
p a t t e r n  could  open th e  door t o  Communism. The f i n a l  r e s u l t  
co u ld  be  an  America su r ro u n d e d  by a Communist w o r ld .  
V andenberg was aware t h a t  such  t h i n k i n g  d rove  th e  American 
peop le  to  su p p o r t  t h e  p l a n .  He r e l i e d  upon th e  S e n a t e ' s  
knowledge o f  the same f a c t s  t o  se c u re  p a s sa g e  of th e  a c t .
H is  l a s t  p l e a  t o  th e  S e n a te  was a c a l l  f o r  prompt 
a c t i o n .  "Time i s  th e  e s se n c e  i n  t h i s  b a t t l e  fo r  p e a c e ,  even  
a s  i t  i s  i n  the b a t t l e  f o r  w a r ." ^ ^ ^  He a g a in  p o in te d  t o  
C z e c h o s lo v a k ia .  "Nine months ago , C z e c h o s lo v a k ia  w anted  t o  
j o i n  W estern  Europe i n  t h i s  g r e a t  e n t e r p r i s e  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  
and peace  . . . to d a y  C z e c h o s lo v a k ia  j o i n s  o n ly  such  e n t e r ­
p r i s e  a s  Moscow may d i r e c t . "^^0 T h is  im p e l l i n g  p a t h e t i c  
a p p e a l  rem inded t h e  S e n a te  t h a t  i t  must speak  q u ic k ly  i f  i t  
w ere  t o  u se  the  r e s o u r c e s  o f  America to  h e lp  save  E urope .
C o n c lu s io n . —The S e n a to r  c o n c lu d ed :  " I t  i s  t h e  f i n a l
p r o d u c t , "  he s a i d ,  " o f  e i g h t  months o f more i n t e n s i v e  s tu d y
^̂ Îbid.
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by more d e v o te d  minds th an  I  have  e v e r  known to  concen­
t r a t e  upon any one o b j e c t i v e  i n  a l l  my 20 y e a r s  i n  C o n g r e s s ,” 
a d d in g ,  ”God g r a n t  t h i s  b e n e d i c t i o n  upon t h i s  u l t i m a t e  
e v e n t .
The S e n a to r  m ust have been  g r a t i f i e d  by th e  im m ediate  
r e s p o n s e  t o  th e  sp e e c h .  In  s p i t e  o f  S e n a te  r u l e s ,  " S e n a to r s  
and s p e c t a t o r s  sp ra n g  to  t h e i r  f e e t  i n  u n r e s t r i c t e d  a p p l a u s e " 1 5 2  
when th e  S e n a to r  f i n i s h e d  h i s  hou r  p r e s e n t a t i o n .  ” I t  was 
A r th u r  H. V and en berg ’ s show ,” ^53 s a i d  Newsweek. One news­
p a p e r  o b se rv e d  t h a t  i f  th e  i s s u e  co u ld  have been  d e c id e d  ”a t  
t h e  c lo s e  o f  h i s  a d d r e s s ,  t h e r e  would have been  few ’ n a y s ’ 
c a s t  a g a i n s t  i t . ”^54
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  Speech 
Economic a s s i s t a n c e . — From t h e  t im e  t h a t  Vandenberg 
began t o  q u e s t io n  th e  s i n c e r i t y  o f  th e  R u ss ians  in  f o l lo w in g  
th ro u g h  on t h e i r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p le d g e s  i n  1945 u n t i l  h i s  
advocacy  of th e  M a r s h a l l  P la n ,  he had p roposed  t h a t  America 
d i r e c t l y  f a c e  th e  S o v i e t  c h a l le n g e .  H is main l i n e  o f  a c t i o n ,  
how ever, had been  th ro ugh  p o l i t i c a l  a d ju s tm e n ts  a r r i v e d  a t  
i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  M a rs h a l l  P la n  a d d r e s s ,  he c a l l e d  
f o r  a new a p p ro a c h .  N e g o t ia te d  s e t t l e m e n t s  were v i r t u a l l y
151ibid.
^^^The New York T im es, March 2 ,  1948, p . 1.
’’S o v ie t  T im e ta b le  vs ERP,” Newsweek, TTTT 
(March 15 , 1 9 4 8 ) ,  1 0 .
154ih e  New York T im es, March 2 ,  1948, p. 1.
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abandoned i n  f a v o r  o f  a more a g g r e s s iv e  p o l i c y  d e s ig n e d  to  
m eet s t r e n g t h  w i th  s t r e n g t h .  The n a t i o n a l  p u rp o se  was t o  
be a c h ie v e d  th ro u g h  a  b u i ld - u p  o f  power r a t h e r  th a n  t h e  
s o l e  u se  of f i rm n e ss  a t  th e  c o n fe re n c e  t a b l e .
The means employed to  a c h ie v e  the  new o b j e c t i v e  was 
economic a s s i s t a n c e .  The program  was n o t  V andenberg’ s i d e a ,  
b u t  he gave i t  h i s  endo rsem en t.  The speech  shows t h a t  he 
had come to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  A m erica ’ s e n l i g h t e n e d  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
must now be c o n ce iv e d  in  c o n c r e te  economic te r m s .  What 
fo l lo w e d  was a change in  h i s  c o n cep t  o f  th e  f o r e i g n  economic 
p o l i c y  f o r  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s .  At t h e  end of th e  w ar, 
Vandenberg s u b s c r ib e d  to  th e  lo n g - r a n g e  American g o a l  o f  
w ork ing  to w ard  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c u r re n c y  c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  and 
e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  com m ercial p o l i c i e s  among n a t i o n s .  
As h i s  C lev e la n d  Forum a d d re s s  d e n o te s ,  by e a r l y  1 9 4 7 ,  he 
was s u p p o r t in g  th e  r e c i p r o c a l  t r a d e  a g re em e n ts  which aimed 
a t  a lo w e r in g  o f  t a r i f f  w a l l s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  he s u p p o r te d  
t h e  p o l i c y  o f  d i r e c t  r e l i e f  on a l i m i t e d  s c a l e  t o  th e   ̂
c o u n t r i e s  s u f f e r i n g  from war d i s l o c a t i o n s .  I n  th e  speech  
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  Vandenberg su p p o r te d  th e  u se  o f  
economic means t o  a c h ie v e  a p o l i t i c a l  end, i . e . ,  th e  
s t r e n g th e n in g  o f  E u ro p e ’ s economy to  e n a b le  th e  W estern 
powers to  b u i l d  a d e fe n se  a g a i n s t  S o v ie t  a g g r e s s io n .  To 
be s u r e ,  he re c o g n iz e d  the  economic v a lu e  o f  th e  program 
f o r  A m erica’ s economy, b u t  h i s  m ajo r  g o a l  was to  p r o t e c t  
t h e  n a t i o n ’ s i n t e r e s t  a g a i n s t  th e  S o v ie t  t h r e a t .  He looked
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upon the Marshall Plan as a means of immunizing Europe to  
in tern a l subversion. Economic aid  became a p o l i t ic a l  weapon 
to  achieve American goals in  the cold war.
Vandenberg^s conception o f the Soviet Union had now 
become the very a n t ith e s is  o f that which guided American 
diplomats at Yalta and Potsdam. At that tim e, i t  was 
generally  assumed that the Soviet Union would wish to  
liq u id a te  "those who had v io la ted  the le g a l boundaries and 
had presumed to  redraw the map of Europe to su it  th e ir  own 
purpose."155 Vandenberg’s view of the Soviet Union as 
revealed in  the Marshall Plan address i s  that o f a country 
conspiring to  extend i t s  power through the democratic s ta te s  
by using the ex p lo ita tio n  of so c ia l and economic unrest in  
the war-torn countries o f Europe and Asia. "Aggressive 
communism threatens a l l  freedom and a l l  s e c u r i t y ,"156 he 
in s is te d .
Leadership o f free  world. —The speech a lso  shows that 
Vandenberg wanted America to  accept the leadersh ip  of the 
free  world, to  act as a major power, and to  assume the 
primary burden involved . He fu l ly  departed from the days 
before Pearl Harbor when he refused America any p o s it iv e  
ro le  in  world a f fa ir s .  At that tim e, he argued again st a
155john C. C am pbell ,  "The T e r r i t o r i a l  S e t t l e m e n t , "  
F o re ig n  A f f a i r s . XXVI ( 1 9 4 7 ) ,  1 9 7 .
15^Eecord, SOth Cong., 2d S e s s .,  194#, XCIV, P a r t  
2, 1915.
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p o l i c y  t h a t  p ro p o sed  to  s e l l  goods to  a democracy t h r e a t e n e d  
by an a g g r e s s o r .  A f t e r  P e a r l  H a rb o r ,  he com m itted  h i s  
c o u n try  t o  a  j o i n t  r o l e  i n  p r o t e c t i n g  th e  peace  o f  th e  
w o r ld .  By 194#, he had moved t o  a p o s i t i o n  i n  w hich he 
viewed t h e  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  i n  te rm s t h a t  r e q u i r e d  th e  
U n ited  S t a t e s  t o  e x e r c i s e  i t s  economic power a g a i n s t  t h e  
t h r e a t  o f  a new a g g r e s s o r .  I n  th e  M a rs h a l l  P lan  a d d r e s s ,  
h i s  c o n v e r s io n  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  to o k  on a new d im e n s io n .
The h u r d l e s  i n v o lv e d . — I n  ch o o s in g  h i s  d e fe n se  o f  
t h e  m ea su re ,  Vandenberg had  t o  work h i s  way th ro u g h  a number 
o f  h u r d l e s .  He had to  av o id  p r e s e n t i n g  th e  program  t o  
E uropeans s im p ly  a s  a  means o f  c o n ta in in g  th e  Communists; 
o th e r w is e ,  t h e y  m ig h t f e a r  p o s s i b l e  R u ss ian  r e t a l i a t i o n .  
H i s t o r i a n s  n o te  t h a t  in  1947 " t h e r e  was a d e f i n i t e  te n d e n c y  
in  th e s e  s t a t e s  t o  se ek  an a d ju s tm e n t  and improve economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  t h e  S o v ie t  Union and i t s  
s a t e l l i t e s . "157 As a  r e s u l t ,  Vandenberg s t r e s s e d  t h a t  a l l  
European c o u n t r i e s  were i n v i t e d  to  s h a r e  i n  th e  p rog ram , 
b u t  R u s s ia  had r e f u s e d .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand , he  p ro b a b ly  se n se d  t h a t  th e  Ameri­
can  p e o p le  m igh t r e j e c t  t h e  program  i f  he o f f e r e d  i t  a s  j u s t  
a n o th e r  a id  program f o r  E u ro pe . T h is  f o r c e d  him to  s t r e s s  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  aim s in v o lv e d  w h i le  a t  th e  same t im e  he was 
t r y i n g  t o  av o id  l e a v in g  t h e  im p re s s io n  t h a t  i t  was d i r e c t e d
1 5 7 R e i t z e l ,  Kaplan, and Coblenz,  op. c i t . , .  p. 11#.
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s o l e l y  a g a i n s t  R u s s ia .  He w alked  a  c h a lk  l i n e  betw een  
t h e  two g o a ls  by d i s c u s s i n g  each t o  a l im i t e d  d e g re e .
T andenberg  f a c e d  a n o th e r  m a jo r  h u r d l e .  He had to  
s e l l  th e  program  t o - a  R e p u b lica n  C ongress t h a t  had p rom ised  
t o  red u c e  t a x e s  and b a la n c e  th e  b u d g e t .  I t  was to  t h i s  
c h o re  t h a t  he d i r e c t e d  most o f  h i s  a rgum ent. The f a c t  t h a t  
he  sp e n t  l i t t l e  t im e  i n  o u t l i n i n g  the  s e r io u s n e s s  o f  E u ro p e 's  
economic c o n d i t i o n s  o r  the  d a n g e rs  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  posed  would 
i n d i c a t e  he th o u g h t  th e  American p e o p le  were f u l l y  aware o f  
t h e s e  and were p r e p a r e d  to  ta k e  up the  burden  o f  do ing  some­
t h i n g  abou t them . But he was no t a s  su re  t h a t  th e  R e p u b lic a n  
C ongress  would p ro v id e  th e  r e q u e s t e d  amount o f  money f o r  t h e  
p r o j e c t .  He hoped t o  av o id  a b ig  s l a s h  in  th e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n .
His s t r a t e g i c  p u rp o s e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  was t o  o f f e r  th e  
R e p u b lica n  C ongress  a r a t i o n a l e  f o r  a c c e p t in g .  H is c h i e f  
a d v an tag e  was th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  h i s  own p e r s o n a l i t y .  But he 
had  to  f in d  a means o f  l e t t i n g  the  R epub lican s  save  f a c e .
H is s u b t l e  a p p ro ach  t o  t h e  h a n d l in g  of t h i s  problem  added 
much t o  h i s  s t a t u s  a s  a C o n g re s s io n a l  l e a d e r .
He t r i e d  t o  show th e  C ongress  i n  an i m p l i c i t  manner 
t h a t  th e  P r e s i d e n t  had made a  number o f  c o n c e s s io n s .  For 
exam ple , he n o te d  t h a t  Truman had a g re e d  to  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  an in d e p e n d e n t  g o v e rn m en ta l  agency to  a d m in i s t e r  t h e  
p rogram . The P r e s i d e n t  had o r i g i n a l l y  u rg ed  t h a t  th e  p ro ­
gram be a d m in i s t e r e d  th ro u g h  the  S t a t e  D epartm ent i n  o rd e r  
t o  i n t e g r a t e  th e  program  w i th  th e  t o t a l  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  The
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R e p u b lica n  m a j o r i t y  i n  th e  S e n a te  o b j e c te d  on th e  grounds 
t h a t  th e  S t a t e  Departm ent p e rs o n n e l  la c k e d  th e  b u s in e s s  
e x p e r ie n c e  needed in  th e  h a n d l in g  o f  l a r g e  sums o f  money. 
Vandenberg n o te d  t h a t  t h e  P r e s id e n t  a g re e d  t o  fo l lo w  th e  
a d v ic e  of the B rookings I n s t i t u t i o n  o f  W ashington who 
recommended t h a t  a  s e p a r a t e  agency be  e s t a b l i s h e d  w hich  
c o u ld  e n l i s t  to p  businessm en  t o  h a n d le  th e  p r o j e c t .  He 
q u ic k ly  d i s p e l l e d  th e  f e a r s  of t h o s e ,  how ever, who th o u g h t  
t h i s  p la n  might r e s u l t  i n  economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o v e r ­
shadowing the  p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s .  He p o in te d  ou t t h a t  t h e  
f i n a l  d e c i s io n  i n  case  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  would be 
made by th e  P r e s i d e n t .
W ithout s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e  to  them as su c h ,  t h e  
S e n a to r  n o ted  o t h e r  c o n c e s s io n s .  One o f  the  m a jo r  com­
p ro m ises  in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  e x e c u t iv e - C o n g r e s s io n a l  p roblem  
was th e  d e c i s io n  t o  encourage  a n n u a l  C o n g re s s io n a l  re v ie w  
o f  t h e  program . Vandenberg c a l l e d  i t  th e  "watchdog" 
com m ittee . The e v a lu a t io n  o f  th e  program  was n o t  l e f t  
e n t i r e l y  in  t h e  hands o f  th e  P r e s i d e n t .  " I t  must be 
d e te rm in e d ,"  s a id  V andenberg, " t o  what e x te n t  y e s t e r d a y ’ s 
pe rfo rm ance  w a r r a n t s  tom orrow ’s c o n t in u in g  c o o p e r a t io n .
The i m p l i c a t i o n  advanced h e re  was t h a t  t h e  C ongress was
l^ÜRecord. SOth Gong., 2d Sess., 194Ô, XCIV,
Part 2, I9W .
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f o r c i n g  th e  P r e s i d e n t  to  g iv e  i t  a hand in  th e  s h a p in g  o f  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  and a s h a re  i n  i t s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
Vandenberg a l s o  c a l l e d  a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  a d m in is ­
t r a t i o n ’s a c c e p ta n c e  o f  the  R ep u b lica n  demand t h a t |  th e  
p rog ram ’s  c o n t in u a t io n  would depend upon the  e f f e c t i v e  u se  
o f  the  money in  E urope . He n o te d  t h a t  a ’’ro v in g  am bassado r” 
would p ro v id e  a means o f  h o ld in g  " th e s e  governm ents to  s t r i c t  
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  upon w hich th e y  and 
we must depend f o r  th e  f i n a l  b a s ic  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  u n d e r ­
t a k i n g . ”^^9 He f a i l e d ,  however, to  s p e c i f y  p r a c t i c e s  to  
which t h e  c o u n t r i e s  would be e x p e c te d  t o  comply. He o f f e r e d  
no s p e c i f i c  form o f  economic o r g a n i z a t i o n  which th e  c o u n t r i e s  
would be fo rc e d  t o  f o l lo w .  T his would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
Vandenberg was e x p e c t in g  Europe to  make use o f  th e  money to  
r e s t o r e  i t s  s ta n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g ,  b u t  t h a t  he d id  no t e n v is io n  
th e  a id  a s  a means o f  r e q u i r i n g  th e s e  c o u n t r i e s  t o  ado p t 
any p a r t i c u l a r  economic sy s tem . —
I n  t h i s  manner, he t r i e d  t o  c o n v e r t  a r e l u c t a n t  
R e p u b lic a n  C ongress t o  h i s  p o in t  o f  v iew . He pu t th e  burden  
o f  p ro o f  d i r e c t l y  on th e  backs o f  th o s e  who would oppose him 
when he a s s e r t e d  t h a t  the  " g r e a t e s t  n a t i o n  on e a r t h  e i t h e r  
j u s t i f i e s  o r s u r r e n d e r s  i t s  l e a d e r s h i p .  We m ust ch o o se .
T h is ,  i n  f a c t ,  v i r t u a l l y  f o r c e d  th e  R ep u b lica n s  e i t h e r  t o
159%bid.
l^Of b i d . ,'o. 1915.
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su p p o r t  t h e  m easure  o r  o f f e r  a  b e t t e r  program  i n  i t s  p l a c e .
To have done l e s s  would have meant t h a t  America was t u r n i n g  
i t s  back on t h e  c o u n t r i e s  c a l l i n g  f o r  h e lp  from Communist 
im p e r ia l i s m .
H is  sp eech  a l s o  n o te d  t h e  l a g g in g  f a i t h  w hich th e  
American p e o p le  h e ld  i n  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  U n ited  N a t io n s  
t o  keep th e  p e a c e .  The S e n a to r ,  i n  f a c t ,  f e l t  no co m pu ls ion  
t o  o f f e r  an a p o lo g y  t h a t  th e  program  b y -p a s s e d  th e  U n ite d  
N a t io n s .  W hile a d m i t t in g  t h a t  th e  b e t t e r  way " i s  an u n d i ­
v id ed  U n ited  N a t io n s  which i s  made to  w o rk ,"^ ^ ^  he p r o ­
ceeded on th e  a s su m p tio n  t h a t  th e  American p eo p le  now v iew ed 
t h i s  body as  im p o te n t  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  th e  communist t h r e a t .  
C o n se q u e n tly ,  he  f e l t  no com p uls ion  t o  t r y  t o  f i t  t h e  p r o ­
gram i n t o  th e  scheme o f  th e  U n ited  N a t io n s .  He i m p l i e d ,  i n  
f a c t ,  t h a t  the  p rogram  a c t u a l l y  lo o k ed  beyond t h e  U n i te d  
N a t io n s  t o  a  new " p o s i t i o n  o f  s t r e n g t h "  b a se d  on th e  c o n c e p t  
o f  " b a la n c e  of pow er."
The i s s u e  o f  t r a d e . — For t h e  most p a r t ,  Vandenberg 
made a v e r y  c a n d id  c h o ic e  o f  a rg u m e n ts .  I f  one ch o o ses  to  
ig n o re  t h e  a d v e rs e  e f f e c t  w hich  i t  could have had on th e  
S e n a t e ' s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  th e  b i l l ,  how ever, one can c r i t i ­
c i z e  t h e  S e n a to r  f o r  s k ip p in g  over a v i t a l  phase  o f  E uropean  
r e c o v e r y .  As V andenberg  o u t l i n e d  i t ,  E u ro p e 's  economic 
prob lem  was one o f  in a d e q u a te  i n d u s t r i a l  c a p a c i ty  and  tem p o ra ry
iG^Ibid . . p. 1920.
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food  s h o r t a g e .  American a id  was t o  be used  t o  p rim e a few 
pumps so t h a t  European p r o d u c t io n  c o u ld  be r e s t o r e d .  Assum­
in g  t h a t  t h i s  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  could  be b ro u g h t i n t o  b e in g ,  
i t  became obv ious t h a t  E urope  needed m ark e ts  f o r  h e r  manu­
f a c t u r e d  p r o d u c t s .  T hat m eant f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  The S e n a to r ,  
how ever, made no m en tion  o f  t h e  American t a r i f f  w a l ls  which 
would have t o  be removed o r  lo w ered  i f  Europe were to f i n d  
economic r e c o v e r y .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  th e  M a rs h a l l  P la n  
to  w orld  t r a d e  was r e c o g n iz e d  by th e  N a t io n a l  P la n n in g  
A s s o c ia t io n :
In  th e  long r u n ,  no tem p o ra ry  e x p e d ie n ts  can
s u f f i c e  to  p u t  i n t o  th e  hands o f  f o r e ig n  im p o r te r s
amounts of d o l l a r  exchange  needed t o  pay fo r  th e  
e x p o r t s  w h ich  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  i s  equ ipped  to  send 
them. The most im p o r ta n t  a c t i o n  w hich th e  U n ited  
S t a t e s  m ust t a k e  i s  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  of a s e r i e s  of 
r e c i p r o c a l  t r a d e  a g re e m e n ts  t h a t  w i l l  make a r e a l l y  
s u b s t a n t i a l  b re a c h  i n  th e  p r o t e c t i v e  t a r i f f .
One m ust t u r n  t o  c o n j e c t u r e  to  a s c e r t a i n  V andenberg^s
re a s o n  f o r  o m i t t in g  any d i s c u s s i o n  o f  th e  t r a d e  i s s u e .  He
may have f e l t  t h a t  th e  need  f o r  more t r a d e  w ith  th e  U n ited  
S t a t e s  was no t a p r e s s in g  o n e .  C e r t a i n l y ,  i t  must be 
a d m i t te d  t h a t  a t  t h a t  p o in t  t h e r e  were few goods t h a t  
Europe c o u ld  send  t o  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .  He must have 
r e c o g n iz e d ,  however, t h a t  E urope c o u ld  not r e c o v e r ,  no 
m a t t e r  how much American a id  was g iv en  h e r ,  a s  lo n g  as
B. Condliffe, "Obstacles to Multilateral Trade," 
Planning Pamphlet No. 59 (Washington, D. C.: National
Planning Association, April, 1947), p. 1.
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trade restrictions stifled her producers and traders. But 
since that day was a few years away, he may have felt no 
compulsion to introduce the subject. To have done so might 
have invited opposition to the proposal. On the other hand, 
the speaker claimed that the program offered a good chance 
to help Europe back to economic stability. It can be argued 
that Vandenberg should, at least, have recognized the trade 
condition as an essential if rehabilitation under the 
Marshall Plan was to be effective.
Collectivism as an issue.— Vandenberg also chose to 
slide over one major objection to the proposal. It had been 
charged that the money might go to countries essentially 
socialistic in behavior. Such was the opinion of Merwin K. 
Hart, President of the National Economic Council. He argued 
that"the political implication of our adoption of this 
Marshall Plan . . .  is that we will be promoting the very 
system in which we d i s b e l i e v e . T h e  Senator said little 
in refutation to this objection. He either concluded that 
it carried little weight or else he had little to say in 
return. Wilson noted that during this period "collectivism 
seemed to be the order of the times"^^^ in Europe. Americans 
were alarmed by such trends. The Senator, instead, relied
l&^Merwin K. Hart, "Marshall Plan," Congressional 
Digest, IXVII (March, 194#), p. 91.
l64prancis Graham Wilson, The Americ^ Political 
Mind (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), p* 4-6?.
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upon the equally strong opinion of Americans that each 
country had a right to chart its own economic destiny.
He simply asserted that "we do not presume to dictate thé 
f o r m u l a . T h e  implication was that should the Marshall 
Plan be installed as a model of American private enterprise, 
the program would obstruct the efforts of Europeans to 
recover and might even encourage the Communists. But this 
point was not vigorously asserted. It was evident that 
American aid was to provide the means of using the country’s 
economic and political resources on behalf of its foreign 
policy goals.
The A ddress on th e  N orth  A t l a n t i c  
T re a ty  O r g a n iz a t io n
The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan served 
notice that the United States was prepared to resist Soviet 
expansion. The result was a world-wide awareness by the 
middle of 194# that the Soviet bloc nations and the Western 
Allies were solidly engaged in a "cold war." Tensions built 
up in America that it might turn into a hot war. What 
followed was a series of steps that eventually resulted in 
the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization— a 
military alliance of twelve Western bloc nations who agreed 
to aid each other in case of attack.
^̂ R̂ecord, SOth Cong., 2d Sess., 194#» XCIV, Part
2 , 1920.
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Senator Vandenberg gave his support to this new 
containment policy. He had, in fact, been instrumental 
in gaining the approval of Congress for a special resolution 
which cleared the way for the proposal. His major Senate 
address in support of the treaty was presented on July 6,
1949.166
The Context of the Speech 
Reactions to American containment policies.— The 
Economic Recovery Program is believed to have been instru­
mental in preventing Italy and France from going into the 
Russian camp in the elections of 194#. The fact that the 
United States, however, considered these areas vital to her 
defense drew protests from the Soviet Union. Her first 
reaction was to hold a conference in Warsaw in September 
of 1 9 4 7  with nine Eastern European nations for the purpose 
of drawing up strategy to meet the new American policies. 
Defense treaties were drawn up with Bulgaria, Finland, 
Hungary, and Rumania. A series of protest strikes against 
the Marshall Plan broke out in Italy and France. The most 
violent reaction, perhaps, came in the attempt by Russia 
to push the West out of Berlin. Beginning in April of 1 9 4 # >  
the Soviet Union tried to stop any movement into or out of
7, ##91.
^^^Record, # l s t  Cong., 1st S e s s . ,  1949, ÎCV, Part
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the city. The American response was an airlift which lasted 
until April of 1949, at which time an agreement was reached 
to end the blockade. The "cold war” had been officially 
declared.
In America, the blockade added to the growing belief 
that Western Europe might expect military aggression from 
the Russians. While economic aid was a help in preventing 
Communist infiltration, it offered no assurance that Western 
Europe could defend itself from military attack. John Foster 
Dulles reported that this fear of attack in Europe was inter­
fering "greatly with economic recovery," adding that "only 
a decisive pronouncement by the United States would check the 
fear that was inspired by Moscow."^^7 Bernard Baruch pro­
posed that the United States join with the nations receiving 
Marshall Plan aid in a "firm promise to go to war in joint 
defense if any of them are a t t a c k e d . B a r u c h  was not 
the first, however, to make the proposal. Winston Churchill 
at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, proposed a "fraternal 
association of the English-speaking people"^&9 as a means 
of preventing a war with the Russians, noting that while the
l^^John Foster Dulles, War and Peace (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 95.
^^^U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Hearings, European Recovery Program, SOth Cong.,
2d Sess., I94S, p. 556.
l69winston Churchill, "Alliance of English Speaking 
People," Vital Speeches, XII (March 15, 1946), 330.
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Soviet Union admired strength, "there is nothing for which 
they have less respect than weakness, especially military
weakness."^70 ,
The Vandenberg Resolution.— Vandenberg was among 
those in Congress who gave the matter of a military alli­
ance much consideration. He was present at a meeting in 
194# when John Foster Dulles proposed to President Truman 
that an alliance be set up which would serve notice on the 
Communists that an attack on one free nation would mean 
collective defense on the part of all of them. Vandenberg 
indicated that "the Senate liked the idea of regional 
associations and would be disposed to approve in principle 
a further developing of such associations for collective 
d e f e n s e . W i t h i n  a month, the Senator had a resolution 
before Congress which urged the United States to establish 
"progressive development of regional and other collective 
ai^rangements for individual self-defense."^^2 President 
Truman recalled that Senator Vandenberg "skillfully steered" 
the resolution "through the Senate to overwhelming a p p r o v a l ."^73 
The Senate passed the resolution on June 11, 1946, thus 
paving the way for the entrance of the United States into
l^Olbid.. p. 332.
^7^John Foster Dulles, op. cit., p. 96.
^“̂ P̂apers, p. 407.
^’̂^Truman, op. cit., p. 24 4,
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a military alliance with Western Europe. ’’The contents of 
the resolution,” noted Under Secretary of State Lovett,
’’became our guide in the discussion and subsequent nego­
tiations which led to the conclusion of the North Atlantic 
Pact.”174
Defense of bipartisan policies.— Before the Vandenberg 
resolution was put into practice, the 194# election inter­
vened. During the campaign Vandenberg urged the Republicans 
not to involve foreign affairs in politics. He was distressed 
when President Truman persistently attacked the Eightieth 
Congress as ”the second worst in history.” Speaking from 
Washington on October^4, 194#, Vandenberg told the nation 
that the " B o t h  Congress, in all that relates to our foreign 
affairs,” was definitely not ’’the second worst in history 
as we sometimes hear.” He then gave a detailed account of 
Republican contributions to the United Nations Charter, the 
Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Rio Pact— all 
of which represented, he contended, ’’bipartisan foreign 
policy” at its b e s t . 175 Through Vandenberg’s efforts, in 
large part at least, the new treaty issue did not become 
involved in the campaign.
174u, S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty, Blst Cong., 
1st Sess., 1949, Part 1, p. 237.
175papers, p. 451.
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization.— In his Inaugural 
Address in January, 1949, President Truman told of security 
plans with twelve North Atlantic nations which would insure 
that "any armed attack affecting our national security would 
be met with overwhelming force. . . ."^76 Dean Acheson, 
whose appointment to the job as Secretary of State in 
January, 1949, was defended by Vandenberg, negotiated with 
twelve European countries to complete the pact. It was 
signed on April 4, 1949, and submitted to the Senate on 
April 12, 1949.^77 The pact that emerged was a bipartisan 
project. Secretary Acheson told the Senate that it was 
"without parallel in my knowledge, as a cooperative enter­
prise between the executive and the legislative branches. 
Working together the two groups had committed America to a 
pledge that in case of attack on a member each country would 
assist "by such action as it deems necessary, including the
170use of armed force."
Senator Vandenberg gave public support to the treaty 
in March, 1949. He called the pact the "most important step 
in American foreign policy since the promulgation of the
^7^The New York Times, January 21, 1949, p. 4.
l^^Foster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., pp. 242-44.
^^^Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty, p. 4.
179lbid.; p. 19.
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Monroe D o c t r i n e . But long before this statement, he 
was busy behind the scenes working in liaison with the State 
Department and the Foreign Relations Committee to help pro­
duce a document acceptable both to the political parties in 
America and to the nations signing the treaty. His imprint 
was particularly found in Article 3 where the nations sign­
ing agreed "to develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist attack 'by means of continuous and 
effective self-help and mutual aid. This was language 
which appeared in the Vandenberg resolution. He was also 
instrumental in securing a change in the original version 
of Article 5 in which the parties had agreed to use armed 
force if necessary in case of attack to restore the peace.
He was of the opinion that this would invoke criticism 
from the isolationist element of his party. At his insis­
tence, the Article was changed so that each nation agreed 
to take such action "as it deems necessary including the 
use of force.
In spite of the traditional objections to entangling 
alliances, only scant opposition developed in Congress. A 
small group of Senators, however, voiced alarm over the 
possibility of sending American troops abroad and the obli­
gation which the pact imposed on America to furnish armaments




and other supplies. "Especially was there continuing and 
often vehement controversy," notes Dulles, "over the 
military assistance the United States was called upon to 
provide its North Atlantic partners. The debate in
fact largely resolved down to this issue. The bill passed, 
however, without any crippling amendments. Dean Acheson 
captured the sentiment: "History and common sense dictate
the wisdom that the preservation of peace and of our own 
security is immeasurably advanced by the strengthening of 
Western Europe."^^3
The North Atlantic Treaty approached the limits in 
I94Ô of American willingness to support containment policies. 
To give economic aid to those in need was one thing, but to 
commit the nation’s military power to a binding policy was 
another. But in spite of the extremely cautious attitude, 
the American people took up the new burden. Events in 
Europe during 1946-49 tipped the scales in favor of the 
move. The forces of Communism subverted Czechoslovakia, 
and Russia leveled the Berlin blockade. It became evident 
that economic aid would be inadequate in the face of the 
Russian army rolling over Western Europe. It is doubtful 
that many Americans came to a full realization that the
l82pQ3ter Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 244.
^^^McGeorge Bundy (ed.). The Pattern of Responsi­
bility— From the Record of Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952], p. 69.
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United States had committed itself to give money, armaments, 
and arms to the defense of 229 million people spread out 
over 6 .5 million square miles. But the choice was before 
them. Either they moved in such manner that the Soviet 
Union would know that if war came it would lose it, or run 
the risk of having Russia seize Western Europe. They 
naturally chose to align themselves with democratic Allies.
I t  i s  p ro b a b le  t h a t  i f  th e y  had n o t  made t h i s  d e c i s io n  i n  
J u l y ,  P r e s i d e n t  Truman * s announcement i n  August o f  th e  same 
y e a r  t h a t  R u s s ia  had ex p lo d ed  an a tom ic  bomb would have  made 
i t  f o r  them.
R ep ort  o f  th e  Speech
T an d en b erg ’ s m a jo r  sp eech  i n  su p p o r t  o f  th e  A t l a n t i c  
P a c t  was g iv e n  " in  an a tm osphere  where th e  S e n a to r s  o b v io u s ly  
knew how th e y  in te n d e d  to  v o te  b u t  were c o n sc io u s  t h a t  t h e  
d e b a te  was a h e a v i ly  h i s t o r i c a l  o n e . ”^^^ In  h i s  l a s t  " f u l l -  
d r e s s "  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  sp eech  in  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  S e n a te ,  
Vandenberg spoke f o r  two h o u rs  i n  d e fe n se  o f  th e  p r o p o s a l .
The developm ent o f  t h e  sp eech  was tw o - f o ld .  F i r s t ,  
Vandenberg o u t l i n e d  th e  m a jo r  aim s o f th e  p r o p o s a l .  Then 
he gave answ ers to  l e a d in g  a t t a c k s  a g a i n s t  th e  m easu re . I t  
must be s t r e s s e d ,  how ever, t h a t  t h e  speech  in c lu d e d  a  number 
o f  d i g r e s s i o n s  from t h e s e  two d i v i s i o n s .  These were u s u a l l y
^^Vrhe New York Times. July 7, 1949, p. 1.
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inserted for purposes of historical review, often emphasiz­
ing the role of bipartisanship in American foreign policy. 
Such comments may have been a psychological device on 
Vandenberg*s part to make full use of his own historical 
role in foreign policy.
Introduction.— The opening followed the usual 
Vandenberg pattern. He, first, plunged straight into his 
thesis. "I present to the Senate," he said, "my urgent 
reasons for supporting the pending North Atlantic Treaty." 
His next move was to recognize that honest differences of 
opinion existed on the issue. "There is no monopoly of 
truth on either side," he insisted. This attempt to leave 
the impression of fairness was a standard practice for the 
Senator. Then he tried to place the discussion on a 
rational basis. "The treaty's final authority depends upon 
the extent of our intellectual conviction that this phil­
osophy of collective action is wise and sound and right." 
After appealing for the use of logic in making the decision, 
Vandenberg moved to the final phase of his introduction in 
which he outlined the main issues of the debate.
. . . this treaty is the most sensible, powerful, 
practicable, and economical step the United States can 
now take in the . . . interest of its own security; in 
the effective discouragement of aggression; . . .  in the 
stabilization of Western Germany; and, as declared by 
its own preamble, in peacefully safeguarding the free­
doms . . . individual liberty and rule of law. . . .185
^^^Record, S ls t  Cong., 1st S e s s . ,  1949, aCV, Part 7,
8891.
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O b je c t iv e s  o f  t h e  North A t l a n t i c  T r e a ty . — From th e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  Vandenberg moved to  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  o b je c ­
t i v e s  o f  th e  North A t l a n t i c  T r e a ty  O r g a n iz a t io n .  H is  f i r s t  
argum ent more o r  l e s s  s t a t e d  th e  p a c t ’s im m edia te  g o a l .  He 
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  was needed t o  s to p  S o v ie t  a g g re s s io n .  
The p a c t ,  he  a rg u e d , was " th e  b e s t  a v a i l a b l e  im plem ent t o  
d i s c o u r a g e  armed a g g r e s s io n  and th u s  s to p  a n o th e r  w a r ." ^ ^ ^
The peace  o f  t h e  w orld  was be ing  c h a l le n g e d .  I n  V andenberg’s 
t h i n k i n g ,  t h e  way t o  meet t h a t  t h r e a t  e f f e c t i v e l y  was th ro u g h  
a  new m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  w ith  W estern  E urope. The argum ent 
was o b v io u s ly  g e a re d  t o  t h e  f e a r  o f  a g g r e s s io n .
Vandenberg c o n ce iv e d  o f  th e  t r e a t y  in  te rm s  o f  t h i s  
o rg a n iz e d  t h r e a t .  P e a c e ,  he a rg u ed  was i n  " je o p a rd y  i n  
t o d a y ’s  t o r t u r e d  w o r ld . "  T his je o p a r d y  stemmed n o t  from th e  
N o rth  A t l a n t i c  community, b u t  from " g re e d y  communism ab ro a d  
and a t  home; from open c o n s p i r a c i e s  w h ic h  have f r a n k l y  sought 
t o  w reck th e  b rav e  s e l f - h e l p  and m u tu a l  a i d  w hich  would 
r e s t o r e  in d e p e n d e n t  p e o p le s  t o  t h e i r  h e r i t a g e . H e  made 
no a t t e m p t  t o  prove t h i s  a s s e r t i o n .  He s im p ly  c la im e d  t h a t  
" e v e ry  v i g i l a n t  American .knows t h i s  i s  t i m e . "  He r e f e r r e d ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  t o  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  S o v ie t  pu rpose  
was w o r ld  d o m in a t io n .  The S e n a to r ’ s p r o p o s a l  r e c o g n iz e d  
t h i s  t h r e a t  a s  a r e a l i t y .  "Only th o s e  w i th o u t  eyes t o  see
lÜ&I b i d .
lG 7 ib id .
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•and e a r s  t o  h e a r , ” s a i d  V andenberg , "can  deny t h a t  t h e s e  
p r e c io u s  v a lu e s  . . . a r e  i n  je o p a rd y  i n  to d a y ’ s  t o r t u r e d  
w o r ld .  O nly  a y e a r  p r e v i o u s ly  i n  a rg u in g  t h e  case  f o r
E uropean R eco v ery , t h e  S e n a to r  had gone t o  g r e a t  l e n g t h s  t o  
em phasize t h a t  t h e  a c t  was no t d i r e c t e d  a t  c o n ta in in g  t h e  
S o v ie t  Union. But now t h a t  th e  means had changed from 
economic t o  m i l i t a r y ,  he  f r e e l y  a d m it te d  t h a t  a S o v ie t  a t t a c k  
on W estern  Europe was a  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  and he proposed NATO a s  
a  d e t e r r e n t  t o  t h i s  a c t .
But Vandenberg d i d  n o t  p r e s e n t  th e  p ro p o sa l  a s  a  
c h a r i t y  d r i v e  t o  save  W este rn  Europe f o r  i t s  own s a k e .  He 
made th e  p o i n t  t h a t  th e  c o n t r o l  o f  Europe by an u n f r i e n d l y  
power w ould  c o n s t i t u t e  an i n t o l e r a b l e  t h r e a t  to American 
s e c u r i t y .  He was n o t  a s k in g  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  to  ap p ro v e  th e  
m easure  a s  a means o f  making th e  w o rld  " s a f e  fo r  d em o cracy ."  
The r a t i o n a l e  was c lo t h e d  in  the  b e l i e f  t h a t  the S o v ie t  Union 
would l i k e  to  e n c i r c l e  W este rn  Europe so t h a t  i n  th e  end t h e  
U n i te d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  m ain enemy, would be i s o l a t e d .  "We a re  
t h e  f i n a l  t a r g e t , "  i n s i s t e d  V andenberg , "though o t h e r  i n d e ­
pen d en t p e o p le s  a r e  i n  n e a r e r  j e o p a r d y ."  The s t r a t e g y  o f  
R u s s ia  a s  he p i c t u r e d  i t  was to  keep th e  dem ocrac ies  d iv id e d  
so t h a t  th e y  c o u ld  g r a d u a l l y  p ic k  away a t  each one by one 
w i th o u t  e n c o u n te r in g  a u n i f i e d  f o r c e .  "We cannot r u n  aw ay ,"  
he a rg u e d .  "We may a rg u e  o u r s e lv e s  out o f  r a t i f y i n g  th e
IGÜlbid.
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p a c t .  But we canno t th e r e b y  a rg u e  o u r s e lv e s  out o f  th e  
j e o p a r d y  which th e  p a c t  se e k s  to  m i n i m i z e .
Vandenberg f i n a l l y  came t o  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  w h e th e r  
t h i s  move would be e f f e c t i v e  i n  s to p p in g  a  Communist a t t a c k  
i n  E urop e . He em phasized t h a t  th e  r e a l  i s s u e  was n o t 
w he ther  America would be in v o lv e d  i f  such an a t t a c k  came. 
America would be in v o lv e d  w ith  o r  w i th o u t  the  p a c t .  "Once 
upon a  t im e ,  we were a c o m fo r ta b ly  i s o l a t e d  la n d .  Now we 
a r e  u n a v o id a b ly  t h e  l e a d e r  and the  r e l i a n c e  of f r e e  men 
th ro u g h o u t  t h e  f r e e  w o r ld .  We c a n n o t  e scape  from our p r e s ­
t i g e  n o r  from  i t s  h a z a r d . "^90 The q u e s t io n ,  he co n te n d ed , 
was w hether t h i s  p a c t  would h e lp  r e d u c e  th e  d anger i n  which 
Europe found i t s e l f .  H is r e p l y  was i n  th e  a f f i r m a t i v e .  He 
t h o u g h t ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  i t  m ight " w e l l  e x t in g u i s h  th e  je o p a rd y  
. . .  by th e  c l e a r  d e m o n s tra t io n  t h a t  t h i s  u n i t e d  s e l f -  
d e fe n s e  a g a i n s t  a g g re s s io n  w i l l  be i n v i n c i b l e . " ^ 9 1  The p ro ­
p o s a l ,  i n s i s t e d  Vandenberg, d e m o n s tra te d  t h a t  each c o u n try  
would r e l y  on every  o th e r  member o f  th e  p a c t  to  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  t h e  common d e fe n s e .  This a r ran g em en t should  g iv e  t a n g i b l e  
p r o o f  t o  th e  Communists t h a t  th e  d e fe n s e  a g a in s t  a g g r e s s io n  
would be so e f f e c t i v e  t h a t  an in v a d e r  would see  o n ly  r u i n  
f o r  h i s  p eop le  i f  he a t t a c k e d .  Peace  was to  be m a in ta in e d  
u n d e r  t h i s  a rrangem en t by a b a la n c e  o f  power. T h is  co n cep t
^^^Ib id . 19°Ib id . . p. 8892.
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r e s t e d  on th e  a ssu m p tio n  t h a t  t h e  human and m a t e r i a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  
t h e  s k i l l s ,  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  and th e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  
would t i p  th e  b a la n c e  in  f a v o r  o f  t h e  W estern  W orld. ’Upon 
two p r e v io u s  o c c a s i o n s , "  s a id  V andenberg , " t h e  K a is e r  and 
t h e  F u e h re r  found t h i s  o u t  t h e  h a rd  way. T h is  t r e a t y  ought 
t o  make a ren e w a l  o f  t h e  l e s s o n ,  i n  blood and sweat and t e a r s ,
u n n e c e s s a r y . "^92
V a n d e n b e rg 's  second r e a s o n  f o r  s u p p o r t in g  th e  t r e a t y  
p r e s e n t e d  an in t e r m e d i a t e  aim o f  t h e  p a c t .  He contended  
t h a t  th e  a c t  would e n a b le  t h e  W este rn  powers t o  d e v e lo p  a 
" p o s i t i o n  o f  s t r e n g t h , "  w hich sh o u ld  c o n c e iv a b ly  f o r c e  th e  
S o v ie t  Union to  n e g o t i a t e  f o r  p e a c e .  The p a c t ,  he a rg u e d ,  
" s p e l l s  o u t  th e  c o n c lu s iv e  w a rn in g  t h a t  in d e p e n d e n t  freedom  
i s  n o t  an o rp h an  in  t h i s  W este rn  W orld, and t h a t  no armed 
a g g r e s s io n  w i l l  have a chance  t o  w i n . "^93 Faced w ith  such 
a p r o s p e c t ,  R u ss ia  would have  t o  choose  betw een p o s s ib l e  
d e s t r u c t i o n  o r  c o - e x i s t i n g  w i th  t h e  W est. The aim o f  such 
s t r a t e g y  was c l e a r l y  t o  e l i m in a t e  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  a g g r e s s io n ,  
b u t  a l s o  to  s t r e n g th e n  freedom  and dem ocracy . The S e n a to r ,  
how ever, d id  n o t  sp eak  o f  t h e  t r iu m p h  o f  dem ocracy o v e r  
communism. The program  was aimed a t  a s e t t l e m e n t  th ro u g h  
compromise and p r e s s u r e .  The p a c t  was a s y s t ^  d e s ig n ed  




a show o f  s t r e n g t h ,  t h e  W estern  powers hoped to  f i n d  a 
b e t t e r  b a r g a in in g  p o s i t i o n .
W hile t h e  p r e s s in g  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  th e  p a c t  r e v o lv e d  
a round  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  th e  b a la n c e  o f  power by means- s h o r t  
o f  w a r ,  V andenberg a l s o  had h i s  eye on a lo n g - ra n g e  g o a l .  He 
a rg u ed  t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  cou ld  h e lp  i n t e g r a t e  W estern E urope .
He p a r t i c u l a r l y  n o te d  t h a t  t h e  program  would h e lp  i n  t h e  
" s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  W estern  G e r m a n y . "^94 Such was p o s s i b l e ,  
he c o n te n d e d ,  i f  the  A t l a n t i c  Community c o u ld  f u n c t i o n  n o t  
on ly  a s  a u n i f i e d  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  a s  an i n t e ­
g r a t e d  p o l i t i c a l  u n i t .  N o tin g  t h a t  th e  M a rs h a l l  P la n  had 
in a u g u r a te d  t h i s  g o a l ,  t h e  S e n a to r  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  th e  A t l a n t i c  
P a c t  would com plete  th e  t a s k  by s a f e g u a r d in g  " th e  freedo m ,
common h e r i t a g e  and c i v i l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p e o p le s ,  founded
on th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  dem ocracy , i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y ,  and th e  
r u le  of l a w . "^95 He c la im e d ,  how ever, t h i s  c e n t r a l i z e d  
m ach ine ry  would n o t  in v ad e  t h e  p r e r o g a t i v e  of n a t i o n a l  so v ­
e r e i g n t y .  I t  w ould , on th e  o t h e r  h a n d , a t  l e a s t  e n co u rag e  
t h e s e  n a t i o n s  t o  d i s c u s s ,  c o n s id e r  and recommend on m a t t e r s  
o f  m u tu a l  c o n c e rn .
D efense  o f  the  p r o p o s a l . — In  th e  second  main d i v i s i o n  
o f  h i s  sp e e c h ,  Vandenberg d e fe n d ed  th e  t r e a t y  a g a i n s t  a num- » 
b e r  o f  a t t a c k s .  He f i r s t  c o n s id e r e d  the  argum ent o f  th o s e
194 ib id . . p. 8891.
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who b e l i e y e d  t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  " s h a r p  d e p a r tu r e  
from o u r  h i s t o r i c  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o f  non en tang lem en t 
i n  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  o t h e r s . "^96 He a d m i t te d  t h a t  i n  th e  l i t ­
e r a l  way of lo o k in g  a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  t h i s  m ight be t r u e .
But he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  i n  th e  sen se  o f  d e p a r t in g  from a 
" p h i lo s o p h y  o f  p r e v e n t i v e  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  a g g r e s s i o n , '*^97 i t  
was i n  k e e p in g  w i t h  th e  Monroe D o c t r in e  and American member­
s h ip  i n  the  U n ite d  N a t io n s .  " I  a s s e r t , "  he s a i d ,  " t h a t  on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  our own American e x p e r ie n c e  w i th  cand o r  u n d e r  
t h e  Monroe D o c t r in e  t h a t  i t  i s  more c a l c u l a t e d  to  encourage 
peace  and  p r e v e n t  th e  in s a n e  e v e n ts  w hich  would make peace  
i m p o s s i b l e . "^90 H is m o tiv e  was c l e a r . '  He hoped t o  connec t 
t h e  p en d in g  t r e a t y  w i th  r e s p e c t e d  t r a d i t i o n s .
Having  a d m i t te d  t h a t  th e  s i t u a t i o n  c a l l e d  f o r  s o l u t i o n s  
h e r e t o f o r e  u n n e c e s s a r y ,  he pushed on t o  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  
America must make t h e  move w he th er  she l i k e d  i t  o r  n o t .
"We a r e  u n a v o id a b ly  th e  l e a d e r  o f  th e  r e l i a n c e  o f  f r e e  men 
th ro u g h o u t  t h i s  f r e e  w o r ld .  We can n o t e scap e  from our p r e s ­
t i g e  no r  from i t s  h a z a r d . "^99 America must do what she has 
t o  do . "L ike  th e  p r a c t i c a l  peo p le  t h a t  we a r e ,  we faced
19&I b i d . . p .  8892. 
197l b i d . . p .  8894. 
19*I b i d .
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t h e s e  h a rd  f a c t s  o f l i f e , ” he i n s i s t e d .  "We soug h t t o  make 
o u r s e l v e s  s a fe  i n  a w o rld  o f  peace  and j u s t i c e . ”^00
What had Am erica done i n  th e  p a s t  t o  a c h ie v e  t h i s  
o b j e c t i v e ?  He enum era ted  i n  qu ick  s u c c e s s io n  Dumbarton 
Oaks, San F r a n c i s c o ,  E uropean  R ecovery , Act o f  C h a p u lte p e c ,  
t h e  Rio P a c t ,  and now th e  N orth  A t l a n t i c  T re a ty .  A l l  th e s e  
s t e p s  were ta k e n  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  A l l  were b u i l t  
on t h e  theme o f  c o o p e r a t io n  f o r  m u tu a l  p r o t e c t i o n .  "We can ­
n o t  t u r n  back t h e  c lo c k .  We can no t s a i l  by o ld  and e a s i e r  
c h a r t s .  That h a s  been d e te rm in e d  f o r  u s  by th e  march of 
e v e n t s . H e  th u s  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  America had lon g  ago 
embarked upon a p o l i c y  w hich  demanded t h a t  she u se  h e r  
s t r e n g t h  to  p r o t e c t  th e  f r e e  n a t i o n s  o f  Europe from a g g r e s s io n .
"We have t o  p la y  t h a t  p a r t , "  he i n s i s t e d .  " A ll  t h a t  we can 
d e c id e  i s  w h e th e r  we s h a l l  p l a y  i t  w e l l  o r i l l . " 2 0 2
Vandenberg n e x t  r e f u t e d  th e  ch arg e  t h a t  th e  p a c t  was 
a  " r e p e t i t i o n  o f  an o ld  m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  as  m en ac in g ly  
known to  h i s t o r y . He n o te d  t h a t  th e  Holy A l l i a n c e  o f  
1815 was a " c o n t r a c t  n o t  o n ly  f o r  s u r v i v a l  b u t  f o r  d o m in a t io n ."^0^
ZOOlbid.
^Q^I b i d .
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By c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  Monroe D o c tr in e  was d e d ic a te d  t o  peace by 
’’w arn in g  o f  th e  consequen ces  o f  a g g r e s s i o n . "^05 Such, he 
c o n te n d e d ,  i s  th e  b a s i s  o f th e  N orth  A t l a n t i c  P a c t .  I t  must 
be  com pared , he i n s i s t e d ,  to  th e  Monroe D o c t r in e .  ’’The N orth  
A t l a n t i c  T re a ty  . . .  i s  d e d ic a te d  s o l e l y  t o  p e a c e ,” he con­
c lu d e d ,  add ing  t h a t  i t  was ’’devoid  o f  a s i n g l e  i m p e r i a l i s t i c  
o b l i g a t i o n . ”206 His main p ro o f  was th e  an a lo g y  he drew 
be tw een  th e  p a c t  and th e  Monroe D o c t r in e .  Aware o f  th e  
p o p u la r  r e s p e c t  Am ericans, h e ld  f o r  t h e  Monroe D o c t r in e ,  he 
a t t e m p te d  th e  r h e t o r i c a l  f e a t  o f  c o n n e c t in g  h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  
t o  t h i s  r e s p e c t e d  and  c h e r i s h e d  v a lu e .
. . . t h e  N orth  A t l a n t i c  P a c t  may be a  l i t e r a l  
d e p a r tu r e  from o rth o d o x  Am erican d ip lom acy  a l th o u g h  
George W ash in g to n ’ s F a re w e l l  A ddress  v i s u a l i z e d  
tem p o ra ry  a l l i a n c e s .  . . . But I  deny t h a t  th e  
t r e a t y  i s  a d e p a r t u r e  from a p h i lo s o p h y  o f  p r e ­
v e n t iv e  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  a g g r e s s io n .  . . .  I  a s s e r t ,  
on th e  b a s i s  o f  o u r  own Am erican e x p e r ie n c e  w i th  
candor u n d e r  th e  Monroe D o c t r in e  t h a t  i t  i s  more 
c a l c u l a t e d  to  en co u rag e  p e a c e .  4 *. .20?
The M ich igan  S e n a to r  th e n  c o n s id e r e d  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  
a rm s. Much o f  th e  S e n a te  o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  p a c t  had a r i s e n  
o v e r  t h i s  i s s u e .  S e n a to r  T a f t ,  f o r  exam ple , s a id  t h a t  he 
would v o te  ” i n  f a v o r  o f  th e  A t l a n t i c  P a c t  . . .  i f  th e  
q u e s t io n  of arms were no t i n v o l v e d . ”2^8 V andenberg’ s r e p l y  
was tw o - f o ld .  He f i r s t  a t t e m p te d  to  d i v e r t  a t t e n t i o n  away




from th e  arms a s p e c t  o f  th e  t r e a t y  by e m p h as iz in g  th e  non­
m i l i t a r y  p h a se s  o f  th e  program . " I t  i s  n o t  th e  m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e s  i n  b e in g  which m easure  th e  im pact o f  t h i s  'k n o c k - o u t ' 
a d m o n i t io n ,  im p o r ta n t  though  th e y  a r e .  I t  i s  th e  p o t e n t i a l  
which c o u n t s , he i n s i s t e d .  The p a c t ' s  r e a l  v a lu e ,  he 
t h o u g h t ,  w ould l i e  i n  i t s  a s s u ra n c e  to  th e  w o rld  t h a t  an 
a t t a c k  upon any  o f  th e  NATO powers would be r e g a r d e d  as an 
a c t  o f  w ar by a l l  t h e  members. " I t  i s  t h i s  t o t a l  c o n cep t
w h ich , i n  my v iew , would g iv e  even a r e i n c a r n a t e d  H i t l e r
210p a u s e ."  The pu rp ose  was one of p e a c e .  The p la n  was
supposed  to  g iv e  t a n g i b l e  p ro o f  t o  an a g g r e s s o r  t h a t  he would 
have to  f a c e  t h e  combined e f f o r t s  o f  th e  e n t i r e  A t l a n t i c  
community. The r e a l  va lue  i n  t h i s  p l a n ,  i n s i s t e d  V andenberg, 
was i n  i t s  means to  a v e r t  war r a t h e r  t h a n  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  
wage one .
F u l l y  aw are , however, t h a t  he c o u ld  no t c o m p le te ly  
ig n o re  th e  arms i m p l i c a t i o n  of th e  p a c t ,  he e l e c t e d  to  
d iv o rc e  t h i s  phase  o f  th e  program from th e  t r e a t y  i t s e l f .
He could not a v o id  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  p rom ised  m i l i t a r y  
su p p o r t  t o  W estern  E uro pe . He a rg u e d  t h a t  such v i t a l  
q u e s t io n s  a s  how much s u p p o r t  and what ty p e  o f  m i l i t a r y  p la n  
need  n o t  be answ ered  a t  t h a t  t im e .  He went so f a r ,  i n  f a c t ,  a s  
to  im ply t h a t  a S e n a to r  m ig h t s u p p o r t  th e  t r e a t y  and l a t e r  v o te  
a g a i n s t  th e  u se  o f  m i l i t a r y  in s t r u m e n t s .  " I  s h a l l  n e v e r  a r g u e , "
209lb id . , p. 8894. ^^°Ib id .
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he s a i d ,  " t h a t  t h e i r  v o te  f o r  th e  P a c t  p r e c lu d e s  f r e e  and 
h o n e s t  judgm ent and independence  i n  any such  su b seq u en t  
e v e n t . "211 He, o f  c o u r s e ,  ag reed  w i th  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  
Acheson t h a t  " t h e r e  i s  an o b l i g a t i o n  to  h e l p , "212 i n  term s 
o f  m i l i t a r y  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  b u t  he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  a  S e n a to r  
would n o t  be  o b l i g a t e d  to  v o te  t h i s  h e lp  i f  th e  manner and 
t im in g  were n o t  a s  he b e l i e v e d  i t  sh o u ld  b e . I n  th e  p r e c i s e  
s e n s e ,  t h i s  was t r u e ;  b u t  a t  t h e  l e a s t ,  i t  w ould a p p e a r  t h a t  
even u n d e r  V andenberg^s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  A m ericans re sp o n ­
s i b i l i t y  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  program  would 
be r e g a r d e d  a s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  supp lem ent to  th e  t r e a t y .  I t  
co u ld  be assumed t h a t  th e  agreem ent r e a c h e d  i n  p r i n c i p l e  
would p ro b a b ly  n e v e r  be  a r e a l i t y  u n l e s s  C ongress co u ld  
d e f in e  th e  e x t e n t  o f  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  im p l ie d  i n  th e  
t r e a t y .
One o f  th e  m ost p r e v a i l i n g  f e a r s  i n  th e  C ongress  was 
t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  would t a k e  away th e  freedom  o f  t h e  U nited  
S t a t e s  t o  d e c l a r e  i t s  own w ars. S e n a to r  T a f t  v o ic e d  th e  
s e n t im e n t  o f  t h i s  g ro u p .  "The o b l i g a t i o n  t o  go to  w ar seems 
t o  be  b in d in g  upon the U nited  S t a t e s  a s  a n a t i o n ,  so t h a t  
C ongress would be  o b l i g a t e d  t o  d e c l a r e  w ar i f  t h a t  were 
n e c e s s a r y  t o  comply w i th  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  th e  t r e a t y .
211lb id . , p. 8895.
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S in ce  t h i s  o b j e c t i o n  in v o lv e d  th e  h e a r t  o f  th e  t r e a t y ,  i n  
t h a t  i t  co n ce rn e d  th e  p led g e  of m u tua l a s s i s t a n c e ,  Vandenberg 
a t te m p te d  t o  d e a l  w ith  i t  i n  p r e c i s e  te rm s .
H is  f i r s t  move was an obv ious  a t te m p t  t o  t a k e  th e  
fo c u s  of a t t e n t i o n  from th e  "war" a s p e c t  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i o n .
He a rg ued  t h a t  j u s t  becau se  the  A r t i c l e  p ro v id e s  t h a t  "an  
armed a t t a c k  upon one s h a l l  be c o n s id e r e d  an a t t a c k  on a l l "  
d id  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  commit the  U n ited  S t a t e s  t o  w ar. N o ting  
t h a t  th e  u se  o f  armed f o r c e  was o n ly  one a l t e r n a t i v e ,  he 
s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  A t l a n t i c  community m igh t v e ry  w e l l  a c h ie v e  
i t s  d e fe n se  t h r o u ^  a s t r o n g  w arn ing  o r  even an a p p e a l  t o  
t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il .
V andenberg th e n  f a c e d  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some 
a g g r e s s o r  m ig h t seek  to  acco m p lish  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  ends  w i th  
m i l i t a r y  means. "L et u s  s a y , "  s a i d  V andenberg, " t h a t  i t  i s  
c l e a r l y  t h e  d re a d  t h in g  which t h r e a t e n s  th e  l i f e  and freedom  o f  
one of our a s s o c i a t e d  n a t i o n s ,  i f  not o u r s e lv e s  d i r e c t l y . "  In  
t h i s  e v e n t ,  s a i d  V andenberg , America would be a t  w a r .  "P a c t  o r  
no p a c t ,  i t  would mean war f o r  u s  anyway in  t h i s  f o r e s h o r te n e d  
w o r ld . "  A l l  th e  t r e a t y  w i l l  have done i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  i n s i s t e d  
th e  S e n a to r ,  i s  f o rm a l iz e  our p o l i c y  i n  such c o n t in g e n c y ,  and 
"we would be i n f i n i t e l y  b e t t e r  o f f  f o r  hav ing  i n s t a n t  and 
com peten t A l l i e s . "2^4 W ithout m e n t io n in g  names, t h e  S e n a to r  
was say in g  t h a t  the  b a s i c  purpose  of th e  a l l i a n c e  was to
214ib id . .  p. 889$.
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o f f i c i a l l y  announce what A m ericans a l r e a d y  knew, i . e . ,  an 
armed S o v ie t  a t t a c k  on W este rn  Europe would be t r e a t e d  by 
th e  U nited  S t a t e s  a s  an a c t  of w ar and would f i n d  th e  
U n ited  S t a t e s  r e p e l l i n g  such a move. A g g re ss iv e  Communism 
would have a l r e a d y  c a l l e d  th e  p l a y ,  w ith  or w i th o u t  th e  
p a c t ’ s e x i s t e n c e .  The t r e a t y  w ould  have s im p ly  f o r m a l iz e d  
American p o l i c y .  At t h i s  p o i n t ,  i n s i s t e d  V andenberg, th e  
l e g a l i t i e s  would be o f  s m a l l  co n seq uence .
From h e r e ,  V andenberg moved to  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e .  Though a rg u in g  t h a t  Congress 
would r e t a i n  u n im p a ire d  i t s  power t o  d e c l a r e  w ar, he s t i l l  
rem inded th e  S e n a te  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a l r e a d y  h e ld  the  power 
t o  a c t  in  d e fe n s e  of the  c o u n t r y  even  w ith o u t  the  c o n se n t  o f  
C ongress . Would th e  P r e s i d e n t  have  th e  a u t h o r i t y  to  use 
American armed f o r c e s  f o r  t h e  m u tu a l  d e fe n s e  o f  th e  W estern  
A l l i e s  i f  th e  a t t a c k  were n o t  on American t e r r i t o r y ?  
V andenberg’ s r e p l y  was v a g u e .  He s a i d :  "Whoever i s  a t t a c k e d
w i l l  have d ep en d a b le  A l l i e s  who w i l l  do t h e i r  dependab le  
p a r t  by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s . H e  th e n  a rgued  t h a t  
th o s e  who i n s i s t e d  th e  d i s c u s s i o n  on th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e  
be more s p e c i f i c  were g u i l t y  o f  " p r o c e d u r a l  h y p o th e s e s ."
U sing th e  r h e t o r i c a l  d e v ic e  o f  b eg g in g  th e  q u e s t io n ,  he s a i d  
t h a t  p eo p le  o v e r ly  c o n ce rn e d  w i th  th e  p r o c e d u r a l  a s p e c t s  o f  
the. problem w ere f o r g e t t i n g  t h a t  th e  p a c t  was d e s ig n ed  to
Zl^Ibid.
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p ro v id e  m easu re s  f o r  m i l i t a r y  a i d  which sh o u ld  make i t  
u n n e c e s s a ry  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t o  u se  t h e i r  armed f o r c e s .
" l e t  u s  n o t  make t h e  f a t a l  e r r o r  o f  d e s e r t i n g  th e  t r e a t y  
b ecau se  of o u r  p r e o c c u p a t io n v i th  c o n t i n g e n c i e s , "  he a rg u e d .
He th e n  c o n c lu d e d  th e  p o in t  by a t t e m p t in g  to  a t t a c h  th e  
s t ig m a  o f  war to  th o s e  who would r a i s e  such  t e c h n i c a l  
m a t t e r s .  "The p r e v e n t io n  o f  the  n e x t  w a r ,"  s a i d  V andenberg , 
" i s  more im p o r ta n t  even th a n  th e  w in n in g  o f  i t . " ^ ^ ^  Thus, 
i t  seems t h a t  Vandenberg l e f t  hang in g  th e  i s s u e  m ost i n  need 
o f  c l a r i f i c a t i o n .
V andenberg went from th e  to u ch y  q u e s t io n  o f  " a u to ­
m atic  w ar"  to  a much l e s s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i s s u e .  He answ ered  
th o s e  " m a l ig n a n t  c r i t i c s  who c ry  o u t  t h a t  th e  N orth  A t l a n t i c  
P a c t  i s  b o rn  o f  warmongers h a r b o r in g  e v i l ,  and armed d e s ig n s  
upon t h e i r  f e l l o w  m e n . "217 As m igh t be e x p e c te d ,  t h e  S e n a to r  
tu r n e d  p r i m a r i l y  t o  e m o tio n a l  a p p e a ls  to  answ er t h i s  c h a rg e .  
I n  e s s e n c e ,  h i s  argum ent was s im p ly  t h a t  th e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  
t h e  p a c t  was t o  h e lp  c r e a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  which sh o u ld  make 
d isarm am ent p o s s i b l e .  "T h is  i s  th e  supreme C h r i s t i a n  a s p i r a ­
t i o n , "218 j ^ Q  s a i d .  And w h i le  t h e  S e n a to r  rem ained  vague i n  
h i s  lan g u a g e  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  he o b v io u s ly  meant to  im p ly  t h a t  
t h e  p a c t  was d e s ig n e d  t o  o b ta in  c o n c e s s io n s  from R u ss ia  
w i th o u t  w a r .
21&lbid. Î'̂ Ibid.
Z l^ l b i d .
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Vandenberg th e n  a d d re s s e d  h i m s e l f  to  th o s e  who a rg u e d  
t h a t  th e  p lan  would " d e f i l e ,  i f  n o t  . . . s c u t t l e ,  th e  U n i te d  
N a t i o n s . H e  b l u n t l y  d e n ie d  t h a t  t h e  p a c t  d e f i e d  th e  
C h a r t e r .  S t r e s s i n g  t h a t  A r t i c l e  51 made ample p r o v i s io n s  
f o r  r e g i o n a l  a r ra n g e m e n ts ,  th e  S e n a to r  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  
p a c t  was b ased  upon t h e  s e l f - d e f e n s e  f e a t u r e s  o f th e  C h a r te r .  
F i r s t ,  he s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  p a c t  p ro v id e d  i n  th e  ev en t o f  
an  a t t a c k  from o u t s id e  th e  membership o f  NATO, the  c o u n t r i e s  
in v o lv e d  would c o n s u l t  w i th  each o th e r  and g iv e  t h e  r e q u i r e d  
n o t i c e  t o  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l .  Second , i f  th e  member 
n a t i o n s  d e c id e d  t o  ta k e  a c t i o n ,  a g a in  th e  C o u n c il  would be 
in fo rm e d ,  b u t  such  m easu re s  would n o t  i n t e r f e r e  w i th  any 
a c t i o n  t h e  C o u n c il  m ig h t t a k e .
The S e n a to r  r e c o g n iz e d ,  how ever, t h a t  the q u e s t io n  
was not so much w hether  t h e  p a c t  com plied  w i th  th e  t e c h n i c a l  
r e q u i r e m e n ts  o f th e  C h a r te r  a s  i t  was a q u e s t io n  o f  w h e th e r  
NATO would f i t  i n t o  th e  s p i r i t  o f  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s .  Thus, 
he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  p a c t  p r e s e r v e d  th e  C h a r te r  i n  t h a t  t h e  
W estern  P a c t  n a t io n s  co u ld  do w hat th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  c o u ld  
n o t ;  i . e . ,  p r e v e n t  Communist a g g r e s s io n .  "How can we 
underm ine  the  C h a r t e r , "  he a rg u e d ,  "when we keep i t s  o b l i g a t i o n  
a l i v e —when we keep i t s  s p i r i t  a l i v e ? " ^ ^ ^  O bv iously  aw are , 
however, t h a t  such  an  answ er would no t s a t i s f y  th o s e  who 
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  would overshadow  th e  U n ited
219l b i d . ZZOl b i d . , p. 8896.
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N a t io n s ,  t h e  S e n a to r  b ru sh e d  th e  i s s u e  a s id e  w i th  t h e  
rem ark ; "The U n ited  N a t io n s  . . have no s t u r d i e r ,  no
more m i l i t a n t  f r i e n d s  th a n  th o s e  who have j o i n e d  f o r c e s  to  
s u s t a i n  r i g h t e o u s  peace th ro u g h  th e  North  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y . "^21
Vandenberg i n t e r r u p t e d  th e  r e f u t a t i o n  o f  m ajor a t t a c k s  
a g a i n s t  th e  p r o p o s a l  t o  comment upon the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of 
s e v e r a l  p r o v i s i o n s  w i th in  th e  C h a r te r .  He a s s u r e d  h i s  c o u n t r y ­
men t h a t  I t a l y  would no t exceed  th e  peace t r e a t y  l i m i t  on 
rea rm am en t, new members cou ld  be a d m it te d  to  the  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
th e  p le d g e s  c e a se d  to  a p p ly  to  a member w hich " fu n d a m e n ta l ly  
changes ch a ra c ter ,"^22 th e  t r e a t y  d id  n o t  b in d  a  c o u n t ry  t o  
t a k e  a c t i o n  i n  c i v i l  w a rs ,  i t  im p l ie d  no t a r i f f  commitments, 
and f i n a l l y ,  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  was n o t  e x c lu d in g  i t s  concern  
f o r  o th e r  n a t i o n s  o f  th e  w orld  who were n o t  i n  th e  p a c t .
W ith t h e  e x c e p t io n  o f  a b r i e f  q u o ta t io n  by W arren A u s t in  
t h a t  t h e  program  would a id  the  cause o f  p e a c e ,  he  r e l i e d  
upon the a u d ie n c e ’ s aw areness  o f  h i s  work on th e  t r e a t y  as 
ev id e n ce  t h a t  he was g iv in g  p ro p e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  t o  each 
o f  t h e s e  m a t t e r s .
The S e n a to r  d id  no t dw ell  on th e  c o s t  o f  the  program . 
He knew, o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  was no way of e s t im a t i n g  th e  
e v e n tu a l  c o s t .  He s im p ly  s a i d  th e  m ost e f f e c t i v e  way t o  




t r u l y  ^pend  t o  s a v e , ” he s t r e s s e d ,  "when we i n v e s t  i n
p e a c e . "223
C onclus i o n . - -Vand e n b e r  g co nc lud ed  w i th  a s t e m  
w arn ing  t h a t  t h e  p a c t  c o u ld  no t be abandoned w ith o u t  t h e  
g r a v e s t  o f  co n seq uences  f o r  t h e  f r e e  w D rld . The S e n a to r ,  
p e rh a p s ,  r e a l i z e d  a t  t h i s  p o in t  t h a t  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  p o in t  
i n  f a v o r  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n - w a s  t h e  S e n a te ’ s r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  
i t  had l i t t l e  c h o ic e  b u t  t o  approve t h e  t r e a t y .  At t h a t  
h o u r ,  r e j e c t i o n  co u ld  have  been a c l e a r  s i g n a l  t o  W estern  
Europe t h a t  America was i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h e  d a n g e rs  o f  
Communist e n c i r c l e m e n t .
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  Speech
The b i p a r t i s a n  l e a d e r .- -V a n d en b e rg * s  d e fe n se  o f  t h e  
N o rth  A t l a n t i c  T r e a ty  O r g a n iz a t io n  c a r r i e d  th e  to n e  o f  th e  
o p p o s i t io n  l e a d e r  a g a in  p le a d in g  f o r  b i p a r t i s a n  a c c e p ta n c e  
o f  a m ajor f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  move. The a d d r e s s  c o n ta in e d  
l i t t l e ,  p e rh a p s ,  t h a t  had  n o t  a l r e a d y  been  s a i d  by o t h e r s ,  
o r  even by t h e  s p e a k e r .  At l e a s t ,  an  e x a m in a t io n  o f  th e  
speech  r e v e a l s  no s e t  o f  new i d e a s .  The s p e a k e r ’ s c o n t r i ­
b u t io n  to  t h e  m easure  may have been t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a fo rm er 
exponent o f  J e f f e r s o n ’ s  " e n t a n g l i n g  a l l i a n c e s  w i th  none" 
maxium was a d v is in g  h i s  countrym en t o  commit t h e  n a t i o n  to  
a  m i l i t a r y  p a c t .  H is  s t r o n g  p e r s o n a l  a p p e a l  was p la c e d
223Ibid., p. 8897.
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s o l i d l y  b e h in d  th e  m easure  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  " w a te r  down-' 
t h e  v o ic e  o f  th e  o p p o s i t io n .
F o r  V andenberg , th e  North  A t l a n t i c  T re a ty  was more 
th a n  j u s t  a n o th e r  c o n ta in m en t m easu re .  He d e fen d ed  i t  w i th  
th e  v i t a l i t y  o f  one f i g h t i n g  f o r  an i d e a l .  And in d e e d  i t  
w as. He s e n s e d  t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  b re a k u p  o f  b ig  power u n i t y  
even b e f o r e  th e  San F ra n c i s c o  C on fe ren ce  and was i n s t r u ­
m en ta l  i n  g e t t i n g  A r t i c l e  $1 i n t o  th e  C h a r te r  which p ro v id e d  
f o r  r e g i o n a l  d e fe n s e  g ro u p s .  Even b e f o r e  th e  C h a r te r  was 
r a t i f i e d  V andenberg^s f a i t h  i n  g l o b a l  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  
had swung t o  r e g i o n a l  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y .  He th e n  p r e s s e d  
f o r  the  R io  P a c t  w hich  p ro v id e d  f o r  r e g i o n a l  d e fe n s e  o f  t h e  
W este rn  H em isphere . A f t e r  th e  S o v ie t  Union t h r e a t e n e d  th e  
s e c u r i t y  o f  W estern  E urope , he pushed  th ro u g h  C ongress  th e  
V andenberg  R e s o lu t io n  which opened th e  way f o r  th e  P r e s i d e n t  
t o  s e e k  a m u tu a l  d e fe n s e  a rran g em en t w i th  th e  N o r th  A t l a n t i c  
N a t io n s .  The p a c t  had become in  h i s  mind th e  s i n e  qua non 
o f  t h e  f r e e  w o r l d 's  d e fe n se  a g a i n s t  th e  S o v ie t  U nion .
V a n d e n b e rg 's  speech  in  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  t r e a t y  shows 
t h a t  he was lo o k in g  to  t h e  p a c t  a s  a b a la n c e  o f  s t r e n g t h  
be tw een  th e  S o v ie t  Union and t h e  U n ited  S t a t e s .  H is  main 
o b j e c t i v e  was c l e a r :  t o  d e t e r  .a S o v ie t  a t t a c k  by making i t
e v id e n t  t h a t  t h e  members o f  th e  a l l i a n c e  were i n  a  p o s i t i o n  
t o  d e fe n d  th e m s e lv e s  th ro u g h  a  c o o p e r a t iv e  e f f o r t .  I t  was 
i n  t h i s  m anner t h a t  Vandenberg th o u g h t  th e  a l l i a n c e  would 
o f f e r  i t s  m a jo r  re w a rd .  He r e c o g n iz e d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e
3^4
lo n g - ra n g e  o b j e c t i v e .  I f  w ar sh o u ld  come, r e t a l i a t i o n  
would be more e f f e c t i v e  i f  c a r r i e d  ou t w i th  o t h e r  democ­
r a c i e s  i n  a  c o - o r d i n a t e  m anner.
The M ichigan  S e n a to r  p la y e d  down th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  
th e  lo n g - ra n g e  o b j e c t i v e .  He a lw ays i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  c h i e f  
a d v a n ta g e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  d id  n o t  l i e  i n  i t s  o v e r t  
m i l i t a r y  a c t s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  i n  i t s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r c e  and m ora l 
im p a c t .  He a rg u e d ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  th e  c h i e f  v a lu e  of t h e  
U n i te d  N a t io n s  was n o t  i n  th e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c il  w here  power 
t o  ta k e  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  had  been  p l a c e d ,  b u t ,  i n s t e a d ,  was 
found i n  th e  G e n e ra l  Assembly w here th e  n a t i o n s  o f  th e  w o rld  
were  s t a n d in g  r e a d y  to  p a ss  m o ra l judgment on t h o s e  who b roke  
th e  p e ac e .  He c la im e d  th e  same f o r  th e  Rio P a c t .  H is con­
c e p t io n  was s im p ly  t h a t  th ro u g h  r e g i o n a l  c o l l e c t i v e  d e fe n se  
t h e  d em o crac ie s  c o u ld  d e fe n d  th e m se lv e s  w ith o u t  h av ing  t o  
wage w a r .
L i t t l e  need  be s a i d  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  p r o o f  o f  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  th e  S o v ie t  Union d id  n o t  f r i g h t e n  a s  e a s i l y  a s  
Vandenberg im p l ie d  i n  t h i s  a d d r e s s .  The t im e  was soon t o  
come when t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  would be f o r c e d  t o  p ro v id e  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  means t o  im plem ent th e  ag reem ent d e f in e d  i n  t h e  
N orth  A t l a n t i c  P a c t .  V andenberg was n a i v e ,  in d e e d ,  i f  he 
assumed t h a t  t h e  W estern  pow ers c o u ld  s ig n  a m i l i t a r y  p a c t  
w i th o u t  p ro v o k in g  t h e  S o v ie t  Union i n t o  a c t i o n s  which would 
i n c r e a s e  i t s  s t r e n g t h .  H in d s ig h t  i s  n o t  needed  to  a r r i v e  
a t  t h i s  c o n c lu s io n .  Vandenberg had  w i tn e s s e d  th e  r e a c t i o n s
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to Americans "get-touch” policy, the Truman Doctrine and 
the Marshall Plan. While the economic measures had speeded 
recovery in Western Europe, the positive effects did not 
follow from any withdrawal tendencies of the-Soviet Union. 
The change had come because American dollars enabled the 
countries to buy needed commodities from the United States.
Military assistance.— Vandenberg, of course, recog- 
the persuasive value of divorcing the treaty from the 
proposed military assistance program. He recognized that 
this phase of the treaty offered the major opposition to the 
achievement of his goal. Aside from this, however, a close 
comparison of Vandenberg^s remarks in his January 10, 1945, 
address with the one under consideration will reveal that 
he placed great faith in the deterrent force of potential 
military strength.
All this is not to suggest that Vandenberg did not 
anticipate that military assistance to'the members of the 
organization would follow the signing of the pact. He was 
prepared to contain the Communists by whatever means the 
free world could muster. His speech shows that he hoped 
an extensive program would not be necessary. Although no 
further proof was needed at this hour, it gave further 
evidence that Vandenberg was fully prepared, if necessary, 
to risk war in the name of national security.
The Senator's purpose in calling for ratification 
of the treaty was thus not dependent on whether the Soviet
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Union desired to pursue a policy of conquest. This was 
assumed. The real issue as the Senator put it was simply 
whether the United States wished to permit the divided 
elements of the free world to be.swallowed up, thus leaving 
America to deal with Russia alone. He saw Western Europe 
as the key to the future security of the United States. 
Anything short of this policy, he argued, would result in 
appeasement which he called "surrender on the installment
p la n ."224
Function of the pact.— By the time the North Atlantic 
Treaty reached the Senate floor, the differences of opinion 
on the measure were more a matter of procedure than of 
fundamentals. The goals had been agreed upon in the debate 
over the Marshall Plan and in the year of discussion over 
the pact. Tandenberg's speech reflects these attitudes.
The basic premises in his address were the same as those he 
had used in defending the European Recovery Program. The 
Soviet Union threatened Western Europe. In the name of 
American security, both economic and military measures had 
to be taken to check the Communists. Controversies arose 
over the extent to which America should become involved, the 
circumstances under which the use of troops could be employed 
in foreign lands, and the fear that the program might drain 
the American economy. Vandenberg, therefore, devoted most 
of his time to a discussion of these issues.
^^4 b i d . . p. 8891.
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As previously stated, the major function of the pact, 
according to Vandenberg, was to force a peaceful restoration 
of the balance of power. He made a very candid analysis of 
this issue. He argued that the Atlantic Community would 
bring overwhelming power to resist the Soviet Union. This 
would demonstrate to Russia that peaceful retreat would be 
preferable to military defeat. Vandenberg made it evident 
that the center of this great show of strength was to be 
the American possession of atomic energy along with the 
economic and military restoration of Western Europe. Al­
though more brilliantly clothed, such a combination in 
essence was little more than power politics in response 
to the challenge presented by power politics- of Russia.
The strategy and force of the organization was designed 
to meet and defeat an invasion of Western Europe by an 
aggressive enemy. He hoped that this would force the enemy 
into a position of possible retreat— the extent to which 
Vandenberg never specified. Certainly it was upon this 
issue that the American people would either accept or 
reject the proposition. The Senator argued the core of 
the issue.
In insisting that the pact would bring the fringe 
benefit of an integrated Western Europe, however', 'the 
Senator failed to demonstrate the validity of his thesis.
His fundamental premise that a common heritage of ethical 
vaiues and belief in democracy existed among the countries
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was even  open t o  s e r i o u s  q u e s t io n .  He o m i t t e d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
even  i f  many o f  t h e  p e o p le s  i n  Europe d id  p o s s e s s  a  h ig h  
r e g a r d  f o r  j u s t i c e  and th e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t i e s  o f  man, 
t h e r e  w ere a l s o  many who were Communists and o t h e r s  who 
had  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i th  f a s c i s t  movements. The f a c t  t h a t  
P o r t u g a l  w i th  i t s  d i c t a t o r s h i p  was a member o f  t h e  p a c t  
te n d e d  to  d e s t r o y  t h e  image t h a t  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  s h a re d  ‘ 
m u tu a l  d e m o c ra t ic  i d e a l s  and r e s p e c t  f o r  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ’s 
r o l e  i n  s o c i e t y .  I t  i s  th u s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  he  tu r n e d  
t o  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  to  d i s c u s s  th e  l o n g - r a n g e  g o a l  o f  th e  
p a c t .  I t  was much e a s i e r  to  show t h a t  t h e s e  p e o p le  m ight 
d e v e lo p  a theme o f  c o o p e ra t io n  f o r  t h e i r  m u tu a l  p r o t e c t i o n  
a g a i n s t  a common enemy th a n  i t  was t o  p ro v e  t h a t  a  t r u e  
community o f  n a t i o n s  would e v o lv e .  At b e s t ,  he c o u ld  o n ly  
c o n te n d  t h a t  t h i s  move coup led  w i th  the  European  R ecovery  
Act c o n s t i t u t e d  a s t e p  i n  t h i s  u l t i m a t e  d i r e c t i o n .
The p a c t  and th e  Monroe D o c t r i n e . — V andenberg’ s 
a t t e m p t  t o  show t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  was an e x te n u a t io n  
o f  th e  Monroe D o c t r in e  o f f e r s  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  th e  m anner i n  
w hich  he a t t e m p te d  t o  j u s t i f y  h i s  s h i f t  from  i s o l a t i o n i s m  
t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m .  He a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  p a c t  was a t  l e a s t  
w i t h i n  t h e  s p i r i t  of p a s t  American t r a d i t i o n s .  I t  w as, 
p e r h a p s ,  i r o n i c a l  t h a t  i n  1941, he opposed  L end-L ease  as  
a  c o l l e c t i v e  m easure  a g a i n s t  H i t l e r  on th e  g rounds t h a t  
i t  v i o l a t e d  th e  Am erican t r a d i t i o n  o f  a v o id in g  f o r e i g n  
e n ta n g le m e n ts .  Now, o n ly  e i g h t  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  he lo o k e d  upon
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America’s attempts at collective security as an extension 
of the Monroe Doctrine. But Vandenberg could not deny that 
the pact marked an innovation in United States Foreign Policy. 
He was forced to admit that the move meant the United States 
would participate in a permanent alliance with nations across 
the ocean, whereas, America had attempted to avoid such 
commitments in the past. ’’Times have changed,” he insisted. 
His rationale for the turn in American policy was thus geared 
to the concept that different conditions demand new criteria 
as a basis of problem solving. ”¥e might compare,” he said, 
’’old-fashioned muskets with new-fashioned b o m b s .”^25 America 
must meet twentieth century problems with new solutions.
The immediate solution, in his mind, called for alliances.
In his efforts to show that the Atlantic Treaty was 
simply another Monroe Doctrine, he failed to note signifi­
cant differences. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, was a 
unilateral declaration— not a treaty. The United States was 
free to modify the doctrine without the consent of other 
powers. The United States, in fact, was free to withdraw at 
any time and was left completely free to judge the merits of 
each situation without consultation with others. The Atlantic 
Pact imposed an obligation to go to the defense of member 
nations in case an armed attack occurred. Such obligation 
was binding for twenty years. The Monroe Doctrine
225ib id . . p. 8892.
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imposed no such obligation and set no time limit. He could 
not demonstrate (and this was a crucial issue in the minds 
of the American p e o p l e t h a t  the treaty would not obli­
gate the United States to go to the defense of any member 
nation whether the other members did so or not.
The military means.— It can be argued that the Senator 
was trying to make a distinction without a difference in 
insisting that a vote for the pact did not necessarily commit 
the country to support its principles with military means.
Logic does not support his position. The pact was basically 
a military pact.^Z? it is doubtful that the pact could be 
perfected without military support. The pact, at least, 
implied an obligation to fight in case of attack.
It is open to question whether Vandenberg*s position 
on the military assistance aspect was defensible. It was 
possible that the military implementation could get the 
Atlantic Community into the very difficulty it was trying 
to avoid. Many thorny problems were involved in implementation. 
What would a defense which would protect Western Europe from 
invasion by Russia involve? The Soviet Union was believed 
to have in 1949 about 4,000,000 men in uniform, including 
1 7 5  to 2 1 0  divisions. The scanty information available 
placed her combat aircraft at 14,000  to 1 6 ,0 0 0  p l a n e s .
226j>oster Rhea Dulles, op. cit., p. 244. 
227Reitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, op. cit., p. 133. 
22SThe New York Times, August 4, 1949, p. 3.
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To create a defense against such force involving all of 
the Atlantic Community would take time and money. Would 
such rearmament delay economic recovery? If recovery were 
hindered, would it invite Communist infiltration? On the 
other hand, America could attempt to send enough troops to 
Europe immediately, thus not calling on her Allies for much 
help. Would the Russians stand by while America moved an 
army into Europe?’
The American people were naturally concerned about 
these problems. At least minimally associated with the pact 
was the possibility that America might be making a pledge 
she might not wish to keep. Vandenberg, perhaps, owed it 
to his audience to include a consideration of these questions. 
A discussion of the implications involved in the pact might 
have avoided a mistaken notion in the minds of many Americans 
that all the pact involved was a promise by Americans that 
any Russian aggression would be met by American force. These 
problems later proved to be of such significance that one 
historian has concluded that the difficulties in providing 
military assistance "might have dragged on interminably, if 
the Soviet Union had not tested its first atom bomb in 
September, 1949,” adding that "even with this stimulus," 
the program "did not become effectively operational until 
early 1951.”^^^
^^^R eitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, op. c i t . , p. 134.
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The pact and the United Nations.— Neither was the 
Senator’s attempt to connect the program with the United 
Nations very satisfactory. He must have recognized that 
merely repeating, "This treaty does not affect in any way 
the obligation under the charter of the parties which are 
members of the United Nations,"230 could not hide reality. 
America’s line of defense was shifting away from that body. 
The mere fact that Vandenberg apparently believed he could 
justify this shift with a few scattered comments about the 
spirit of the Pact and its relationship to the Charter 
would indicate that the American people by 1949 had relegated 
the Charter to a place of secondary importance. The Senator 
felt little compulsion to justify this shift. His brief 
remarks on the subject appear to have been directed to those 
nations in the United Nations which might look upon the 
Atlantic Pact as further dividing the peoples of the world 
into the "East" and the "West." In view of the formation of 
the neutral bloc in the United Nations, which followed the 
creation of the Atlantic Community, the Senator should have 
been more concerned with this group.
F i n a l l y ,  Vandenberg p a s s e d  o v e r  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
su c h  a p la n  a s  NATO m igh t l e a d  to  t h e  war i t s  s u p p o r t e r s  
w ere  t r y i n g  t o  p r e v e n t .  Or s t a t e d  a n o th e r  way, one can
230Record, S ls t  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  1949, ICV, Part
7 , 8896.
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p o n d e r  t h e  q u e s t io n  of w hether t h i s  c o u rs e  o f  a c t i o n  was 
th e  b e s t  p o s s ib l e  s t r a t e g y  f o r  America t o  t a k e  a g a in s t  th e  
R u s s ia n s .  Would su c h  a  p o l i c y  a c t u a l l y  have  k e p t  R u ss ia ,  
i f  she had  so d e s i r e d ,  from  in v a d in g  Europe? Was America 
p r e p a r e d  t o  b u i l d  an army in  Europe b i g  enough to  s to p  t h i s  
t h r e a t ?  To th e s e  q u e s t i o n s ,  Vandenberg gave no a n sw e rs .
I n  f a c t ,  he n e v e r  r a i s e d  th e  i s s u e s .
With h i s  sp e ec h  on th e  N orth  A t l a n t i c  P a c t ,  Vandenberg 
s u p p o r t  o f  c o n ta in m e n t  p o l i c i e s  e n te r e d  a  t h i r d  s t a g e .  His 
r a t i o n a l e  f o r  th e  M a r s h a l l  P lan  was b a se d  on the  b e l i e f  t h a t  
economic a id  w ould  r e n d e r  the  W estern  World l e s s  v u ln e r a b le  
t o  i n f i l t r a t i o n .  The N orth  A t l a n t i c  T re a ty  O rg a n iz a t io n  added 
a  new d im en s io n . He hoped t h i s  new r e g i o n a l  a l l i a n c e  would 
e n a b le  t h e  f r e e  w o r ld  t o  f a c e  th e  S o v ie t  b lo c  from  " p o s i t i o n s  
o f  s t r e n g t h "  o b v io u s ly  d e s ig n e d  to  make th e  Communists a d ju s t  
t o  W estern  p o l i c y .
The D efense  o f  Containm ent
T his c h a p te r  a t t e m p ts  t o  d e s c r ib e  V andenberg^s 
r a t i o n a l e  f o r  p o l i c i e s  t o  cope w i th  t h e  prob lem  o f  Am erican- 
S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s .  H is p u b l ic  a d d re s s e s  be tw een  th e  r a t i f i ­
c a t i o n  o f  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  C h a r te r  and th e  a d o p t io n  o f  
t h e  N orth  A t l a n t i c  T r e a ty  i n d i c a t e  an a t t i t u d e  s h i f t  from 
f a i t h  i n  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  a s  A m erica’ s b e s t  hope f o r  peace 
an d  s e c u r i t y  t o  t h a t  o f  S o v ie t  co n ta in m en t  th ro u g h  r e g i o n a l  
a l l i a n c e s .
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The Pattern of the Speeches 
The shift of ideas.— Vandenberg was one of the first 
in official circles to call openly for a firmer policy in 
dealing with the Communists. In both the ''What is Russia 
Up To Now?” speech in 1946, and the Cleveland Forum Address 
in 1947, he conceived of stiffen opposition to the Russians 
in political negotiations. That was the design of his con­
tainment policy in its early stages.
Although he had not yet constructed a new approach, 
by early 1947, he was willing to follow the administration's 
leadership beyond the "get-tough" policy at the conference 
table. He agreed to overt acts designed to develop positions 
of strength in the non-Communist world. The first move came 
in his support of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. 
His rationale for supporting this phase of containment 
evolved from his concept of a bipolar world. He concluded 
that the United States must have help in the struggle. The 
new containment policy called for extensive economic aid 
programs to nations facing the threat of Communist infil­
tration. This was containment in its second stage.
While economic aid started the European nations'-on 
the road to recovery, it did not provide military defense 
from the Soviet threat. Containment was containment in all 
forms decided Vandenberg. He initiated a Senate Resolution 
which paved the way for the administration to explore a
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defense arrangement with the North Atlantic countries. 
Yandenberg gave full support to the new treaty on the 
rationale that it would restore the balance of power 
between Russia and the United States by means short of 
war. This was containment in its third stage.
In the "get-tough" stages of containment, Yandenberg 
moved slowly ahead of public attitudes. The American people 
had not, in 1 9 4 6 ,  lost faith in the Charter of the United 
Nations to keep the peace. But by the time of the economic 
and military aid programs, Yandenberg and public, sentiment 
were in accord. By 1 9 4 7 ,  Yandenberg and the public were 
subscribing to the philosophy of containment as expressed 
by George Kennan. The idea behind the concept was to "force 
upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and 
circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, 
and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually 
find their outlet either in the breakup or the gradual 
mellowing of Soviet p o w e r ."%31 The Michigan Senator must 
have recognized the possible consequence of such amove.
At its best, the policy meant a permanent display of 
strength around the Communist world. At its worst, it 
could mean an arms race ending in war. Why did Yandenberg 
support such a risky proposal? The answer probably lies in
23lKennan, op. c i t . ,  p. 127.
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an  e x a m in a t io n  o f  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  c o n f r o n t in g  him. H is 
sp e e c h e s  i n d i c a t e  why he made th e  c h o ic e  f o r  c o n ta in m e n t.
Yandenberg ■'could have called for a return to isola­
tionism. Since the United Nations had failed to prevent an 
arms race, the Senator could have aruged that collective 
security had failed. But his speeches show that he faced 
the facts of life. His diplomatic relations with the 
Russians and a full awareness of the atomic era convinced 
him that isolationism was an impossibility. In all of his 
major foreign policy addresses after 1943, the Senator 
insisted that "obviously” America was a world power and must 
act as one. The only question was whether she wished to act 
as a leader or a follower.
Am erica a l s o  fa c e d  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  of waging a war 
o f  a n n i h i l a t i o n ,  a g a i n s t  th e  enemy. Such a  p o l i c y  could  have 
b een  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  th e  name o f  l i b e r a t i o n ,  While t h e  con­
t a in m e n t  p o l i c y  was a p p a r e n t ly  d e s ig n e d  t o  h o ld  the  l i n e  
a g a i n s t  t h e  R u s s ia n s ,  l i b e r a t i o n  would have a t te m p te d  t o  
s u p p r e s s  t h e  Communist movement w hereve r  i t  e x i s t e d .  The 
p o l i c y  o f  l i b e r a t i o n  would have m eant t h a t  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  
i n t e n d e d  to  f r e e  t h e  Communist e n s la v e d  p e o p le s  th ro u g h o u t  
t h e  w o r ld .  T h is  ty p e  o f  s t r u g g l e  would have in v o lv e d  w hat­
e v e r  m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  means t h e  U n ited  S t a t e s  and h e r  
A l l i e s  c o u ld  p r o c u r e .  One n o t a b l e  exponen t o f t h i s  p o l i c y — 
Jam es Burnham— arg u ed  t h a t  l i b e r a t i o n  would have had a  b e t t e r  
chance  o f  a v e r t i n g  war b e ca u se  i t  th re w  th e  " S o v ie t  Empire
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on the defensive,” adding that "only the offensive can 
win.”232
S e n a to r  Yandenberg r e f u s e d  th e  l i b e r a t i o n  p o l i c y .
His speeches from 1937 to 1949 were filled with hatred of 
war. His view of the postwar world was more realistic than 
Burnham ̂ s. Even if Yandenberg admitted that preventive war 
or any other attempt at liberation might shorten the struggle, 
he recognized that conflict would still continue among nations. 
He was looking for a means which would enable America to 
peacefully negotiate the settlement of such disputes rather 
than create new ones. He also believed that any deliberate 
attempt at liberation would lead to full-scale war. He had 
fought that disease all of his public life. He sincerely 
believed that if the Soviet Union were faced with the alter­
native of surrender or annihilation, she would fight to the 
end. The Senator had no illusions about the Soviet Union 
being afraid to fight.. He rejected the possibility of free­
ing captive peoples with a policy which might destroy both 
the Communists and the free world.
N e i th e r  cou ld  Yandenberg j o i n  t h e  movement o f th o s e  
who more or l e s s  chose t o  ig n o r e  th e  c o n f l i c t  between t h e  
E a s t  and W est, o r  th o s e  who c a l l e d  f o r  a u n i v e r s a l  s o c i e t y  
o r  w o r ld  gov ernm en t. I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h e  i d e a  t h a t
232jajnes Burnham, C ontainm ent o r  L ib e r a t i o n  (New 
York; The Jo h n  Day Company, 1 9 5 2 ) ,  p .  242.
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America sh o u ld  s u r r e n d e r  her s o v e r e ig n ty  t o  a s u p e r s t a t e  
rem ained  u n th in k a b le  t o  th e  M ichigan S e n a to r .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
he re c o g n iz e d  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  i s  th e  a r t  o f  th e  
p o s s i b l e .  Even i f  he a d m i t te d  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n a rch y  
a long  w i th  arms r a c e s  and w ars were u n d e s i r a b l e ,  he  r e c o g n iz e d  
t h a t  the m a jo r  powers were n o t  i n  th e  mood t o  e s t a b l i s h  a 
w orld  governm ent. The M ichigan S e n a to r  knew h i s  h i s t o r y .
He r e c a l l e d  t h a t  i t  to o k  the  U n ited  S t a t e s  over e i g h t  y e a r s  
t o  com plete  a f e d e r a t i o n  in  a  s i t u a t i o n  w here th e  s t a t e s  
were c lo s e  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y ,  c u l t u r a l l y ,  and  i d e o l o g i c a l l y .
The Communist c h a l le n g e  was r e a l .  I t  m igh t t a k e  decades  
t o  f i n d  an sw ers  t o  th e  problem s t h a t  would c o n f ro n t  th o s e  
who would a t t e m p t  to  f o rm u la te  a w o rld  gov ernm en t. In  th e  
m eantim e, th e  S o v ie t  governm ent was ex p an d in g  i n t o  every_ 
c o u n try  w i t h i n  i t s . r e a c h .  America needed  an im m ediate  
answ er t o  a p r e s s i n g  p rob lem . Vandenberg tu r n e d  w i th  h i s  
co u n try  t o  c o n ta in m e n t .
Y andenberg^s c o n ta in m e n t . — The m ain  l i n e  o f  a c t i o n  
e n v is io n e d  by Vandenberg was to  c o n ta in  th e  Communists by 
a c o a l i t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s t a t e s  who would  a c t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  
e f f o r t .  He hoped t h a t  th e  economic and m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  
programs would b u i l d  up  a  W estern World t h a t  would b a la n c e  
th e  S o v ie t  U nion . From t h i s ,  he hoped w ould  come a more 
f a v o r a b le  c l im a te  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  He d i d  no t a n t i c i p a t e  
a r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  th e  w a r - t im e  u n a n im ity  betw een  th e  E a s t  and 
th e  W est. N e i th e r  d id  he e x p e c t  t h e  com ple te  e x te r m in a t io n
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of problems; but he did hope for the control of them.
Yandenbergsolution faced facts as they existed 
in the late 1940 ŝ. Both a show of power and a willingness 
to compromise were needed in dealing with the Soviet Union. 
America's hope for peace and justice was not abandoned.
But the Soviet threat was imminent. The Senator decided 
that containment was the price America would have to pay 
for her way of life. The programs for which he argued were 
the first of many designed to meet the challenge. There is 
no evidence that he thought these policies would erase the 
problem. His hope was that over the long run the Soviet 
Union would be forced to adjust to the new American concept.
The Pattern of Political Leadership
As America faced up to the task of meeting the Soviet 
threat, it was necessary to adapt to the situation with new 
programs for action. This meant that the administration had 
to re-evaluate its policies in dealing with the Soviet Union 
and propose changes consistent with the fact of a bipolar 
world. Congress had to face the evaluation of these pro­
grams clearly and quickly. Failure of the two branches of 
government to reach a consensus on the best means of dealing 
with the situation could have meant long delays in which 
much of the free world could__have been absorbed by Communist 
infiltration. From 194# to 1949, Yandenberg emerged as the 
connective between the two branches and as the leader for 
bipartisan efforts in dealing with the problem.
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The m e d ia to r »— V andenberg’ s sp eech es  i n d i c a t e  th e  
n a tu r e  o f  th e  r o l e  he s e t  f o r  h im s e l f .  He became the m edi­
a t o r  betw een t h e  R e p u b lic a n  P a r ty  and t h e  S t a t e  D epartm en t. 
He t r i e d  t o  show what b o th  g ro u p s  would a c c e p t  and th e  
comprom ises t h a t  were e s s e n t i a l  i n  b r i n g in g  t h e  two t o g e t h e r .  
I n  h i s  a d d re s s  b e f o r e  th e  C le v e la n d  Forum, f o r  exam ple , he 
showed th e  e x t e n t  t o  w hich  th e  R e p u b l ic a n  Congress would go 
to  s u p p o r t  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  b u t  he e x p re s s e d  a w arn ing  
t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  on t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  b i p a r t i s a n  c o n s u l t a ­
t i o n  in  p o l i c y  m aking . Such c o n s u l t a t i o n  was a  m inim al 
e s s e n t i a l  to  C o n g re s s io n a l  c o o p e r a t io n  and  a u n i t e d  f r o n t .
The same can be s a i d  o f  th e  M a r s h a l l  P la n  a d d re s s .  In  t h i s  
s p e e c h ,  he s t r e s s e d  th e  c o n c e s s io n s  t h a t  had been  g ra n te d  
by  b o th  th e  R e p u b lic a n  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  th e  C ongress and by t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  making t h e  b i l l  a  r e a l i t y .  Vandenberg, 
o f  c o u r s e ,  had been  a c t i v e  b e h in d  th e  sc e n e s  i n  b r in g in g  
a b o u t  t h e s e  com prom ises , b u t  he u se d  th e  o c c a s io n  o f  th e  
sp e ec h  to  p r e s e n t  t h e  c o n c e s s io n s  a s  means o f  p e r s u a s io n .
Vandenberg a l s o  became m e d ia to r  be tw een  th o se  o f  
b o th  p a r t i e s  who advanced ex trem e p o s i t i o n s  i n  d e a l in g  w i th  
t h e  " c o ld  w a r ."  He fo u g h t  h i s  way be tw een  th o s e  who would 
ap p ea se  and th o s e  who would l i b e r a t e ,  be tw een  th o se  who 
w ould  have America w ith d raw  from  th e  s t r u g g l e  and th o s e  
who w an ted  the  f u l l  f o r c e  o f  A m erica ’s m igh t p la c e d  in  
t h e  w a r ,  betw een th o s e  who w ould  n e g o t i a t e  from p o s i t i o n s  
o f  t o t a l  d isa rm am en t,  and th o s e  who would n e g o t i a t e  
from  p o s i t i o n s  o f  w a r - t im e  s t r e n g t h .  Vandenberg u s u a l l y
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spoke o u t  f o r  th e  m iddle  g ro u p . He c a l l e d  f o r  a " g e t - to u g h "  
p o l i c y  i n  p o l i t i c a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h a t  would n e i t h e r  appease  
n o r  i n s u l t ,  one t h a t  would c o n t in u e  to  s u p p o r t  th e  U n ited  
N a tio n s  b u t  one t h a t  r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  th e  w a r- t im e  a l l i a n c e  
had become a m yth. When t h i s  p roved  in a d e q u a te ,  he c a l l e d  
f o r  economic and m i l i t a r y  a i d  w hich  p la c e d  American f o r c e  
b e h in d  American g o a l s ,  b u t  he c a l l e d  f o r  r e s t r a i n e d  p o l i c i e s  
i n  the  u se  o f  t h e s e  r e s o u r c e s .  He w ould n o t  approve o f  the  
u se  of A m erica ’ s m ight f o r  l i b e r a t i o n ,  b u t  he approved  o f  
i t s  use  f o r  t o t a l  c o n ta in m e n t .  As a  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r  he 
u sed  th e  p u b l ic  p la t fo r m  to  show t h a t  t h i s  was th e  o n ly  
a c c e p ta b le  a l t e r n a t i v e .
The b i p a r t i s a n  v o i c e . — F i n a l l y ,  Vandenberg assumed 
th e  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  v e r b a l i z i n g  f o r  th e  w o rld  A m erica’ s u n i t e d  
f r o n t  b eh in d  c o n ta in m e n t .  In  h i s  m ind, i t  was e s p e c i a l l y  
im p o r ta n t  t l i a t  th e  S o v ie t s  have no doub t b u t  t h a t  th e  
R ep u b lican  P a r t y  and  th e  C ongress  were b e h in d  th e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s 
con ta in m en t p rog ram . He se n se d  the  n e c e s s i t y  o f  l e t t i n g  
b o th  th e  Communists and Am erican A l l i e s  know t h a t  a change 
o f  p a r t i e s ,  e i t h e r  i n  t h e  W hite  House o r  C o n g re ss ,  would no t 
change A m erica’ s ap p ro ach  t o  th e  Communist menace. T h is  
meant t h a t  he m u s t ,  a t  th e  same t im e ,  s p e l l  o u t  what c o n s t i ­
t u t e d  a b i p a r t i s a n  p o l i c y .  Through h i s  s p e e c h e s ,  as  one 
means, he l e t  t h e  P r e s id e n t  know t h a t  th e  o p p o s i t io n  Congress 
ex p e c te d  t o  be i n  on p o l i c y  f o r m a t io n ;  o th e r w is e ,  i t  cou ld  
n o t  be e x p e c te d  i n  e v e ry  c a se  to  approve  th e  p o l ic y  a f t e r  i t
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was delivered. He wanted him to know that there were dif­
ferences in points of view on means and that these must be 
ironed out in the formation period. He let the Republican 
Party know that it could either follow through on the pro­
grams that were decided upon in bipartisan efforts, or run 
the risk of weakening America's position.
In short, Vandenberg provided much of the initiative 
for the formation of a total policy of containment from 1946 
to 1949. His speeches show that he viewed his role as that 
of compromiser and adjuster. Once he found the position 
upon which the major contending forces could agree, he 
verbalized the concessions that he had helped to formulate 
as means of persuasion.
CHAPTER YI 
CONCLUSION
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
I n  the  fo re g o in g  c h a p t e r s  s e l e c t e d  sp e ec h es  by 
S e n a to r  A r th u r  H. Yandenberg have  been  exam ined i n  o r d e r  
t o  d e s c r ib e  h i s  chan g ing  v iew s o f  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
be tw een  1937 and 1949, and to  d e s c r i b e  h i s  " p o l i t i c a l  
r o l e "  i n  s e c u r in g  a c c e p ta n c e  f o r  p o l i c i e s  to  im plem ent 
t h e s e  v iew s. The "ch a n g in g  v iew s"  so  d e s c r ib e d  were 
somewhat a r b i t r a r i l y  g rouped  u n d e r  th e  l a b e l s  o f  i s o l a ­
t i o n i s m ,  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y ,  and c o n ta in m e n t .  The 
p re su m p tio n  u n d e r ly in g  t h i s  t h r e e - p a r t  d i v i s i o n  was t h a t  
V andenberg’s r a t i o n a l e  f o r  each, o f  t h e s e  p o s i t i o n s  i s  
d i s t i n c t i v e ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  d i s c e r n i b l e  p h a se s  i n  
th e  o v e r - a l l  change i n  h i s  t h in k i n g  d u r in g  t h i s  tw e lv e -  
y e a r  p e r i o d .  Having c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e s e  t h r e e  p h a se s  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  and i n  c h r o n o l o g i c a l  se q u en c e ,  i t  i s  t h e  
p u rp o se  of t h i s  c h a p te r  t o  d i s c u s s  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  
i d e a s  w hich  ru n  th ro u g h  t h e  e n t i r e  p e r i o d ,  t o  d e s c r i b e  
th e  t o t a l  p ro c e s s  o f  ch ang e .
The fo r e g o in g  e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  p h a s e s ,  
how ever, has  p roduced  th e  f o l lo w in g  h y p o th e s i s :  w h i le  t h e
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chan ges  i n  V andenberg*s p o s i t i o n  th ro u g h o u t  th e s e  tw e lv e  
y e a r s  w ere s i n c e r e  and d e e p - ru n n in g ,  he  d id  n o t  g r e a t l y  
a l t e r  t h e  fu n d am e n ta l  p re m ise s  upon w hich  t h e s e  c h an g in g  
b e l i e f s  r e s t e d .  P u t d i f f e r e n t l y ,  he c a r r i e d  th ro u g h  t h i s  
e n t i r e  p e r i o d  a  s e t  o f  u l t i m a t e  o b j e c t i v e s  tow ard  th e  a c h ie v e ­
ment o f  w hich  he u n v a ry in g ly  aimed a l l  o f  h i s  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  
American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  "The "ch an g es"  i n  h i s  b e l i e f s ,  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  h i s  p o l i c y  p r o p o s a l s  d u r in g  t h i s  p e r io d ,  
w ere  i n  th e  means by w hich  he th o u g h t  America cou ld  b e s t  
p u r s u e  th e  f i x e d  o b j e c t i v e s .  He v a r i e d  t h e s e  "means" a s  
t h e  Am erican p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  changed and a s  t h e  c ircu m ­
s t a n c e s  o f  th e  w o r ld  a ro u n d  him changed.
T h is  c o n c lu d in g  c h a p t e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w i l l  b e g in  by  
exam in ing  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  i d e a s  i n  th e  e le v e n  sp eech es  a s  
(1 )  a s e t  o f  u l t i m a t e  and  c o n s ta n t  g o a l s ,  and (2) a s e t  o f  
ch an g in g  means t o  a c h ie v e  them.
The s e c o n d ,  and somewhat se co n d a ry  pu rpo se  of t h i s  
t h e s i s  was to  d e s c r ib e  th e  " p o l i t i c a l  r o l e "  of Vandenberg 
i n  s e e k in g  t o  g a in  a c c e p ta n c e  f o r  t h e s e  changing  p o l i c i e s .  
O b v io u s ly ,  t h e r e  w ere  changes d u r in g  t h e s e  y e a r s  i n  V andenberg’ s 
r o l e  i n  t h e  S e n a te ,  i n  th e  F e d e ra l  gov ernm en t, and i n  t h e  
e y e s  o f  t h e  n a t i o n  and th e  w o r ld .  Some o f  t h e s e  v a r i a t i o n s  
i n  " r o l e "  to o k  p la c e  c o n c u r r e n t l y  w i th  th e  s h i f t s  i n  a t t i t u d e  
on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d e s c r i b e d  above, b u t  o t h e r s  w ere  p roduced  
by t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  o th e r  v a r i a b l e s .  T h is  c h a p t e r  w i l l  be 
c lo s e d  by a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  V andenberg’ s  chang ing  p o l i t i c a l
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role throughout the period. In both of these concluding 
sections the effort will be to indicate the fashion in 
ch these conclusions are deducible from his speeches.
The Pattern of Ideas 
An examination of Tandenberg's speeches has revealed 
that he subscribed to three broad foreign policy concepts 
from 1937 to 1949: neutrality, collective security, and
Soviet containment. It was discovered that these policies 
proved to be the means through which he hoped to achieve a 
constant set of four goals. Although "means” and "goals" 
are not wholly separable, an effort is made here, neverthe­
less, to describe the two processes apart from each other.^
Ultimate Goals of Foreign Policy^
Constant pursuit of the national interest.— In 
Vandenberg’s mind, the single most important factor in the 
formation of foreign policy was the concept of national 
interest. Throughout his public life, national security 
and national interest were synonymous to him. America 
should engage in those foreign policy activities which.
^In a "Dewey” view, a change in "means" inevitably 
alters "goals" and this is true of Vandenberg’s ideas, but 
at least it can be argued that in this twelve-year period 
his goals shifted in nature much less than did his means.
^In general, these goals are discussed in the rank 
order of their priority in Vandenberg’s mind. Very often 
he seemed forced to choose between two policies, each of 
which pursued a different one of his goals; his choice was 
to rank order the goals and make the choice.
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first of all, protected her national interest. The wisdom 
of this conclusion was never questioned. ”I am not so 
impractical as to expect any country to act on any final 
motive other than self-interest,"3 Vandenberg told the 
nation on January 10, 1945.
The national interest in his mind was not a static 
phenomenon. His so-called dramatic switch from isolationism 
to internationalism was not a vision like that which came 
to Paul on the Damascus road. The origin of the change %as
his realization that the national interest had changed. He 
made the change from isolationism to internationalism when 
his concept of the national interest was altered. Americans 
international interests became the supreme national interest 
to such an extent that he was willing to risk war for his 
country. Pearl Harbor appeared to awaken in him a conviction 
that the United States had interests in the rest of the world. 
From that point on, he was willing to engage in alliances, 
in peace and war, if necessary to preserve the national 
security.
Senator Vandenberg always placed great faith in the 
ability of the executive and Congressional leaders to sit 
down together and decide what the national interest should 
be at any given moment. For this reason, the clamor of 
competing interests never seemed to disturb him. In his
^U. S. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st S e s s . ,
1945, C II, Part 1 , 166.
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sp e e c h e s ,  b o th  b e fo r e  and  a f t e r  h i s  ^ c o n v e r s i o n ,” he was 
alw ays v e ry  c a r e f u l  t o  p o i n t  ou t  t h e s e  c o n f l i c t i n g  c la im s .
But he u s u a l l y  s p e n t  t h e  rem a in d e r  o f  h i s  speech  t r y i n g  t o  
show i n  a  r a t i o n a l  manner t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  w ould 
be b e s t  s e rv e d  by t h e  d i r e c t i o n  i n  which he hoped h i s  a u d i ­
ence would move. I n  a l l  o f  h i s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y , s p e e c h e s ,  
Yandenberg t r i e d  t o  show t h a t  n a t i o n a l  s u r v i v a l  was in v o lv e d  
w ith  each  p r o p o s a l .  He d id  n o t ,  how ever, c o n ce iv e  o f  
s u r v i v a l  i n  a l i m i t e d  s e n s e .  He was concerned  w i th  more 
th a n  p h y s i c a l  s u r v i v a l .  He hoped t o  advance  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  
would r e t a i n  t h e  s o c i a l ,  econom ic, and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
o f  America as he had  come to  know them .
P r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  maximum s o v e r e i g n t y  f o r  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s . —A lthough he o u tg rew  h i s  t h i n k i n g  o f  th e  1930^s 
t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  was f o r e i g n  t o  Am erican i n t e r e s t s ,  
Yandenberg n ev e r  l o s t  h i s  c o n v ic t i o n  t h a t  th e  American 
n a t i o n a l - s t a t e ,  f r e e  o f  o u t s id e  c o n t r o l ,  was th e  main s t a y  
o f  American s e c u r i t y .  He view ed th e  American governm ent 
w ith  i t s  sys tem  o f  ch ecks  and b a l a n c e s ,  the  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
powers c o n c e p t ,  and th e  p r e c a u t i o n s  f o r  th e  s a f e g u a r d in g  o f  
p e r s o n a l  l i b e r t i e s  a s  th e  b e s t  sys tem  o f  governm ent i n  th e  
w o rld .  He p la c e d  g r e a t  f a i t h  i n  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  A m ericans 
t o  u se  t h e  n a t io n ^ s  r e s o u r c e s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h i s  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  
b u t  he was n e v e r  w i l l i n g  t o  s u r r e n d e r  any c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  
use  o f  American power t o  o th e r  p e o p le s .
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I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  -Vandenberg jo in e d  i n  t h e  w r i t i n g  o f  
t r e a t i e s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ag re em e n ts  i n  which the  U n ited  
S t a t e s  assumed p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  o b l i g a t i o n s  tow ard  
o t h e r s .  But he v iew ed a l l  such a r r a n g e m e n ts - a s  n e c e s s a ry  
e x te n s i o n s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y 's  d u ty ,  and a s ' f r e e l y  chosen  by 
t h e  Am erican p e o p le .  He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e y  in  no way 
im p a i re d  Am erican s o v e r e i g n t y .  In  h i s  t h i n k i n g ,  American 
m em bership  i n  th e  U n ited  N a t io n s  and the  North A t l a n t i c  P a c t  
s im p ly  meant t h a t  h i s  c o u n t r y  a c c e p te d  c e r t a i n  g e n e r a l  r u l e s  
and o b l i g a t i o n s  by  w hich i t  a g re e d  t o  conduct f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  
But a t  no t im e  d i d  he view  t h e s e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ag re em e n ts  
a s  an  e x te n s io n  o f  power t o  a n o th e r  n a t i o n  to  e n fo r c e  i t s  
d e c i s i o n s  upon th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  w ith o u t  th e  p r i o r  c o n sen t  
o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y .  He had g r e a t  r e s p e c t  f o r  th e  o b l i g a t i o n s  
a c c e p te d  by a c o u n t r y  en g ag in g  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g re e m e n ts .
But he  b e l i e v e d  th e  o b l i g a t i o n  was a m oral commitment r a t h e r  
th a n  a b in d in g  f o r c e  o f  law .
A tta in m e n t  o f  peace  w i th  j u s t i c e  f o r  a l l  men. — Like 
m ost c i v i l i z e d  men, Vandenberg hoped f o r  p e a c e .  The p a s s io n  
f o r  t h i s  g o a l  was so  s t r o n g ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  i t  may a t  t im e s  
have b l in d e d  him t o  th e  w o r l d ' s  r e a l i t i e s .  But t h e r e  was 
p ro b a b ly  n e v e r  a t im e  vhen  he would n o t  have been  w i l l i n g  
t o  wage war t o  p r o t e c t  h i s  c o u n t r y 's  s e c u r i t y .  When fa c e d  
w i th  th e  c h o ic e  be tw een  w a r ,  a s  a means o f  p r e s e r v in g  th e  
r i g h t s  o f  men, and  p e a c e ,  b a se d  on s u b ju g a t io n ,  he  n e v e r  
h e s i t a t e d  t o  a d v o c a te  w a r .  I t  was j u s t  t h a t  u n t i l  P e a r l
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H arbor he d id  n o t  t h i n k  i t  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  Am erica t o  t a k e  
up arms t o  p r o t e c t  h e r  s e c u r i t y  o r  h e r  r i g h t s .  D e s i r e  f o r  
peace and the  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  b o th  a rg u e d  f o r  i s o l a t i o n i s m .
Vandenberg^s g o a l  o f  peace  w i th  j u s t i c e  was n o t  
l i m i t e d  to  Am erica. He was n e v e r  i n d i f f e r e n t  to  th e  r i g h t s  
o f  o t h e r s .  B efo re  P e a r l  H arb o r ,  how ever, he b e l i e v e d  t h a t  
t h e r e  was l i t t l e  t o  be g a in e d -b y  America j o i n i n g  i n  a  con­
f l i c t  t o  " sav e  dem ocracy ."  He ad h ered  to  th e  n i n e t e e n t h  
c e n tu r y  b e l i e f  t h a t  A m erica ’ s g r e a t e s t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  
democracy was t o  d e m o n s tra te  t h a t  th e  American e x p e r im e n t  
cou ld  be  made t o  w ork. His sw itc h  from  i s o l a t i o n i s m  to  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  was i n  l a r g e  p a r t  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r e a l i ­
z a t io n  t h a t  a  t h r e a t  to  peace and j u s t i c e  anywhere i n  t h e  
w o rld  was a t h r e a t  t o  A m erica’ s p e ac e .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  he 
was co nce rn ed  t h a t  each  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n  be 
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  n a t i o n ’ s t r a d i t i o n a l  d e d i c a t i o n  to  
human freedom  and d i g n i t y  f o r  a l l  p e o p le s .  He lo o k ed  upon 
a s t r i c t  adheren ce  t o  t h i s  d e d ic a t io n  t o  human r i g h t s  a s  
the  prim e f o r c e  b e h in d  A m erica’ s m oral s t r e n g t h  i n  a l l  h e r  
d e a l in g s  w i th  f o r e i g n  powers.
The m a in ten a n ce  o f  a p p r o p r i a t e  check and b a la n c e  i n  
th e  making o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y . —W hile g r a n t i n g  t h a t  th e  
P r e s i d e n t  had f u l l  power to  n e g o t i a t e  w ith  f o r e i g n  g o v e rn ­
m en ts ,  Vandenberg b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w ere i n h e r e n t  d a n g e rs  
i n  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  C ongress to  keep  t i g h t  r e i n s  on th e  
e x e c u t iv e  i n  such  m a t t e r s .  He th o u g h t  C ongress  shou ld  have
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an in f lu e n c e  on th e  p r o c e s s e s  employed by th e  e x e c u t iv e  i n  
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  and s h o u ld  r e t a i n  a c o n s ta n t  v o ic e  i n  t h e  
f i n a l  outcome o f  a l l  d e c i s i o n s .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  h i s  a t t i t u d e  
on t h i s  i s s u e  may have r e f l e c t e d ,  i n  p a r t ,  h i s  o p in io n s  o f  
t h e  men i n  t h e  e x e c u t iv e  c h a i r  w h i le  he s e rv e d  on th e  
American sc e n e .  But i n  l a r g e  m easu re , i t  r e g i s t e r e d  h i s  
f i rm  b e l i e f  t h a t  C ongress  had b o th  an o b l i g a t i o n  and a 
p r e r o g a t iv e  t o  h e lp  d e c id e  and implement i s s u e s  o f  p o l i c y  
i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .
Yandenberg fought the trend to expand the power of 
the executive in  the conduct of foreign  r e la t io n s . His 
attempt, fo r  example, to  amend th e  N eutra lity  Act o f 1937 
to  deny the President any d iscre tio n  in the embargo of goods 
was motivated by a d esire  to  keep th is  authority  in the  
hands o f Congress. His major objection  to Lend-Lease was 
based on a sim ilar r a tio n a le . As he moved beyond i s o la ­
tionism , he came to  recognize th at a wide la titu d e  was 
necessary in  the adm inistration o f such massive programs
as the Marshall Plan, but he s t i l l  sought means of lim it in g
P resid en tia l d iscre tio n  as much as possible-.
F o re ig n  P o l i c y  a s  "Means"
I n  th e  p re c e d in g  S e c t io n ,  fo u r  g e n e r a l  g o a ls  were 
d e s c r ib e d  w hich a p p e a r  t o  run  th ro u g h o u t  Yandenberg*s f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  s p e e c h e s .  T h is  s e c t i o n  w i l l  examine the  p roposed  
means th ro u g h  which he a t t e m p te d  to  implement th e s e  g o a l s .
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I s o l a t i o n i s m  as "m eans. " —When war b ro k e  ou t in  
Europe and A s ia  i n  t h e  1 9 3 0 ’ s ,  Vandenberg co nc lud ed  t h a t  
America c o u ld  and sh o u ld  s t a y  out o f th e  s t r u g g l e .  D is ­
i l l u s i o n e d  by p a s t  American a t t e m p t s  a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,  
he  d e c id e d  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  c o u ld  on ly  s u f f e r  
i f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  became i n v o lv e d .  He conclud ed  t h a t  
i t  was n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  th e  c o u n t r y  to  d e p a r t  from i t s  
t r a d i t i o n a l  a lo o f n e s s  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  He s t r e s s e d  t h a t  
t h e  U n ited  S t a t e s  had ample p r o t e c t i o n  w ith  the t h r e e  th o u ­
sa n d  m ile s  s e p a r a t in g  h e r  from  E urop e , and t h a t  i t  was 
u n th in k a b l e  t h a t  any  E uropean  c o u n try  would e v e r  c h a l le n g e  
A m ericans g u a rd ia n s h ip  o f  th e  W estern  H em isphere . F u r t h e r ­
m ore , i n  h i s  m ind, t h e r e  was no f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t  ( i n c l u d in g  
t h e  human r i g h t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s )  im por­
t a n t  enough f o r  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  to  ru n  th e  r i s k  o f  
in v o lv e m en t  i n  w ar.
He t u r n e d  t o  s t a t u t o r y  n e u t r a l i t y  a s  a means o f 
av o d in g  the  c o n f l i c t .  I n  an e f f o r t  to  a v o id  a l l  p rov o ­
c a t i o n s  t o  w ar, h i s  b ran d  o f n e u t r a l i t y  p rop osed  to  t r e a t  
a l l  o th e r  n a t i o n s  a l i k e .  To i n s u r e  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h i s  
p rogram , he was w i l l i n g  f o r  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  to  s a c r i f i c e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  r i g h t s  upon th e  h ig h  s e a s  and American t r a d e  
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  b e l l i g e r e n t s ,  t o  s a c r i f i c e  a  l e s s e r  f o r  a 
g r e a t e r  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .  • ^ •
With th e  f a l l  o f  s e v e r a l  W estern  European c o u n t r i e s  
i n  1940 , h i s  co n ce p t  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  was d e a l t  a  s e r i o u s  blow.
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A m ericans were t o r n  b e tw een  th e  d e s i r e  to  s t a y  out o f war 
and th e  e q u a l ly  s t r o n g  hope t h a t  t h e  N azis  would be d e f e a t e d .  
V andenberg was f o r c e d  to  d e fe n d  n e u t r a l i t y  i n  t h i s  c o n te x t .
He t r i e d  t o  t i p  t h e  b a la n c e  on th e  i s s u e  o f  w ar by a rg u in g  
t h a t  such p r o p o s a l s  a s  L end-L ease  and s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e  w ould 
in v o lv e  th e  c o u n t r y  i n  th e  s t r u g g l e .  He a d m i t te d ,  how ever, 
t h a t  n e u t r a l i t y  had en d ed . W hile i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  i t  was f a r  
more im p o r ta n t  f o r  A m erica t o  s t a y  o u t  o f  th e  war th a n  i t  was 
f o r  h e r  to  i n s u r e  a B r i t i s h  v i c t o r y ,  he a g re e d  to  lo a n s  and 
g i f t s  t o  th e  A l l i e s .  Even t h i s  l i m i t e d  h e lp ,  how ever, was 
a  d r a s t i c  a l t e r a t i o n  o f  h i s  e a r l i e r  n e u t r a l i t y  p o l i c y .  But 
t h e  th o u g h t  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  rem ained  u n t h in k a b le .  The s a f e  
p a th  f o r  America was s t i l l  t o  rem a in  a t  home and r e l y  upon 
t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  a f f o r d e d  h e r  by g e o g ra p h ic a l  l o c a t i o n .
F or a l l  t h i s ,  i t  s t i l l  can be s t a t e d  t h a t  Y andenberg^s 
r o l e  i n  i s o l a t i o n i s m  d u r in g  th e  19 3 0 ^s was n o t  a d e l i b e r a t e  
a t t e m p t  t o  a b s t a i n  from  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w ith  th e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
w o r ld .  H is  im m edia te  o b j e c t i v e  a s  he spoke f o r  n e u t r a l i t y ,  
a g a i n s t  L end -L ease , a g a i n s t  s e l e c t i v e  s e r v i c e ,  a g a i n s t  embargo 
r e p e a l  was peace  in  h i s  t im e  and s e c u r i t y  f o r  h i s  c o u n t r y .
He was n o t  a  spokesman f o r  i s o l a t i o n  f o r  th e  sak e  o f  i s o l a ­
t i o n i s m .  He was w i l l i n g  f o r  America t o  c o o p e ra te  w i th  
f o r e i g n  n a t i o n s .  H is  sy m p a th ies  w ere  c e r t a i n l y  w i th  th o s e  
s t r u g g l i n g  f o r  human r i ^ t s .  But h i s  d i s i l l u s io n m e n t  o v e r  
t h e  World War I  s e t t l e m e n t  co n v in c ed  him t h a t  any e n c o u n te r  
o f  American dem ocracy i n  f o r e i g n  w ars  would mean t h a t  Am erica 
w ould  come o u t  on t h e  s h o r t  end o f  th e  s t r u g g l e .
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C o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  a s  "m eans. " —When bombs f e l l  on 
P e a r l  H a rb o r ,  Y andenberg^s r a t i o n a l e  fo r  i s o l a t i o n i s m  was 
d e a l t  a  d e a th  b low . The a t t a c k  was c o n v in c in g  p r o o f  t h a t  
Americans g e o g r a p h ic a l  l o c a t i o n  no lo n g e r  p r o t e c t e d  h e r  
from f o r e i g n  q u a r r e l s .  F u r th e rm o re ,  th e  m ass iv e  s t r e n g t h  
t h a t  was n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e f e a t  th e  N az is  co n v in c ed  him t h a t  
America c o u ld  no lo n g e r  p ro v id e  h e r  own s e c u r i t y ;  she needed 
th e  h e lp  of o th e r  n a t i o n s .  H i t l e r ' s  m ass ive  a r r a y  o f  m i l i ­
t a r y  m igh t d e s t r o y e d  any i l l u s i o n s  he m ight have h e ld  t h a t  
th e  European  b a la n c e  of power co u ld  be depended upon i n  
th e  f u t u r e  t o  s a f e g u a rd  th e  W estern H em isphere . W ith th e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  f o u n d a t io n s  of h i s  i s o l a t i o n i s m  s h a t t e r e d ,  he 
tu r n e d  to  new f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  means t o  p r e s e r v e  h i s  c o u n t r y ' s  
s e c u r i t y ,  i t s  freedom  o f  a c t i o n ,  i t s  hopes f o r  peace w i th  
j u s t i c e ,  and i t s  way of l i f e .
Y a n d e n b e rg 's  new concept became t h a t  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y .  By com bin ing  f o r c e s ,  p e a c e - lo v in g  n a t i o n s  co u ld  
d e t e r  a g g r e s s io n .  A m e ric a 's  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  cou ld  be 
p r o t e c t e d  no t by i s o l a t i o n i s m  any l o n g e r ,  b u t  by  e s t a b l i s h ­
in g  a  p re p o n d e ra n c e  of p w e r  t o  be u se d  a g a i n s t  th o s e  who 
broke  th e  p e a c e .  H is new "means" s u b s t i t u t e d  c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y  f o r  s e l f - h e l p .  S h o r t  of any  s a c r i f i c e  o f  American 
s o v e r e ig n ty  and American c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  he was 
w i l l i n g  f o r  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  to  assume m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  
o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  w ere u n th in k a b le  t o  him 
i n  the  1 9 3 0 ' s .
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The U n ite d  N a t io n s  became the  i n s t r u m e n t .  He view ed 
t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a s  o f f e r i n g  America a chance  f o r  s u r v i v a l .
I t  w as, p e rh a p s ,  n a t u r a l  t h a t  he w ould  hope w i th  o th e r  Ameri­
can s  t h a t  t h e  a l l i a n c e  o f  c o u n t r i e s  w hich  d e f e a t e d  Germany 
and Jap an  c o u ld  c o n t in u e  t h a t  same c o o p e r a t io n  to  keep t h e  
p e a c e .  From th e  b e g in n in g ,  how ever, Vandenberg had  m is ­
g iv in g s  ab o u t  t h e  manner i n  which th e  U n ited  N a t io n s  would 
o p e r a te  i n  a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e .  Even b e fo re  t h e  San F r a n c i s c o  
C o n fe re n ce ,  he q u e s t io n e d  S o v ie t  peace  a im s. He was e s p e c i a l l y  
f e a r f u l  t h a t  t h e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n  would be u se d  a s  an i n s t r u ­
ment f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  th e  w o r ld ^ s  s t a t u s  quo . The S e n a to r  was 
n o t  e x a c t l y  happy w i th  th e  w o rld  a s  he  saw i t  a t  t h e  end o f  
World War I I .  But when f a c e d  w ith  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  o r  c o n c e r t e d  e f f o r t  w i th  o t h e r s ,  he was 
w i l l i n g  to  g iv e  th e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n  a  chance to  p rove  i t s e l f .  
At t h e  r i s k  o f  o v e r s t a t e m e n t ,  one m igh t conclude  t h a t  
Vandenberg tu r n e d  t o  t h e  U n ited  N a t io n s  a s  a  means f o r  
_ _ c o l l e c t iv e  s e c u r i t y  on a " t h i s - o r - n o t h i n g "  b a s i s .
Containm ent a s  "m eans. " —Vandenberg was one o f  t h e  
f i r s t  men i n  p u b l ic  l i f e  t o  r e i n t e r p r e t  Am ericans p o s i t i o n  
i n  th e  f a c e  of t h e  S o v i e t  t h r e a t  t h a t  fo l lo w e d  World War I I .
He was q u ic k  to  s e n se  t h a t  w a r - t im e  m i l i t a r y  c o o p e r a t io n  
betw een  th e  two powers d id  n o t  a p p ly  t o  p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s  
a f t e r  t h e  w ar. The U n ite d  S t a t e s  must e i t h e r  adop t a p p e a s e ­
ment i n  t h e  f a c e  of S o v ie t  d ip lo m a t ic  demands o r  c o u n te r  
w i th  p r e s s u r e s  o f  h e r  own.
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Yandenberg led the drive for a new direction. He 
proposed a "get-tough" policy with the Russians. It was 
based on the assumption that the security of the United 
States was threatened by any change of the world's status 
quo in favor of the Soviet Union. He advocated that America 
seek political adjustments through negotiations at the con­
ference table. National interest, the maintenance of peace 
with justice, and national sovereignty were all involved.
By 1 9 4 7, it had become evident that collective security 
through the United Nations could not deal with the "cold war." 
Neither were negotiated adjustments an adequate defense against 
the threats of the Soviet Union. Yandenberg now believed that 
any further Soviet absorption of free nations was a threat 
to the peace and security of the United States. His support 
for the Marshall Plan was based on the assumption that it 
would help to contain the Soviets. European hunger played 
into Soviet hands. It was hoped that American economic aid 
would help raise the standard of living of the peoples of 
Europe. From a self-interest point of view, he hoped it 
would check the Soviet penetration of the free world. It 
was a marked departure in policy for one who eight years 
earlier had refused Lend-Lease to a nation about to be invaded 
by Hitler. His "collective security" in 1941 did hot: go. 
beyond loans and gifts. Redefined in 1947, the concept 
included massive economic aid to a large part of the entire 
free world. It also marked a radical departure from his
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concept of -war-time Lend-Lease. He demanded that Lend- 
Lease end with, the war. But that was before the Senator 
had become a full partner with the White House in the 
formation of policy, and before the world condition became 
almost desperate.
With full awareness that the European Allies lacked 
the military capacity to defend Western Europe, Vandenberg 
expedited a step which made a fundamental change in the 
nature of American international relations. He pushed 
through the Senate a resolution which paved the way for 
American support of a regional alliance of the North 
Atlantic Community. He was willing at this point to risk 
war to prevent Soviet aggression. He was further willing 
for the United States to use her total strength if necessary 
to contain the Soviet Union. America had now assumed not 
only the political leadership of the free world, but in his 
mind, must now assume the role of protector of the anti- 
Soviet nations because of her own self-interest and of a 
desperate hope for peace.
In accepting the containment p o l ic ie s ,  Vandenberg 
took the Communist threat at face va lue. He looked upon the 
- cold  war as a f i ^ t  to  the death struggle between the Soviet  
Union and the United S ta te s . He accepted the r isk s  involved. 
I t  was indeed a ra d ica l departure from h is  i s o la t io n is t  
p o s it io n . In 1939, he opposed embargo repeal on the ra tio n a le  
that i t  might provoke H itle r  in to  an a tta ck . But now he was
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•willing to call the Russian bluff— even at the risk of war. 
His method had become regional collective security— another 
step away from the United Nations as "means” and indeed the 
antithesis of isolationism'.
The Pattern of Political Leadership 
It can be deduced from Yandenberg’s speeches that he 
played at least three major leadership roles from 1937 to 
1949: the role of the compromiser, the expediter, and
ultimately— the "elder statesman."
The compromiser.--Yandenberg looked upon himself as 
the "great compromiser" in the area of international affairs. 
He was forever concerned -with bringing competing interests 
together for purposes of achieving workable legislation and 
for creating the impression of a united front. The changes 
in his leadership resulted from changes in his conception of 
the levels at which compromise should take place and as he 
worked with a variety of different groups.
Yandenberg’s role as compromiser during the 1930’s 
was played at the level of legislative ratification and , 
'among groups opposing the Roosevelt administration's foreign 
policy. During the battle.oyer .neutrality and intervention, 
he was on the outside looking in as far as policy formation 
was concerned. He could only accept, reject, or modify the 
policies that were formulated and presented by the Roosevelt 
administration. He viewed most of the programs that came
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before Congress as measures that would lead his country 
into war. His major problem was how to oppose these measures 
in the face of an America that regarded Britain as the 
country's first line of defense. His strategy evolved in 
attempts to mold the behavior of the various forces that 
stood with him in opposing the President.
<9
His public speeches show the leadership role that 
he assumed. He became the mediator between the opposing ex­
tremes in his own party. He tried to provide a rallying 
point for those non-compromising isolationists, and those 
who were willing to accept a portion of the President's 
leadership. Sensing that the public would frown upon an 
indifference to Europe's plight, he also took on the task 
of giving respectibility to his cause by advocating pro­
posals that would both aid the British and avoid direct 
intervention. Finally, he became the face-saving voice for 
those Democrats who opposed the President in foreign affairs, 
but voted consistently with him on domestic matters. By 
avoiding direct attacks on the President, he tried to keep 
the issues from becoming immersed in party considerations.
After Pearl Harbor, Vandenberg became the mediator 
between the White House and the Republican Party. He shifted 
the level of his compromising from the legislative floor to 
the conference room. Pearl Harbor awakened in Vandenberg 
more than the realization that America could not isolate 
herself from the world. He could foresee that in the postwar
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world America would have to assume a larger share of 
international responsibilities than she had accepted in 
the past. This would mean a more active role for the 
President in foreign affairs. But Vandenberg hoped that 
the Senate would increase its voice in the shaping of 
foreign policies. He could also see that a divided country 
on foreign policy matters could be disasterous to the 
nation's security. Never again could the country split 
down the middle as it had done in dealing with the European 
situation before Pearl Harbor.
At this point, Vandenberg assumed_a new leadership 
role. He sought a means whereby the Republican Party could 
have a voice in foreign policy on the lower levels of ; , 
decision-making so that differences could be ironed out 
before America faced the world with her decision. Inde­
cision and differences could only serve to confuse America's 
Allies and encourage her enemies. This was the beginning 
of Vandenberg's role as bipartisan leader in foreign affairs— : 
the one, perhaps, in which he earned his greatest distinction.
Beginning in 1943, his speeches began to reflect the 
changing pattern of his role as compromiser. He became his 
party's major spokesman for a new order, rushing to put 
the party on public record for collective security before 
the few remaining isolationists could assume the leadership.
He served notice on the administration that help was forth­
coming from the opposition in the shaping of America's postwar
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role, and he assumed the role of major compromiser of 
differences among his party members on what the new policy 
should be.
After the Republicans captured control of Congress 
in 1946, Vandenberg's role as bipartisan leader was extended 
beyond that of party to that of Congressional leader. He 
became mediator between the administration and the entire 
Congress. His position as chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee became the channel of communication 
between the two. In spite of the odds, he suffered no set­
backs in pushing through Congress such significant contain­
ment policies^as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.
^it-was .aĥ  unprècedentéd era in the achievement of a bipar- 
■ tisan :f orëign,. : policy'in thé conduct; of foreign, affairs.
' ■ Vandenberg^s speeches during this period reflect his 
efforts to mediate differences in policy between the White 
House, and the Congress. Hé made maximum use of the fact 
that prolonged consultation between Congressional leaders 
had preceded the actual formation of each major issue. He 
also assumed the task once again of compromising the extreme 
points of view. There were members of both parties who wished 
to face the Soviet threat with appeasement while others 
advocated extreme counterattacks. Tandenberg worked his 
way through a variety of considerations to compromise these 
extreme points of view. The end result was a set of contain­
ment policies vhich committed the full force of Americans
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might against the Soviet threat while at the same time 
preserving the possibility of a negotiated truce in the 
cold war.
The expediter.— With few exceptions, Vandenberg 
served in the role of expediter of foreign policy rather 
than as originator of the ideas behind the policies for 
which he worked. During the 193Ô s he played.dhly a minor 
role in the construction of ideas placed.i n ' o f  
isolationism. He did, however, become a major defender of 
the concept when it came under serious attack. When neu­
trality proved inadequate to meet the demands of a war-torn 
world, he offered, little in its place that could protect 
his country^s^s.ecurity. His major role was that of taking 
■ the-ideas advanced by others and expediting them with a 
high regard for the ethical standards involved in making use 
; Of the ’’available means of persuasion.” In so doing, he 
may have played a role in restraining the President in his 
efforts to help Britain,. Cole notes that "persons close to 
Roosevelt felt the non-interventionists had fought the 
President very nearly to à standstill late in 1941.”^ If 
historians conclude that this was a diplomatic blunder, then 
Vandenberg must share in the blame.
Between 1943 and 1949, Vandenberg earned a distin­
guished place in American history through his handling of
^Wayne S. Cole, America First (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1952), p. 199.
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f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  He a c h ie v e d  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  i n  f o r e i g n  
r e l a t i o n s  d u r in g  a  c r i t i c a l  p e r io d  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s h i s t o r y .
He did not provide many of the concepts, but he helped to 
provide a national consensus that made the final result 
possible. He expedited the compromises that were necessary 
to produce the Connally Resolution in 1943, and the United 
Nations Charter in 1945» With courage, he supported policies 
that helped America enter the postwar world with a united 
front. When the "cold war" erupted he ironed out many of 
.. the.; thorny problems necessary to make the Marshall Plan an 
{ adceptable piece of legislation, and when the administration 
dal a regional arrangement for security, he initiated
a Senate Resolution that paved the road for the North Atlantic 
Pact.
Vandenberg’s speeches, however, show a few instances 
of creativity in the initiation of new ideas or new directions. 
In early 1945, for example, he suspected the Russians of 
sinister designs on the buffer states; he proposed an immedi­
ate postwar alliance that would call the Russian bluff by 
removing her claim that her actions in Poland resulted from 
fears of a rearmed Germany. His insistence that the United 
Nations Charter make provisions for regional arrangements 
foreshadowed America’s entrance into regional collective 
security. In demanding that the General Assembly be given 
a full voice in recommendations for action needed to pre­
serve the peace and security, he may have perceived the
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in s t ru m e n t  t h a t  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  h a s  come to  b e ;  i . e . ,  a  
"town m ee tin g  o f  th e  w o r ld , "  whose g r e a t e s t  i n f l u e n c e  l i e s ,  
a s  V andenberg p r e d i c t e d ,  i n  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  m o b il iz e  a  m oral 
v o ic e  f o r  p e a c e .  F i n a l l y ,  Vandenberg was the  f i r s t  Am erican 
d ip lo m a t  t o  come to  g r i p s  w ith  th e  R u ss ia n  t h r e a t  f o l lo w in g  
t h e  b rea k u p  o f  th e  Big F ive  w a r - t im e  u n a n im ity  and c a l l  f o r  
a  new " g e t - to u g h "  p o l i c y  i n  d e a l in g  w ith  the  new t h r e a t  t o  
A m erica ’ s peace and s e c u r i t y .
The e l d e r  s t a te s m a n . —J u s t i c e  O l iv e r  W endell Holmes-' 
d e s c r ib e d  ya. g r e a t  man a s  " a  s t r a t e g i c  p o in t  i n  t h e ' . c ah^ài'gn: 
o f  h i s t o r y i ; ( ^ d ,  p a r t  . o f  h i s  g r e a t n e s s . c o n s i s t s  i n \ h i s  b e in g  
t h e r e . T h is  can  ;c e r t a i n l y .  - b e sdid:.: w hich
A r th u r  Vandenberg a c h ie v e d  i n  t h e  p d s tw a r  W orld. He b o th  
h e lp e d  t o  c l a r i f y  th e  i s s u e s  o f  h i s  t im e  and p o s s e s s e d  th e  
n e c e s s a r y  judgment and im a g in a t io n  to  a llow  f o r  th e  changes 
t h a t  th e  p la y  o f  e v e n ts  f o r c e d  upon him and t o  a p p r e c i a t e  
th e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  a c t i o n .  But much o f  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  which 
he  e x e r t e d  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d u r in g  th e  1940 ^s e v o lv e d  from 
th e  r e p u t a t i o n  w hich  he e n jo y e d  a s  a keen  o b s e rv e r  an d  f o l lo w e r  
o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  He u t i l i z e d  t o  i t s  f u l l e s t  the  a d v an tag e  
w hich  he g a in e d  from  h a v in g  been  an i s o l a t i o n i s t ;  he n e v e r  
c e a se d  i n  h i s  e f f o r t s  t o  keep  th e  r e s p e c t  o f  t h i s  g ro u p .
At t h e  same t im e ,  he made f u l l  u se  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he  was 
a  r e s p e c t e d  member o f  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t y .  He e a rn e d  t h i s
^Max L e rn e r  ( e d . ) .  The Mind and F a i th  o f  J u s t i c e  
Holmes (B oston : L i t t l e  Brown & C o . ,  1 9 4 3 P* 383*
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r e p u t a t i o n  h o n e s t l y .  Even i n  h i s  w o rs t  moments, Vandenberg 
n e v e r  r e s o r t e d  to  name c a l l i n g  o r  c h a r a c t e r  a s s a s s i n a t i o n .
As a  r e s u l t ,  i t  was e a s y . f o r  th e  R o o se v e l t  and Truman admin­
i s t r a t i o n s  t o  t u r n  t o  him a s  b i p a r t i s a n  l e a d e r .
On th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e s e  e x p e r i e n c e s ,  he emerged as  " e l d e r  
s ta te s m a n "  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  I n  t h i s  r o l e ,  he to o k  up th e  
t a s k  o f  v e r b a l i z i n g  A m erica ’ s f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  A l l i e s  and 
fo e s  a l i k e  were t o l d  t h a t  th e  C ongress  would s u p p o r t  th e  
P r e s i d e n t  i n  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  and t h a t  a  
change e i t h e r  i n  th e  W hite  House o r  i n  th e  C ongress would 
n o t  mean a d r a s t i c  a l t e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  co n d u c t o f  f o r e i g n  
r e l a t i o n s .  Vandenberg t h u s  u se d  b i p a r t i s a n s h i p  a s  a  p e r -  
-:::''suasive d e v ic e  t o  a c h ie v e  a  u n i t e d  f r o n t  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .
As V andenberg’ s coun trym en , b o th  i n  C ong ress  and th e  
: : : a t  l a r g e ,  came to  r e s p e c t  h i s  judgm ent and i n s i g h t s
' i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  h i s  sp e ec h  making to o k  on th e  a i r  o f  th e  
y: ' e l d e r  s ta te s m a n ,  convey in g  th e  need  t o  remove f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s  from p a r t i s a n  p o l i t i c s .  He became i n t e r p r e t e r  o f  
Am erican p o l i c y  a t  home a s  w e l l  a s  a b ro a d .  He u s e d  every  
o p p o r t u n i t y  on t h e  p u b l ic  p la t f o rm  to  speak  w e l l  o f  members 
o f  b o th  p a r t i e s  who were r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  th e  c o n d u c t  o f  
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  He e l e v a t e d  th e  whole to n e  of a l l  d i s ­
c u s s io n s  by s t r e s s i n g  th e  f a c t  t h a t  b o th  p a r t i e s  had  worked 
t o g e t h e r  t o  fo rm u la te  th e  p rop osed  p o l i c y .
Vandenberg u rg e d  A m ericans t o  f a c e  th e  w o r ld  as i t  
a c t u a l l y  was r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  t h e y  would l i k e  f o r  i t  t o  b e .
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In this role, he was attempting to lead and direct the 
American people rather than be guided by them. Ironically, 
he was very critical of President Roosevelt in the 1930’s 
for this same sort of effort. But once in the position of 
bipartisan leader, he seemed to recognize that all the 
information necessary in making a rational decision in 
foreign affairs could not be aired before the world.
Tandenberg as "elder statesman" accepted the role of 
persuading his countrymen to face the realities of inter­
national politics. He warned them that they would have to 
live with threats to their security. His most enduring 
contribution to his country may have been in the-final 
analysis his insistence that Americans face aggression, 
cope with it, sacrifice to meet it, and if necessary elect
war rather than be overcome by it.
«
Summary
An examination of Tandenberg^s speeches shows that 
he worked for the attainment of four broad goals in American 
foreign policy between 1937 and 1949. In all of his policy 
activities, he was in the constant pursuit of the national 
interest, the preservation of maximum sovereignty for the 
United States, the attainment of peace with justice for all 
men, and the maintenance of an appropriate check and balance 
between the executive and Congress in the making of foreign 
policy.
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H is  p ro p o se d  means t o  a t t a i n  t h e s e  g o a ls  may be 
grouped  i n t o  t h r e e  m ajo r d i r e c t i o n s  be tw een  1937 and 1949.
He i n s i s t e d  on a  p o l i c y  o f  s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y  u n t i l  P e a r l  
H arbor d e s t r o y e d  h i s  i l l u s i o n s  about an i s o l a t e d  Am erica. 
A f t e r  war came, h i s  t h i n k i n g  to ok  a t  l e a s t  two m a jo r  s h i f t s .  
H is f a i t h  i n  the  U n ited  N a tio n s  ex p er im e n t  based  on th e  
w a r - t im e  u n a n im ity  was bo rn  in  th e  i d e a l i s m  of w a r .  He 
q u ic k ly  came to  g r i p s  w ith  the  im p o n d e rab le s  i n  w o rld  
p o l i t i c s  and d ropped  any im m ediate  dream o f  one w o r ld .  A 
f u l l  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  p e r i l o u s  in v o lv e m en t w i th  th e  S o v ie t  
Union, how ever, f a i l e d  to  d i r e c t  him back to  i s o l a t i o n i s m .  
With th e  b rea k u p  o f  th e  Grand A l l i a n c e  o f  World War I I ,  he 
t u r n e d  h i s  e f f o r t s  t o  S o v ie t  c o n ta in m e n t ,  a d v o c a t in g  the  
maximum u se  o f  American economic and m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  con­
s i s t e n t  w i th  n a t i o n a l  s a f e t y .
I t  was deduced from V andenberg^s sp e ec h es  t h a t  he 
p la y e d  th e  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e s  o f  "com prom iser” and " e x p e d i te r "  
among com peting  i n t e r e s t s  in  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  The changes 
i n  h i s  l e a d e r s h i p  o c c u r re d  a s  he moved th ro u g h  v a r io u s  
l e v e l s  o f  governm ent a t  which f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  a re  
made, and a s  he worked w i th  a  v a r i e t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  g ro u p s .  
W hile he was n o t  e s s e n t i a l l y  a c r e a t o r  o f new i d e a s ,  he was 
e s p e c i a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  d e s ig n in g  and im p lem en ting  program s 
f o r  a c t i o n .  I n  th e  t w i l i g h t  o f  h i s  c a r e e r ,  he a ssum ed -th e  
r o l e  o f  th e  " e l d e r  s ta te sm a n "  whose jo b  i t  became t o  i n t e r ­
p r e t  Am erican f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  to  h is  countrym en and t o  th e
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w o r ld .  H is  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  t h i s  r o l e  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
n o te d  a f t e r  h i s  r e t i r e m e n t  from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s c e n e .  The 
New York Times c a p tu r e d  t h e  c o n t r a s t ;
W ithou t him th e  R e p u b lic a n s  seem l e a d e r l e s s  
and u n c e r t a i n .  Even th e  Dem ocrats m iss  th e  c l e a r ,  
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  v o ic e  t h a t  r i s e s  above th e  buzz o f  
p a r t y  p o l i t i c s  t o  d e f i n e  American p o l i c y  t o  t h e  
w o r ld .  F o r S e n a to r  V andenberg^s d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  
t h a t  he h a s  g iv e n  l e a d e r s h i p  t o  b o th  p a r t i e s  i n  
t h e  developm ent o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  . . . 6
&The New York T im es, March 24, 1950, p. 24.
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